
Book lLl 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 



y^ 



THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON 
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1912 



THE WEST FLORIDA 
CONTROVERSY, 1798-1813 



A STUDY IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 



BY 



ISAAC JOSLIN COX 

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI 



BALTIMORE 

The Johns Hopkins Press 

1918 



h 



Copyright, 191 8 
By The Johns Hopkins Press 



• - • 



PR -6 1918 



PRESS OF 

THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY 

LANCASTER, PA. 



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TO MY MOTHER 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

The Definition and Delimitation of West 
Florida i 

CHAPTER n 
The Occupation of the Natchez District. ... 32 

CHAPTER HI 
The Louisiana Purchase and the Floridas. . 64 

CHAPTER IV 
The Failure of Monroe's Special Mission. . . 102 

CHAPTER V 
Frontier Problems and Personalities 139 

CHAPTER VI 
The Burr Conspiracy and the Embargo 188 

CHAPTER VII 

American Bickering and French Bargaining 227 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Shadow of the Corsican 266 

CHAPTER IX 

The Movement for Self-Government at 
Baton Rouge 312 

vii 



Viii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER X 
Drifting toward Insurrection 358 

CHAPTER XI 
Baton Rouge — Insurgent and Militant 388 

CHAPTER XII 
Filibustering Operations on the Mobile. . . . 437 

CHAPTER XIII 
American Intervention in West Florida . . . 487 

CHAPTER XIV 
In Defense of Intervention 530 

CHAPTER XV 
Incorporation and Adjustment 572 

CHAPTER XVI 
Mobile and the Aftermath 609 

CHAPTER XVII 
The Conclusion of the Controversy 645 

MAPS 

1. Darby's Map of the State of Louisiana 

facing 1 

2. Map to Illustrate the Acquisition of 

West Florida facing 2 

3. The District of Baton Rouge facing 312 

4. The District of Mobile facing 438 



i/ 



PREFACE 



It is to be hoped that the title, scope, and subject- 
matter of this study will be self-explanatory, and that 
the notes will prove clear and detailed enough to sup- 
ply the place of a formal bibliography. But neither 
text nor notes show definitely my indebtedness to the 
courteous and efficient aid of a number of individuals 
who have assisted in gathering material for the volume 
and in preparing it for the press. To most of these 
persons I can render only a general acknowledgment ; 
of a few I must make special mention. 

No detailed study such as is here attempted would 
be possible were it not for the series of helpful guides 
published during the last ten years by the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington. In addition to these 
printed aids, I have had access to the notes, cards, and 
manuscript reports belonging to the Bureau of His- 
torical Research of that institution, and have been 
furnished with extensive excerpts from these sources, 
and with proof sheets of reports in process of publica- 
tion. For these and many other evidences of helpful 
interest in my work, I wish to express my personal 
thanks to the director of the Bureau, Dr. J. Franklin 
Jameson, and to his efficient associate, Mr. Waldo G. 
Leland. 

While working over the Papeles Procedentes de 

ix 



X PREFACE 

Cuba, in the Archive General at Seville, I experienced 
the usual courteous attention and assistance of Senor 
Don Pedro Torres Lanzas, the chief of the archive, 
and of the assistant chief, the late Senor Don Jose 
Gonzalez Verger. It was also my good fortune to 
meet there Professor Roscoe R. Hill, now of the Uni- 
versity of New Mexico, who was then engaged in 
preparing for the Carnegie Institution his monumental 
"Descriptive Catalogue" of the Papeles . . , de Cuba. 
By making use of Mr. Hill's notes, which he freely 
turned over to me, I was able to avoid much unnec- 
essary labor in what proved the most fertile collection 
of material for my purpose and also to make my 
search infinitely more fruitful. Moreover, Mr. Hill 
has made me doubly his debtor by reading the proofs 
of the present work. 

Several volumes of transcripts from the Papeles 
are to be found in the State Department of Archives 
and History at Jackson, Mississippi. It was my privi- 
lege to examine these before going abroad, with the 
aid of Mr. J. A. Robertson's valuable "List of Docu- 
ments" (also published by the Carnegie Institution), 
and to find that this preliminary work measurably 
curtailed my labors at Seville. Moreover, the deposi- 
tory at Jackson contains the original letter books of 
Governor W. C. C. Claiborne and other valuable docu- 
mentary sources for the territorial period of Missis- 
sippi history. The letter books, in part duplicated at 
Washington, have recently been edited and published 



PREFACE XI 



by the director of the Department, Dr. Dunbar Row- 
land. This timely pubHcation, of more than local sig- 
nificance, will readily supplement my references to the 
manuscript sources. In addition to courteous assist- 
ance in his own Department, I am also indebted to Dr. 
Rowland for many practical suggestions regarding the 
local archives in his vicinity. 

To the keepers of these archives, and to the officials 
in charge of other local, state, and national reposi- 
tories, including the archives of the State and War 
departments at Washington and the manuscript col- 
lections in the Library of Congress, space forbids 
more than a general acknowledgment. But I wish to 
reiterate the customary expression of obligation that a 
growing list of American scholars gladly render to 
these helpful and courteous custodians. In the same 
manner I must express my indebtedness to the officials 
of historical societies, and to numerous private indi- 
viduals, who have opened their libraries and manu- 
script collections to me in unstinted measure. For 
the archives at Washington, the guides prepared by 
Messrs. Van Tyne and Leland and D. W. Parker for 
the Carnegie Institution were very helpful. 

The guide of Messrs. Paullin and Paxson, or rather 
notes prepared for their guide, afforded me a service- 
able survey of the collections in the British Public 
Record Office. The notes of Mr. Leland rendered 
the diplomatic correspondence in the Archives des 
Affaires ifitrangeres at Paris immediately available. 



Xii PREFACE 

Professor W. R. Shepherd's guide was of assistance 
in the Archivo Historico Nacional at Madrid. At all 
these archives the officials in charge gave substantial 
aid, but I must mention in particular the helpfulness 
of Sefior Don Ignacio Olavide, who was temporarily 
in charge of the Archivo Historico Nacional at the 
time of my visit there. 

The preparation of this book is due in a peculiar 
manner to the cooperation of three universities. The 
greater part of the necessary research was carried on 
during a leave of absence from the University of Cin- 
cinnati. Subsidies afforded by a Harrison Research 
Fellowship at the University of Pennsylvania and the 
Albert Shaw Lectureship at Johns Hopkins University 
enabled me to employ this leisure most advantageously. 
My colleagues, Professor Merrick Whitcomb, Dr. 
Reginald C. McGrane, and Professor Clyde W. Park, 
have still further exemplified this spirit of academic 
cooperation by a careful reading of manuscript and 
proof sheets. Mr. Carl E. Otto and Mr. K. W. Bron- 
son, students in my classes, have assisted in preparing 
the maps. In the drudgery of compositio'n and proof 
reading my wife, as might be expected, has been my 
constant mentor and indispensable partner. 

Isaac Joslin Cox. 

University of Cincinnati, 
December, 1917. 






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CHAPTER I 
The Definition and Delimitation of West Florida 

During the first six decades of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, Spain, France, and Great Britain asserted over- 
lapping claims in what is now the southeastern part of 
the United States. Their uncertain spheres of influ- 
ence, to borrow a modern term, comprised coastal 
plains on the Gulf and the Atlantic, indented by shal- 
low bays and inlets and drained by rivers of moderate 
size, together with an indefinite hinterland. This re- 
gion was peopled by numerous aborigines, largely 
grouped in imposing confederacies, mutually hostile 
but generally unfriendly toward intrusive Europeans. 
Position, physical characteristics, and native popula- 
tion thus jointly served to give an immense strategic 
value to the entire region, and these same basic con- 
ditions likewise suggested that political control and 
development therein must be unified. 

For nearly two hundred years after its discovery 
the region attracted but casual international attention. 
Then, in the early part of the eighteenth century a 
series of factors — physical, racial, colonial, interna- 
tional — began in more thorough measure to exert their 
influence in blocking out a part of the region for fu- 
ture diplom.atic and border controversies. This period. 



2 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

which may not inaptly be called the period of defini- 
tion, ended in i763.^y''JVest Florida, first named and 
tentatively defined in that year, was the residuary 
legatee of the international claims and controversies 
that had hitherto characterized the history of the en- 
tire region. 

Great Britain, now possessing all the territory lying 
between the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Mississippi, 
except the Island of New Orleans, was in a position 
to establish that unified control so necessary to its 
complete development. Her first step to this end, the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763, gave West Florida a 
name and a northern boundary, the thirty-first parallel. 
This line, derived from the early Carolina grants, was 
destined to play an important part in the succeeding 
history of the region. The attempt to prescribe defi- 
nite limits for the new province, an attempt repeated 
by the British and their successors during the next 
thirty-five years, began what we may term its period 
of delimitation. Shortly after 1763 the English au- 
thorities themselves modified the boundaries that they 
had first prescribed, because they found that it was 
advisable to extend the jurisdiction of West Florida 
to include all white settlements below the junction of 

1 For a description of the terms " definition " and " delimi- 
tation " as used in tliis chapter, consult my article on " The 
Significance of the Louisiana-Texas Frontier " in Proceedings 
of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, 1909-1910, 
19&-215. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 3 

the Yazoo with the Mississippi. During the Ameri- 
can Revolution Spain conquered the Enghsh holdings 
and retained them under the Treaty of 1783. But 
that power was immediately involved in a territorial 
controversy with the United States and in 1795 was 
obliged to yield to her rival the portion of the prov- 
ince above the thirty-first parallel. 

By the early part of 1798 the stipulations of the 
treaty of the Escorial, by which Spain made this ces- 
sion to the United States, were in process of adjust- 
ment. The thirty-first parallel was reestablished as 
the boundary of West Florida, this time becoming an 
international line in the area east of the Mississippi. 
We may, therefore, take 1798 as the closing date for 
what we have called the period of delimitation in West 
Florida. The territory of Mississippi and the prov- 
ince of West Florida, the frontier jurisdictions of 
their respective nations, were separated by a definite 
limit, as well marked, in the course of the next two 
years, as their needs required. But such a settlement 
violated the essential unity of the region and the 
quarrel between Spain and the United Slates that had 
lasted fifteen years was soon renewed. In this dual 
dispute Great Britain and France, two of the parties 
to the original controversy that was settled in 1763 
and still bitter commercial and political rivals, threat- 
ened to intervene whenever it should suit their indi- 
vidual purposes. The United States, ambitious heir 



4 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

of the former, desired to acquire both the Floridas, 
and after 1803 claimed that portion of the western 
province lying between the Mississippi and the Per- 
dido as part of the Louisiana Purchase.^ This claim, 
which was largely responsible for the bitter territorial 
disputes in which the United States was immediately 
involved, and the measures taken by its officials dur- 
ing the succeeding decade to establish the claim and 
occupy the disputed area, form the subject of the pres- 
ent study. 

The American claim included that portion of the 
Mississippi delta and its back country of which Baton 
Rouge is the natural center, the alluvial bottoms of the 
Pearl and the Pascagoula, and the area around Mobile 
Bay. The western portion resembled the Natchez dis- 
trict, with which it made a common physiographic 
unit. Here was found the larger part of West Flor- 
ida's scattered population, gathered into considerable 
communities along the lakes and streams as far east- 
ward as the Pearl. There were isolated habitations 
at Bayou St. Louis and Pass Christian, the Bay of 
Biloxi, and the mouth of the Pascagoula. The group 
of settlements second in importance was that scattered 
around Mobile Bay. For these the town of that name 
formed a military and business center. Pensacola, 

2 Cf. Chambers, " West Florida in its Relation to the His- 
torical Cartography of the United States," in J. H. U. Studies, 
Sen XVI, No. 5. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 5 

beyond the Perdido, lay outside the disputed area, but 
was the capital of West Florida under both British 
and Spanish rule. The only unity to this artificial 
jurisdiction was afforded by the chain of lakes and 
bays through which its rivers discharged their waters 
into the Gulf. 

The significant part of West Florida was, therefore, 
merely a strip of the Gulf coast possessing little in- 
trinsic value, but rendered temporarily important 
through international rivalry. It had even greater 
claims to distinction. Its creation, development, occu- 
pancy, and division determined the destiny of the 
whole region of which it was a part. It afforded at 
once an epitome and a prophecy of territorial expan- 
sion in the Southwest. The American pioneer in his 
varying aspects — turbulent squatter, domiciled subject, 
covert revolutionist — found it an adequate stage for 
his unconscious propaganda in behalf of democracy. 
Small as it was it bulked large enough in contem- 
porary diplomacy to modify Napoleon's commercial 
system and to further Jefferson's Pan-American views. 
Frontier turbulence, foreign and domestic wrangling, 
and evasive treaty provisions marked each phase of 
its brief history and afforded a warning or an incentive 
for subsequent diplomatic procedure. Foreign inva- 
sion and filibustering left their marks upon its soil. 
After West Florida had thus put its sinister impress 
on nearly every important contemporary issue, the 



6 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

single star, emblem of its short-lived independence, 
disappeared and the territory was quietly absorbed 
by the neighboring commonwealths. 

It was fitting that the first historical event connected 
with the region should arouse controversy. The Span- 
iard Pineda discovered what he called the Bay and 
River of Espiritu Santo. Whether this was the Mis- 
sissippi or the Mobile was long in dispute, but mod- 
ern scholarship is inclined to think the latter.^ De 
Vaca skirted its shores, and De Soto visited upon its 
leading Indian community his most signal act of 
cruelty. More significant still is the interest mani- 
fested in its occupation by the Mexican viceroys, Men- 
doza and Velasco. The latter's representative touched 
at Mobile Bay in 1558 and made such a favorable 
report that the viceroy sent De Luna the following 
year to establish a definite settlement. He selected 
the nearby Pensacola Bay as his headquarters, but 
after two years of discouraging hardships his surviv- 
ing followers found refuge in Hispaniola and Cuba.* 
For the next century and a quarter the region re- 
mained unnoticed except for random mention such as 
that by Father Alonso Benavides f but the early Span- 

3 Hamilton, Colonial Mobile (ed. 1910), 10. 

* Lowery, Spanish Settlements within the Limits of the 
United States to 1562, 356-375- 

5 The Memorial of Fray Alonso de Benavides, 1630, 64-66. 
Translated by Mrs. Edward E. Ayer, Chicago, 1916. Pri- 
vately printed. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 7 

iards had indicated a connection with Mexico and 
Cuba that was to characterize in large measure the 
later stages of their control. 

In the closing years of the seventeenth century the 
Spaniards were destined to a rude awakening from 
their apathy. The intrepid La Salle, seconded by 
his lieutenant Tonty, narrowly missed becoming the 
first French colonizer of the region.^ He did link it 
with Texas, likewise to be associated in a future 
boundary controversy. The English also claimed it 
under the Carolina and subsequent grants ; and, shortly 
after the Peace of Ryswick, a certain Daniel Coxe 
dispatched a vessel to explore the mouth of the Mis- 
sissippi. This prospective rivalry led La Salle's suc- 
cessor, the Sieur d'Iberville, to favor some point east 
of the Mississippi for his settlement. He preferred 
Pensacola Bay. But when, early in 1699, he reached 
its vicinity and found the jealous Spaniards already 
established there, he led his garrison o'f eighty men 
to old Biloxi. During this period his brother, Bien- 
ville, encountered Coxe's captain at the mouth of the 
Mississippi, but succeeded in persuading him to de- 
part.^ Thus by the opening of the eighteenth century 

6 The most complete collection of La Salle material is in 
Margry, Decouvertes et fitablissements des Frangais, Vols. II 
and III, passim. For a brief sketch consult the introduction 
to my Journeys of La Salle in " The Trail Makers' Series." 

"^ Margry, Decouvertes et fitablissements, IV, 53, 229, 393. 



8 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

the future West Florida was involved in a tripartite 
dispute which was to continue for six decades. 

Iberville wished to combine French and Spanish in- 
terests against the English, and for the purpose sug- 
gested that Spain should cede Pensacola, or possibly- 
all Florida, to France in return for a guarantee of its 
possessions in Mexico. A century later a more fa- 
mous Frenchman made a similar proposal. The Council 
of the Indies then resented the presence of the French 
in Louisiana, and rejected Iberville's proffer.^ Their 
representatives at Pensacola even protested when 
Bienville moved his fort from Biloxi to the shores of 
Mobile Bay, and later to the present site of Mobile, 
but they were powerless to do more. The ensuing re- 
lations between their respective frontier garrisons 
were generally friendly, although during a few weeks 
in 1719 Pensacola was captured by the French, recap- 
tured by the Spaniards, retaken by the French, and 
finally restored to its original occupants. By this time 
the French had established their headquarters at New 
Orleans, but they still retained Mobile for the sake of 
controlling the Indians. From that date the frontier 
commanders at that post and at Pensacola agreed to 
observe the Perdido as the limit of their respective 
jurisdictions.^ By their silence the home governments 
tacitly accepted' this boundary. 

8 Margry, Decouvertes et fitablissements, IV, 539-568. 

9 Margry, Decouvertes et fitablissements, IV, 381-385, 503. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 9 

Above the coast the French government, in the grant 
to Crozat and to the Western Company, vaguely spoke 
of CaroHna as limiting their claims on the east. The 
EngHsh peril, threatening from the first, became more 
pronounced with the founding of Georgia in 1732. 
Its leader, Oglethorpe, brilliantly defended the new 
colony against the Spaniards and in addition en- 
deavored to extend his influence among the western 
Indians. From the Carolinas and the colonies to the 
north English traders also visited the Choctaws and 
the Chickasaws. To maintain French prestige over 
his former allies, Bienville, in 1736 and 1740, under- 
took expeditions against the Chickasaws, which re- 
sulted disastrously and still further weakened the al- 
lied Bourbon defense.^^ 

On the eve of the decisive contest for territorial 
supremacy in North America, Spanish Florida, extend- 
ing over the peninsula and up to the Perdido, was 
guarded by Saint Augustine and Pensacola. The 
French settlements at Mobile and at New Orleans had 
as their eastern outposts Fort Natchez, Fort Tombecbe, 
and Fort Toulouse. English Carolina, now divided, 
was protected by the buffer colony of Georgia. The 

539-541, 561, 577-580 ; V, 426, 461 ; Historia, Vol. 43, Opusculo 
I, par. 31, 54, (iZ-^7y MS., Archivo General y Publico de la 
Nacion, Mexico ; French, Historical Collections of Louisiana, 
III, 63-65 ; ibid,, new series, I, 147. 

^0 Hamilton, Colonial Mobile, 126-130; Gayarre, History of 
Louisiana, The French Domination, 470-488, 503-517. 



lO DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

capital of the latter, Savannah, was flanked by forts 
Augusta and Frederica. The conflicting claims are 
summed up by Du Pratz, who mentions the Perdido 
as the limit between the French and Spaniards ; and by 
De Lisle, who on his map draws an irregular line be- 
tween the British and French possessions from that 
stream to the mountains, and so to the northward. 
Montcalm, in 1758, suggested about the same line as 
the limit between the English and the French.^^ The 
decision in the Valley of the St. Lawrence, later reg- 
istered in the preliminary treaty at Versailles, brought 
the contested area between the mountains, the Missis- 
sippi, and the Gulf into the hands of the English. At 
the same time Spain surrendered the Florida Penin- 
sula in exchange for Cuba. By this double transfer 
the English sphere of influence was enlarged to in- 
clude all the territory east of the Mississippi except 
the Island of New Orleans. The first Bourbon com- 
bination failed to check the English advance predicted 
by Iberville. 

West Florida now passed from the period of defi- 
nition to that of delimitation, in which the diplomat 
plays a more important part than the discoverer or 
settler. The first paper marking this period is the 
treaty which closed the Seven Years' War. Inci- 

11 Le Page du Pratz, Histoire de la Louisiane, I, 160; Win- 
sor, The Mississippi Basin, 63, 74; Thwaites, France in 
America, 156. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA II 

dentally this document partially delimited West Flor- 
ida by a " line drawn along the middle of the Missis- 
sippi ... to the river Iberville, and from thence by a 
line drawn along the middle of this river, and the lake 
Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea." In order to 
carry out this provision, the French king ceded to 
" His Britannic Majesty, the river and port of Mobile 
and everything which he possesses or ought to possess 
on the left side of the river Mississippi, except the 
town of New Orleans and the island in which it is situ- 
ated." The remainder of this seventh article pro- 
vides for the free navigation of the entire Mississippi 
by the subjects of both nations. The twentieth ar- 
ticle of the treaty calls for the cession by Spain to 
Great Britain of " Florida, with the Fort Augustine 
and the Bay of Pensacola, as well as all that Spain pos- 
sessed on the continent of North America to the east 
or the southeast of the river Mississippi."^^ 

Following the transfer of the territory thus desig- 
nated, the English sovereign proceeded to organize 
his new possessions. His proclamation for this pur- 
pose bears the date of October 7, 1763. It contem- 
plates four new colonial governments, of which the 
second and third are of immediate concern. East 
Florida, the second mentioned in the proclamation, 
was "bounded to the westward by the Gulph of Mex- 
ico and the Appalachicola river." The third colony, 

12 The Annual Register, 1762, 2ZZ-2StT. 



12 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

West Florida, was to be "bounded to the Southward 
by the Gulph of Mexico, including all islands within 
six leagues of the coast, the river Appalachicola to 
Lake Pontchartrain," and to the westward by the line 
laid down in the treaty. Its northern limit was a 
"line drawn due East from that part of the Missis- 
sippi, which lies in the 31st degree of North latitude, 
to the river Appalachicola, or the Catahouchee," which 
was its eastern limit.^^ 

From this time the colony of West Florida is fairly 
defined except to the northward, where lay the Indian 
country marked out by the same proclamation. It 
shortly appeared that the line of the thirty-first paral- 
lel would pass below extensive settlements at Nat- 
chez, and possibly below some on the Mobile. These 
communities were not important enough for an 
independent government, and they could not be at- 
tached without great difficulty to distant Georgia. Ac- 
cordingly, by a supplemental royal order issued in 1764, 
the territory of West Florida was enlarged to include 
all white settlements below a line drawn due east from 
the mouth of the Yazoo river. This extension was 

13 Ibid., 1763, 20^213. C. E. Carter states that the selection 
by the British of the thirty-first parallel was wholly arbitrary, 
because this was " as far north as the Settlements can be 
carried, without interfering with lands claimed or occupied 
by the Indians." But it seems to me that it was by no mere 
coincidence that they hit upon the line that had already ap- 
peared in the Carolina grants. Cf. Mississippi Valley His- 
torical Review, I, 365. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 13 

repeated in the commissions issued to the various 
British governors from 1764 onward.^* Very little 
of the territory was actually occupied by white settlers, 
till at a conference with Colonel John Stuart in 1770 
the Chickasaws and Choctaws agreed to sell a portion 
of their land to the west and south of what was called 
the Chaterpe line. This limit began on the Tombig- 
bee, about 135 miles above Mobile, and ran to the 
Yazoo some 15 miles above its junction with the Mis- 
sissippi, and included territory along the Alabama, 
Tombigbee, and Pascagoula rivers, which the Choc- 
taws had previously agreed to sell.^^ These cessions 
may be regarded as establishing a provisional line be- 
tween the Indians and the whites under British rule. 
Some thirty years later the American government in 
new treaties negotiated by General Wilkinson gained 
substantially the same territory. 

The revolt of the English colonies checked the run- 
ning of Indian boundaries, and brought another set 
of interests to the front. The new American govern- 
ment desired to carry on commerce with the Spaniards 
at New Orleans, and to intimidate or occupy the 

1* American State Papers, Public Lands, I, 57. 

15 Hamilton, Colonial Mobile, 242-246 ; Farrand, " The In- 
dian Boundary Line," in American Historical Review, X, 782 ; 
Gayarre, History of Louisiana, The Spanish Domination, 412; 
Ellicott to Pickering, Sept. 20, 1797, Ellicott and the Southern 
Boundary, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of 
State. 



14 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

British settlements at Natchez, Mobile, and Pensa- 
cola. Patrick Henry favored such a scheme. Oliver 
Pollock, the American agent at New Orleans, and his 
associate, James Willing, tried to carry it out ; but the 
Tory element at Natchez, led by Anthony Hutchins, a 
retired British officer, proved too' much for them, even 
when their efforts were secretly aided by Bernardo 
de Galvez, governor of Spanish Louisiana." In the 
course of a few years diplomatic complications in 
Europe forced the Americans to moderate their west- 
ern ambitions. Accordingly, in 1779, their representa- 
tive to Spain was instructed to ask for the thirty-first 
parallel as the southern boundary. In this they fol- 
lowed the early Carolina grants as did the Proclama- 
tion of 1763; but in claiming to the Mississippi, they 
disregarded a very essential part of that proclamation. 
They likewise demanded the right to navigate this 
river and to use a suitable port of entry below the des- 
ignated boundary. The instructions furthermore show 
that, while they abandoned all hope of conquering the 
Floridas for themselves, they were ready to assist 
Spain to do so, provided that power would grant a 
substantial subsidy.^^ 

i^Winsor, The Westward Movement, 147-149, 155; Enclo- 
sure No. 6 in Ellicott to Pickering, Nov. 14, 1797, Ellicott and 
the Southern Boundary, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library; 
James Dallas to Colonel John McGillivray, July 3, 1778, MS., 
Bancroft Collection, University of California. 

17 Foreign Affairs, Secret Journal, 1775-1781, 132, 138, 139, 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA J 5 

In 1779 war broke out between Spain and Great 
Britain, and the latter power planned to strengthen 
Pensacola, and, with the aid of southern Indians, to 
push the Spaniards away from New Orleans. But 
George Rogers Clark and his men prevented coopera- 
tion between Hamilton at Detroit and Campbell at 
Pensacola. This indirect aid from the Americans en- 
abled Galvez, in September, 1779, to reduce the British 
establishments on the Mississippi. In the following 
March he occupied Fort Charlotte at Mobile, and in 
1 781 forced the English to surrender Pensacola.^^ 

Galvez was friendly to the Americans, but the Span- 
ish government at home already regarded their terri- 
torial ambitions with jealousy. Consequently Pollock 
at New Orleans was unable to gain needed assistance 
for Clark and other American leaders, while John Jay 
at Madrid vainly tried to negotiate a loan of five mil- 
lions of dollars. The Spanish representative, Diego 
de Gardoqui, plainly told him that this loan was con- 
tingent upon abandoning the claim to the navigation 
of the Mississippi. Owing to the lack of military 
success during 1780, Congress was more ready to 

149, 226, 262; Winsor, Westward Movement, 160; Phillips, 
The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution, 

53, 55. 

18 Winsor, Westward Movement, 162, 181, 189; Manuel Ser- 
rano y Sanz in Revista de los Archivos, Madrid, Mar-Apr., 
1914, 167. 



l6 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

yield this point; but even so, Jay was unable to take 
advantage of the concession.^^ 

After he was transferred to Paris, Jay discovered 
that the Spanish government wished to retain the ter- 
ritory above the thirty-first parallel that Galvez had 
conquered, and also insisted upon absolutely con- 
trolling the navigation of the Mississippi. The French 
minister, Vergennes, tried to maintain an unsatisfying 
neutrality towards both Spanish and American preten- 
sions, but his secretary, Rayneval, supported Spain. 
Under the circumstances, Jay and John Adams per- 
suaded Franklin to make a separate provisional treaty 
with Great Britain, despite their instructions, and thus 
secured from the mother-country a recognition of their 
territorial claims and of the right to navigate the Mis- 
sissippi.^^ A secret article, however, called for the Yazoo 
line, in case Great Britain recovered the Floridas ; in 
case Spain retained them, the thirty-first parallel. ^^ 

19 Revista de los Archivos, Mar.-Apr., 1914, 201 ; Johnston, 
Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, I, 460. 

20 Johnston, John Jay, II, 388; Foreign Affairs, Secret Jour- 
nal, IV, 73; Annual Register, 1782, 322-324. 

21 Foreign Affairs, Secret Journal, 1781-86, 338; Revista de 
los Archivos, Mar.-Apr., 1914, 174. In 1802 Lord Lansdowne 
told Rufus King that twenty years before he wished to obtain 
the Floridas, New Orleans, and some of the West Indies in 
exchange for Gibraltar, but that popular outcry prevented. 
He also stated that Jay and Franklin were willing for Great 
Britain to seize the Floridas, after the provisional treaty, if 
they could avoid the appearance of collusion. King, Life and 
Correspondence of Rufus King, IV, 93. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 1 7 

This provisional treaty between the United States and 
Great Britain was not modified in the later general 
peace. But when the latter ceded the Floridas to 
Spain she mentioned no definite limits.-^ Obviously 
here was a chance for dispute, and possibly Great 
Britain intended that there should be. Nor was the 
prospect of trouble removed when the Spanish authori- 
ties shortly afterward learned of the secret article. 
The territory involved was a strip about a hundred 
miles wide, extending from the Mississippi to the 
Chattahoochee, but the strip itself was not the most 
significant factor. Spain insisted upon this territory 
largely because it strengthened her assumed right to 
the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi. This in 
turn involved the control of the Indians in the region 
west of the mountains and south of the Ohio. For 
the next two decades these three factors constituted 
the leading issues in southwestern diplomacy. 

In this struggle the Creeks, under the astute Alex- 
ander McGillivray, entered into an alliance with the 
Spanish governor, June i, 1784, and agreed to protect 
his territory from encroachment. This led to a border 
war with Georgia which continued, in spite of the in- 
tervention of the national government under Washing- 
ton, until the death of the great half-breed removed 
the principal stumbling-block to peace in the South- 
west. The Spaniards gained some temporary advan- 

22 Annual Register, 1783, 331-338. 
3 



1 8 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

tage from their connection with him, as well as from 
their treaties with the Chickasaws and Choctaws. They 
also exerted some influence over the Cherokees, who 
carried on hostilities with the Watauga and Cumber- 
land settlements.^^ For a generation to come Mobile 
and Pensacola, and for a shorter time, New Orleans, 
in Spanish hands, continued as recruiting centers for 
the Southwestern Indians. 

Aside from Indian affairs the most significant event 
in the Southwest during this decade was the attempt 
by Georgia to organize Bourbon County in the Natchez 
district. Thomas Green, the leader in this project, 
failed to cooperate with his associates. The greater 
part of the inhabitants at Natchez probably sympa- 
thized with him, but feared to take a definite stand 
that might result in their total ruin. The Spanish 
authorities absolutely refused to yield the territory in 
question, and Georgia was too far away to conduct a 
military campaign to advantage. At the same time 
the Indians defeated another attempt by Georgia to 
organize a county in the bend of the Tennessee 
River.2* 

In this failure of Georgia to uphold its own terri- 
torial claims against Spain we have evidence that the 

23 Pickett, History of Alabama, II, 6i, T>), i4i ; cf. article by 
Jane M. Berry in Mississippi Valley Historical Review, March, 
1917. 

2* American Historical Review, XV, 66-171, 297-353. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 1 9 

problems of the Southwest were too much for a single 
State. But under the Confederation it was doubtful 
if the national government could succeed any better. 
Shortly after the Revolution, La Fayette undertook 
without success to initiate diplomatic relations between 
Spain and the United States. Ill success likewise ac- 
companied the efforts of Jay and Gardoqui, in 1785- 
1786, at Philadelphia. The diplomatic duel which 
they there resumed over the boundaries and the navi- 
gation of the Mississippi led to no other result than 
a tentative proposal to forego the navigation of the 
Mississippi for- twenty-five years. Jay submitted the 
proposal to Congress ; but, influenced by western op- 
position, that body refused even to consider it.^^ Ne- 
gotiations were then suspended during the continuance 
of the government under the Confederation. 

Meanwhile Spain retained possession of the east bank 
of the Mississippi as far north as the present Mem- 
phis. To strengthen her hold there her officials opened 
intrigues with certain leaders in the Blue Grass region 
of Kentucky and in the Cumberland district of Ten- 
nessee. In time, however, the element that was loyal 
to the American government was reinforced by the 
promise of a " more perfect union " under a new consti- 
tution, and checkmated the plans of Wilkinson and 
other western disunionists.^® Their communities suf- 

25 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 248-251. 
-6 Shepherd, " Wilkinson and the Beginning of the Spanish 



20 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

f ered many genuine grievances that encouraged speci- 
ous advances from Spain and half hearted intrigues on 
the part of Great Britain. The situation was further 
complicated by the desire of France to regain posses- 
sion of Louisiana. But despite these untoward cir- 
cumstances, the genuine loyalty of the West was 
clearly demonstrated when separatism received a 
check in Kentucky and North Carolina resumed con- 
trol over the western counties. The West preferred 
to seek a remedy by regular means under the new gov- 
ernment, rather than attempt the uncertainties of re- 
bellion or the restrictions of a Spanish colonial sys- 
tem. The French traveler, Brissot de Warville, indi- 
cated another possible solution when he predicted the 
success of an American campaign against New Or- 
leans.^^ 

The " Nootka Sound Affair," the first serious diplo- 
matic question under the new government, threatened 
American neutrality. The Venezuelan revolutionist, 
Francisco de Miranda, urged Great Britain to occupy 
New Orleans. The trader and adventurer, W. A. 
Bowles, offered to conquer for her the Floridas and 
lower Louisiana. Hamilton and even Jefferson inti- 
mated to a British agent that American acquiescence, 
if not complicity, might be secured by ceding New 

Conspiracy," in American Historical Review, IX, 490-506, 
748-766. 
27 American Historical Review, X, 258. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 21 

Orleans and the Floridas to the United States. Later 
Jefferson veered round and refused to welcome Great 
Britain as a neighbor west of the Mississippi. In- 
stead he hoped to gain New Orleans or some other 
suitable port through the good offices of the French 
government. He also instructed William Carmichael 
at Madrid to propose the cession of New Orleans and 
the Floridas to the United States in return for a guar- 
antee of Spanish possessions west of the Mississippi. 
In neither case did he gain his point. France herself 
had designs on the desired territory, and his instruc- 
tions to Carmichael arrived too late for use. Jeffer- 
son's attitude, however, reminds us of his course just 
before the purchase of Louisiana.^^ 

The following ten years presented many diplomatic 
episodes equally perilous to the Spanish hold on the 
Floridas. But a more insidious peril was developing 
in the very region. The original French and Spanish 
elements in its population were, after 1763, joined by 
British immigrants largely from the Carolinas and 
Georgia. There was also some infiltration from the 
movement that was peopling Kentucky and Tennessee. 
Originally this Anglo-American element was mostly 
Tory in sympathy ; but after the independence of the 
former British colonies, it naturally sided with the 
Americans rather than with the Spaniards. After 

28 Manning, " The Nootka Sound Episode," in American 
Historical Association, Annual Report, 1904. 



22 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

1783 a renewed migration from Georgia and the Caro- 
linas poured into the Mobile and Natchez districts.^^ 
These newer immigrants, whether loyalist or Whig, 
were for the most part people of character and sub- 
stance, and met with an unexpected welcome from 
the Spaniards. This attitude arose from a desire to 
erect buffer colonies against future illegal immigra- 
tion. Gardoqui joined with Colonel Morgan of New 
Jersey to found a settlement at New Madrid.^^ This 
project was largely neutralized by the opposition of 
Wilkinson and the jealousy of Governor Miro, who 
wrote to Judge Sebastian of Kentucky, under date of 
September 16, 1789, that Wilkinson had mentioned 
him as one who expected to leave Kentucky. Miro 
assured Sebastian that he would welcome him and 
his companions with pleasure, and permit them to 
locate "in any part of Louisiana, or anywhere on the 
East side of the Mississippi below the Yazoo river." 
Such settlers should receive a liberal land grant, in- 
troduce their personal property free of duty, and dis- 
pose of their surplus tobacco in the general market. 
They might practice their religion without molestation, 
and enjoy the privileges and immunities of His Majes- 
ty's subjects.^^ 

29 Pickett, History of Alabama, II, 25, 28, 124. 

30 Ogg, Opening of the Mississippi, 449. 

31 Miro to Sebastian, N. O., Sept. 16, 1789, enclosed in Bev- 
erly Randolph to Washington, May 31, 1790, Miscellaneous 
Letters, MS., Vol. 3, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Depart- 
ment of State; Revista de los Archivos, May-June, 1914, 356. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 23 

As a general criticism, we may say that these Span- 
iards were playing with fire, and they ought to have 
known it. The prediction of John Sullivan, a resident 
of Charleston, affords a case in point. After assur- 
ing his friend. Major WilHam Brown, that there was 
work cut out for him in the western country, he 
added ; " Take my word for it, we will speedily be in 
possession of New Orleans." The American authori- 
ties affected to believe that this letter represented Sul- 
livan's personal views only ; but he may have had some 
connection with Dr. James O'Fallon, who was agent 
for the Yazoo Land Company of South Carolina. If 
so, this letter has added significance. O'Fallon pro- 
posed to plant a colony of Americans on the site of 
modern Vicksburg. He attempted to allay the fears 
of Governor Miro by representing his company as 
made up of disaffected westerners ready to ally them- 
selves with the adjoining Spanish authorities and to 
serve as a rampart against future irruptions. He was 
to organize his settlers into a semi-military battalion, 
under the command of George Rogers Clark. The 
latter had been unjustly treated both by the State of 
Virginia and by the American government, and was 
ready to enter Spanish service in return for a land 
grant. Washington's proclamation rather than Span- 
ish reluctances led the prospective colonizers to await 
a more favorable opportunity.^^ 

S2 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 281 ; Pick- 



24 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

Similar encouragement given by the governor of 
East Florida led Jefferson to predict the natural re- 
sult of this poHcy. Under date of April 2, 1791, he 
wrote Washington: "This [invitation] is meant for 
our people. Debtors will take advantage of it and go 
off with their property. Our citizens have a right to 
go where they please, and it is the business of the 
states to stop them till their debts are paid. This 
done, I wish 100,000 of our inhabitants would accept 
the invitation. It may be the means of delivering to 
us peaceably what may otherwise cost a war. In the 
meantime we may complain of this seduction of our 
inhabitants, just enough to make them believe we see 
it a very wise policy for them, and confirm them in it, 
this is my idea of it."^^ 

In 1793 it seemed possible to combine the commer- 
cial and territorial demands of the Americans with the 
universal revolutionary propaganda of Brissot de War- 
ville and his fellow Girondists. The new French min- 
ister Genet was the agent selected to make the com- 
bination. Thomas Paine in the name of recently nat- 
uralized French citizens ; Pierre Lyonnet for his fel- 
low Creoles of Louisiana; Clark and O'Fallon in be- 
half of the western frontiersmen, assured him that 

ett, History of Alabama, II, 114; Revist'a de los Archivos, 
May-June, 1914, 359-361. 

23 Jefferson to Washington, Apr. 2, 1791, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 5, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 25 

they were ready to cooperate in overthrowing Spanish 
rule in Louisiana and the Floridas. Hoping to secure 
the latter from France as a reward for quiescence, Jef- 
ferson now directed our minister, Carmichael, not to 
guarantee the Spanish colonies west of the Mississippi, 
and in his personal relations with Genet failed to main- 
tain the rigid neutrality that Washington prescribed.^* 
He, too, was playing with fire to gain his coveted end. 
Lacking resources and the ability to organize his 
heterogeneous volunteers, even with Jefferson's clan- 
destine aid. Genet at Philadelphia failed to overcome 
the administration's neutral policy. In the West, Wil- 
kinson opposed his projects and thereby measurably 
justified the continuance of his Spanish pension. But 
from New Orleans Governor Carondelet, distrusting 
denizen and defenses alike, vainly attempted to revive 
among the Kentuckians the project of separating the 
West from the Union. ^^ They were beginning to feel 
an increased respect for the new national government 
and hoped to realize their aspirations through its reg- 
ular channels. Fauchet's proclamation,^^ therefore, 

34 Turner, " The Policy of France toward the Mississippi 
Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams," in Ameri- 
can Historical Review, X, 261-264. 

^^ Gayoso to Alcudia, Sept. 19, 1794, in American Historical 
Association, Annual Report, 1896, p. 1081 ; Carondelet to Al- 
cudia, July 30, 1794, ibid., 1069. 

3^ Quoted in Mangourit Correspondence, No. 39, in Ameri- 
can Historical Association, Annual Report, 1897, 629. 



26 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

disavowing his predecessor's filibustering projects, fell 
upon receptive ears. 

The diplomatic relations of the United States with 
Spain had advanced but little during the preceding 
decade. The southern boundary was still unsettled and 
the western settlers were without the privilege of navi- 
gating the Mississippi. By this time the Indian situa- 
tion had become acute. Washington, out of patience 
with the double-dealing McGillivray, was on the point 
of declaring war against the Creeks. Before doing so 
he determined to make one more attempt to settle all 
outstanding questions with Spain. For this purpose 
he made use of a significant feature of our early diplo- 
macy — the special mission. WilHam Short, our min- 
ister to Holland, was associated with Carmichael in a 
fresh attempt to overcome Bourbon hostility and delay. 
The American claim to the Natchez district, Jefferson 
informed the joint envoys, was based on the prelim- 
inary treaty with Great Britain ; that of Spain, on con- 
quest. The inchoate right of the latter nation was not 
confirmed by formal treaty until some months after 
the American pact with Great Britain. Hence the 
American claim took precedence. He also naively in- 
structed his representatives to deny the secret article 
in the preliminary treaty by which the Americans had 
agreed, under certain conditions, to accept the Yazoo 
line, or to discuss it only hypothetically. What the 
United States might do for Great Britain after a long 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 27 

war could not be used as a precedent for her action 
toward Spain under more favorable circumstances. 
Moreover, the new constitution of the United States 
guaranteed the territory of each State, and only a dis- 
astrous war could change this fact. He based the 
American territorial claim on the Carolina Charter of 
1663, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the prelim- 
inary and final treaties with Great Britain. But in 
connection with the proclamation he disregarded one 
very essential point — the source line limiting the east- 
ern colonies. 

Jefferson founded the American claim to navigate 
the Mississippi on the treaties of 1763 and 1783 and 
on natural right. Under the earlier treaty the British 
colonists had the right to navigate the Mississippi. 
They had now become American citizens, but had not 
relinquished this right, nor had Spain conquered it 
from the United States, with whom she had never 
been at war. Great Britain yielded the Floridas to 
Spain, it is true, but she did not thereby yield a privi- 
lege which belonged to the United States. Aside from 
our treaty rights, Jefferson asserted that the inhabi- 
tants on the upper course of the river had the right to 
pass in and out of its mouth. In support of this view 
he cited the case of Antwerp on the Scheldt and 
those rivers of Spain which flowed through Portugal.^^ 

37 This principle was not definitely recognized in European 
diplomacy until the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Cf. W. E. 
Hall, International Law (sixth edition), 131-140. 



28 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

An additional argument in favor of the American 
claim was the fact that our population on the Mis- 
sissippi and its tributaries surpassed that of Spain. He 
quoted from Roman law to prove that the navigation 
of rivers was a public privilege. The right to navi- 
gate also implied the means to exercise it, and this 
meant a place to deposit and transship goods from 
river-craft to ocean-going vessels. These rights of 
navigation and deposit, as well as our claim to the 
thirty-first parallel, were to be regarded as a sine qua 
non, for which Spain could not expect compensation.^® 
When Short reached Madrid in February, 1793, 
Spain, at war with France and allied with Great 
Britain, was unwilling to treat with our envoys. Her 
own representative was the inflexible Gardoqui, now 
secretary of finance, and he was as little inclined to 
yield upon the points at issue as he had been with Jay 
some years before. Nor were the Americans more 
successful with Godoy, the Duke of Alcudia. After 
some months of fruitless endeavor, Carmichael quitted 
Madrid in disgust.^^ Short continued as charge, al- 
most unnoticed. The Spaniards tried through him to- 
reopen negotiations with France, but to no purpose. 
He then suggested a descent of the Mississippi or an 

38 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 252-255. 

39 Ibid., 259 ff. ; Dispatches of William Short, MS., Ill, No. 
168, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 29 

invasion of the Floridas to bring the Spanish govern- 
ment to terms.*^ 

About this time the Spanish representatives in Phila- 
delphia intimated that the United States needed in 
Madrid a minister of the requisite " character, conduct, 
and splendor, with full powers to treat on all subjects 
at issue." Edmund Randolph, then secretary of state, 
was thoroughly impressed with the idea, and secured 
the appointment of Thomas Pinckney, our minister at 
London, as special envoy.*^ Both Monroe and Thomas 
Paine, who had been instrumental in bringing Spain 
and France together, believed that the French Direc- 
tory was ready to assist in pressing the American 
claims. But all evidences of French friendliness dis- 
appeared on news of Jay's treaty with England. Marks 
of open displeasure followed when Pinckney passed 
through Paris without giving the Directory, or even 
Monroe, any inkling of its terms.*^ 

Nevertheless the fates were working to favor the 
Americans. Spain could not become friendly with 
France without incurring the hostility of Great Britain. 
Accordingly their officials did not wish to add the 
United States to the number of their avowed enemies. 

40 Dispatches of Short, MS., Ill, No, 183, Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives. 

41 Randolph to Washington, Oct. 10, 1794, Miscellaneous 
Letters, MS., Vol. 17, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 

*2 Monroe, A View of the Conduct of the Executive, 203 ; 
American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1903, II, 580, 



30 DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 

Yet for a time they resorted to their customary meth- 
ods of delay, among which the periodical migration 
of the Spanish court to the Escorial was not the least 
trying. Pinckney also found himself handicapped by 
a lack of definite instructions. When Godoy began to 
review the questions at issue Pinckney refused to dis- 
cuss them in detail or treat of them separately. The 
only point that seemed to cause serious difficulty was 
the navigation of the Mississippi. Finding that Godoy 
was again inclined to temporize, Pinckney promptly 
asked for his passports. This forced the Spaniard to 
yield to his demands.*^ By so doing, as his enemies 
later charged, Godoy sacrificed all the advantages 
gained from Great Britain in 1783. Yet under the cir- 
cumstances, it is hard to see what else Godoy could do. 
It was impossible to restrain the Americans any 
longer; and if they had once begun hostilities against 
Spain, New Orleans and all of the Floridas must have 
passed into their possession so much the earlier. Un- 
der these circumstances the treaty of 1795 was signed. 
Spain accepted the thirty-first parallel as the northern 
boundary of the Floridas, conceded the navigation of 
the Mississippi with New Orleans as a place of de- 
posit, and agreed to restrain the Indians within her 
jurisdiction. 

Godoy's signature was no assurance that he would 
be prompt in carrying out the terms of the treaty. In 

*3 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 542-546. 



DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF WEST FLORIDA 3 1 

the course of a few months he perceived that, despite 
the Jay treaty, the United States and England were 
not Hkely to become allies. By this time he had 
brought about that agreement with France which 
gained for him his most significant title — the Prince 
of the Peace. France desired to regain Louisiana, 
and with it, as much of the territory formerly included 
ir that jurisdiction as could be forced from the United 
States. Godoy, therefore, vainly attempted to gain 
French favor by retaining certain posts on the east 
bank of the Mississippi. For more than two years 
after signing the treaty he found one pretext after 
another for delaying its fulfilment. But when, early 
in 1798, French influence temporarily forced him from 
office, he issued the necessary orders for carrying out 
the treaty. By this act he completed the period of 
dehmitation in West Florida. 



CHAPTER II 
The Occupation of the Natchez District 

Nearly a score of years before the treaty signed at 
San Lorenzo el Real in 1795 the Americans had cast 
envious eyes upon the Floridas. Later miHtary re- 
verses and financial necessities caused them to moder- 
ate their desires to the limits of the former British 
grant and proclamation. The mother-country acqui- 
esced in this modified claim, possibly with the inten- 
tion of embroiling her former colonists with the Span- 
iards and profiting from the ensuing conflict. But, 
fortunately, the trend of affairs in Europe after 1789 
and the waxing power of Washington's administra- 
tion combined to favor the new nation. However un- 
acceptable their cause, Pinckney at the Escorial and 
Jay at the Court of St. James scored distinct triumphs ; 
and of the two Pinckney 's was by far the more strik- 
ing. His treaty guaranteed the possession of certain 
posts and probably immunity from Indian warfare, as 
did Jay's, and in addition carried with it the formal 
acknowledgment of a territorial claim and the coveted 
privilege of navigating the Mississippi. 

It is reasonable to assert that this treaty did more 
than the militarj^ demonstration against the whiskey 

32 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 33 

insurgents to reconcile the West to the national admin- 
istration and to overthrow the intrigues of the Span- 
ish conspirators. While it did not render acceptable 
their remaining limited commercial subserviency to a 
foreign nation, the men of the western waters were 
content to put up with it for a term of years, being 
fully persuaded that the Natchez district represented 
but the first step toward New Orleans and the Flor- 
idas. It was because Godoy feared this that he de- 
layed the carrying out of the treaty. But his formal 
protest was directed against a possible invasion by his 
recent allies — the British — reinforced by the American 
frontiersmen. 

Per contra the American government hastened to 
secure the advantages now opened to its citizens. 
After the formal ratification of the treaty, April 26, 
1796, Andrew EUicott and Thomas Freeman were 
appointed to represent the United States in running 
the southern boundary.^ But Ellicott's task was by no 
means restricted to the stipulated line of demarcation. 
In addition to his formal instructions he was verbally 
advised to watch Wilkinson, whose intrigues had long 
since given rise to damaging reports.^ Conditions at 
Natchez might cause him to assume indefinite political 
functions. Thus his was a semi-diplomatic mission, 

1 Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 21, Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives. 

2 Annals of Eleventh Congress, First and Second Sessions, 
Pt. 2, 2306. 

4 



34 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

destined to exert considerable influence in the South- 
west. As such it may be compared to Casa Calvo's 
career in New Orleans after the Louisiana Purchase.^ 
The Quaker certainly rivalled the Marques in finesse, 
while the fates were much more propitious toward 
him. 

The Spanish authorities in Louisiana displayed no 
intention of assisting Ellicott in his ostensible mission. 
The Baron de Carondelet attempted another intrigue 
with Wilkinson, although he believed the latter was 
leady to turn against the Spaniards in order to gain 
favor with the American authorities.* More impor- 
tant than this tampering with the loyalty of the Amer- 
ican commander was Carondelet's determination to de- 
lay the evacuation of the posts above the thirty-first 
parallel. If it was necessary to yield these posts he 
suggested the possibility of moving the inhabitants 
below the new boundary line, where they might serve 
to guard the other royal possessions against both the 
Americans and Indians. For the present, however, if 
the people of Kentucky and Tennessee were allowed 
to navigate the Mississippi, they would not become 
impatient over the delay in surrendering the posts, nor 

3 See p. 147. 

* See my article on " Wilkinson's First Break with the 
Spaniards," in Eighth Annual Report of the Ohio Valley His- 
torical Association, 49, 51 ; printed in Biennial Report of the 
Department of Archives and History of the State of West 
Virginia, 1911-1914. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 35 

would they assist their government in capturing them. 
Furthermore he expected them within a few years to 
separate from the Union, and then they would be 
glad to have these forts in possession of the Spaniards, 
rather than of the Americans. 

According to the Spanish governor, the treaty af- 
forded many pretexts for disputes, each of which 
would require months for settlement. Thus His Maj- 
esty would have an opportunity to temporize for two 
or three years over the evacuation without exposing 
Spain to any disadvantage.^ A few days later, his 
subordinate at Natchez, Gayoso de Lemos, told Daniel 
Clark that he did not believe that the Spanish authori- 
ties intended to carry out the treaty with the United 
States. Evidently Gayoso's utterance was inspired, 
for like his chief he expressed a belief in an early dis- 
solution of the Union.^ The Indians objected to the 
presence of the Americans, and this afforded the Span- 
ish officials a strong pretext for disregarding the pro- 
posed boundary line. 

5 Carondelet to Alcudia, reservado No. 70, June 12, 1796, 
Legajo 178, Papeles de Cuba. This collection, the most im- 
portant single source for this work, is located in the Archivo 
General de Indias, Seville. For a description of the papers 
in this collection relating to the United States, see Roscoe R. 
Hill's " Descriptive catalogue of the Documents relating to the 
History of the United States in the Papeles Procedentes de 
Cuba deposited in the Archive General de Indias at Seville " — 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916. 

6 Annals of Tenth Congress, First Session, n,,App. 2730. 



36 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

Some two months later, Carondelet sent Gayoso a 
very secret dispatch in which he said that it was in- 
dispensable to seek pretexts for deferring until De- 
cember the evacuation of the posts. By that time they 
might learn the king's resolution in regard to the 
Natchez settlers and the complaints of the Indians. 
Gayoso must act so as to afford the Americans no 
opportunity for complaint, and while expressing the 
greatest desire to carry out the treaty, find obstacles 
to prevent it. If the American commissioner arrived 
by way of the Ohio, the military authorities along the 
Mississippi were to detain him. If he came by sea to 
New Orleans Carondelet himself would do so, under 
pretense of preparing his escort. Having delayed 
him until September or later, they could then point out 
the impossibility of evacuating the upper forts on ac- 
count of low water. While this condition lasted, he 
could not withdraw the garrisons from the lower posts 
and leave the upper ones defenseless. This would 
provide a plausible reason for not evacuating the forts 
until January. Then Carondelet planned to question 
the ability of the United States to pacify the Indians 
within its limits. This task presented so many diffi- 
culties that Spain would be justified in not ceding the 
territory without more explicit assurances. Gayoso, 
prompt to take the cue from his superior, feared that 
he would be unable to equip a party for the work of 
surveying. The people of the Natchez district had 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 37 

been permitted to extend the period of payment for 
their lands. The approaching transfer might inter- 
fere with this arrangement, and cause some inconveni- 
ence. He wrote in November that the Indians near 
Fort Confederation^ were greatly excited over the 
prospect that Americans might run a line through their 
territory. They knew what this had meant for other 
Indians, and objected to the Spaniards' taking any 
part in the survey or delivering the territory to the 
Americans.^ These officials certainly found no dearth 
of pretexts for delaying to execute the treaty. 

Contemporary events in the West favored their de- 
signs. The British authorities in Canada began to 
cultivate cordial relations with the western settlers and 
with the Indians, with a view to using them in an 
expedition against upper Louisiana. At the same time 
Senator William Blount of Tennessee planned to in- 
vade the Floridas and Louisiana. He feared the loss 
of his extensive land holdings should the French be- 
come established in New Orleans, and expected to in- 
duce the western frontiersmen and the Indians to co- 
operate with a British fleet in attacking the Spanish 
posts on the Gulf. But the mutual antagonism of 

''■ On the site of the French Ft. Tombecbe on the Tombig- 
bee River. 

s Carondelet to Gayoso, Aug. 23, 1796, Gayoso to Caronde- 
let, Aug. 31, 1796, Gayoso to Carondelet, Nov. 14, 1796, Legajo 
43, Papeles de Cuba; Houck, The Spanish Regime in Mis- 
souri, II, 139. 



38 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

his prospective forces rendered such an undertaking 
extremely problematical. 

John D. Chisholm, long a resident in the Indian 
country, was Blount's chief agent. The British min- 
ister, Liston, stated that Chisholm had promised to 
deHver the Floridas to Great Britain through the aid 
of his friends near the border. The premature reve- 
lation of the plot caused the British government 
promptly to disavow all responsibility for Liston's 
statement. Chisholm's employer resigned his seat in 
the United States Senate,^ following a demand of the 
Spanish minister for his punishment, and thus escaped 
impeachment. Before this event, however, he seems 
to have interested Vice-President Jefferson and Gen- 
eral Wilkinson in his scheme, and to have involved 
them so thoroughly that Jefferson was long subject to 
Wilkinson's influence.^^ Aside from this incident, the 
main result of this conspiracy was to arouse the Span- 
ish authorities to unwonted activity in protecting their 
dominions, and to justify them in retaining the forts 
above the thirty-first parallel. 

Timothy Pickering, the secretary of state, regarded 
the whole affair as part of the French plan to regain 
Louisiana. The French ministers, Fauchet and Adet, 
certainly did nothing to disprove the charge. Both 

9 American Historical Review, X, 576, 582; Quarterly of the 
Texas State Historical Association, X, 65. 

10 Eighth Annual Report of the Ohio Valley Historical As- 
sociation, 53. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 39 

opposed war with the United States, but beheved that 
by possessing Louisiana, France could exert the proper 
influence on American affairs. Adet employed a 
French officer, Victor Collot, to visit the western 
country and plan its military defense. Collot's visit 
took place during the Blount conspiracy, against which 
he warned the various Spanish commandants. More- 
over he assured Adet that the" same nation must pos- 
sess both banks of the Mississippi.^^ In view of the 
French plan to reoccupy Louisiana, this suggestion 
had a sinister meaning for the American holdings in 
the West. 

Other French agents besides Collot aroused Ameri- 
can distrust. One Samuel Fulton, an American in the 
service of the Directory, visited George Rogers Clark, 
confirmed him in his French sentiment, and enlisted 
him against the British project.^^ Fulton also endeav- 
ored to enlist the Creek Indians in the French serv- 
ice. At the same time another French adventurer, 
Milfort, representing the former McGillivray faction, 
was planning to organize the Creeks against the Amer- 
icans and to use their country as a foothold from 
which the French might later regain Louisiana. ^^ 

^1 Collot, A Journey in North America, etc., II, 230-245, 
257; American Historical Review, X, 272, 577-582. Wilkinson 
later emphasizes this same idea in his letter of July 6, 1803, to 
Secretary Dearborn, Letters Received, MS., War Department. 

12 American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1903, 
II, 1098. 

13 American Historical Review, X, 271. 



40 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

Thus while the Spaniards delayed in delivering the 
Natchez district to the Americans, English and French 
agents in the Southwest were plotting against each 
other and against the United States ; and our own offi- 
cials, such as Blount and Wilkinson, tried to turn the 
general turmoil and uncertainty to their personal ad- 
vantage. 

In his journey to Natchez, EUicott encountered 
many evidences of the forces working against the 
treaty. Philip Nolan joined him at the mouth of the 
Ohio. The Spanish commandants at New Madrid, 
Chickasaw Bluffs, and Walnut Hills affected ignor- 
ance of the treaty and attempted to detain him. EUi- 
cott nowhere indicates that these two circumstances 
bore any relation to each other. Yet Nolan was the 
confidential agent of Wilkinson, against whom EUicott 
had been warned. On this occasion, however, Nolan 
proved extremely useful in dealing with the Spanish 
officers along the route and in approaching Gayoso.^* 
Within two days after arriving at Natchez, where 
the commandant received them with a great show of 
cordiality, EUicott learned that the Spanish authori- 
ties had no intention of evacuating the posts as stipu- 
le The source for Ellicott's career at Natchez is his Journal 
(Phila., 1803), supplemented by his correspondence with the 
State Department, in EUicott and the Southern Boundary, 
MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library. For the relations of EUi- 
cott and Nolan with the Spaniards, cf. Quarterly of the 
Texas State Historical Association, X, 53-55. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 4I 

lated. At the same time they seemed disposed to grant 
free navigation of the Mississippi. This concession 
was Hkely to prove illusory, for if Louisiana soon 
passed under control of the French, as seemed certain, 
the latter might use their superior resources to close 
that river and bring about the separation of the western 
communities from the Union. 

It was precisely because he feared such a result that 
Ellicott insisted on beginning the boundary survey at 
once. Failing to persuade Gayoso, he strove, as he 
later confessed, so "to embarass the Spanish govern- 
ment " as to force the abandonment of the Natchez dis- 
trict. Although not a Houston or a Fremont, he 
played a similar part in American expansion. Find- 
ing himself upon disputed territory which his govern- 
ment greatly desired ; surrounded by an unsettled pop- 
ulation, most of whose elements were eager for Amer- 
ican control ; facing officials of an expiring regime, de- 
termined to make a last despairing effort to hold the 
coveted territory, he furthered every effort to stimu- 
late a revolt against the Spaniards. The resulting in- 
surrection was a bloodless one, but it was none the less 
effective. Thus the Natchez district served as a proto- 
type for West Florida, as that region in turn did for 
Texas and California. 

In furthering his design Ellicott from the first dis- 
played the American flag over his camp, contrary to 
the request of the Spaniards. Against their wish he 



42 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

brought the military escort under Lieutenant Pope to 
Natchez, and united it with his own company in a for- 
tified camp of considerable strength. He encouraged 
visits from the " inquiet spirits " of the neighborhood, 
among them Thomas Green, already a marked man 
because of his part in the attempt to organize Bourbon 
County ; and encouraged those who were dissatisfied 
to petition for leave to migrate to the upper American 
territory. By arousing undue expectations among the 
Choctaws, he detached them from Spanish allegiance, 
so that they gave him no difficulty when he ran the 
line through their territory. In all of this he exceeded 
his instructions and created the impression with some 
American officials that he was a blundering busybody. 
Doubtless he magnified his services, but honest mo- 
tives inspired them, and in the end crowned with a 
modest measure of success his " Quaker conquest." 

His opponent, Gayoso, was not backward in his at- 
tempts to retaliate ; but he represented a losing cause. 
He tried to separate Ellicott from his escort and get 
him down the river, but the surveyor refused to be 
enticed away from his point of vantage. He sug- 
gested to the landed proprietors that their titles would 
be unsettled under American control, especially where 
there was a conflict between former English and Span- 
ish grants and the claim of Georgia. He also at- 
tempted to attract the debtor class by promising the 
remission of crop liens. His proclamation of March 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 43 

29 mentioning these points, as well as his attitude to- 
ward religious worship and the Indians, repelled as 
many as it attracted. Those who had been "impru- 
dently warm" in declaring their preference for the 
American government felt that they had thereby fa- 
tally compromised themselves.^^ 

At this time, reinforced by a royal order of October 
29, 1796, Gayoso began to ask whether the forts be- 
low the mouth of the Yazoo were to be demolished 
or delivered intact. This was obviously another pre- 
text to delay the evacuation, but he quoted Caronde- 
let's order to retain possession until their governments 
should settle this point. Ellicott believed that the 
other did not intend to give them up at all. Yet he 
rejected Green's offer to raise a hundred men and cap- 
ture the forts, and Anthony Hutchins's proposal to 
make a hostage of Gayoso. Hutchins seemed too in- 
timate with one of Blount's agents and too closely iden- 
tified with British interests to gain Ellicott's confidence. 

In April, 1797, Carondelet instructed Gayoso to as- 
sume a firmer tone in his dealings with Ellicott, should 
he find that the Spanish party at Natchez was more 
powerful than the American. He should refuse to 
evacuate the forts, restrict the number of Ellicott's 
escort, and forbid the approach of the remaining 
American soldiers. In case Ellicott continued his in- 

1^ Riley, " Transition from Spanish Rule," in Publications 
of the Mississippi Historical Society, III, 261 ff. 



44 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

trigues or attempted to exercise private jurisdiction 
while the territory was under Spanish control, Gayoso 
was to escort him courteously to New Orleans, and re- 
press with force any attempt on the part of the resi- 
dents or soldiers to prevent this act. If, however, the 
American party should prove the stronger, Gayoso 
was not to risk an attack at Natchez. He should de- 
stroy the fort there and abandon that at Walnut Hills, 
after withdrawing the artillery from both. This ac- 
tion would estabhsh a basis for later claims against 
the American government. As Ellicott was now act- 
ing with greater caution, Gayoso replied that if Caron- 
delet could secretly send more troops, he would be able 
to delay the evacuation and keep order in the district. 
Early in May Gayoso brought Blount's conspiracy 
and the allied Canadian expedition against Upper Lou- 
isiana to EUicott's attention. These afforded other 
reasons for holding the forts along the Mississippi and 
suspending the boundary survey. It would be neces- 
sary to await assurance from the American govern- 
ment that it would not permit the British to violate its 
neutrality. Ellicott worded his protest against this 
decision so as to convey the impression that Gayoso 
and his colleagues hoped by delay to court favor with 
the French, the prospective owners of Louisiana. This 
would compromise the Spaniard with the people of 
Natchez. But Gayoso repelled the charge with dig- 
nity. At the same time Ellicott advised the secretary 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 45 

of war that there could be no lasting peace as long 
as the Spaniards remained east of the Mississippi. 

Meanwhile at New Orleans Carondelet was teUing 
Nolan that he was determined to suppress the trouble 
brewing up the river by a judicious use of lead and 
hemp. For the purpose he had already issued orders 
to assemble twelve hundred men at Baton Rouge. 
He now asked Nolan, who was a favorite of his, if he 
wished to take part in the expedition, and received 
positive assurance that he did. Yet the American 
kept Ellicott informed of these proceedings, through 
the younger Clark, and thus enabled the commissioner 
to counteract Carondelet's plans and "turn his weap- 
ons upon himself." By this course the double-deal- 
ing Nolan exposed himself to great peril ; but his as- 
sociates carefully concealed his agency, and Ellicott 
at least conceived a high opinion of his ability and 
patriotism. 

President Adams's determined attitude toward 
France so aroused the American contingent at Natchez 
that they formed a plan to add to the Union " the two 
Floridas with the Island of New Orleans," in case the 
Spaniards began hostilities, or permitted the French to 
move through their territory. From the caution with 
which this affair was managed, together with the num- 
ber, character, and resources of its leaders, ElHcott be- 
lieved that it would have met with instant success. In 
a letter he states : " Nothing was left undone through 



46 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

confidential channels to embarrass the Spanish govern- 
ment in this country till the military authority, (which 
was all they had) was abohshed in the district of 
Natchez, after which it was not worth holding ; and if 
Baron de Carondelet had persevered in his calling to- 
gether the militia at Baton Rouge, our plans were in 
such forwardness that the whole country east of the 
Mississippi would certainly have been in our posses- 
sion in less than six weeks. "^^ 

Aside from military preparations to checkmate the 
Americans, Carondelet determined to make a final ap- 
peal to Wilkinson and the other disunionists. Ac- 
cordingly on the 26th of May, 1797, he commanded 
Thomas Power to carry a message to Wilkinson in re- 
gard to postponing the delivery of the forts. This 
was the ostensible motive for Power's journey, but 
his true purpose was to stir up the separatists in Ken- 
tucky. In conferring with the various leaders of that 
State and with Wilkinson, he was to offer them $100,- 
000 immediately, and another $100,000 together with 
twenty field guns and other munitions, as soon as they 
began the projected revolution. Carondelet had not 
written to Wilkinson for fear of compromising him 
since Power's unsatisfactory interview of the previous 
year. Now the threatening perils led him once more 

16 Ellicott to Secretary of State, Jan. 10, 1799, Ellicott and 
the Southern Boundary, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 47 

to appeal to Wilkinson's former Spanish predilection.^^ 
Power accordingly left New Orleans and reached 
Natchez early in June, 1797. There Gayoso furnished 
him with money for his expenses, and with additional 
letters for Wilkinson. The agent endeavored to per- 
suade Ellicott to come down to New Orleans, and 
assured him that the difficulty over the treaty would 
be settled within a month or so. But Ellicott already 
knew of Power's mission through Daniel Clark, and 
determined to thwart it.^® He charged some of his 
friends in Kentucky and Tennessee to use their best 
efforts to the same end. Power reached Kentucky 
with great difficulty and reported Carondelet's project 
to Sebastian. He promised complete indemnity for 

1'^ The details of this mission are given in Gayoso to the 
Prince of the Peace, June 5, 1798, No. 20, sumamente reser- 
vado, Legajo 43, Papeles de Cuba. 

18 Ellicott's own testimony in regard to Power's mission is 
conflicting. In a deposition years afterward (Annals of 
Eleventh Congress, First and Second Sessions, Pt. II, 2307 ff.) 
he stated that he supposed it had reference only to Wilkin- 
son's finances and not to the treaty. Yet in November, 1797, 
he informed the secretary of state that the object of Wilkin- 
son and his friends was to detach Tennessee and Kentucky 
from the Union, unless the treaty were carried out. He also 
reported a more extensive plan in which Wilkinson was to 
combine with Gayoso and Carondelet in revolutionizing Span- 
ish America. The administration regarded the latter as highly 
improbable, and thus missed the real danger involved in the 
intrigue — the possibility that Wilkinson and his confederates 
might be bribed to undertake a western revolt. Cf. Wilkin- 
son, Memoirs, II, 170. 



48 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

any loss the conspirators might suffer. He mentioned 
the Yazoo as the possible southern limit of the pro- 
posed independent state, and informed Sebastian that 
it was not the purpose of the Spaniards to deliver the 
posts on the Mississippi. Sebastian believed the project 
untimely, but promised to communicate it to his 
friends. 

Power then went to Wilkinson's headquarters at 
Detroit, and endeavored to persuade him to head the 
new revolution and become the Washington of the 
western country. Wilkinson, however, refused to con- 
sider the matter, for he felt that the treaty, conceding 
the free navigation of the Mississippi, had destroyed 
the efforts of himself and his companions for the past 
ten years. Never again would the western settlers en- 
tertain a proposition for separation from the Federal 
Government. His own honor and employment would 
not permit him to continue his correspondence with 
the Spaniards. He had destroyed his cipher and the 
previous letters, so that he was relieved of this in- 
trigue, but he speedily showed that he was not will- 
ing to make this relief permanent. He counseled the 
Spanish officials to fulfill the treaty; then perhaps his 
own government would place him in command of the 
Natchez district, where he might have many oppor- 
tunities for new projects. The general also displayed 
his ruHng passion when he asked Power if he had 
brought him the $640 which was due on the last in- 
stalment of his pension. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 49 

So filled with fear was Wilkinson that he went 
through the form of arresting Power and sending him 
under guard to New Madrid. Therefore Power had 
no opportunity for another interview with Sebastian 
and his friends. Some months afterward Sebastian 
went down the river to confer with Gayoso, who by 
this time had succeeded Carondelet at New Orleans. 
He told the governor that the time was unfavorable 
for secession. If they should ever become convinced 
that their affairs demanded a separation from the Fed- 
eral Government, they would be able to undertake it 
alone, and then could treat securely with the Span- 
iards for the navigation of the Mississippi.^^ Thus 
Carondelet failed in his last appeal to western disloy- 
alty. Ellicott believed that the Spaniards greatly over- 
rated the advantage to be derived from such intrigues. 
The time had passed when such a course promised suc- 
cess, but EUicott's own reports were too greatly exag- 
gerated to arouse the governmental authorities against 
the real peril. 

So far the people at Natchez had a very indefinite 
knowledge of the controversy between the American 
commissioner and the Spanish officials. In the latter 
part of May Carondelet issued a proclamation warn- 
ing them against the " improper measures " of cer- 
tain evil-disposed persons. He explained that the sus- 
pension of the treaty was due to the threatened British 

19 Cf. note 17. 
5 



50 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

invasion. His explanation offended all British sym- 
pathizers, of whom there were many in the district. 
With these and the leading landowners largely against 
him, the days of Spanish jurisdiction were numbered. 

ElHcott nov/ endeavored to organize his adherents 
by encouraging a general meeting at which they should 
declare themselves American citizens. With only a 
feeble garrison of fifty men, Gayoso dared not resist 
the circulation of petitions for this purpose. The sit- 
uation was so tense that the least opposition threat- 
ened to precipitate an outbreak. This occurred on 
June 9, when Gayoso arrested a Baptist preacher who 
had personally menaced him. The people at once 
rose, threatened to seize the commandant, and forced 
him and his fellow officials with their famihes to take 
refuge within the fort. 

This virtual abdication of authority caused a gen- 
eral loosening of all restraint throughout the district. 
Ellicott sought to turn the situation to the advantage 
of the United States by assisting those who wished 
to become American citizens to organize for protec- 
tion and the maintenance of order. He circulated 
lists to be signed by these prospective citizens, and at 
the same time Pope promised to protect all those above 
the thirty-first parallel, which he tentatively placed at 
twenty-nine miles below Natchez. They must, how- 
ever, assist his soldiers in repelling any attempt to 
strengthen the Spanish garrison. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 5 1 

Gayoso instructed his men to defend themselves to 
the last extremity. Pope's actions, which measurably 
justified his nickname "crazy," seemed designed to 
exasperate them. A clash between the rival patrols 
was narrowly averted. Exerting himself to prevent 
hostilities, Stephen Minor, a naturalized Spanish sub- 
ject acting as Gayoso's secretary, brought the latter 
to an interview with Pope and Ellicott. Gayoso blamed 
the Americans for the outbreak and threatened to 
bring the Indians down on the settlement. Pending a 
final adjustment he agreed to regard as neutral the 
people living in the territory above the designated 
boundary. 

Meanwhile a meeting of the leading citizens of the 
district had selected seven men to serve with Ellicott 
and Pope as a temporary committee of safety. This 
committee secured Gayoso's reluctant consent to meas- 
ures for securing neutrality and for the selection of 
local officials. The agreement brought the tumult to 
a close. Carondelet ratified the action, because he 
could not help himself, but he complained of the 
course pursued by Pope and Ellicott, and through 
Casa Yrujo requested the American government to re- 
strict them to their proper functions. Early in July 
a permanent committee, appointed jointly by the tem- 
porary body and Gayoso, assumed charge of affairs. 
In November the inhabitants put an end to Spanish 
control in the district by refusing to receive Colonel 



52 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

Carlos de Grand Pre as commandant. In the follow- 
ing month Captain Isaac Guion definitely established 
American jurisdiction there. 

These changes were not accomplished without arous- 
ing the opposition of Anthony Hutchins and his 
friends, who attempted to organize a committee of their 
own. Their purpose was to elect a territorial delegate 
before Congress organized the district and secure their 
individual land claims. By its delay in authorizing a 
territorial government, Congress created the impres- 
sion that the treaty would never be carried out. Many 
were thus led to ally themselves with the Spanish 
party. In emphasizing their personal claims, Hutchins 
and his adherents ignored the American right to the 
whole district. In a similar m_anner the residents of 
West Florida later desired American intervention 
without giving up the vacant lands. 

In September, 1797, Ellicott learned of Blount's con- 
spiracy, and with the permanent committee, devised 
measures against it in the district and among the In« 
dians. By this time he had become extremely cen- 
sorious of colleague as well as of opponent. He sus- 
pected that the conspiracy might be part of the larger 
plan to revolutionize Spanish America, in which he 
implicated Wilkinson. He also reported that the gen- 
eral was tampering with Indian agents in an attempt 
to break up the boundary survey. This made him 
anxious to proceed with it as soon as the Spanish gar- 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 53 

rison should withdraw from Natchez. At the same 
time the Spaniards thought that he and Pope were 
accomphces of Blount, for such friends of the latter 
as came to Natchez rallied around them. Their sus- 
picions were heightened by the reports that Wilkinson 
was gathering troops around the lakes and Guion en- 
trenching himself at Chickasaw Bluff, both with evi- 
dent hostile intent ao^ainst the Spaniards. Ex-Gov- 
nor Matthews and Judge Miller of Georgia, agents 
for one of the groups of Yazoo grantees, not only 
stimulated land disputes in the locality, but suggested 
possible complicity with Blount. For a brief period 
the Tennessee leader rivalled Burr's later reputation 
as the bogie of frontier disturbance. 

In the following year David Humphreys, American 
minister to Spain, used the Blount incident as evi- 
dence that his country was unwilling to profit at 
Spain's expense. He assured Saavedra, Godoy's nom- 
inal successor, that republican neighbors were not so 
bad, after all. His countrymen had no desire to ex- 
pand by conquest, or to interfere in the domestic af- 
fairs of other nations. Sound policy and common 
sense must lead the United States to develop its vacant 
territory, preserve neutrality, and encourage commerce 
with His Catholic Majesty, rather than plan hostile 
expeditions against his dominions. 



20 



20 Letters of D. Humphreys, Apr. 20, 1798, MS., Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives, Department of State. 



54 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

Humphreys could well afford to assume this vir- 
tuous tone. Before French influence had forced 
Godoy into temporary retirement, he had definitely 
ordered his subordinates to carry out the treaty with 
the United States. By this concession he completed 
the service begun some two years before in signing 
the treaty. He had no assurance that his tardy action 
would long content American ambition ; but he knew 
that because of it, the French would derive less satis- 
faction from the retrocession of Louisiana. 

After the Spaniards had determined to deliver the 
Natchez district to the Americans, the next step was to 
run the boundary line. On January lo, 1798, Gayoso 
wrote Ellicott that he was ready to begin this work, 
but the Quaker surveyor expressed little confidence in 
his declaration, and during the next two months found 
many reasons to justify his lack of faith. The ques- 
tion of military escort for the surveying party, the 
delay in withdrawing the garrisons from Walnut Hills 
and Natchez, the fear that the Spaniards, by stirring 
up the Indians, were trying to prevent the survey, — 
all of these matters, coupled with his past experiences, 
forced Ellicott to doubt Gayoso's sincerity. Wilkin- 
son's protest against the delay and the reported Indian 
intrigues did not give him any more confidence. 

In the middle of March Ellicott's friend, Stephen 
Minor, was appointed as Spanish commissioner on the 
boundary survey. The ill-feeling between him and 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 55 

Gayoso, however, threatened still further to retard 
proceedings. Moreover Gayoso lacked scientific men 
and the necessary instruments. This lack was met in 
a measure by the appointment of WiUiam Dunbar as 
temporary representative for the Spaniards, and the 
purchase of his instruments. Yet this gave Ellicott 
little assurance that the Spaniard was in earnest. On 
March 23, however, the Spanish garrison evacuated 
Walnut Hills. Three days later Jose Vidal, Minor's 
secretary, informed Guion that he lacked the neces- 
sary transports to convey the rest of his men down 
the river. Guion pointedly told him that the dignity 
of his country could no longer brook evasions, and gave 
him a peremptory order to evacuate Natchez before 
the 31st. On the last Wednesday of the month the 
Spanish officers waited on Ellicott and Guion in a 
formal leave-taking, and two days later, without any 
definite ceremony, abandoned the fort. 

Following the departure of the Spaniards, Ellicott 
conducted his party down the river and began opera- 
tions to mark the thirty-first parallel ; but the nature 
of the country and the condition of the river delayed 
him for nearly a mxonth. On the 21st of May, Minor 
and a party of laborers joined him, and Dunbar ap- 
peared on the 26th. Gayoso had protested against 
their beginning before his arrival and did not join 
them until May 31. Ellicott believed that if he had 
not proceeded without him, the Spaniard would not 
have appeared during the whole season. 



56 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

Gayoso had to cut short his interview with Sebastian 
in order to join the boundary commission. On his 
way up the river he met John Montgomery Brown, 
bearing letters from the governor of Kentucky and 
from Wilkinson. The general briefly mentioned the 
vigilance of his enemies, spurred on by Humphrey 
Marshall's bitter attacks, and warned Gayoso not to 
trust the western people any longer. This advice, so 
contrary to Wilkinson's former views, aroused the 
Spaniard's suspicions. He believed that the general, 
having abandoned his Spanish connection, was deter- 
mined to keep Sebastian or any of the other conspira- 
tors from continuing them. 

By this time Gayoso had entirely lost confidence in 
the western people, whom he regarded as mercenary 
or seditious, and was equally suspicious of the Amer- 
ican government. He commented to his superior on 
the forces already gathered in Natchez, and these, ac- 
cording to rumor, were to be greatly increased. Wil- 
kinson was even to move his headquarters there. The 
most favorable interpretation that he could put on 
these movements was that the American government 
intended them against France, in case that power de- 
clared war and attempted to use Spanish territory for 
hostile operations. As Wilkinson had sufficient forces 
to prevent this, Gayoso determined not to break 
with him but await a more favorable turn in condi- 
tions. Yet he fancied that with adequate resources he 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 57 



could still control a large party among the Amer- 
icans, or repel any hostilities on their part.^^ 

Meanwhile the party on the boundary line was much 
disturbed by threats of the Choctaws to break up the 
survey. This menace was greatly exaggerated by the 
agent, Samuel Mitchell.-^ With this task once well 
under way and with the difficulties in the Natchez dis- 
trict settled by the withdrawal of the Spanish garri- 
son, Gayoso reported general conditions to Saavedra. 
He felt that the treaty now being carried out gave the 
United States the balance of power in North America. 
Ultimately that nation planned to control the whole 
continent. Its rapid advance and unconcealed ambition 
rendered this very probable. The Spanish sovereign 
would profit, then, if at the next general treaty in 
Europe he could substitute the Yazoo for the thirty- 
first parallel. The Americans could not justly com- 
plain of this enforced retrocession if they still re- 
tained the navigation of the Mississippi. 

The Spanish government had gained nothing by 
granting concessions in the treaty of 1795, for the 
American government still maintained friendship with 
Great Britain, failed to restrain the Indians, and 
wished to push trade with them west of the Missis- 
sippi. By holding Natchez the Americans could cut 
the communication between upper and lower Louisi- 

21 Cf. note 17. 

22 Ellicott to Pickering, Feb. 20, 1798, Ellicott and the South- 
ern Boundary, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library. 



58 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

ana, especially if working in harmony with the British 
in Canada. Such a combination would gain control 
of the highway to the Pacific, and with it the mastery 
of North America. The only thing that kept them 
out of Louisiana and the Floridas was the jealousy 
between the eastern and western portions of the 
United States. Gayoso believed that this would even- 
tually lead to a separation which would force the West 
into an alliance, either with Spain or with England. 
He referred to the earlier attempts to bring this about, 
and the more recent efforts which had been suspended 
by the treaty, yet he was determined to maintain a 
good understanding with the Kentuckians, so as to 
attract them in another crisis. ^^ Thus with true Bour- 
bon insistence he persevered in a policy already out- 
worn. 

In this same letter Gayoso suggested a method by 
which he might counteract American advance. The 
Spanish land system was much more liberal than the 
American, and this would lead many to emigrate from 
the United States to the Spanish dominions. Gayoso 
was not inclined to permit this too freely, especially 
in the country west of the Mississippi, for he pre- 

23 Gayoso to Saavedra, Nov. 2.2, 1798, Spanish Transcripts, 
Missouri Historical Society; Robertson, No. 4665 in List of 
Documents in Spanish Archives, Relating to the History of 
the United States, Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1910. 
The documents thus listed will hereafter be referred to by 
number only. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 59 

ferred to settle French Canadians there. Numbers 
from the Natchez district wished to move below the 
line. Among them were Anthony Hutchins and his 
friends, but Gayoso excluded them because they had 
seemed unfriendly during the recent crisis. More- 
over Hutchins still received half pay from the British 
government.-* Gayoso permitted others to settle in the 
Feliciana district and still others to form a commun- 
ity on the Pearl River. He was suspected of aiding 
Zachariah Cox,^^ in order to attract discontented Amer- 
ican citizens. Gayoso assured Daniel Clark that his 
purpose was not so much to entice immigrants from 
Mississippi Territory as to encourage a progressive 
population in the Floridas and Louisiana. ^^ Within 
a decade his successors were to find these settlers alto- 
gether too progressive. 

The prospect of Wilkinson's arrival in the Natchez 
district aroused much interest. Daniel Clark the elder 
was especially gratified to learn of it. They were 
both good republicans, he wrote, who loved, honored, 
and served their country. Evidently Wilkinson's com- 
ing was heralded by ugly rumors, for Clark stated 
that he had not heard that the general had ever held 
a commission in the Spanish service, and no Anglo- 

24 Ellicott, Journal, 182. 

25 For Cox's plans see Quarterly of the Historical and Phil- 
osophical Society of Ohio, 1913, 29-114. 

26 D. Clark, Jr., to Wilkinson, Nov. 30, 1798, Letters Re- 
ceived, MS., War Department. 



60 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

American in the district would be more likely to know 
than himself. He advised Wilkinson not to be dis- 
turbed by these reports, which only proved the worth 
of republican institutions. Under a despotism no one 
would dare utter them. He mentioned the fact that 
the line of demarcation was still in statu quo. Pa- 
tience had been characteristic of the United States 
from the days of Fabius [Washington] to the present 
time, but he hoped that Wilkinson was now coming 
with a sufficient force to cause the treaty to be car- 
ried out.^'' 

Wilkinson's arrival at Natchez, about the middle of 
August, 1798, caused considerable stir below the line, 
and induced Gayoso to organize his militia. This led 
Ellicott later to write to the secretary of state that 
" the fears and jealousies of the Spanish nation " 
would shortly result in its losing all the country on 
this side of the Mississippi.^^ Clark himself expressed 
a wish to eat his Christmas dinner in New Orleans 
with " Governor Wilkinson." To bring this to pass 
he offered the assistance of his entire family. " I tell 
you, General," he wrote, " you must take New Orleans 
ere permanent tranquility can reign in the United 
States, or agriculture and commerce flourish. These 

27 D. Clark to Wilkinson, Mar. 18, 1798, Letters Received, 
MS., War Department. 

28 Ellicott to Pickering, Nov. 8, 1798, Wilkinson, Memoirs, 
II, 184 n. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 6l 

objects I am anxious to see accomplished ere I attain 
my three score and ten, to which you know I have but 
two or three years to run."^^ 

In January, 1799, ElHcott was in New Orleans on 
a visit, partly official and partly social in character. 
While there Daniel Clark, Jr., furnished him with con- 
clusive evidence that the Spanish authorities had not 
intended to carry out the treaty in 1797. Clark felt, 
however, that recent British naval victories and the 
tone of the last presidential address had induced them 
to pursue a different course. Ellicott's report on the 
Spanish tenure in Louisiana was prophetic. He had 
thought their hold on Natchez very weak, but that on 
New Orleans still more so. **'I am convinced," he 
wrote, "the present government might be abolished by 
the materials within itself, and that with but little risk 
to those who might undertake it, and what contributes 
considerably to this weakness is the general opinion 
of the inhabitants that it will unquestionably before 
many years, be annexed to the United States. The 
arrival of Gen. Wilkinson has greatly strengthened 
that opinion. For my own part, I cannot see any 
advantages that the United States might derive from 
owning this province at present." He believed that 
the Americans would profit more from its trade and 
commerce while in Spanish possession than if in their 

29 Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 122. 



62 OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 

own, and he favored its occupation by the United 
States should any European nation threaten it.^" 

From this point on, ElHcott's work has but inci- 
dental bearing on West Florida. In due course of 
time the surveying party established the line on the 
Mobile, when the Spaniards to their regret learned 
that Fort St. Stephens came above it. Despite rumors 
of Indian hostiHty, encouraged in a measure by the 
"crooked talks" of Vizente Folch, the commander at 
Pensacola, Ellicott also surveyed along the Appalachi- 
cola. Beyond this point the attitude of the Creeks 
became so threatening that Ellicott did not attempt 
to run the line overland. After reaching the St. 
Mary's River, Ellicott completed his task on April 
lo, 1800, more than three years after he had first 
reached Natchez. During this time he had been much 
more than a surveyor, but he firmly believed that his 
varied services more than justified his large expense 
account.^^ With our present information this claim 
seems reasonable. 

Events in the Natchez district during these critical 
years of transition afford many points of comparison 
with later developments in West Florida. There was 
the long-drawn dispute with Spain over the terms of 
a treaty, finally decided more by the exigencies of 

30 Ellicott to Pickering, Jan. 13, 1799, Ellicott and the South- 
ern Boundary, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library. 

31 Ellicott, Journal, passim. 



OCCUPATION OF THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 63 

European politics and by happenings on the frontier 
than by the skill of the American diplomats or the es- 
sential justice of their contention. The Spaniards 
were attempting to control a pioneer population, alien 
in spirit, custom, and political training, but land hungry 
and unscrupulous in appeasing their appetite. It was 
inevitable, then, that charge and countercharge, in- 
trigue and evasion, should finally result in revolt. 
Fortunately the period of disturbance was brief and 
bloodless ; the neighboring savages were not drawn 
into it, or outside nations involved. Yet it estab- 
lished a precedent, and led the United States to pursue 
a similar course, deviously but without intent, through 
the neighboring West Florida into Texas and distant 
California. 



CHAPTER III 

The Louisiana Purchase and the Floridas 

Diplomatic success at the Escorial and the subse- 
quent occupation of Natchez did not afford complete 
security to our southern border. Although Spain still 
possessed New Orleans and the Floridas, there were per- 
sistent rumors that these coveted possessions, along 
with the whole of Louisiana, were about to pass un- 
der the control of the French. Washington had re- 
garded the latter as " unpleasant " prospective neigh- 
bors to our Trans-Allegheny possessions, and Secre- 
tary Pickering thought that Spain should be equally 
concerned for Mexico.^ The American alliance with 
France had been "a mere scrap of paper" since 
Genet's mission, so that it would be necessary to exert 
pressure elsewhere to prevent the transfer. Our min- 
isters to England and Spain were so instructed. King 
in London elicited little sympathy from British offi- 
cials, who were evidently unwilling to intervene with- 
out a definite alliance with the United States f but 
Humphreys, after a special trip from Portugal to 

1 Washington to Pickering, Feb. 14, 1797, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 22, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Picker- 
ing to R. King, Feb. 14, 1797, King, Rufus King, II, 147. 

2 King, Rufus King, III, 572. 

64 



/ 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 65 

Madrid, secured from Godoy's rival, Urquijo, an as- 
surance that France would never get Louisiana while 
he was in office.^ 

Scarcely a year elapsed before the assurance of the 
Spanish minister was shown to be worthless. The c* 

Treaty of San Ildefonso provided for the retroces- 
son of Louisiana, while the new American agreement 
with Bonaparte removed such protection as the for- 
mer alliance gave.* The French were evidently pre- 
paring to limit American holdings by the Appalachians 
rather than by the Mississippi, as CoUot had advised 
them to do.^ Their agents, Milfort and Fulton, were 
already at work among the Creeks, and to the great 
concern of Ellicott and Governor Sargent were plan- 
ning closer connections with Clark and other western 
filibusters.^ Aroused by this Gallic propaganda, the 
attorney-general advised more definite military pre- 
cautions in the Southwest. Wilkinson should oppose 
the passage of French troops up the Mississippi, even 
if under the Spanish flag, and if necessary he might in- 
vade the Floridas to attack them."^ In the following 

3 D. Humphreys to Secretary of State, Aug. 6, 1794, Letters 
of D. Humphreys, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

4 Adams, History of the United States, I, 365. 

5 Ibid. ; King, Rufus King, III, 414. 

6 Turner in American Historical Review, X, 270, 271 ; Ameri- 
can Historical Association, Annual Report, 1903, II, 1097. 

'' Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry, 
439- 
6 



66 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

year Hamilton, as the active head of the American 
army, planned a series of military campaigns begin- 
ning on the Florida border that were ultimately to 
include all Spanish America. Fortunately Adams pre- 
ferred diplomacy to militarism, and thus prevented 
the Floridas from becoming either the Belgium or the 
Balkans of America. 

Jefferson openly maintained a friendly attitude to- 
ward France and Spain, but he still was apprehensive 
in regard to the proposed cession. His first concern 
was to learn if it provided for American privileges 
under existing treaties ; his next, to secure an exten- 
sion of these privileges. The most obvious method 
was the purchase of part or all of the territory in ques- 
tion east of the Mississippi, where the navigation of 
the Mobile was presenting a problem secondary only 
to that of the navigation of the Mississippi. 

Shortly after arriving at his station, Charles Pinck- 
ney, our new minister to Spain, essayed this double 
task. The Spanish secretary, Cevallos, who was so 
long to prove the bete noir of the American diplomats, 
gave him Httle satisfaction about the rumored treaty 
or existing guarantees. Finally Cevallos told the 
American that if the " King His Master " should think 
proper to cede Louisiana to another power, he would 
preserve all the rights of the United States. Pinck- 
ney advised that Livingston should attempt to secure 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 67 

a more definite pledge from the French government.^ 
In his second object Pinckney was even less success- 
ful, although he was authorized to tempt the Spanish 
government to part with the Floridas by offering a 
guarantee of the remaining Spanish colonies west of 
the Mississippi. This was the offer that Jefferson, 
as secretary of state, had empowered Carmichael to 
make a decade before. To make it with effect Pinck- 
ney assumed, as he then fully believed, that the Flor- 
idas did not form part of the Louisiana Province, al- 
though New Orleans did. Moreover he represented 
the desired cession as an act of mutual helpfulness, 
"essential to [his nation] and not at all injurious to 
the other." If granted it would "fix forever such a 
great Natural Boundary between the dominions of 
Our Good Friend, His Catholic Majesty and the 
United States, as will leave no possible room for dif- 
ference hereafter, with the Nation for whom the 
United States cherished so much affection." 

The American minister also pointed out the fact 
that the Floridas had never been productive, and with 
Louisiana in the hands of France, would be still less 
valuable to Spain. On the other hand the navigation 
of the Mobile and other streams was necessary to 
those Americans residing on their upper courses. 

8 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 481, 482. 
The manuscript copy in Spanish Dispatches, MS., VI, Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, contains some significant pas- 
sages omitted in the folio edition. 



68 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

Aside from their commercial advantage and the estab- 
lishment of a natural boundary like the Mississippi 
(which he mistakenly called a "barrier"), he had no 
material motive in pressing for the cession. " Our 
government," he emphatically asserted, "being one 
without ambition, never wishing to extend its territory 
except in so similar a case as this, and never having 
the least idea or desire to possess colonies or more 
than they own, except in this single instance, they trust 
that His Majesty will on this occasion consent to the 
sale and transfer upon such reasonable terms as may 
be agreed upon by the two nations."^ 

Notwithstanding the " affectionate terms " in which 
Pinckney had proffered his request, he did not expect 
the Spanish officials to receive it with favor. They 
were already enraged over the recent forcible cession 
of Trinidad to Great Britain, and might hesitate to 
introduce another power into the Mexican Gulf. Nor 
were they free to act without the consent of the 
French. Moreover, the American diplomat perceived 
a domestic difficulty. How could the Floridas, having 
never formed part of the original States, be constitu- 
tionally received into the American Union? "We 
shall however," he added comfortingly, "have full 
time to consider the question, as the Spanish court 
moves slowly in important negotiations."^^ 

9 Pinckney to Cevallos, Mar. 24, 1802, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

10 Pinckney to Madison, Apr. 20, 1802, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 69 

Evidently they would have full time, for Cevallos 
guardedly replied that the proposal for the sale of the 
Floridas was of such great importance that his gov- 
ernment must consider it with the utmost circumspec- 
tion.^^ Bonaparte himself afforded an additional 
reason for this circumspection. Determined to gain 
the Floridas along with Louisiana, in November, 1802, 
he proffered Parma in exchange. Godoy, once more 
in power, affected to dicker with the French represen- 
tative, Beurnonville, and thought that on this basis the 
First Consul ought to be satisfied with West Florida 
alone. The Frenchman peremptorily asked for a defi- 
nite answer to his offer, and Godoy informed him that 
the king was unwilling to sacrifice any further terri- 
tory in America for a new monarchy in Europe." 
From a later statement of Beurnonville, Pinckney be- 
lieved that his own offer to buy the Floridas was 
largely instrumental in defeating the French attempt, 
but the concurrent opposition of Great Britain and 
Russia was doubtless even more potent.^^ Certainly 

11 Cevallos to Pinckney, Apr. 7, 1802, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

12 Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, Louisiane et les Flori- 
des, 1792-1803, MS., Supplement, Vol. 7, 232-287, passim, Min- 
istere des Affaires £trangeres, Paris. Talleyrand also ad- 
vised Napoleon to content himself with West Florida. Cf. 
page 74- 

13 Pinckney to Madison, Jan. 24, 1804, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Livingston to 
Madison, Feb. 5, 1803, American State Papers, Foreign Rela- 
tions, II, 532. 



70 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

Pinckney obtained no satisfaction when, in response 
to a petition from residents on the upper Mobile, he re- 
quested the Spanish government to put that stream on 
the same footing as the Mississippi.^* While waiting 
for the response of the Spanish authorities, he made 
a leisurely trip to Italy. His secretary, John Graham, 
thus had the opportunity to write Madison that if 
American rights on the Mississippi were preserved, 
they might expect similar privileges on the Mobile; 
otherwise, not. They could expect little from the 
evasive policy of the Spaniards. With regard to the 
inclusion of West Florida in Louisiana, Graham 
learned, probably from the French minister, that the 
boundaries were those laid down in the Treaty of 
1763, but his informant added significantly, "We have 
not yet taken possession of it."^^ 

Despite the hope or threat implied in these words, 
it is evident that none of the diplomats at the court 
of Spain believed that power ready to alienate the Flor- 
id Hunt, Writings of James Madison, VI, 448, 449. This 
was doubtful in view of Morales' recent action. Cf. page 75. 
15 John Graham to Madison, Nov. 29, 1802, Spanish Dis- 
patches, MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. Perhaps 
Graham's attitude was determined by the wishes of his supe- 
riors. He may have been sent to Madrid to check the erratic 
Pinckney and to give Madison inside information of that 
minister's actions. If so, it is an interesting commentary on 
the mutual lack of confidence existing between the South 
Carolinian and the Virginia statesmen. The same distrust 
characterized the relations between the latter group and the 
incumbent in the Paris ministry. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 7I 

idas, and certainly none of them regarded the aliena- 
tion as already accomplished. In London Rufus King 
reported the British authorities as indifferent. Lord 
Hawkesbury seemed to think it immaterial whether 
Louisiana included New Orleans and the Floridas or 
not. As a wilderness area the whole region would be 
valueless for years to come. Later, when war with 
France seemed probable, the British became more in- 
terested in the region and planned to occupy it provi- 
sionally or to permit the United States to do so. But 
this change did not indicate any marked friendliness 
for the latter nation. ^^ 

Paris was the real center of diplomatic pressure dur- 
ing this eventful year, and after his arrival there as 
minister, in December, 1801, Robert R. Livingston 
did not intermit his efforts to aid his colleague Pinck- 
ney. Talleyrand told him that the cession of Louisi- 
ana had been merely a subject of conversation between 
France and Spain. Another minister, probably Barbe- 
Marbois, said that Louisiana was not theirs to use even 
partially for paying their debts.^^ Stirred up by re- 
ports from the frontier, Jefferson affected to regard 
the prospective danger from French neighbors as suf- 
ficient to justify a British alliance. As usual his sec- 
ond thought was less belligerent, for he preferred to 

16 King, Rufus King, IV, 17-19, 146-148. 

17 Livingston to Secretary of State, Dec. 10, 1801, Dec. 12, 
1801, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 512. 



72 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

buy New Orleans and the Floridas from France, if 
that power now possessed them and was ready to sell 
on favorable terms. ^^ At the same time he wrote Du- 
pont de Nemours that such a cession would be only a 
" palliation " for the " vicinage " of France. But even 
so, if the United States should secure it, the boundary 
of our country would then be sufficiently extensive, 
and the " chain of the American Union rendered too 
strong to be weakened for several centuries."^^ 

Although the Americans hoped to gain the Floridas 
through the influence of the French, Livingston pur- 
sued a course little calculated to enlist their sympathy. 
While Napoleon, incensed at the earlier failure to ex- 
tort the Floridas from Spain, along with Louisiana, 
was striving to obtain them by proferring Parma, or 
Parma and Placencia together, the American minister 
assumed that France did not yet possess them and 
proceeded to make sure that she should not. Aware 
that the two governments were disputing on this point, 
he told De Azara, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, 
that Spain ought to keep the Floridas as security for 
South America.^" What she should do to counter- 
act American possession of the Floridas he did not 
state. He disputed with Collot and Adet over the 

18 Jefferson to Livingston, Apr. i8, 1802, Ford, Writings of 
Jefferson, VIII, 143. 

19 Jefferson to Dupont de Nemours, ibid., 203. 

20 Livingston to De Azara, May 28, 1802. American State 
Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 518. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 73 

possible inclusion of Mobile and Pensacola in the 
cession to France.^^ He contended that the territory 
east of the Mississippi was of little economic value to 
France or Spain, but of great strategic importance to 
the United States. He even hinted that Great Britain 
might join his country in protesting against an increase 
of French power on the Gulf.^^ By such "short 
hints " he pursued with little success his double object: 
to keep the Floridas from France and to gain them, 
wholly or in part, for the United States. France did 
not get the desired provinces, but her failure was due 
to the fact that the obstinacy of Charles IV and his 
advisers far surpassed Livingston's persistence as a 
diplomatic factor. The American also retarded his 
cause by associating commercial claims with it. Hav- 
ing once made this unacceptable combination, it seemed 
impossible for American diplomats to dissociate the 
claims and the Floridas. 

It was at this time that Livingston also presented 
another characteristic phase of the future negotiation. 
Failing to awaken a response by his offers to purchase 
the entire Florida area, he expressed a willingness to 

21 Livingston to Secretary of State, June 8, 1802, ibid., 519. 
Thomas Sumpter, who acted as secretary of the legation, 
charged that Livingston was planning with Daniel Parker 
and others to make a real estate speculation out of the Florida 
negotiation. Cf. Sumpter to Monroe, Oct. i, 1803, Monroe 
Papers, MS., X, 1219, Library of Congress. 

22 Livingston to Minister of Exterior Relations, Jan. 10, 
1803, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 531. 



74 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

content himself with West Florida alone. This would 
give the United States control of the eastern bank of 
the Mississippi and the shores of Mobile Bay. New 
Orleans and East Florida would enhance the value of 
this limited area; but, if they were unattainable, the 
Americans might construct a channel to the sea by way 
of Manchac and the Iberville and thus render their 
upper settlements independent of the future Crescent 
City.^^ The United States would also be able to dis- 
regard any feeble colonies that France could maintain 
west of the Mississippi, and even acquiesce in her 
possession of Pensacola and St. Augustine. This em- 
phasis upon the strategic and commercial value of 
West Florida may account for his later insistence, con- 
trary to his earlier views, that West Florida formed 
part of Louisiana. 

Another, even more influential than he, held a simi- 
lar opinion. In November, 1802, Talleyrand wrote Na- 
poleon: "West Florida suffices for the desired en- 
largement of Louisiana. It completes the retrocession 
of the French colony, such as had been given to Spain. 
It carries the eastern boundary back to the river 
Appalachicola. It gives us the port of Pensacola and 

23 The British had considered the feasibility of such a chan- 
nel, while possessing West Florida. Knowledge of this fact 
may account for the similar views of Jefferson and Gallatin. 
Cf. Jefferson to Dr. Hugh Williamson, Apr. 30, 1803, Works 
of Jefferson (Memorial Edition), X, 385; Gallatin to Madison, 
Feb. 7, 1803, Hunt, James Madison, VH, 32. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 75 

the population which forms more than half that of 
the two Floridas. By leaving East Florida to Spain 
we much diminish the difficulties little felt today but 
which some day may become of the greatest impor- 
tance."^* Talleyrand did not persuade the other to 
abate his demand for both the Floridas. In that 
same month the First Consul offered to exchange 
Parma for them, but without result. With Talleyrand 
advising Napoleon to accept West Florida, in lieu of 
a better bargain, and with Decres counseling him to 
"think well" before taking Louisiana without Mo- 
bile,^^ Livingston's efforts to gain the same region 
were likely to be futile. 

On October i6, 1802, Juan Ventura Morales, the 
intendant, definitely suspended the American right of 
deposit at New Orleans. This unexpected act, arous- 
ing the entire West and galvanizing Federalist opposi- 
tion, demanded some immediate diplomatic achieve- 
ment. A special mission seemed the most promising 
method. Monroe was asked to associate himself with 
Livingston and Pinckney in the endeavor to secure 
the Floridas and settle once for all the vexatious ques- 
tions of western navigation. If he failed to secure 
the coveted territory, the administration hoped that 
he would at least obtain an " enlargement " of the right 

24 Adams, History of the United States, I, 401, 402. 

25 Minuit de Decres, 13 Vendemiaire An XI, Archives des 
Affaires fitrangeres, Louisiane et les Florides, MS., Vol. 7, 
supplement. 



76 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

of deposit, to include all rivers passing from Amer- 
ican territory to the Gulf through the Floridas.^^ In 
the combined diplomatic and domestic problem thrust 
upon them Jefferson and Madison thought half a loaf 
better than none. 

For a time it seemed likely that Livingston, spurred 
into redoubled activity, would fail to secure even this 
modest concession. Having found Talleyrand a doubt- 
ful channel for his communications to Napoleon, he 
availed himself, as before, of such intermediaries as 
the friendly Lebrun and even Joseph Bonaparte. Fi- 
nally a suggestion to use the American claims against 
France in the proposed exchange drew from Talley- 
rand the crushing declaration : " It is entirely opposed 
to the maxims of Government, adopted by the Repub- 
lic, to mingle important and delicate political relations 
with calculations of account and mere pecuniary inter- 
ests."^^ After assuming this virtuous tone it must 
have been doubly bitter for Talleyrand, a few weeks 
later, to offer the whole of Louisiana to the persistent 
American. 

Livingston could interpret this offer only in keep- 
ing with his obsession for the Floridas. France did 
not expect to obtain them, along with Louisiana, and 
so regarded the latter as of little worth. He told Tal- 

26 Madison to Pinckney and Monroe, Feb. 17, 1803, Ameri- 
can State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 533. 

27 Talleyrand to Livingston, i Ventose An XI (Feb. 19), 
1803, ibid., 546. Iv 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 77 

leyrand that the Americans did not want Louisiana ; 
but at once wrote Madison that if they should get it, 
they should exchange all that portion west of the Mis- 
sissippi for the Floridas.-^ This, to paraphrase his 
own words, seemed like disposing of the skin before 
he had killed the bear ; but it showed that after months 
of vacillation he fully believed that France had not 
acquired the coveted territory. Yet when the con- 
scienceless Napoleon performed this act of slaughter 
for him, he completely reversed himself, and in the 
process carried with him his unacceptable colleague, 
Monroe, and the entire administration, with the pos- 
sible exception of Gallatin.^^ 

In Spain, Pinckney not only protested against the 
suspension of the deposit, and with success, but re- 
newed his previous proposal to purchase the Floridas. 
To render this more acceptable he now offered for the 
first time to guarantee the Spanish possessions west of 
the Mississippi.^^ What he or his superiors hoped to 
accomplish by this offer, after the failure to carry out 
a similar guarantee with France, under the Treaty of 
1778, does not clearly appear, but it indicates their 
anxiety to gain the Floridas. 

After allowing the Spanish minister a month to re- 

28 Livingston to Madison, Apr. 11, 1803, ibid., 552. 

29 Cf. pages loi, 228. 

30 Pinckney to Cevallos, Feb. 17, 1803, Letters of C. Pinck- 
ney and R. Livingston, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 
Department of State. 



78 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

fleet Upon his generous offer, he reverted to the sub- 
ject from a different standpoint. The number, re- 
sources, position, and spirit of the western Americans 
rendered it problematical how much longer they would 
submit to Spanish exactions upon their commerce. 
Should they take affairs in their own hands the Span- 
iards could not resist their onset, nor could the eastern 
States check them, granted that they cared to do so. 
He wished this statement to be taken as an evidence 
of sincere friendship, rather than of threatening ambi- 
tion. His country desired a lasting peace with His 
Catholic Majesty, and to ensure it was willing to pur- 
chase the Floridas at a fair price and obligate them- 
selves to defend the Spanish possessions near them. 
If Spain, however, should persist in her restrictive 
commercial policy, war would be inevitable. "We 
must have the free navigation of the Mississippi " 
(and he might have added "of the Mobile") "or we 
will take it by force. "^^ 

This vigorous memoir preceded by one day his an- 
nouncement of Monroe's special mission. At the same 
time he asked Cevallos if there was anything in the 
treaty between France and Spain that affected the 
existing rights of the United States, or prevented 
compliance with his proposition to buy Florida. In 
answer to his first question Cevallos sent him the third 
article of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, which Pinckney 

31 Pinckney to the Prince of the Peace, Mar. 21, 1803, ibid. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 79 

at once forwarded to Pans. It may be that this ar- 
ticle was inserted verbatim in the subsequent treaty 
between France and the United States, because Mon- 
roe and Livingston had this official copy before them. 
If so, the Spanish minister unwittingly rendered the 
Americans a service that was to prove extremely em- 
barrassing to himself. 

In answer to his second question Cevallos sent a 
brief but pointed reply : " The system adopted by His 
Majesty not to alienate any of his estates deprives him 
of the pleasure of agreeing to the concession which 
the United States wished to obtain by purchase." Af- 
ter stating that France was to regain Louisiana " with 
the same limits it had, saving the rights accruing to 
other powers," he advised Pinckney that the United 
States would be able "to direct itself to the govern- 
ment of France to negotiate for the acquisition of the 
territories which may be conducive to their interests."^- 

In all probability the Spanish minister merely wished 
to end an unpleasant discussion with the Americans. 
He felt reasonably sure that France would be un- 
willing to negotiate in their behalf when she had not 
been able to gain the region for herself. Casa Yrujo 
was instructed to inform Madison of this decision. 
In doing so, he added that the Spanish king, by thus 
alienating his dominions contrary to the Treaty of 

22 Cevallos to Pinckney, May 4, 1803, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



80 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

Utrecht, would injure his reputation and arouse com- 
plaints among the great powers of Europe. Besides, 
such action would be discourteous to France after 
Spain's recent refusal to accept her advantageous of- 
fers. ^^ Both Casa Yrujo and Cevallos speedily learned 
that Napoleon was by no means equally scrupulous in 
his dealings with them. On May 2 his minister 
signed with Livingston and Monroe the treaty that 
conveyed Louisiana to the United States. 

The recipients of Napoleon's vast and unexpected 
gift prospered beyond their dreams, but not in the 
pathway of their instructions. This led east of the 
Mississippi, while they had wandered far to the west- 
ward. Despite the success that had overtaken them, 
they must still direct their efforts toward the Flori- 
das, which for nearly a quarter of a century had been 
the goal of their countrymen. Moreover the defense 
of their new acquisition imperiously led them thither. 
West Florida intervened between New Orleans and 
the rest of the United States and still gave the Span- 
iards a chance to close the Mississippi. Thus the great 
problem of its commerce was by no means perma- 
nently settled, although with Louisiana in their posses- 
sion, the Americans were in much better shape to in- 
sist upon a favorable solution. 

At first neither American diplomat perceived the 

33 Casa Yrujo to Madison, July 2, 1803, Spanish Notes, MS., 
I, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



V 



t 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 8 1 

solution afforded by the indefinite article that consti- 
tuted the only description of their purchase. Each 
worked independently to secure for himself all the 
advantage that might be gained by further acquisition. 
Monroe, anxious to avoid additional expense, at first 
proposed to exchange the territory west of the Missis- 
sippi for the Floridas.^* Even this required French 
assistance. Napoleon vaguely promised his aid ; but 
when Spain presented her inevitable but unavailing 
protest against the alienation of Louisiana, he deter- 
mined to protect her, at least from other aggressors 
than himself. He intimated to the special envoy that 
it was not a favorable time to negotiate at Madrid, 
and afterwards repeated this declaration so decidedly 
that Monroe withdrew to his new post in London to 
await developments.^^ 

Livingston was equally unsuccessful in attempting 
to get a clearer definition of the acquisition. Napo- 
leon's cynical threat to render the territorial article 
obscure, if it were not already so ; Talleyrand's mock- 
ing encouragement to make the best possible bargain 
out of the treaty ; and Barbe-Marbois' evasion over 
the claim to Mobile^^ — all of these pointed to but one 
conclusion : the Americans might interpret the treaty 

3* Monroe to Madison, May i8, 1803, Hamilton, Monroe, 
IV, 24. 

35 Monroe to Secretary of State, July 20, 1803, ibid., 44. 

36 Livingston to Madison, May 20, 1803, American State 
Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 561. 

7 



82 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

to suit themselves. Evidently Napoleon had intended 
to do so ; at least the Spaniards later accepted this as 
the most obvious interpretation of the puzzling third 
article in the Treaty of San Ildefonso :^^ " His Catho- 
lic Majesty promises and engages in his part, to retro- 
cede to the French Republic the colony or province of 
Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the 
hands of Spain, that it had when France possessed it; 
and such as it should be after the treaty subsequently 
entered into between Spain and other states. "^^ 

It is true that the instructions to the French envoys 
at Madrid, and to General Victor, who was to take 
possession of the province, expressly follow the 
Treaty of 1763, and thus exclude West Florida from 
the cession. All documents relating to the transfer 
are to the same effect.^^ Yet Napoleon's general at- 
titude toward Louisiana, to say nothing of other phases 
in his career, lead one to conclude that he would not 
have hesitated to use this article to force the cession 
of West Florida, whenever it suited his purpose. 

37 See the Memoir dated Dec. 23, 1814, in the manuscript 
volume, Papers in Relation to Burr's Conspiracy, Bureau of 
Rolls and Library, Department of State. 

38 De Clercq, Recueil de Traites de la France, I, 411. 

39 Adams, History of the United States, II, 5-10. The docu- 
ment's gathered by Mr. Adams from the French archives and 
deposited in the Bureau of Rolls and Library of the State 
Department give additional evidence to support this position. 
The correspondence of the Spanish colonial authorities in the 
Archive General de Indias, Seville, is to the same effect. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 83 

Whether he intended to incite the Americans to the 
same end is immaterial. They were bound to get 
into a controversy with Spain over the article, and 
both parties must submit their quarrel to him as ar- 
biter. 

Previous to May, 1803, Livingston had contended 
that West Florida formed no part of Louisiana. It 
might be awkward to reverse himself so quickly, but 
few knew of his previous contention, and the public 
credit for obtaining the territory would far outweigh 
their disfavor. The ambiguous article lent itself to 
his purpose, although he had to adopt an interpreta- 
tion that France had not asserted nor Spain allowed. 
Less than three weeks after the treaty he was ready 
to urge his behef upon Madison. " Now sir," he 
wrote, "the sum of this business is to recommend to 
you, in the strongest terms, after having obtained the 
possession, that the French commissary will give you, 
to insist upon this as part of your right; and to take 
possession at all events, to the river Perdido. I pledge 
myself that your right is good, and after the explana- 
tion that has been given here, you need apprehend 
nothing from a decisive measure." Eight days later 
he wrote Pinckney that West Florida, including Mo- 
bile, was regarded as part of the purchase and that 
he should act accordingly.**' The conception, clever 
enough for the Corsican himself, proved irresistible 

40 Adams, History of the United States, II, 68-73. 



84 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

to Monroe and later to his fellow-statesmen from Vir- 
ginia. Their only regret was that they had not thought 
of it before it had occurred to the gentleman from 
New York. 

Early in June Livingston persuaded his colleague 
to join him in advising Madison to act just as if West 
Florida formed part of the island of New Orleans.*^ 
On the 19th of the month Monroe wrote to Madison 
that his opinion on the southeastern boundary of Lou- 
isiana was "too clear to admit of a doubt."*^ He 
evidently intended by definiteness of expression to 
neutralize what Livingston had gained by priority. He 
then elaborated his opinion in a memoir, which forms 
the most complete statement that we have of subse- 
quent American opinion upon the boundaries of Lou- 
isiana.*^ He affirmed that the Spanish government 
held views similar to his own, or at any rate that it 
would acquiesce in the occupation of the territory to 
the Perdido. 

Monroe made a detailed examination of each clause 
in the puzzling third article. He interpreted the first 
— that the cession should comprise Louisiana " with 
the same extent that it actually has in the hands of 
Spain" — as if Spain since 1783 had considered West 
Florida as a part of Louisiana. At any rate if Spain 

*i American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 563-565. 
*2 Hamilton, Monroe, IV, 38, 39. 
43 Ibid., Appendix II. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 85 

had governed the areas together, she had thus re- 
stored the former Hmit to the Perdido. The second 
clause — that " Louisiana shall comprise the same ex- 
tent that it had when France possessed it " — he thought 
sufficiently obvious. It had only served to render the 
first clause clearer. Otherwise the fact that Great 
Britain had owned a part of the territory for twenty 
years under a different name might be confusing. The 
third clause — "and such as it ought to be after the 
treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other 
powers" — referred to the treaties of 1783 and 1795, 
and was designed to safeguard the rights of the United 
States. This clause, then, simply gave effect to the 
others, as was shown by some corroborative evidence 
from French sources. 

According to Monroe, France never dismembered 
Louisiana while it was in her possession. On Novem- 
ber 3, 1762, she conveyed New Orleans and the ter- 
ritory west of the Mississippi to Spain, and on the 
same day transferred the Floridas to Great Britain. 
After 1783 Spain reunited West Florida to Louisiana, 
thus completing the province as France possessed it, 
with the exception of those portions controlled by the 
United States. By a strict interpretation of the treaty, 
therefore, Spain might be required to cede to the 
United States such territory west of the Perdido as 
once belonged to France. Such was Livingston's con- 
clusion, as elaborated by Monroe and later reinforced 
by Jefferson and Madison. 



86 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

A few weeks later in London, Monroe informed 
Lord Hawkesbury that the Perdido was the eastern 
limit of the Louisiana Purchase. His lordship seemed 
favorably impressed with the idea, and thought that 
East Florida would likewise soon belong to the United 
States.** From Madrid, however, Pinckney reported 
that the Spanish authorities naturally held the opposite 
view ; but if the United States made good its claim 
there would be little difficulty in getting East Florida 
on its own terms. Cevallos and Godoy, however, 
were more disturbed by the prospective transfer of 
Louisiana than by any mere question of its limits. 
Unless the Americans could induce France to assist 
them in gaining the Floridas, they were liable to have 
trouble over this unexpected interpretation of the 
treaty. Only through the exigencies of European 
diplomacy could they bring the Spanish king to ac- 
cept it.*^ 

Jefferson and Madison needed no urging from Paris 
to show them the desirability of claiming part of West 
Florida. They had an even stronger sense of the do- 
mestic value of such a claim than had their diplomatic 
representatives. Despite their meagre archival data 
and lack of touch with international affairs, they were 
determined to push their bargain to the uttermost. At 

44 Hamilton, Monroe, IV, 70. 

45 Pinckney to Madison (Private), Aug. 30, 1803, Spanish 
Dispatches, MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 87 

separate times during the negotiation both Livingston 
and Monroe had advised the administration to ex- 
change part of the territory west of the Mississippi 
for the Floridas. Madison now warned them to en- 
tertain no proposition of the sort, but to collect the 
proofs necessary to substantiate their claim to the Per- 
dido.^® Jefferson had already included all the waters 
of the Mississippi and Missouri in the purchase.*^ 
Upon perusing the arguments of Livingston and Mon- 
roe he was ready to extend it to the Perdido, " the 
ancient boundary of Louisiana," and confidently ex- 
pected to possess the whole Florida region, "all in 
good time," without sacrificing " one inch of the 
waters of the Mississippi."*^ Two weeks later he as- 
sured his secretary of state that their right to the Per- 
dido was " substantial " and could be opposed " by a 
quibble on form only."*^ In the autumn he embodied 
his views in a pamphlet entitled " The Limits and 
Bounds of Louisiana," and this pamphlet, distributed 
in manuscript form, determined the future attitude 
of the administration and its adherents.^^ 

Jefferson had asked some gentlemen on the border 
to give him their views on Louisiana cartography. 

46 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, (yzT. 

*'^ Jefferson to Horatio Gates, July 11, 1803, Ford, Jefferson, 
VIII, 249. 

*s Jefferson to John Breckenridge, Aug. 12, 1803, ibid., 242. 

49 Ibid., 245. 

^0 Published in Documents Relating to the Purchase and 
Exploration of Louisiana, Boston, 1904. 



88 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

Daniel Clark, the best informed of them, did not be- 
lieve the cession extended beyond the line laid down 
in the Treaty of 1763, and Dunbar coincided with his 
view. The latter seemed to favor the exchange of ter- 
ritory west of the Mississippi for the Floridas. Clark 
thought the question must be settled by negotiation 
and concession. Claiborne and John Sibley of Natchi- 
toches were inclined to favor the claim to the Per- 
dido, but their views were evidently determined by 
policy rather than precise information. The substance 
of their replies afforded the president little comfort, 
but in summarizing them he still insisted on placing 
the boundary at the " Perdigo which enters into the 
Gulf east of Mobile.'' 

Across the border Governor Manuel Salcedo was 
not at all certain about the territorial limits of Louisi- 
ana. He had earlier asked for instructions to guide 
him in regard to Mobile and contiguous territory. 
His associate, Vizente Folch, and his superior, Cap- 
tain-General Someruelos, both told him that Spain 
retroceded to France exactly the territory that it had 
received forty years before. Therefore Louisiana did 
not include West Florida, which Spain had acquired 
from Great Britain. Occasionally the governor of 
Louisiana had exercised a personal control in West 
Florida, but this did not mean a merger of the two 
provinces.^' 

^^ Salcedo to Someruelos, Oct. 22, 1802, Folch to Salcedo, 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 89 

Notwithstanding these explicit statements Salcedo 
persisted in his confusion. On December 13, 1803, 
he referred to Manchac and Baton Rouge as "that 
part of Louisiana which still remains to us," although 
in the same missive he reported that the transfer on 
November 30 to the French " included Louisiana only." 
In January he and his associate, the Marques de Casa 
Calvo, asked the French commissioner to support their 
contention that "beyond doubt the limits on the east 
bank of the Mississippi remain fixed by the treaty 
of Paris." He made an acknowledgment to this ef- 
fect, and furthermore told the American commission- 
ers, General Wilkinson and Governor Claiborne, that 
Spain had peremptorily refused to include Mobile in 
the transfer. After a silence of some two months the 
Americans protested against any statement that might 
seem to infringe upon their full claim to Louisiana.^- 

By this time the passage of the Mobile Act, assert- 
ing jurisdiction over the disputed region, raised the 
question to one of international importance. The 
Spanish commissioners then asked Laussat to endorse 
their protest against American pretensions. Laussat 

Nov. 22, 1802, Someruelos to Salcedo, Nov. 10, 1802, Feb. 28, 
1803, Mar. 12, 1803, Spanish Transcripts, Department of Ar- 
chives and History, Jackson, Miss. Cf. Robertson, 4874, 4877, 
4882, 4895, 4896. 

52 Robertson, 4935-4937, 4949, 4950, 4961 ; Claiborne and 
Wilkinson to Madison, Dec. 27, 1803, Louisiana Purchase, 
MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State. 



90 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

complied, although he pursued a contrary policy in re- 
gard to Texas.^^ Perhaps, as Wilkinson then charged, 
he designed to start a controversy between the Span- 
iards and the Americans, from which his country 
alone might profit. 

The American general, one of the chief actors in 
the transfer, evidently aspired to be its evil genius 
also. Despite his prominence as one of the American 
representatives, he did not hesitate to act as mercen- 
ary adviser for the Spaniards. Folch, the new gov- 
ernor of West Florida, and Casa Calvo, now an ac- 
credited Spanish boundary commissioner, were so im- 
pressed by his specious representations that they paid 
him a munificent sum outright and advised their su- 
periors to secure his allegiance by additional largesses. 
In return he gave them some obvious suggestions about 
frontier defense that Folch himself combated in his 
accompanying letter.^* 

Wilkinson endeavored to impress Folch by claiming 
to know " thoroughly what was in the heart of the 
president." The executive was not always fortunate 
in selecting his bosom companions, but on this occasion 

53 Robertson, Louisiana under Spain, France, and the United 
States, 1785-1807, II, i63 ff. 

5* For the details of the intrigue, cf. Cox, " General Wilkin- 
son and his Later Intrigues with the Spaniards," in American 
Historical Review, XIX, 794-812. For the memoir printed by 
Robertson (Louisiana, II, 325-347) but wrongly ascribed to 
Folch, cf, ibid., 798, note 11. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 9 1 

the general either greatly abused the confidences of his 
great friend or was using them with extraordinary 
finesse to advance his own fortunes. Jefferson, as 
we have seen, accepted the claim to West Florida and 
encouraged his supporters in Congress to declare it 
openly. Wilkinson advised Folch to protest against 
this and to enlist the aid of the French government 
to the same end. The president proposed to gain 
the Floridas without any material sacrifice elsewhere. 
His protege, absolutely dependent upon his favor, did 
not hesitate to point out to the Spaniard, in return for 
a bribe already in hand, that the Floridas formed the 
key to the New World. With them in her possession 
Spain could still control American commerce on the 
Gulf and the Mississippi, exert a powerful influence 
over the neighboring Indians, and check every attempt 
of the United States to press its claims to the west- 
ward. By yielding them as a result of Monroe's pro- 
jected mission, she could unlock the heritage of the 
Indies, and the western frontiersmen, " like the an- 
cient Goths and Vandals would precipitate themselves 
upon the weak defenses of Mexico, overturn every- 
thing in their path, and propagate in their course the 
pestilent doctrines that had desolated the most valu- 
able part of Europe and deprived whole kingdoms of 
their foundations." Yet Spain would do well to ex- 
change the Floridas for the entire western bank of the 
Mississippi. She could even be generous in the pro- 



92 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

cess and assume the existing public debt of the United 
States. 

Perhaps Wilkinson depended upon this last sug- 
gestion to appease the economical Jefferson should he 
ever hear of this intrigue. He was anxious to make 
one great financial strike that would place him in easy 
circumstances for the rest of his life, and this proposal 
would certainly have accomplished his purpose had the 
Spanish authorities seriously entertained it. In the 
interim he sagely advised them how to defend West 
Florida, as well as Texas, and urged them to encour- 
age the American policy of removing the Indians west 
of the Mississippi. Those so removed would become 
bitter enemies of the United States and would be 
more ready to assist Spain in protecting her western 
frontier. 

Folch had some faith in Wilkinson, but doubted his 
accuracy. So he advised his superiors to keep the 
Floridas as a rampart for Cuba, and to gain the west 
bank of the Mississippi as well. Perhaps they might 
immediately cede some territory on its eastern bank. 
He was willing to repay what the United States had 
actually expended for Louisiana, but it would be po- 
litical heresy to do more. More to the point was Casa 
Calvo's payment of twelve thousand dollars on ac- 
count. Wilkinson, then and thereafter, offered vari- 
ous explanations of his ill-gotten store of Mexican 
silver, and despite the inconsistency of his excuses, 



i 
t 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 93 

succeeded only too well in concealing the transaction 
that produced it. Other dealings of equally shady 
character were to mark the renewal of his intrigues 
with the Spaniards. 

In the meantime, in connection with the ratification 
of the Louisiana treaty, the American Congress had 
so acted as to give point to Wilkinson's advice. In 
the Senate Pickering of Massachusetts voiced his op- 
position, because the Hmits of the purchase were so 
" uninteUigible," especially on the side of Florida. 
Dayton, of New Jersey, with some inside information 
acquired during his recent sojourn in Louisiana, as- 
sured his fellows that the French prefect had no inten- 
tion of being restrained by the Iberville, after his troops 
should arrive.^^ The suggestion was clearly too un- 
scrupulous for his hearers. Congress rather preferred 
to follow the advice that Mitchell of Georgia gave the 
House : ratify the treaty, take possession of the terri- 
tory, and then settle the disputed boundaries by joint 
commissions. John Randolph warned the House that 
if they waited to adjust Hmits before ratifying the 
treaty, they might never secure any of the territory. 
Acting as the spokesman for the administration, he 
stated definitely that the United States had gained con- 
trol of the "mouth of the Mississippi, the Mobile, and 
of every river of note except the Appalachicola, rising 

65 Annals of Eighth Congress, First Session, I, 47, 4S. 



94 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

within the United States and falHng into the Gulf of 
Mexico."^^ 

To support his assertion Randolph briefly reviewed 
the French and Spanish claims to the Floridas. Es- 
saying an interpretation of the perplexing third ar- 
ticle in the Treaty of San Ildefonso, he reached the 
seemingly inevitable American solution: the Perdido 
bounded the Louisiana Purchase, below the thirty- 
first parallel. It was against this interpretation that 
Wilkinson warned Folch and advised him to enlist 
French assistance. A few Americans opposed this 
view, — Rufus King, who at first seemed to favor it, 
his friend Pickering, and Ellicott, whose book ap- 
peared that year.^^ About a decade later Stoddart 
and H. M. Brackenridge strongly championed the Jef- 
fersonian view and aroused most scathing criticism, 
especially from Benjamin Vaughn of Boston.^^ In 
general these controversialists were too partisan to be 
convincing. 

Madison, who had independent leanings toward the 
Monroe-Livingston interpretation of the Louisiana 
Purchase, told Pichon, the French minister, how de- 

56 Annals of Eighth Congress, First Session, I, 401, 415, 
439, 486. 

^'^ For the position of King and Pickering, cf. King, Rufus 
King, IV, 329-332, 363, 554, 555, and Jefferson Papers, Series 
2, Vol. 66, No. 36, MS., Library of Congress. For Ellicot't's 
opinion cf. Preface of his Journal, pp. V and VI. 

58 A. Stoddart, Sketches . , . of Louisiana, 131-149; Vaughan, 
Remarks on a Dangerous Mistake, etc., Boston, 181 4. Copy 
of latter consulted in the Library of Congress. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 95 

sirable it was to define Louisiana with greater ac- 
curacy before delivering it to the Americans. Else, 
he observed, the treaty of cession would be subject 
to " every legitimate interpretation and inference " the 
Americans might care to make.^^ But Laussat made 
the delivery with no public statement about West 
Florida or the boundaries in general. It would be an 
easy matter, the secretary wrote Monroe, "to take 
possession according to our idea. The mode alone 
can beget a question. "^^ 

The Spanish minister, Casa Yrujo, warned the 
colonial authorities that the Americans would prob- 
ably occupy West Florida at once^ — a course to which 
the weakness of the garrisons there invited them; or, 
by withholding part of the purchase money, force the 
French to get it for them.^^ Evidently he did not 
know either party as thoroughly as he imagined. The 
French autocrat, already regretting his munificent do- 
nation to the Americans, was not inclined to augment 
it, while the president would hesitate before attempt- 
ing to force his generosity. Rather, Jefferson ex- 
pected to gain that part of West Florida bordering 
on the Mississippi through the voluntary action of its 

59 Madison to Pichon, Oct. 21, 1803, Domestic Letters, MS., 
Vol. 14, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of 
State. 

60 Hunt; Madison, VII, 78. 

61 Casa Yrujo to Someruelos, Feb. 12, 1804, Legajo, 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



96 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

inhabitants, and that right soon. As for the rest of 
it, he could await some " favorable conjunction 
abroad." An attempt to restrict American commerce 
on the Mobile might likewise avail to bring Spain to 
a "just and liberal settlement."^^ He was soon given 
a chance to test both these possibilities. 

Despite the president's optimism, Anthony Merry, 
the new British minister at Washington, noted a dis- 
appointment in administration circles because of this 
failure to secure West Florida. The unsympathetic 
attitude of the prefect, Laussat, increased their disap- 
pointment, which was rendered still more poignant be- 
cause certain explanations at Paris had led them to 
claim the region publicly. But the Englishman felt 
that they would employ diplomacy rather than arms to 
gain it, and they would at the same time instruct 
Monroe, who was to conduct the negotiation, to essay 
East Florida as well. The British minister interpreted 
American irritation as due in some measure to a fear 
that Great Britain might occupy the disputed territory, 
should Spain ally herself with France. This would 
revive all the dread of western separation. To offset 
this the United States might seek closer relations with 
France.^^ 

In view of what followed we cannot credit Merry 

62 Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 8, 1804, Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 
289. 

63 Merry to Hawkesbury, Jan. 16, 1804, MS., British For- 
eign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 41, London. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 97 

with a very good guess. Back in November John 
Randolph had introduced into the House of Repre- 
sentatives a bill to carry into effect the laws of the 
United States within the new acquisition. On Feb- 
ruary 24, 1804, it received the president's signature. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the measure as a 
whole, it was its fourth and eleventh sections that gave 
it its popular name, " The Mobile Act." 

The fourth section provided for the annexation to 
the Mississippi revenue district of "all navigable 
w^aters, rivers, creeks, bays, inlets, lying within the 
United States which empty into the Gulf of Mexico 
east of the Mississippi river." But if the Iberville 
was the eastern limit of American territory, there were 
no such navigable waters wholly within the United 
States. Section eleven was still more explicit, for it 
authorized the president, whenever he should deem it 
expedient, to form " the shores, waters and inlets of 
the bay and river of Mobile, and of other rivers, creeks, 
inlets, and bays emptying into the Gulf of Mexico east 
of the said river of Mobile, and west thereof to the 
Pascagoula," into a separate revenue district, and to 
designate suitable ports of entry and delivery. These 
two sections placed a full legislative interpretation on 
the theories of Livingston, Monroe, and Jefferson, and 
there remained only the open or tacit acquiescence of 
Spain to make good the title of the United States as 
far as the Perdido. 
8 




98 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

In a violent personal interview which Casa Yrujo 
held with him, Madison speedily learned that Spain 
would by no means consent to this interpretation. 
The incensed Spaniard demanded the annulment of 
these offending sections, and gave at great length the 
Spanish interpretation of the obscure territorial 
clauses. Moreover, Yrujo refused to ratify the pend- 
ing claims convention which the administration hoped 
to use in negotiating for the Floridas. Madison, of 
course, could not comply with Yrujo's peremptory 
demand, nor could he allege that the other held a mis- 
taken view of the objectionable clauses. In a com- 
munication to Livingston he intimated that the act was 
passed to prevent smuggling through West Florida, 
but this seems an afterthought. As neither he nor 
Jefferson had demanded possession of the territory at 
the time Louisiana was transferred, the situation was 
an awkward one for both of them. 

It promised to become more awkward from the fact 
that Casa Yrujo persuaded Merry to make common 
cause with him. Through his foreign ofhce and the 
London press the British minister was to inform his 
people that Spain had not evacuated West Florida 
and did not propose to do so, however much the 
Americans sought to create the contrary impression. 
Moreover Spain would not sell any territory that 
would assure them control of the Gulf to the detri- 
ment of her own interests and those of Great Britain. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 99 

In a later memoir the British minister showed how- 
important this region was in the commercial develop- 
ment of the western country. Its harbors were espe- 
cially valuable in view of the difficulties in navigating 
the lower Mississippi. 

As Madison rendered him no adequate explanation 
of the administration's course, Yrujo withdrew from 
Washington in anger. The president then cleared the 
situation by his proclamation of May 30, 1804, in 
which he stated that " all the above mentioned shores, 
waters, inlets, creeks, and rivers, lying within the 
boundaries of the United States, should form a sepa- 
rate district under the name of Mobile, with Fort 
Stoddart as its port of entry and delivery." Thus he 
virtually annulled the act, and that too in face of the 
general public interpretation. Merry reported this 
course as "perfectly satisfactory" to Casa Yrujo.^^ 
If so, the Spaniard did not permit the president to 
know it, but despite a later conciliatory explanation by 
Madison, continued to harp upon it as a characteristic 
example of American duplicity. Monroe was to find 
Casa Yrujo's superiors equally obdurate. 

That Jefferson's concession was but temporary is 
evident from his previous statement to Dunbar : " how- 
ever much we may compromise on our western limits, 

6* Adams, History of the United States, II, 260-263 ; Merry 
to Hawkesbury, Mar. 13, 1804, MS., British Foreign Office, 
America, II, 5, Vol. 41. 



100 LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS 

we never shall on our eastern."^^ He had evidently 
permitted Congress to pass the act in order to test 
Spanish resistance to our claim. When this proved 
unexpectedly strong, he wavered, suggested a specious 
explanation that made him appear more liberal than 
Congress, and by implication threw upon Randolph, 
whom he tutored in regard to West Florida, the major 
part of the blame for the unfortunate legislation. The 
testy chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means 
did not forget the affront, as the shifty executive was 
to discover. 

Monroe's special mission constituted another reason 
for conciliating the Spaniards. By this negotiation, 
with Pinckney's casual aid, the administration hoped to 
finish with its great problems of European diplomacy, 
and acquire East Florida, perfect its title to West 
Florida, and fix upon a satisfactory western boundary. 
On April 15, 1804, Madison sent Monroe his instruc- 
tions, embodying the opinion of the united cabinet. 
By insisting that the strip to the Perdido formed part 
of the Louisiana Purchase, he would avoid acknowl- 
edging the recent land grants that Morales had made 
there. He was to offer two million dollars for the 
remainder of West Florida and East Florida, together 
with the renunciation of certain commercial claims. 
In the following July he was informed that the right 

65 Jefferson to Dunbar, Mar. 13, 1804, Washington, The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 537. 



LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE FLORIDAS lOI 

to the Perdido was a sine qua non, and that he must 
contend still more strongly for the whole of Texas. 
To this program, however, Gallatin did not wholly 
give his consent.^^ 

With this statement we may conclude the American 
position in regard to West Florida. Political, com- 
mercial, and strategic motives, as well as personal 
views, led Livingston, Monroe, Madison, and Jeffer- 
son to insist upon including it in the Louisiana Pur- 
chase. West Florida was necessary for the defence 
of New Orleans and the navigation of the Mobile. It 
had been desired for more than twenty years. Its ac- 
quisition formed the main purpose of Monroe's special 
mission. East Florida, though more extensive, was of 
less immediate importance. Both territories, however, 
were necessary to the proper rounding out of Ameri- 
can dominions. The next decade was to determine 
the status of West Florida. Within five years more, 
even Spain recognized that she must yield East Florida. 
The methods by which she was brought to acknowledge 
these truths constitute the main features of the ensu- 
ing discussion. 

^^ American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 62%, 630. 



CHAPTER IV 
The Failure of Monroe's Special Mission 

In the quadrennium following the renewal of war- 
fare in Europe, Napoleon's crushing victories gave him 
the mastery from the Tagus to Tilsit. Outside these 
limits his diplomacy was potent, if not wholly supreme. 
Its most direct manifestations in the United States 
centered about the problems of neutral commerce; 
but the controversy over West Florida, involving 
East Florida as well, and damages for commercial 
spoliations, played an important if insidious part in 
the diplomatic game. Through it Napoleon hoped to 
gain a substantial subsidy, as he had done in the case 
of Louisiana, even if he did not bring the United 
States into an alliance against the Mistress of the 
Seas. Neither the American nation nor Spain was 
able wholly to resist his machinations, but the latter, 
because of her proximity, was to be the greater 
sufferer. 

Far from being moved to compassion by Spain's 
plight, and distinctly repelled by what it regarded as her 
obstinate pride, the American administration proposed 
to make her lot still harder by forcing the long desired 
cession of the Floridas. For this purpose Jefferson 

102 



FAILURE OF MONROES SPECIAL MISSION I03 

and his advisers armed their representatives with the 
plausible claim to West Florida and with questionable 
commercial demands, which their unfortunate southern 
neighbor could not meet unaided. 

Doubtful as these claims were, they depended upon 
the modern Caesar to push them to a successful con- 
clusion. But unwilling to match his ruthless methods, 
Jefferson and Madison undertook a diplomatic bout 
that resembled the famous attack on the windmill. 
Monroe was their champion ; his task the purchase of 
the Floridas — the same that brought him to Europe the 
year before. Napoleon had then refused to counte- 
nance his efforts, but as Spain was soon to number 
England among her enemies the time now seemed 
favorable for the United States to press its demands. 

Again, as in the previous year, Monroe's commission 
aroused a jealous rival. Charles Pinckney had been 
instructed to await his coming; but as early as July, 
1803, when he learned that Monroe would not come 
on at once, he had begun to pave the way for him. By 
reviving former claims against Spain for spoliations 
and urging these in an offer to purchase the Floridas, 
he hoped to avoid any controversy over the claim to the 
Perdido. Now that Napoleon had abandoned his ter- 
ritorial aspirations in America, Pinckney counted on 
French assistance. The price offered was too small 
and the method of payment was objectionable, but as 
the United States was the only possible purchaser, he 



104 



FAILURE OF MONROE^S SPECIAL MISSION 



prophesied an easy acquisition. His secretary, Gra- 
ham, as before, did not share in his confidence, but 
hoped that Monroe's mission would create the proper 
impression on the Spanish officials.^ 

Graham was not the only American to express little 
confidence in Pinckney's efforts. Jefferson and Madi- 
son advised him to do nothing about the Floridas, 
pending Monroe's arrival, unless the Spaniards first 
broached the matter. But in keeping with his earlier 
course, Pinckney encouraged the Spanish secretaries 
to make such advances. He reminded Godoy that he 
had once '' done much for the United States in a spirit 
of conciliation." The minister knew this only too well 
and doubtless little relished the seductive reference. 
A hint that the French might favor the cause of the 
Americans, or that Great Britain, when Spain should 
be at war with her, would make an alliance with them, 
pleased him as little.^ None of these unwelcome hints 
moved him or the obdurate Cevallos. Both acknowl- 
edged that the Floridas were economically worthless 
and that the United States must inevitably possess 

1 Pinckney to Secretary of State, Nov. 20, 1803, Spanish 
Dispatches, MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; same 
to Madison, Aug. 30, 1803, Letters of C. Pinckney and R. 
Livingston, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Graham 
to Monroe, Nov. 18, 1803, Lenox MSS., New York Public 
Library. 

2 Pinckney to the Prince of the Peace, Dec. 30, 1803, Letters 
of C. Pinckney and R. Livingston, MS., Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives. 



FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 105 

them, but neither covert threat nor proffered friend- 
ship could induce the Spaniards to hasten this achieve- 
ment. 

Undeterred by their failure to respond to his ad- 
vances, Pinckney pursued his chosen course, inform- 
ing Madison and Jefferson, to their discomfiture, that 
'' we must be moderate and patient. The game we are 
playing is not a trifling one and appears now to he 
more within our power than ever!' At the same time 
he warned them, " I have already mentioned to you in 
many of my letters the improbability of my doing any- 
thing with the sum^ limited as to Florida and now I 
repeat it as a thing almost impossible with that sum/' 
Livingston, whom he counselled to enlist the aid of the 
French, shared his view.^ 

The man who would not keep his hands off a nego- 
tiation when explicitly instructed to do so was hardly 
likely to further it to the exclusive advantage of a 
prospective rival. No one, then or thereafter, charged 
that Pinckney consciously attempted to bungle the 
delicate task in which he was simply to introduce the 
chief agent, Monroe ; but he was so anxious to antici- 
pate honors for himself that, copying Livingston in 
like circumstances, he spent months in meddling with 

3 Pinckney to Madison, Jan. 24, 1804, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; same to same, 
Apr. 8, 1804, Letters of C. Pinckney and R. Livingston, MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. The italicized portions of 
the above dispatch were written in cipher. 



I06 FAILURE OF MONROE^S SPECIAL MISSION 

a question that above all needed to be left alone. It 
was a case that seemed to call for " watchful waiting " 
rather than unwelcome insistence, but the former 
course promised little public renown. 

At length the report of the Mobile Act gave Cevallos 
a chance to still the American's unwelcome urging. His 
vigorous protest aroused the anger of Pinckney, who 
retaliated by asking Cevallos to explain why his sov- 
ereign had failed to ratify the claims convention of 
August, 1802, which played a substantial part in the 
administration's program. On receiving a conditional 
reply, that demanded among other points the revoking 
of the Mobile Act, Pinckney threatened an immediate 
rupture.* The puzzled and frightened Cevallos, faced 
with the necessity of yielding to American encroach- 
ment or becoming more subservient to France, chose 
the latter alternative. His country had long borne the 
burden of this subserviency, and despite the costly 
concessions that it entailed, his colleague Godoy, the 
victim of one of the most shameful of concessions, 
could suggest nothing better.^ They first appealed to 
Beurnonville, the French ambassador. Pinckney also 
turned to him in his difBculties,^ although he urged 

* Adams, History of the United States, 11, 279. 

5 Pinckney to Madison, Aug. 26, 1804, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

6 Beurnonville to Minister, 18 Prairial, An XII (June 7, 
1804), Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, :£spagne, MS., Vol. 
666, 294. 



^ 



FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION 107 

Livingston to busy himself with the very source of 
authority. The Spanish ministers hkewise instructed 
their representative, Admiral Gravina, to enlist the 
aid of the French emperor, for such Napoleon had 
now become. If war with the United States should 
materialize, that country was liable to form an alliance 
with Great Britain, invade Mexico, and, aided by the 
British army, cut Spain off from her most productive 
colonies. This prospect touched Napoleon at a tender 
point, for he had scarcely less interest in the Mexican 
treasury than had Spain herself. Accordingly he lent 
a ready ear to Gravina's request and bade Talleyrand 
instruct the new envoy to the United States, General 
Louis Marie Turreau, to aid Casa Yrujo in preventing 
hostilities and in curbing the territorial pretensions of 
the Americans.'' 

In answer to Beurnonville's request for specific in- 
structions about West Florida, Talleyrand vaguely in- 
formed him that France sold to the United States only 
such territory as it actually received from Spain. 
Having repossessed Louisiana only momentarily, with 
no opportunity to determine its rights, his government 
was now unwilling to enter into the dispute. But it 
hoped for a friendly settlement between the interested 
parties.^ Perhaps Talleyrand distrusted the French 

"^ Adams, History of the United States, II, 294, 295. 

s Talleyrand to Beurnonville, 16 Messidor, An XII (July 5, 
1804), Archives des Affaires £trangeres, fitats Unis, MS,, Vol. 
57, 160. 



I08 FAILURE OF MONROe's SPECIAL MISSION 

ambassador's ability to still the tumult then raging at 
the Spanish court and to control both Pinckney and the 
Spanish ministers. He felt better able to guide the 
controversy from the home office. 

At the same time Livingston explained to Talley- 
rand how the first sight of the Treaty of San Ildefonso 
removed all doubts about the eastern limit of Louisiana 
and overcame his hesitation at exceeding his powders 
in purchasing it. Under French possession that 
province had extended to the Perdido, both wrhen 
France originally owned it and after Spain retroceded 
it to her, and the United States was entitled to all that 
France had acquired. This last statement almost para- 
phrased Talleyrand's dictum to Beurnonville, but to the 
American it meant something far different. More- 
over, he alleged that Talleyrand, the year before, had 
assented to his claim that Louisiana extended to the 
Perdido. He alluded to the "excessive delicacy" 
that kept the Americans from taking possession of the 
disputed area, pending more definite explanations. 
Talleyrand doubtless appreciated both these references. 

With this ingratiating introduction Livingston 
passed to an explanation of the Mobile Act. His gov- 
ernment had expected the Spanish authorities to accept 
the American interpretation of the cession and grant 
the claim to the Perdido. As this concession might 
occur after the adjournment of Congress, that body 
had judged it expedient to pass certain regulations for 



FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION I09 

establishing custom-houses in that region. Unfor- 
tunately the Spanish minister misinterpreted this ac- 
tion, and his heated remonstrances thereon threatened 
to disrupt friendly relations between the United States 
and Spain. Hostilities once begun, the safety of the 
western country would lead the frontiersmen to occupy 
the disputed territory. At the same time the United 
States would join Great Britain in an attempt to free 
the Spanish colonies. On the other hand, by promptly 
intervening the emperor would assure the United 
States its just claims, and enable that nation to pur- 
chase East Florida before another maritime power 
could seize it. The other colonies would then con- 
tinue under Spanish control as best suited French and 
American interests.^ 

With both disputants appealing to him. Napoleon 
was free to use the quarrel to his own advantage. By 
yielding for the moment to the protests of injured 
pride, he might atone for the hurt inflicted upon Spain 
when he alienated Louisiana. I'he unseemly haste of 
the Americans in claiming a region that he had vainly 
attempted to purchase, the inopportune passage of the 
Mobile Act, and the vigorous insistence on commercial 
claims further impelled him to favor the outraged 
Spaniards. Under his direction, therefore, Talley- 
rand instructed Turreau to inform the American gov- 

9 Livingston to Talleyrand, Aug. 23, 1804, Archives des 
Affaires fitrangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Supplement, Vol. 8. 



no FAILURE OF MONROE^S SPECIAL MISSION 

emment in a thoroughly conciliatory manner that the 
eastern limit of Louisiana was undoubtedly the Missis- 
sippi, the Iberville, and the lakes, as laid down in the 
Treaty of 1762; and that the double cession since 
afforded no basis for a more extensive claim. The 
United States should also modify some objectionable 
features of its commercial claims. ^^ 

This yielding to Spanish susceptibilities promised to 
be only temporary. If war should break out between 
Spain and Great Britain the latter, as mistress of the 
seas, might prevent the Spanish treasure ships from 
reaching Europe and thus cut France off from a 
million or more dollars per month, which Spain paid 
as a secret subsidy to her imperial plunderer. The 
political libertine would then be forced to seek com- 
pensation elsewhere. Another cherished possession 
of his helpless mistress would afford the means, and 
with the Louisiana Purchase still fresh in mind, he 
did not doubt that the Americans stood ready to pay 
his price.^^ The mere pride of despoiled Spain would 
weigh but little against the needs of his treasury. He 
could afford to await the moment of hostilities between 
Spain and England, for delay would enhance the value 
of the Floridas in the eyes of the Americans. 

The disputants were not forced to wait long. Spain 

10 Adams, History of the United States, II, 295-300. 

11 Livingston hinted at this in his communication to Madi- 
son, Sept. 21, 1804; Hamilton, Monroe, IV, 305, n. 



FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION III 

was assembling an armament at Ferrol, possibly to use 
against the United States. The British minister, seek- 
ing a pretext for hostilities in order to cut off Spain's 
subsidy to Napoleon, demanded an explanation of this 
armament. The Spanish government was unwilling 
to give it, whereupon the British fleet seized the 
Spanish treasure ships and Spain immediately de- 
clared war. Pinckney, who had not yet recovered from 
the humiliation of his failure, wrote : ** We ought to 
get what we want now."^^ Possibly so, but his su- 
periors preferred to substitute another agent. Casa 
Yrujo had asked for his recall and Jefferson yielded. 
Madison expected him to return in very bad humor. 
" I could not permit myself to flatter him," the secre- 
tary wrote, " and the truth will not permit me to praise 
him. He is well off in escaping reproof for his agency 
has been very faulty as well as feeble."^^ At the 
present time a calm review of the whole Florida nego- 
tiation must convince one that Monroe, Livingston, 
and the administration at home must share the blame 
that the secretary then visited upon the unfortunate 
Pinckney. 

From across the Atlantic came conflicting reports 
concerning the attitude of the American government. 

^2 Pinckney to Madison, undated but probably some time in 
December, 1804 Letters of C. Pinckney and R. Livingston, 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

12 Madison to Monroe, Nov. 9, 1804, Letters and other Writ- 
ings of James Madison, II, 208, 



112 FAILURE OF MONROe's SPECIAL MISSION 

Merry thought that it might take advantage of hostili- 
ties between Spain and Great Britain, should the two 
nations come to blows, to get the Floridas and initiate 
a revolt in South America ; but he did not believe Jef- 
ferson would risk his popularity just before election 
by forcing a war on the issue. The American execu- 
tive evidently expected the French government to aid 
him in gaining his ends.^* CasaYrujo did not directly 
disprove this assumption of Merry, and assured him 
that his own government would not carry the issue to 
a crisis. At the same time the Spaniard wrote home 
that the administration did not countenance Pinckney's 
course, due in a measure to Livingston's promptings, 
and that it was not strong enough in Congress to bring 
about a declaration of war in behalf of its commercial 
and territorial pretensions. It had given a " sort of 
satisfaction" in regard to the objectionable Mobile Act, 
so that now with a firm and moderate diplomatic 
policy, and with three thousand effective men at Mo- 
bile, Spain could hold her own in any further contro- 
versy. She could lose only if a " certain neighboring 
power " forgot its interests and came to the support of 
the untenable American claims. He did not believe 
Napoleon would make such a false move, and with 
nothing to fear from him, Cevallos could meet and 
discomfit Monroe as he had Pinckney.^^ 

14 Merry to Harrowby, Oct. i, 1804, same to Hammond, Oct. 
I, 1804, MS., British Foreign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 42. 

15 Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, Oct. 22, 26, 1804, Adams Tran- 



FAILURE OF MONROES SPECIAL MISSION II 3 

The latter's blundering course made some action at 
Madrid necessary, but the time and the man did not 
seem in favorable conjunction. Monroe was needed 
in London ; the administration also desired to use him 
in Louisiana ; and Livingston was unwilling to cooperate 
with him from Paris. The French government was 
less favorable to his mission than it had been the 
year before, but Monroe's Paris correspondent did not 
know the full extent of its opposition. The only 
promising feature of the situation was the prospect of 
immediate hostilities between England and Spain. 

In October, 1804, Monroe reached Paris on his way 
to Madrid. Here he met Livingston, and the latter's 
brother-in-law and successor, John Armstrong, who 
was to continue the New York tradition at the Paris 
legation. Neither welcomed his presence and both 
doubted the efficacy of his proposed effort. Monroe 
desired to remind Talleyrand of Napoleon's promise 
the year before to assist the United States in procur- 
ing the Floridas. Both Livingston and Armstrong 
officially supported his representation to that minister, 
but in later years he charged them with encouraging 
the French government to expect some twelve or four- 
teen millions from the transaction.^^ Some ugly charges 
of the sort were current in Paris, then and thereafter, 

scripts, Spanish State Papers, Bureau of Rolls and Library, 
Department of State (Robertson, 5007). 
16 Monroe to Skipwith, July 31, 1823, Lenox MSS. 

9 



114 FAILURE OF MONROES SPECIAL MISSION 

but it is probable that the disappointed Monroe exag- 
gerated them and attributed to the irregularities he sus- 
pected a preponderant share in his subsequent failure. 

Monroe preserved a concihatory tone in his note to 
Talleyrand, although he strongly intimated that war 
might follow a diplomatic rupture at Madrid. He dis- 
cussed in some measure the American claim to West 
Florida, and explained that the president, although 
authorized by Congress to take possession of the an- 
cient boundaries of Louisiana, had preferred to defer 
this step to give time for necessary explanations and 
adjustments.^^ Notwithstanding his evident good-will 
and patience (for he tarried several weeks in Paris) 
his letter remained unanswered. His friend Marbois, 
however, told him that it was a financial affair. M. 
Hauterive tersely stated the conditions : " Spain must 
cede territory, the United States must pay money."^^ 
France, he clearly learned, was to reap all the profit 
from the transaction. 

It seemed apparent that Monroe could escape a mor- 
tifying diplomatic failure only by abandoning his mis- 
sion at the outset or submitting to the terms offered. 
Neither alternative appealed to his personal pride or 
was in keeping with what he chose to consider na- 
tional honor. Even at that time Madison was assur- 

17 Monroe to Talleyrand, Nov. 8, 1804, American State Pa- 
pers, Foreign Relations, II, 634. 

18 Adams, History of the United States, II, 305. 



FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION II5 

ing him, in additional instructions, that he could not 
"too earnestly press upon Spain the necessity of clos- 
ing all the differences between the two countries." 
The Mississippi and the Mobile were absolutely essen- 
tial to the United States, while " Spain must sooner or 
later swallow " the commercial claims against her.^^ 
Some similar feeling, heightened by his nearer view 
of Spain's helplessness before England, doubtless led 
Monroe to persevere in his task. He must, at any 
rate, straighten out the muddle into which Pinckney 
had brought affairs. 

Some three weeks before Monroe left Paris, Tal- 
leyrand advised the emperor to disapprove of the 
American commercial claims as insincere and as at- 
tacking his good faith. Moreover the Americans had 
displayed little civility toward France in devising an 
untenable claim to West Florida, after that power had 
vainly negotiated for the same region ; and they had 
displayed still less generosity toward Spain in push- 
ing that claim when she was helpless. Talleyrand 
intimated, however, that the Floridas were of little 
use to Spain, but very essential to the military se- 
curity and commercial development of the United 
States. If that power should adopt a more courteous 
policy Napoleon might well favor the views of the 
Federal Government, and Spain, through financial 
necessity, yield to them. Napoleon took no action on 

1^ See note 13. 



Il6 FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 

these suggestions until Monroe had left Paris. Then 
he directed Talleyrand to declare the American claim 
to West Florida absolutely unfounded and to express 
a sarcastic interest in the outcome of so unusual a 
negotiation.^® 

This declaration probably reached Madrid before 
Monroe himself, and in connection with other previous 
statements did much to insure the failure of his mis- 
sion. Before leaving Paris he received some intima- 
tion that Talleyrand's report to the emperor was not 
favorable. After a period of uncertainty he deter- 
mined to continue, hoping to accomplish something 
single-handed by working upon the fears of Spain 
for her colonies. His colleagues regarded his cause 
as hopeless, and his long review of conditions, sent to 
Madison from Bordeaux on December i6,^^ reflected 
this feeling. Nevertheless he wrote his Parisian cor- 
respondent and friend, Skipwith, " I shall pursue the 
object intrusted to me with zeal and diligence, and I 
trust with success. "^^ 

The administration in Washington did not need the 
discouraging reports from Paris and Bordeaux to con- 
vince it that Monroe must fail in his mission. In 
January, 1805, Turreau and Casa Yrujo, in an em- 
barrassing interview with Madison, informed him that 

20 Adams, History of the United States, II, 310-314. 

21 Hamilton, Monroe, IV, 294. 

22 Monroe to Skipwith, Dec. 18, 1804, Lenox MSS. 



FAILURE OF MONROe's SPECIAL MISSION II 7 

their governments had come to the joint conclusion 
that the American claims to West Florida were un- 
tenable and the commercial claims unjustifiable. Tur- 
reau's predecessor had been too friendly to the United 
States. The present minister was not likely to repeat 
this mistake. He even quoted the Treaty of 1762 as 
the determining factor in the territorial dispute. 
When Madison referred to maps that showed the Per- 
dido as the eastern Hmit of Louisiana, Turreau pointed 
out that the same maps included Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky within that province. As the desire of these 
two States to obtain a commercial outlet by way of 
the Mobile formed an important domestic raison d'etre 
for the West Florida claim, Madison little relished this 
reference. At times he tried to cajole Turreau, while 
that minister attempted to reconcile him with Casa 
Yrujo. But the Spaniard, despising Madison for his 
ungenerous course toward his nation, was only too 
anxious to humiliate him. The whole interview, there- 
fore, was but another of those distressing but enlight- 
ening scenes in which the two had recently appeared 
as principals.^^ Its only result was a request for 
Yrujo's recall — a request that was to constitute the 
only successful point in the program entrusted to 
Monroe. Even this was not made humiliating to 
Casa Yrujo, whose superiors graciously "gave him 
permission to retire " from an unpleasant situation. 

23 Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, Feb. 7, 1805, Adams Transcripts, 
Bureau of Rolls and Library (Robertson, 5021). 



Il8 FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 

Warned by the reports from abroad, the president 
now expected his envoys to break off the hopeless nego- 
tiation and merely attempt to secure the privilege of 
navigating the Mobile. Madison was ready to aban- 
don the American claim to West Florida altogether.^* 
Nevertheless Jefferson and his secretary of state united 
in commissioning James Bowdoin of Massachusetts 
as minister to Spain in Pinckney's stead. In a few 
weeks suggestions from Paris showed that the nego- 
tiation was about to assume those venal phases char- 
acteristic of Talleyrand. Madison wrote Armstrong 
with becoming indignation that "the United States 
owes it to the world as well as to themselves to give 
the example of one government at least, protesting 
against the prevailing corruption. . . . If her [France's] 
object, as you conjecture, is simply to make money out 
of it, this will finally be abandoned in despair."^^ His 
virtuous protest would have been more convincing had 
he expressed it as clearly when France was inclined to 
favor American claims. 

When Monroe reached Madrid he learned that the 
Spanish court was at Aranjuez and thither he and 
Pinckney proceeded. Their ensuing negotiation may 
arouse some additional interest on the part of the 
casual American tourist in this garish retreat of Span- 
ish royalty, and he will doubtless enjoy the palace with 

24 Adams, History of the United States, IV, 54, 55. 

25 Madison to Armstrong, June 6, 1805, Instructions, MS., 
VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State. 



FAILURE OF MONROE <= SPECIAL MISSION II 9 

its tawdry interior, formal garden, and stately avenue 
and park far more than did the distressed diplomats 
who vainly haunted them in the weary months that fol- 
lowed. After going over the situation with Pinck- 
ney, Monroe agreed that his colleague's course the 
previous summer had been the only possible one, and 
determined to have him sign the formal notes jointly 
with himself. Pinckney seemed duly to appreciate 
this evidence of generous confidence, which softened 
for him the mortification of his recall, and the Span- 
iards acquiesced in the arrangement with suspicious 
complacency.-® 

After the ceremonious presentation, the American 
commissioners addressed their first note to Cevallos 
on January 28, 1805.^^ Although they continued their 
formal correspondence with him, Monroe immediately 
adopted the plan of supplementing each communica- 
tion by one or more personal interviews with Godoy, 
the real negotiator. It was his custom to inform the 
Spaniard that he expected to call, if convenient, and 
he interpreted silence as an invitation to come. Aside 
from this indication of indifference, their interviews, 
though wholly unprofitable, were not unpleasant. Mon- 

26 Monroe to Madison, Jan. 19, 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VII, Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, Spanish 
Dispatches, MS., VIII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. In 
this journal Monroe reviews minutely the details of the nego- 
tiation and reveals his mental reaction to each shifting phase. 

27 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 637. 



120 FAILURE OF MONROe's SPECIAL MISSION 

roe often had to urge Godoy to prod up the slow-moving 
Cevallos, and occasionally gained some temporary en- 
couragement only to find it wholly illusory. More 
than once he suspected an intention on the part of the 
two men to keep him vainly see-sawing between them. 
He had also promptly called on Beurnonville and told 
him that he counted on his assistance. But the French 
minister seemed to avoid him in public. To this neg- 
lect, manifestly inspired from Paris, Monroe largely 
attributed his failure. In his defense the other said 
that the Spaniards "would give so little and Monroe 
asked so much." This was true, although we may 
doubt if the Frenchman was sincere in later claiming 
that he had assisted Monroe " as much as possible."^® 
But sincerity is the last thing one would expect to find 
in this ill-judged negotiation. 

The American commissioners hoped to avoid wordy 
discussion and push the questions at issue to a speedy 
conclusion. Accordingly, after a brief view of the 
commercial claims and disputed boundaries, they sub- 
mitted the project for a treaty, based upon the idea of 
balancing the American desire for the Floridas by the 
Spanish apprehension over the western advance of 
the United States. Some minor disturbances then 
prevailing on the Florida frontier gave point to their 
expressed hope that the proposed settlement would 
prevent similar misunderstandings elsewhere. With 
this in mind their offer to assume the commercial 

28 G. W. Erving to Monroe, Nov. 15, 1805, Lenox MSS. 



FAILURE OF MONROE^S SPECIAL MISSION 121 

claims of their own citizens seemed to them very gen- 
erous indeed. 

Godoy speedily charged Monroe with being even 
more unreasonable than Pinckney about commercial 
claims. As for the controverted limits of Louisiana he 
thought the Americans should settle them with France, 
from whom they had bought the territory. Monroe 
said that France had nothing to do with the question. 
His country had simply bought the French right and 
title and must settle all boundary disputes with its 
neighbor. As Godoy stoutly maintained the contrary, 
Monroe intimated that he did not expect to accom- 
pHsh much at Aranjuez. Godoy courteously hoped 
that he would. In turn the Spaniard referred to the 
hostility that France and Great Britain had displayed 
toward the United States when the right of deposit 
at New Orleans was suspended. Monroe replied by 
referring to a British proposal to cede New Orleans to 
the Americans if the latter acquiesced in its seizure 
before the treaty at Amiens. He further suggested 
that his country could more readily restrain its western 
citizens if it had the Floridas.^^ But bribe or bluff 
proved equally ineffective in eliciting a definite answer 
from Godoy. 

The reply of Cevallos to the joint note was unusu- 
ally prompt and equally unsatisfactory. Ignoring the 
expressed desire o'f the commissioners for a categor- 

29 Journal of the Negotiations at Aranjuez, Jan. 30, 1805. 



122 FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 

ical answer, that minister informed them that Span- 
ish boundary commissioners were then at New Or- 
leans, awaiting the arrival of the American repre- 
sentatives. It would be useless to discuss the limits 
of Louisiana before hearing from them. Having 
thus brushed aside the most important American pro- 
posal, Cevallos discussed the claims convention of 
August, 1802."^ In reply the Americans observed 
that the boundary commissioners could do nothing 
until their respective governments should settle upon 
a principle to guide them, and they were in Spain 
for that purpose.^^ Monroe wrote Madison that Ce- 
vallos evidently intended to delay the negotiation, but 
despite this and other discouraging circumstances, he 
believed the Spaniards must recognize the strength of 
the American position, " with due discernment."^^ 
Unfortunately for him and his colleague they did, and 
so on February 10 the Americans had to submit to a 
sharp scolding on the subject of the Mobile Act,^^ in 
lieu of the wished-for answer to their project. 

It was now high time to break off the negotiation, 
and in a personal interview with Godoy, Monroe 
hinted as much. He had already learned of Talley- 
rand's views, which were, as Armstrong wrote, " cal- 

30 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 640. 

31 Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, Feb, 4, 1805, ibid., 641. 

32 Pinckney and Monroe to Madison, Feb. 2, 1805, Spanish 
Dispatches, MS., VII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

33 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 641. 



FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION 1 23 

culated to put the court at Madrid at rest." Monroe 
affected to believe that the French government had 
broken faith with him, and urged Armstrong to make 
its agents understand that the dispute with Spain must 
be settled then and there. " The United States must 
go ahead and depend less on other nations." His hope 
lay in Spain's necessity, and in such pressure as his 
country could exert upon her and France, in case of a 
diplomatic rupture. Yet he betrayed great reluctance 
to force an issue with the stronger nation. Not wholly 
trusting Armstrong, he wrote his friend Skipwith to 
send him some documents in support of the Amer- 
ican claim. The United States must decide upon her 
rights, but "in terms of suitable respect for the gov- 
ernment of France." At the same time he cautioned 
Skipwith to conceal his request from Armstrong.^* 
If Spain failed to yield to necessity or France to 
some unmentioned pressure, there still remained a pos- 
sible British alliance. As a final resort this might gain 
for them " the respect and calculation "of every Euro- 
pean government and establish their relations with 
Spain "on a footing of permanent friendship." But 
Monroe preferred to continue his present negotiation. 
On February i6 Godoy intimated that Spain might ex- 
change the Floridas for an equivalent west of the Mis- 
sissippi, although the presence of the Americans might 

3* Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, Feb. 2, 1805; 
Monroe to Skipwith, Feb. [15?], 1805, Lenox MSS. 



124 FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION 

draw other people into the ceded provinces and en- 
danger the remaining Spanish possessions. Monroe 
pointed out that Louisiana already presented this 
danger, and emphasized the fact that neither the 
United States nor Spain should permit Great Britain 
or France to become too powerful in its neighborhood. 
For some reason Monroe regarded this interview as 
hopeful. But anticipations of a speedy end to his 
task were rudely dispelled, for on that very day Ce- 
vallos submitted a third note, this time treating of the 
right of deposit at New Orleans. In reply to Mon- 
roe's remonstrances that such trifling was likely to 
lead to a rupture, Cevallos promised to refer the whole 
controversy to the king.^^ 

When eight days later Cevallos' note proved to be 
a lengthy discussion of the West Florida question, 
Monroe came to the conclusion that the other's propo- 
sitions, when finally submitted, would prove as "un- 
just" as his reasoning. The Spanish minister in- 
sisted that his government could not " retrocede " to 
France in 1800 what it did not receive from her in 
1762. The two Floridas were, like Louisiana, under 
the jurisdiction of the captain-general of Havana, but 
as separate provinces. Thus they were no more to be 
included in Spanish Louisiana than were the States 
of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, whose territory 

35 Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, Feb. 16, 1805; 
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 643, 644. 



FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION I25 

before 1762 had been vaguely covered by French 
claims. Spain received the Floridas from Great 
Britain in 1783, and the United States acknowledged 
their separateness in the Treaty of the Escorial. Ce- 
vallos clinched his argument by quoting the opinion 
of Andrew Ellicott, who ran the boundary line then 
established, and noted that France had been content 
to accept Louisiana without West Florida.^® 

So far Monroe had treated the French "very deli- 
cately" in this controversy, but now he instructed 
Armstrong to do something at Paris toward counter- 
acting Spanish pretensions. Talleyrand had formerly 
given him the impression that West Florida was part 
of the Louisiana Purchase; now he was trying to es- 
tablish a contrary opinion. He must be made to un- 
derstand that if the negotiation broke up over this 
point, the United States would hold France responsible 
and would retaliate by seeking a British aUiance. If 
the French government thought the demands of the 
Americans unreasonable, they might make some con- 
cession as to commercial claims and the western bound- 
ary, which would more than offset the Floridas. But 
they must insist upon their just rights, and by this 
Monroe doubtless meant the claim to West Florida and 
the residue of their commercial claims. ^^ 

36 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 644. 

37 Monroe to Armstrong, Feb. 26, 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VIII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



126 FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION 

In addition to gaining the support of Talleyrand, 
the Americans must convince the Spanish government 
that their country was not absolutely bound to a peace 
policy. Monroe's interview with Godoy on February 
28 did little to advance either object. The Spaniard 
insisted upon discussing thoroughly every point in 
question and in submitting each to the French govern- 
ment. Monroe asked what would happen if the French 
should favor Spain while the United States continued 
to insist upon its rights. Godoy replied, "We shall 
see," but evinced no disposition to show him what 
they were to see.^^ 

Having nothing else to do, Monroe and Pinckney 
attempted to reply to the note on West Florida. Need- 
less to say they found the word " retrocede " less im- 
portant than Cevallos had done, and saw West Flor- 
ida in the three clauses of the puzzling article as 
clearly as if it were expressly named. Their conten- 
tion must be right because not expressly contradicted. 
Any doubt should militate against the Spanish govern- 
ment for failing to express itself clearly. But Cevallos 
was not ready to abandon his position. Invoking 
grammar, rhetoric, good sense, and history, he showed 
that his interpretation was necessary to reconcile the 
word " retrocede " with the subsequent clauses of the 
crucial third article. All further discussion was use- 
less, for the decision rested with France and Spain, 

38 Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, Mar. 2, 1805. 



FAILURE OF MONROES SPECIAL MISSION 1 27 

and these powers united in declaring that West Flor- 
ida formed no part of Louisiana. It had not been 
mentioned in the transfer arranged at San Ildefonso, 
and no nation could acquire a definite province by a 
treaty that did not mention it.^^ 

Once more the negotiation had reached a good stop- 
ping place. The West Florida dispute was the crux 
of the whole controversy, and if France supported 
Spain upon that point it was useless to continue the 
discussion. Monroe objected to Talleyrand's assum- 
ing the position of umpire. " My letter to him," he 
wrote Armstrong, " was not for that purpose, but 
simply to give information of what position we in- 
tended to take."'*'^ Pinckney expressed himself still 
more bitterly to Madison. Evidently Bonaparte and 
Talleyrand thought it " only necessary to talk in high 
and arrogant terms of our country's aggressions . . . 
and we would shrink into nothing and give up claims 
and meekly receive reprimand for having dared to 
make them." He believed that if he had received 
due support from Paris the preceding summer the 
French government would now take a different posi- 
tion. Such " sycophantick courses " as had been pur- 

3^ American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 653-657. 
The above is the merest summary of the lengthy but useless 
" war of words," but the writer believes that it embraces the 
essential points for his purpose. 

*^ Monroe to Armstrong, Mar. 17, 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VIII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



128 FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 

sued there tended to lower America in the eyes of 
Europe. As for himself he would never be " the in- 
strument of improper submission to any power on 
earth."" Had Pinckney received this support and 
Monroe secured the aid of Talleyrand it is likely that 
neither would have censured the latter and the em- 
peror so strongly. The American diplomats tried to 
use Napoleon and Talleyrand for their own purpose 
and then protested against French interference when 
they failed. 

Early in March Armstrong thought that he had 
" fallen upon a plan " to secure some important papers 
that might establish a French contention for the Per- 
dido, but evidently the papers did not materialize.*^ 
Late in the month his messenger, Dalton, reached 
Monroe with despatches which stated that the French 
had lost all anxiety about the negotiation. In regard 11 
to the boundary Talleyrand told him, "We have al- 
ready given our opinion and see no reason to change 
it." When questioned about the action France might 
take in the event of war between Spain and the United 
States, the French minister answered, "We can neither 
doubt nor hesitate, we must take part with Spain." 
Armstrong found it difficult to explain this position, 
unless France wished to be paid to serve as umpire 

41 Pinckney to Madison (Mar. 7), 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 
*2 Armstrong to Monroe, Feb. 22, 1805, Lenox MSS. 



FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION 129 

or wished to gain the territory for herself. " Be 
this as it may," he added, " our course lies straight 
before us — neither dark nor doubtful, nor embarrassed 
— and with half an eye one may see to the end of it."^^ 
Monroe, however, was not ready to take this course, 
which obviously meant to abandon the commercial 
claims, yield the dispute over West Florida, and seize 
Texas. He had adopted the idea of one New Yorker 
in accepting the Perdido claim, and he would not now 
abandon it at the behest of another, especially after 
he had undertaken to rest his entire negotiation on it. 
Yet alternatives were unpromising or distinctly re- 
pulsive. Ever since he had passed through Paris he 
had known that the United States could gain the 
Floridas by an indirect payment to France of some 
fourteen millions of dollars. Pinckney emphasized two 
crucial phases of the policy when he wrote Madison : 
" France wants to make money out of the Floridas and 
Yrujo has convinced Spain that she has nothing to 
fear by sticking out."** In view of Spain's necessi- 
ties Monroe believed that he might remove this impres- 
sion. To hasten this result he urged Armstrong to 
make sure that the emperor should learn the American 
side of the controversy. He must approach him 
through Joseph Bonaparte, or some other intermediary 

43 Armstrong to Monroe, Mar. 12, 1805, Lenox MSS. 

** Cf. note 41. As Monroe records in his Journal, Casa 
Yrujo had assured his government that the United States 
would never go to war for " desert territory or old claims." 
10 



130 FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION 

than Talleyrand, who, he felt sure, gave Napoleon 
only a partial view.*^ 

This desperate but unfounded surmise led Arm- 
strong to furnish Talleyrand with Monroe's whole cor- 
respondence with Cevallos. The Frenchman returned 
it with the comment : " The more our thoughts are 
turned to this subject, the more completely convinced 
are we that Spain is right on every point of the con- 
troversy." The same decision, though differently 
worded, reached Aranjuez by Spanish conveyance. 
Santivanes, the charge at Paris, had complained of 
Monroe's pretensions. In answer Talleyrand assured 
him that France had received no territory east of the 
Mississippi from Spain and had transferred none to the 
United States. This should settle the dispute, for 
"to know the rights of France is likewise to know 
those of the United States." On April 9 Cevallos 
sent this statement to Monroe in response to repeated 
proddings for a definite reply to the recent notes.^® 

The past month at Aranjuez had been a trying one 
for the American. Nothing could spur Godoy or 
Cevallos into action. The former vaguely suggested 
some sort of joint agreement with Spain, France, and 
the United States in regard to Santo Domingo. Monroe 
eagerly caught at this opportunity to show his friend- 

*5 Monroe to Armstrong, Mar. 31, 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

*6 Armstrong to Monroe, Mar. 18, Apr. i, 1805, Lenox 
MSS. ; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 659, 660. 



FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION I3I 

liness, but in vain. Pinckney gave up hope, but still 
praised Monroe's zeal. The latter characterized Tal- 
leyrand's interference as friendly neither to Spain nor 
to the United States, and vaguely thought that Godoy 
agreed with him. Cevallos repeated the indefinite 
statement of Godoy, that his sovereign would exchange 
his possessions east of the Mississippi for an equiva- 
lent west of that river, but the Americans ought to 
give up their claim to West Florida. Monroe thought 
an "impartial world would judge differently," and 
suggested a possible alliance between the United States 
and Great Britain. Cevallos retorted that this would 
be a step toward British conquest, but Monroe thought 
it would enable both countries to divide the French 
and Spanish colonies between them. The nation 
would gladly support the president in such a policy. 

Cevallos claimed that he was ready to make propo- 
sitions in a conciliatory spirit. Monroe welcomed the 
suggestion, and thought that a specific allowance for 
spoliations might be used as part payment for the 
Floridas. Cevallos was unwilling to agree to this be- 
fore he had discussed the western limits. When Mon- 
roe charged him with an intention of prolonging the 
negotiation indefinitely he elicited nothing more than 
a promise to make propositions after completing the 
discussion. Monroe, deciding that Cevallos was not 
free to act, resolved to continue the discussion. If it 
led to a rupture, he still hoped to receive definite propo- 



132 FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 

sitions on his return to Paris. Thus he clung to the 
thought of aid from the French, though refusing to be 
bound by their restrictions, and continued to conduct 
himself so as not to offend their sensibilities.*'' 

Another powerful reason actuated Monroe. If he 
broke off negotiations suddenly Napoleon would prob- 
ably show his displeasure by seizing all American 
vessels within his reach. The severing of diplomatic 
relations in itself would not warrant such action, 
but, as Monroe had had abundant opportunity to 
learn, ability to injure rather than a desire to do jus- 
tice was the ruling influence in Europe. The people 
respected the United States but their rulers did not, 
and the American commercial stake of four or five 
millions was too great to be lightly risked. Monroe's 
messenger, Preble, represented the prevailing senti- 
ment upon this point. Although he was deeply in- 
volved in commercial relations with France, he at 
first hoped that Monroe would consider national honor 
rather than individual interests. Some weeks later, 
when failure seemed unavoidable, an alliance with 
England unlikely, and a war with Spain unpopular, he 
wrote: "If our national honor should not receive a 
blemish by an arrangement at Madrid, even if not so 
favorable as we ought to expect, we will still be the 
gainers in the end."*^ 

47 Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, entries for April, 
1805, passim. 

48 H. Preble to Monroe, Mar. 14, Apr. 24, 1805, Lenox MSS. 



FAILURE OF MONROE S SPECIAL MISSION 1 33 

Monroe was thus learning that fear, or, as he chose 
to call it, " respect," was the foundation of contempor- 
ary diplomacy. To play its part in such a system, 
and to gain its share of commerce in the West Indies, 
the United States needed a larger navy, a respectable 
army, adequate fortifications, and a fleet of despatch 
boats between the Chesapeake and the eastern and 
southern ports. But time would be necessary to de- 
velop them, granting it were possible to overcome 
Jefferson's natural hostility to such a policy of pre- 
paredness, and in the interim Monroe must determine 
his immediate course in a complicated negotiation. 
The cry of " money, plenty of money " from the diplo- 
matic jobbers of Paris presented one alternative, but 
it was questionable how much would satisfy them, 
or whether yielding to their demands would not estab- 
lish a dangerous precedent. If he allowed them to 
intervene in regard to the eastern boundary of Louis- 
iana, might they not do so on the western border as 
well and reduce the whole purchase to a nullity ?^^ 

On the other hand, if he continued an independent 
negotiation, as he flattered himself he was doing, pre- 
served a dignified and courteous bearing toward 
France, and cautiously employed a hypothetical alliance 
with Great Britain to arouse Spain's fears for her 
colonies, he might still achieve partial success. But 
the prospect was not flattering. If the French should 

*^ Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, Apr. 22, 1805. 



134 FAILURE OF MONROES SPECIAL MISSION 

defeat the English squadron before Brest and then 
undertake the invasion of Ireland, his efforts would 
wholly fail. He wrote Madison that he could "give 
no idea of the vexation of the whole affair."^^ He 
confided to Skipwith that " no exertion of my life has 
been more laborious to me in point of difficulty or 
duty." Yet his task seemed to be "the last difficult 
business which we have to settle with these powers ; " 
and this fact, plus the confidence that his government 
and his countrymen reposed in him, kept him at his 
unwelcome post, and persuaded him to play his part 
" with justice, with moderation, and the dignity be- 
coming their best character."^^ Monroe was both 
moderate and dignified, even in an unbecoming situa- 
tion, but even he must occasionally have doubted the 
justice of the claim to West Florida. 

Early in May he asked Cevallos if he might call to 
submit a final offer. His earlier one remained un- 
answered, but he believed he must play his last hand, 
and force an acceptance or at once bring the negotia- 
tion to a close. Two days later he submitted his pro- 
posal. He wished Spain to cede her territory east of 
the Mississippi and arbitrate part of the commercial 
claims. The United States would then relinquish the 
remaining claims and accept the Colorado as its 
western boundary. He regarded these claims as more 

^^^ Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, May 2, 1805. 
51 Monroe to Skipwith, May 2, 1805, Lenox MSS. 



FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 1 35 

than an equivalent for the territory east of the Missis- 
sippi. To make the exchange more acceptable he was 
willing to abandon the claim to West Florida hitherto 
urged by the Americans. ^^ 

In offering these concessions, particularly the last, 
Monroe had to go beyond his instructions, and their 
tenor reveals his desperate plight. But he yielded in 
vain. The testy Cevallos could see no recompense for 
Spain in the proposition. His nation was not re- 
sponsible for the spoliations and had an unquestion- 
able right to West Florida. The Spaniard's ''high 
toned and peremptory manner" led Monroe, contrary 
to his intention, into a spirited rejoinder. Cevallos 
remained unmoved. Upon his request Monroe com- 
mitted the propositions to writing and Cevallos re- 
jected them, "in terms the most expHcit and at the 
same time not the most respectful."^^ This ended his 
dealings with Cevallos. On May 21 Monroe took 
leave of the king, and two days later in a final interview 
he and Godoy expressed their mutual but meaningless 
regrets over the fruitless discussion. 

About this time Monroe learned from Armstrong 
that the French government was then likely to do 
nothing further. Interest would lead it to let the quar- 
rel proceed until interference became necessary; then 
it could command a higher price for its arbitration. 

^2 Journal of the Negotiation at Aranjuez, May 11, 1805. 
^3 Ibid., May 15, 16, 1805. 



136 FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 

Spain and the United States, according to the Amer- 
ican minister, were two oranges which the emperor 
proposed to squeeze together. The one which yielded 
more juice would be less harmed. Armstrong did not 
expect any commercial difficulties in case of a rupture 
with Spain, and repeated more explicitly his former 
advice to abandon West Florida and the commercial 
claims, and seize Texas. This policy, based on the in- 
structions to Laussat, would force Spain to act, but 
need not arouse French resentment.®* 

Monroe and Pinckney, who reviewed at length their 
course through French intrigue and Spanish delay, 
were not inclined to stop where Armstrong advised. 
Since the seizure of Texas alone would compromise 
them, they favored action in behalf of their claims 
in extenso, — West Florida as well as Texas. Such 
a move would show European governments that the 
destiny of the New World was in American hands 
and would correspondingly increase their respect for 
the United States. Then, dismantling all fortifica- 
tions within the areas occupied, much as Jackson did 
later, they could negotiate upon their own terms.^^ 

Perhaps the man from Virginia and the man from 
South Carolina merely desired to name a policy that 
did not bear an impress from New York. If this was 

5* Armstrong to Monroe, May 4, 1805, Lenox MSS. 

'^^ Pinckney and Monroe to Madison, May 23, 1805, Spanish 
Dispatches, MS., VIII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; 
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 667. 



FAILURE OF MONROe's SPECIAL MISSION 1 37 

Monroe's purpose he did not persevere in it after he 
reached Paris on his return from Spain. Here he 
fell under the spell of Armstrong, just as he had 
yielded to Livingston when that diplomat conceived 
the claim to West Florida. Monroe now advised the 
administration to seize Texas at once, place an em- 
bargo on its trade with the Spanish colonies, and 
threaten offensive operations in the Floridas. This 
would force France to act but without any expectation 
of jobbery, and would show a policy fully in keeping 
with national honor.^^ 

Koskiusko, of Revolutionary fame, was then in Paris 
and offered his services for any emergency. But the 
administration at home was more pacific; and while 
its representatives in France and Spain were calling 
for a vigorous program, Madison was instructing them 
to accept, for the time being, the maintenance of the 
status quo and the privilege of navigating the Mobile.^'' 
Monroe had to content himself with such commenda- 
tion as came to him in a private letter from Rich- 
mond : " It may be consoling to you to know that as to 
your conduct, but a single sentiment prevails here. It 
is believed that you have made every exertion con- 
sistent with national honor and dignity to accomplish 
the object of your embassy. Nothing is charged to 

^^ Monroe to Madison, June 30, 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., VII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 
57 Adams, History of the United States, III, 54, 55. 



138 FAILURE OF MONROE's SPECIAL MISSION 

your imprudence or a want of diplomatic skill or ex- 
perience."^® For five weary months he and Pinckney 
had exerted themselves to make the worse appear the 
better reason, and then had agreed to abandon their 
main contention — the claim to West Florida. They 
vacillated over the western boundary and were ready 
to compromise their commercial disputes, but without 
success. When Monroe left Spain American reputa- 
tion weighed little in the scales of European diplomacy. 
But, as he and Pinckney suggested, the western 
frontiersmen were in a favorable position to redress 
the balance. 

58 M. Jones to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1805, Lenox MSS. 



CHAPTER V 
Frontier Problems and Personalities 

The occupation of Natchez by the Americans in 
1798 and the extension of their control to New 
Orleans, five years later, did not end their frontier 
disputes with the Spaniards. These two events simply 
intensified such administrative problems as centered 
about the Indians, the recovery of fugitive slaves, the 
extradition of fugitives from justice, and commerce 
upon the streams subject to joint ownership. Con^ 
temporary diplomacy did little to settle these problems ; 
the acquisition of Louisiana made them more conspicu- 
ous. At the same time general distrust and jealousy 
hampered the efforts of local officials on both sides of 
the border, and perplexed their distant superiors be- 
yond measure. 

Wilkinson and Daniel Clark in their relations with 
the Mississippi executives, Sargent and Claiborne, and 
the intendant. Morales, in his controversies with his fel- 
lows, Salcedo, Casa Calvo, and Folch, afforded many 
instances of this sort. Their mutual attacks and re- 
criminations, generally carried on in secret, confused 
the national interests they professed to serve, and 
made them less convincing champions when ranged 

139 



140 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

against their natural opponents. For instance, Sargent, 
Wilkinson, and Ellicott, from varying motives, opposed 
the schemes of the land promoter and trader, Zacha- 
riah Cox. But they were not able to persuade Gayoso 
that Cox should be delivered to them when he fled to 
New Orleans ; nor were they able to prevent his return 
to Tennessee, where he had many friends and sym- 
pathizers. Their opposition contributed to the failure 
of his plan for establishing a commercial route be- 
tween the Tennessee and the waters of the Mobile, 
but they could not quiet agitation in favor of the 
project, nor blot out the land claims that long con- 
tinued to harass settlers in the bend of the Tennessee.^ 
The adventurer Bowles owed his immunity to lack 
of harmony among the Spaniards, as well as to his in- 
fluence over the Indians. Ellicott gave him some as- 
sistance when he encountered him wrecked on the 
Florida coast. Although his presence among the 
Creeks, whom he attempted to organize into a sort of 
a republic, was hardly less annoying to the American 
officials than to the Spaniards, they refused to counte- 
nance any underhand means to make way with him or 
even to apprehend him. When, early in 1803, the 

1 A reprint of the pamphlet issued by Cox in Nashville in 
1799 is edited by R. C. McGrane and the writer in the Quar- 
terly of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 1913, 
29-114. Cf. also Gayoso to Saavedra, Nov. 22, 1798, Spanish 
Transcript's, Missouri Historical Society. Robertson (No. 
4666) reverses the authorship of this document. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES I41 

Spaniards finally surprised his stronghold at St. Marks 
and carried him away to the dungeon in which he 
ended his days, the event relieved the Americans as 
much as it did their rivals.^ 

The Indians presented an increasing series of prob- 
lems. Ellicott feared for the safety of his party while 
surveying in the Choctaw country, and was forced by 
Creek hostility to retire from the Chattahoochee. 
Sargent hardly knew how to keep the Choctaw war 
parties on the American side of the Mississippi, as 
he was bound to do under the Treaty of 1795, or how 
to render his necessary parsimony toward them more 
likable than apparent Spanish munificence.^ Even 
Wilkinson varied his pursuit of "the one thing need- 
ful" with attempts to place American relations with 
the Indians on a more permanent basis. To do this 
he had to forego his dreams of a bucolic existence at 
Fort Adams, where he might devote himself to land 
speculations and intrigues with the Spaniards. As a 
result of two years' effort, however, he flattered him- 
self that he had established relations between the In- 
dians and whites on the basis planned by the British 

2 Pickett, History of Alabama, I, 4if>-4i3, 458, 47o; Robert- 
son, List of Documents, for 1799-1803, passim; Secretary of 
War to Benjamin Hawkins, Dec. 12, I799, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 24, same to same. May 30, 1803, Miscellaneous 
Letters, MS., Vol. 27, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

3 Mississippi Territorial Archives, I, passim, Jackson, Miss. 



142 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

thirty years before."* His services were important, 
but as usual he spoiled the effect by using them to 
cover up his later mercenary dealings with the 
Spaniards. 

The Indian problem assumed a new importance 
when the French seemed on the point of reestablishing 
themselves in Louisiana. The French agents appeared 
among distant tribes and invited their leading men to 
visit New Orleans. Such action aroused dire appre- 
hension in the entire Southwest, and led Clark to urge 
Wilkinson to occupy Mobile or even New Orleans 
before the French could establish themselves there. 
He also stimulated quarrels between the French com- 
missary, Laussat, and the Spaniards with some 
measure of success.*^ Perhaps resentment played as 
great a part as patriotism in Clark's attitude, for he 
had been disappointed in his attempt to secure employ- 
ment under the prospective French regime. At the 
same time he did not hesitate to give Madison hints 
of Wilkinson's former shady transactions with the 
Louisiana authorities. Nor did he and Wilkinson 
spare Jefferson himself in criticising what they termed 

* Wilkinson to Dearborn, Mar. 30, 1802, Letters Received, 
MS., War Department; Pickett, History of Alabama, 462; 
Claiborne, Mississippi, I, 238. 

5 D. Clark to Wilkinson, Feb. 26, 1803, Wilkinson, Memoirs, 
II, 249 ; same to same, Apr. 13, 25, May 4, 5, 20, 28, 1803, Let- 
ters Received, MS., War Department. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 43 

the nerveless policy of the administration.^ The chief 
target for their vituperation, however, was its youth- 
ful representative, the new governor of Mississippi, 
W. C. C. Claiborne. 

Wilkinson was perforce also led to concern himself 
with the navigation of the Mobile and its branches. 
At the time of the American occupation Gayoso per- 
mitted him to send troops to the Tombigbee by way of 
Bayou St. Jean and the lakes. He told his superiors 
that he granted this favor because it was an advantage 
thus to separate the American forces, but he warned 
Wilkinson not to regard the concession as a precedent 
for the future. While the boundary commission was 
in the region Gayoso permitted the schooner Palhis 
to carry provisions from Savannah to Fort Stoddert, 
the post which the Americans had established just 
above the line of demarcation. This also was not to 
be regarded as a precedent, but both incidents caused 
much trouble for those who came after. 

Casa Calvo, Gayoso's successor ad interim, believed 
that in case of hostile outbreak the Americans would 
use the privilege of transporting troops to surprise and 
occupy the province. If once they gained the general 
right to navigate rivers through alien territory they 
would, by monopolizing the Indian trade, ruin the 
house of Panton, and reduce the Spanish settlements 

^ (Wilkinson) to Clark, Apr. 30, 1803, Clark, Proofs of the 
Corruption of General James Wilkinson, Appendix, 196. 



144 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 



to mere presldlal guards/ The proposal of the Amer- 
ican government to establish an Indian factory at 
St. Stephens gave point to his warning. President 
Jefferson proposed this establishment as a means to 
wean the Choctaws from trading at Mobile and other 
Spanish centers. It was part of his general plan to 
reform all the aborigines. In this case its success de- 
pended on the courtesy of those whom he wished to 
circumvent. Pursuant to his plan, in March, 1803, he 
appointed Silas Dinsmoor as agent to the Choctaws, 
and placed Joseph Chambers in charge of the Indian 
factory at St. Stephens.® 

By this time a flourishing settlement was springing 
up around the trading post. In behalf of these new 
settlers, therefore, as well as in behalf of the American 
garrison and trading post, Wilkinson, in the early 
summer of 1803, determined to make a definite plea to 
the Spanish authorities in New Orleans for the navi- 
gation of the Mobile. The all-pervading suspicion that 
then characterized the Creole capital led him to em- 
ploy a special messenger, rather than make the journey 
himself. His aide. Lieutenant Walbach, brought back 
word that Morales would for the present permit gov- 

■^ Casa Calvo to Someruelos, May 21, 1800, to Urquijo, Oct. 
8, 1800, Spanish Transcripts, Department of Archives and 
History, Jackson, Miss. ; Robertson, 4758, 4790. 

8 Claiborne to Silas Dinsmoor, Jan, 28, Feb. 28, Mar, 2, 14, 
1803, Claiborne to Chambers, June 28, 1803, Governor's Cor- 
respondence in the Mississippi Territory, MS. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 45 

ernment goods to pass Mobile, but he must refer the 
wider commercial question to his home government. 
In his representation Wilkinson had questioned the 
exclusive right of Spain to navigate streams only 
partially within her territory, or to close the only out- 
let to the sea for residents along the upper courses of 
a river. With his usual assurance, the general be- 
lieved that he had " tickled " the intendant's vanity and 
"bewildered" his "shallow understanding." But 
Morales granted him only the tentative permission to 
send one vessel up the Mobile each fall and spring, 
provided its commander bore the proper official cer- 
tificate that it was engaged exclusively in public busi- 
ness.^ It was at this juncture that tidings of the sale 
of Louisiana to the United States threatened to un- 
settle all border conditions. 

The resulting transfer brought Claiborne and Wilk- 
inson together in conspicuous but distrustful associa- 
tion. While the more crafty of the ill-assorted pair 
proceeded to renew his mercenary, relations with the 
Spaniards, his inexperienced colleague turned to the 
perplexing problems that confronted the new regime. 
Possession of the west bank of the Mississippi had 
not solved the disputes over extradition, Indian rela- 
tions, and commercial privileges, but it had localized 

^Wilkinson to Dearborn, Aug. 20, 1803, with enclosures, 
MS., Bureau of Indian Affairs, Choctaws and Chickasaws, 
1801-1823. Some of the material is dupHcated in Wilkinson 
Papers, MS., II, Chicago Historical Society. 
II 



146 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

them more definitely in West Florida. The ownership 
of this region was in dispute, and there were current 
vague rumors to the effect that the United States 
would take forcible possession of it, upon the demand 
of its inhabitants, or would exchange the new acquisi- 
tion for the Spanish territory east of the Mississippi, 
It is no wonder that these rumors disturbed the motley 
population of New Orleans and above all the young 
executive who was attempting to govern the city.^^ 

Nor was the course of the Spaniards at all reassur- 
ing. Without consulting the views of the American 
government, they arranged to have Morales continue 
his functions as intendant at New Orleans, instructed 
Casa Calvo to remain there as boundary commissioner, 
and furnished him with a hundred thousand pesos for 
his work. The administration regarded Morales as 
"a mischievous member of society," but he ignored 
all polite hints that he remove elsewhere. His long 
term of service as intendant — fourteen years — although 
technically only an ad interim appointment, gives color 
to the assumption that his superiors found him a 
useful check upon the actions of his fellow-officials, 
as well as a shrewd opponent of American pretensions. 

10 From this point the narrative is mainly dependent upon 
the manuscript volumes of the Claiborne Correspondence, in 
the Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State, These 
volumes largely duplicate material in the Letter Books of 
Governor Claiborne, which have just been published. Cf . page 
X of the Introduction. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 47 

Claiborne believed that Morales' presence in New 
Orleans encouraged opposition to the claim to West 
Florida, especially among the reputed land specu- 
lators.^^ 

The affable and popular Marques de Casa Calvo 
presented a welcome contrast to the stubborn Morales, 
but his very excellencies rendered him a dangerous 
permanent resident. To him Claiborne attributed the 
persistent rumor that the United States would ex- 
change Louisiana for the Floridas. His reputation 
for intrigue equalled his courtesy, and the only re- 
deeming feature was the fact that his residence in New 
Orleans pleased the neighboring Spanish officials as 
little as it did Claiborne.^^ Moreover the presence of 
these higher officials seemed more dangerous in view 
of the prolonged stay of the Spanish garrison in New 
Orleans. When these soldiers finally left, the per- 
plexed Claiborne was still concerned to find that they 
had simply gone to the posts on the disputed frontier, 

11 Claiborne to Madison, May 24, 1804, Claiborne Corre- 
spondence, II, Bureau of Rolls and Library (Parker, Calendar 
of Papers in Washington Archives, Relating to the Territories 
of the United States, No. 6937, Carnegie Institution, Wash- 
ington, 191 1. Later references will be to numbers as in the 
case of Robertson's Calendar) ; Hunt, Madison, VII, 78, 115; 
Morales to Cevallos, Mar. 31, 1804, Legajo 267, Papeles de 
Cuba; Robertson, Louisiana, II, 30, n. 23. 

^2 Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 9, 1804 (Parker, 6971), Sept. 
23, 1804 (Parker, 7059), Mar. 30, 1805 (Parker, 7181) ; Mo- 
rales to Soler, June 20, 1805, Legajo 595, June 30, 1806, Legajo 
2330, Papeles de Cuba. 



148 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

where reinforcements from Havana or Spain itself 
would probably join them. The administration did 
not wholly share Claiborne's fears or trust his reports 
of the probable strength of these garrisons ; but they 
instructed him to inform such Spanish officials as still 
remained in the city that October i, 1804, the date 
when the new regime for Orleans Territory was to be 
formally inaugurated, would be a fitting time for them 
to leave. Neither Morales nor Casa Calvo took the 
hint.13 

Complaint and suspicion were by no means all on 
one side. Casa Yrujo, the Spanish minister, asked 
Madison to explain why the American government 
was sending more regular troops to the new acquisi- 
tion than was at first intended. Such action on the 
eve of a possible war between Spain and Gr-eat Britain 
seemed suspicious. Madison affected ignorance on the 
subject, but thought that, even if true, it was only a 
necessary precaution in a newly acquired territory 
where the blacks equalled the whites. He assured the 
Spaniard that, when the anticipated war actually broke 
out, the Americans would attempt to derive no ad- 
vantages from it. The obvious policy for both his 
nation and Spain was to maintain the status quo east 
of the Mississippi. If the president "had varied mili- 

13 Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 31, 1804 (Parker, 6953), Apr. 
9, 1804 (Parker, 6955), Oct. 5, 1804 (Parker, 7065) ; Hunt, 
Madison, VII, 155 ; Claiborne to Casa Calvo and Casa Calvo 
to Claiborne, July 25-27, 1804 (Parker, 7023-7031, passim). 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES I49 

tary dispositions there," his action was simply tentative 
and a result of previous Spanish movements.^* 

Notwithstanding their common fear of American 
aggression, the Spanish officials were by no means 
united in their proposals to defend their threatened 
frontier. Salcedo, who still wished to retain the 
emoluments of office, if not its cares, determined to 
exercise his functions as governor of West Florida at 
Baton Rouge, which he described as "in that part of 
Louisiana which still remained to us." He dwelt upon 
the commercial and agricultural advantages of the 
region on the Mississippi, and its strategic importance 
as a point from which to threaten New Orleans.^^ 
His suggestions for fortifying Baton Rouge fell on 
deaf ears. His superiors feared that such measures 
would incite the very attack they dreaded. The com- 
mercial advantages of the district as well as its secur- 
ity absolutely depended upon the near-by Americans. 
Pensacola, more remote, with an excellent harbor and 
an adequate meat supply, afforded the necessary facili- 
ties for headquarters.^^ Its commander, Vizente 

1* Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, Feb. 21, 1804, Adams Transcripts, 
Bureau of Rolls and Library (Robertson, 4953). 

1^ Salcedo to Someruelos, Dec. 13, 1803 (Robertson, 4936). 

^6 Gelabert to Someruelos, Dec. 30, 1803 (Robertson, 4938). 
Someruelos to Caballero, Jan. 7, 1804 (Robertson, 4945). 
Folch's legal title was " commandant'e propietario," but his 
neighbors uniformly called him governor and he so styled 
himself. Cf. Howard to Someruelos, Oct. 31, 1806, Legajo 
1564, Papeles de Cuba. 



150 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

Folch, rather than the decrepit Salcedo, was invested 
with the governorship. The old governor retired to 
the Canaries, and his son, whom report had stigma- 
tized as the evil genius of his administration, later 
became governor of Texas.^^ 

Folch was a nephew of Stephen Miro, who had fol- 
lowed Galvez in the governorship of Louisiana. Dur- 
ing his residence of twenty years on the frontier he 
had advanced regularly in commission and responsi- 
bility. He knew his neighbors to the northward, 
their language and their political views, and watched 
them with keen insight and justifiable foreboding. 
Claiborne later spoke of him as possessing " more tem- 
per than discretion, more genius than judgment," and 
characterized his general conduct as " far from con- 
ciliatory."^^ But even so, he was more than a match 
for the American, and during his eight years of execu- 
tive control performed his difficult tasks to the satis- 
faction of his superiors and the discomfiture of his 
enemies. 

Baton Rouge, if not to become the capital of his 
province, was destined to remain its storm center. 
Captain Carlos de Grand Pre remained in immediate 
charge of it, and his mild administration was better cal- 

17 Robertson, Louisiana, II, 41, 231 ; Claiborne to Madison, 
Feb. 26, 1804 (Parker, 6950). 

18 Folch to His Majesty, Aug. i, 1803, Legajo 179, Papeles 
de Cuba; Claiborne to Madison, Mar. 30, 1805, Claiborne Cor- 
respondence, III, Bureau of Rolls and Library, 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 15I 

culated than were the more vigorous methods of Folch 
to keep its Anglo-American population under nom- 
inal Spanish sway. Folch often suspected Grand 
Pre's ability, if not his loyalty, but the fact remains 
that the subordinate quelled such disturbances as 
threatened the peace of the western jurisdiction under 
his rule without the governor's personal intervention.^^ 
Folch's enmity finally drove Grand Pre from office to 
a premature grave, but his successor needed barely 
twelve months to incite the disaffected residents of the 
region to open rebellion. 

The greater part of these were Anglo-Americans 
who resented the fact that they were not included in 
the transfer at New Orleans, and who showed their 
dissatisfaction by insolent threats against the local 
officials or by open disobedience. The officials, tak- 
ing their cue from the conciliatory Grand Pre, tried 
to placate the disaffected without jeopardizing the in- 
terests of the existing government.-^ Yet they held 
the American administration responsible for the in- 
cipient revolt that shortly broke out in the Baton 
Rouge district. Jefferson anticipated such an event 
and contemplated it with equanimity, but this attitude 
did not imply the direct complicity that the Spaniards 
charged against him. 

^® Cf. pp. 158-161. Folch's correspondence during 1804 and 
1805 emphasizes the necessity for defending Baton Rouge 
(Robertson, 501 1, 5017, 5031, 5033). 

20 Casa Calvo to Cevallos, May 18, 1804 (Robertson, 4974). 



152 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

The causes of the insurrection of 1804 antedated the 
acquisition of Louisiana. Its leaders were the three 
Kemper brothers, who long bore an unenviable repu- 
tation on the border as disturbers of the peace. The 
struggle was precipitated by a lawsuit between them 
and John Smith, a prominent merchant of Cincinnati 
and speculator in West Florida lands, who was then 
serving in the United States Senate. His agents hav- 
ing proved unprofitable, if not faithless. Smith ob- 
tained a judgment against them from a committee of 
disinterested neighbors, and sought through another 
agent to eject them from some of his property near the 
mouth of Bayou Sara.^^ In June, 1804, the alcalde, 
Alexander Sterling, had some altercation with Na- 
than Kemper. He then placed himself at the head of 
some twenty members of the provincial militia and 
sought to execute the order which Grand Pre had is- 
sued to cover the case. Nathan and Samuel Kemper, 
with four other well armed companions, barricaded 
themselves in a house on the disputed premises, while 
their more notorious brother, Reuben, seconded their 
resistance by sending threatening missives from New 
Orleans. Under the circumstances. Sterling contented 
himself with patrolling the neighborhood, while await- 
ing further instructions from Grand Pre. 

That distressed official could only advise him to 

21 Grand Pre to Folch, July 19, 1804, Legajo 106, Papeles de 
Cuba. 






FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 53 

pursue his cautious policy. While the district was 
the most populous of West Florida its residents were 
largely Anglo-Americans, " inclined to insubordination 
and prone to insurgency." Aside from the uncertain 
mihtia, he could muster a force of only fifty-six, "in- 
cluding the drummer boy and the invalids." Beyond 
the line were the dreaded frontiersmen, who looked 
upon his jurisdiction as their next acquisition and 
were only too ready to initiate the necessary measures 
to acquire it. Pensacola and Havana were too distant 
for ready recourse. Casa Calvo at New Orleans was 
the only one who might aid him, and in his extremity 
he applied to him for the necessary men and gunboats, 
with which to " exterminate all these vagabonds at one 
blow." But he did not await the tardy arrival of rein- 
forcements. He sent an improvised gunboat under 
the command of Thomas Estevan, who, cooperating 
with the militia under Champney Terry, drove the out- 
laws from Bayou Sara into American territory.^^ 

Casa Calvo lost no time in letting Claiborne know 
of these events. Reuben Kemper had already ap- 
pealed to the latter in regard to Smith's lawsuit, under 
the impression that Claiborne was to take possession 
of the disputed territory. Having referred Kemper 
to the marques, the governor now expressed his regret 

22 Grand Pre to Folch, June 20, 1804 (Robertson, 4979) ; 
Grand Pre to Casa Calvo, June 24, 1804 (Robertson, 4981) ; 
same to same, Aug. 28, 1804 (Robertson, 4998). 



154 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

at the hostile outcome, but was sure that no American 
official was concerned in it. Casa Calvo had intimated 
the contrary, and Morales repeated the charge more 
definitely. Both Claiborne and Casa Calvo took ad- 
vantage of the occasion to mention the claims of their 
respective governments in the rebellious territory, but 
as a negotiation was impending to settle them, the 
former urged leniency toward the misguided rebels.^^ 
Casa Calvo promised to recommend this, and upon his 
advice Grand Pre offered to pardon the Kempers if 
they and their seditious companions would leave the 
province.^* 

This offer only elicited threats to burn and pillage 
the dwellings of their opponents and encourage their 
slaves to escape. A provincial patrol under Vizente 
Pintado fired upon a marauding gang about to cross 
the line and wounded and captured two of them. 
But as Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee could easily 
replace these " white Indians and river pirates," the 
harassed governor renewed his plea for men, money, 
munitions, and vessels to cope with them. After at- 
tempting to fire Pintado's house, the outlaws still fur- 
ther astonished him, on July 20, by reappearing at 
Bayou Sara. Pintado naively ordered them to de- 
liver up their arms and leave the disputed premises, 

23 Claiborne to Madison, June 27, 1804 (Parker, 7006). 

24 Grand Pre to Casa Calvo, Aug. 28, 1804 (Robertson, 
4998). 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 55 

and requested further instructions from Grand Pre. 
Disregarding threat or proffered pardon, the impudent 
scoundrels continued in his jurisdiction and in that 
of the neighboring alcalde, John O'Conner, accom- 
panied by k rabble of untrained vagabonds, who gath- 
ered stolen horses and slaves with impunity.^^ With 
such subjects the lot of the Florida official was far 
from enviable. 

But worse was to come. On August 7 the brothers 
Nathan and Samuel suddenly crossed the line at the 
head of some thirty followers, seized Pintado, O'Con- 
ner, and Terry, whom they treated with marked in- 
dignity, burned Pintado's house and cotton gin, and 
took up their march for Baton Rouge. Their purpose 
was to surprise and capture Grand Pre, and thus force 
the surrender of the fort. This was no mere act of 
bravado, but evidently a serious attempt to overthrow 
the existing government, for it was accompanied by a 
proclamation of independence, supposedly the work of 
Edmund Randolph of Pinckneyville, a partner of Daniel 
Clark.26 They also raised a banner composed of seven 

25 Grand Pre to Casa Calvo, July 19, 1804 (Robertson, 4982), 
same to same, July 21, 1804 (Robertson, 4984)- 

26 This remarkable document begins with the statement, 
" For a people to be free it is sufficient that they will it." It 
then continues : " Whereas, the despotism under which we 
have long groaned, has grown into an unsupportable burthen, 
and as it is long since admitted men are born with equal 
rights, we the undersigned, inhabitants of that part of the 
[Spanish] dominions called West Florida, have resolved to 



156 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

white and blue stripes, bearing two stars in a blue field. 
Thus equipped they inaugurated their campaign for 
"Floridean freedom." 

By seven o'clock on the evening of that initial day 
of freedom Grand Pre was informed of the threaten- 
ing peril by one of Pintado's slaves. Other messen- 
gers confirmed this report, and among them an Eng- 
lishman, John Mears, gave some details of the insur- 
gents' reputed strength and purpose. They claimed 
to have two hundred men enlisted in their cause, and 
were prepared to maintain it whether the United States 
or any other government came to their aid or not. 
Grand Pre put his slender garrison in a state of de^ 
f ense and summoned the neighboring militia. At day- 
break on the following morning he exchanged shots 
with two small parties skulking near the fort. Later 
John O'Conner came as the messenger of the rebels 
to offer himself and fellow-hostages in exchange for 

throw off the galling yoke of tyranny and become freemen, 
by declaring ourselves a free and independent people, and by 
supporting with our lives and property that declaration." 
They then invited " fellow sufferers throughout the province 
aforesaid ... to aid in our common emancipation," The 
signers pledged themselves to avoid unnecessary bloodshed 
and to respect private property. As soon as they accom- 
plished their emancipation they proposed to offer themselves 
" to some government accustomed to freedom." Those who 
opposed them were to be regarded as their " common enemy, 
the enemy of mankind, and of liberty." This proclamation 
was published in the Charleston Courier, Sept. 2, 1804 (Rob- 
ertson, 4997). 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 57 

the prisoners whom Grand Pre held. The latter re- 
fused to treat with the insurgents. O'Conner could 
give no idea of their strength, but evidently it was not 
great enough to enable them to assault the fort with- 
out artillery. On the other hand the Spanish forces 
did not dare venture beyond their fortification. 

Discouraged by their failure to capture Grand Pre 
and the unwillingness of the people at large to revolt, 
the insurgents on the 9th retreated to Bayou Sara. 
There, as "banditti," they speedily resumed on both 
sides of the line their marauding practices, which 
they tried to dignify "under pretense of giving free- 
dom to West Florida."^^ It was these practices, un- 
checked by the Mississippi authorities, that doubtless 
deterred many in Feliciana from espousing the cause 
of the insurgents and led the better elements there to 
appeal to the Spaniards for protection. O'Conner re- 
ported that nearly all the people there were ready to 
revolt, and that the unstable American population 
above was ready to assist them. Grand Pre even be- 
lieved that Cato West, the acting governor of Missis- 
sippi, definitely encouraged their aspirations. Outside 
Feliciana, the people remained loyal and willingly re- 
sponded to the call for such military service as the 
situation demanded. In relays of a hundred each they 
manned the fort, kept the patrols, garrisoned strategic 
points, and loaned their slaves to the common cause. 

27 Grand Pre to Casa Calvo, Aug. 8, 1804 (Robertson, 4989) ; 
Charleston Courier, Sept. 25, Oct. 11, 1804. 



158 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

By August 16 the commandant, assisted by Armando 
Duplantier, Samuel Fulton, and George Dupassau, had 
assembled, organized, and armed a force of nearly 
a hundred and fifty volunteers, largely from the vicin- 
ity of the Amite and Comite rivers. On that morn- 
ing Grand Pre presented them with a small flag and 
"an analogous discourse," and sent them to scour the 
roads passing through Feliciana. Michael Jones, a 
famous partisan of the American Revolution, was to 
gather men in the St. Helena or Ticfau region and 
secure the near-by roads leading into American terri- 
tory. With boats at the same time blockading Bayou 
Sara, Grand Pre hoped to cut off the escape of the 
insurgents and prevent a recurrence of the revolt.^^ 

While these forces were marching to suppress the 
insurrection. Grand Pre entertained an unexpected but 
distinguished guest. Daniel Clark presented a peni- 
tent letter signed by Nathan Kemper and five other 
leaders, and asked the commandant to pardon them 
on the plea that they were now ready to lay aside their 
arms and refrain from further molesting persons or 
property. Grand Pre did not believe him, recounted 
the outrages which the insurgents had committed both 
against citizens and against the province, and sharply 
chided Clark for asking him to pardon them. More- 
over he plainly told Clark that the people of Feliciana 

28 Grand Pre to Casa Calvo, Aug. 17, 1804 (Robertson, 
4991). 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES J 59 

associated his partner Randolph with the insurgents' 
proclamation. On the whole the American did not 
carry on the interview with his usual confidence. 
Grand Pre was persuaded that Clark and Randolph 
had largely stimulated the revolt because of their ex- 
tensive property interests in Feliciana, and that his 
own military preparations had caused them to abandon 
their original design and had brought Clark to ask 
pardon for the deserters. But he was not inclined to 
be lenient with them a second time.^^ 

If Grand Pre's military precautions dumfounded the 
supposititious chief conspirator, they failed to entrap 
his scattered adherents. Secrecy on the part of the 
authorities was impossible; the American border was 
very near, and the highways and byways thither were 
sufficiently numerous to favor the fugitives but were 
so nearly impassable as to hinder organized pursuit. 
The leaders of the punitive forces, Fulton and Duplan- 
tier, carried on a tart correspondence with the local 
authorities in Pinckneyville. The latter promised to 
arrest and punish all who violated the laws of the 
United States, but refused to compel revolting Span- 
iards to leave their territory. Under such a ruling the 
Kempers and their followers feared no personal harm 
above the line, while their property interests below 
were so slight as to be negligible. There remained 

29 Grand Pre to Casa Calvo, Aug. 19, 1804 (Robertson, 
4992). 



l60 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

nothing for Grand Pre to do but arrange to have his 
jurisdiction adequately patrolled, and to thank the 
officers and men whose services, even if interested, 
had enabled him to survive a perilous revolt.^^ 

When Casa Calvo learned of the second Kemper 
outbreak he reported the facts to Claiborne, and asked 
him, by notifying the neighboring officials, to prevent 
aid from reaching the insurgents. In proffering his 
request he had no wish to insinuate that the American 
government countenanced these outrages. His only 
purpose was to preserve the harmony that then existed 
between the two nations. He also asked Claiborne to 
reprimand or imprison Reuben Kemper for his threat- 
ening correspondence with Alexander Sterling. Clai- 
borne's answer was delayed on account of a severe 
attack of fever, but at the end of a fortnight he as- 
sured Casa Calvo that he would notify the officials 
as requested, although he hardly thought it necessary. 
Certainly no Americans of repute had countenanced 
the insurgents in West Florida. On September 13 
Casa Calvo reported that the outlaws had taken refuge 
in Mississippi Territory, and asked that they be ex- 
tradited or required to move away from the border. 
Claiborne refused to apprehend them, but promised to 
bring the affair to the attention of the president and 

30 Fulton and Duplantier to Thomas Dawson and reply of 
latter, Aug. 21, 1804 (Robertson, 4994, 4995). Cf. also the 
three following entries in Robertson. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES l6l 

the acting governor of the territory.^^ As the Span- 
iards strongly suspected both officials of encouraging 
the disturbance, his oflfer doubtless gave them Httle 
satisfaction. However, they attributed the whole pol- 
icy of the United States toward such offenders as due 
more to the weakness of its government than to the 
open wish of its officials. 

When Folch first heard of the disturbances at Baton 
Rouge, he hesitated to advance westward until he 
could learn the disposition of the people in the St. 
Helena district. Assured of their loyalty, he sent for- 
ward a force of fifty men with artillery to construct 
a military road from Mobile to Baton Rouge, and re- 
quested the captain-general to send him more men and 
vessels.^^ As soon as he learned of the second out- 
break — about three weeks after the event — he placed 
himself at the head of a force three times as large 
as that of the insurgents, and on August 31 left Pen- 
sacola for Baton Rouge by way of the lakes. His 
course indicated some distrust of Grand Pre's age and 
activity, if not of his attachment to the Spanish cause, 
but when he reached Baton Rouge all was quiet. He 
recommended better fortifications ; provided for a bet- 

31 Casa Calvo to Folch, Aug. 11, 1804 (Robertson, 4990); 
Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 2^, 1804 (Parker, 7039) ; Clai- 
borne to Casa Calvo, Sept 13, 1804 (Parker, 7056). Cf. also 
Parker, 7041, 7042, 7055. 

32 Folch to Someruelos, June 6, 1804, Legajo 1557, Folch 
to Casa Calvo, July 17, 1804, Legajo 55, Papeles de Cuba. 

12 



l62 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

ter system of administrative and police regulations, 
particularly in respect to foreigners, Indians, and 
negroes ; and then, led by the scarcity of provisions at 
Baton Rouge, returned to Pensacola. On his way 
back he passed through New Orleans, where the ar- 
rest of one of his officers led to a bitter correspondence 
with Claiborne. That executive believed Folch's jour- 
ney to be useless and possibly hostile to the United 
States, but the Spanish authorities approved it and re- 
joiced in its successful outcome. 

Folch partly attributed the disturbances to the care- 
less if not criminal methods of Morales in conducting 
his land sales and to a six per cent duty on the 
cotton and other products shipped from the district. 
The American administration knew of the discontent 
prevailing there and, as he strongly suspected, was 
only too glad to use it in gaining its territorial claims. 
The official periodical of Mexico reported the same 
view.^^ Casa Yrujo reiterated it from Philadelphia, 
and while visiting Jefferson at Monticello, brought the 
matter up in such a way as to cause the president 
considerable embarrassment. When his own part in 

33 Folch to Someruelos, Aug. 27, 1804, Legajo 1557, same to 
same, Dec. 5, 1804, Legajo 1558, Folch to Josef Rufiiiaco, Oct. 
8, 1804, Legajo 55, Folch to Casa Calvo, Oct. 7, 1804, Legajo 
55, Papeles de Cuba; Instructions to Syndics, Oct. 30, 1804 
(Robertson, 5008) ; Claiborne to (Madison), Nov. 22, 1804 
(Parker, 7085) ; same to same, Apr. 27, 1805 (Parker, 1794) ; 
Charleston Courier, Oct. 8, 1804. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 163 

the mortifying Jackson episode became known, he 
tried still harder to connect Jefferson, and particularly 
Madison, with the insurrection in West Florida. Mad- 
ison met this attempt with decidedly bad grace, but 
desiring to insure the success of Monroe's mission he 
advised Claiborne to bring the instigators of such 
movements to justice if they operated within the limits 
of the United States or attempted to enlist the aid of 
American citizens.^* 

Affairs along the Florida border, however, were not 
to remain peaceful as long as the Kempers were at 
large. In April, 1805, it was reported at Pinckneyville 
that Reuben, with some companions, had departed for 
the Bahama Islands to enlist the aid of the British in 
a project to invade and plunder the Baton Rouge dis- 
trict and slaughter its principal inhabitants. Edward 
Randolph was reputed to be one of the leading con- 
spirators. His residence near the line and his busi- 
ness connections on both sides of it enabled him to 
exert his sinister influence to the utmost. 

The alarmed Grand Pre was even in worse shape to 
deal with such a project than he had been the year 

3* Casa Yrujo to Someruelos, Sept. 14, 1804, Legajo 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba; Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, Dec. 5, 1805, Legajo 
5546, Estado, Archive Historico Nacional, Madrid ; Casa 
Yrujo to Madison, Nov. 5, 22, 1804, Spanish Notes, MS., I, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, 
Oct. 2(i, 1804 (Robertson, 5003, 5007) ; Madison to Claiborne, 
Nov. 10, 1804 (Parker. 7104). 



164 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

before. Casa Calvo, to wliom he straightway ap- 
pealed, found Claiborne regretful but dubious about 
the conspiracy, although willing to warn his fellow- 
officials. Robert Williams, the new governor of Mis- 
sissippi, was equally skeptical but was fairly complai- 
sant. Grand Pre had furnished him with a list of the 
insurgents and their abettors. Folch asked him and 
Claiborne to assist in punishing them, but counseled 
Grand Pre to rely on his own efforts rather than on 
those of the American officials. Williams promised 
to cooperate with the Spaniards in suppressing all bor- 
der lawlessness, and especially the outbreaks of the 
Kempers. But his course a few months later showed 
Grand Pre the wisdom of Folch's advice.^^ 

The Kemper episodes, the reports that American reve- 
nue officers had sacked a house on the Pascagoula, and 
that unknown persons were killing cattle and indulging 
in promiscuous shooting near Mobile, made the Span- 
iards more than ever determined to prevent Americans 
from settling in their territory or traveling through it 
without passports.^^ But in the summer of 1805 they 

35 Thomas Hutchins to Grand Pre, Apr, 22, 1805, Legajo 
1559. Papeles de Cuba; Grand Pre to Casa Calvo, Apr. 29, 
1805, Casa Calvo to Claiborne, May 6, 1805 (Parker, 7207). 
Cf. also 7209, 7210, 7212, 7214; Executive Journal Mississippi 
Territory, 1805-1810, MS., 7; Grand Pre to Williams, May 
29, 1805, Mississippi Territorial Archives, MS. ; Folch to Wil- 
liams, June 6, 1805, ibid. 

86 Casa Yrujo to Madison, Aug. 2, 1805, Spanish Notes, MS., 
I, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Folch to Someruelos, 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 165 

afforded the Americans some chance to make counter- 
complaints. In July a murderer named William Flan- 
nigan fled from Lake Maurepas to Mississippi Terri- 
tory. More than a month later a posse of twelve rode 
above the line in search of him, threatened a resident 
on the Ticfau, named Holden, and apprehending the 
nephew of the murderer, took him some ten miles be- 
low the line, deprived him of his horse, and forced him 
to trudge home on foot. This act technically consti- 
tuted a violation of American sovereignty, but the char- 
acter of all concerned was evidently such as warranted 
little attention from the authorities.^^ For more than 
a month those of Mississippi took no notice of it; 
then a new disturbance in which the Kempers figured, 
or possibly hints from the seat of government, caused 
WilHams to add this to his inflated catalogue of Span- 
ish aggressions. 

On the night of September 3 a party of white men 
and negroes seized Nathan and Samuel Kemper in 
their homes near Pinckneyville. A more important 
prize was the redoubtable Reuben, whose chance pres- 
ence there probably determined the time of the foray. 
Apparently the attacking party was composed of resi- 
dents from each side of the line, who regarded the 
brothers, and especially Reuben, as a common scourge. 

Sept. 13, 1805, Dec. 13, 1805, Legajo 1559; Folch to Casa 
Yrujo, Feb. 17, 1806, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 
37 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 685. 



I66 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

Having secured them, they passed below the line, and 
when a few feet within the province of West Florida, 
"casually" met a party of twelve Spanish militia under 
Captain Solomon Alston. The captors then fled in 
the darkness, leaving the Kempers in Alston's hands. 

Captain Alston immediately led his prisoners to 
Tonica Bayou, whence he proceeded to conduct them 
under guard to Baton Rouge. While on the way the 
pirogue in which they were proceeding approached so 
near the west bank of the Mississippi that the Kem- 
pers were able to inform a chance passerby of their 
plight. Lieutenant Wilson, commanding the Amer- 
ican garrison at Point Coupee, took the whole party 
into custody, and prepared to defend himself against 
any counter-attack from the Spaniards. Under or- 
ders from Captain Richard Sparks, they were con- 
veyed to Fort Adams and turned over to the civil 
authorities. Thus the Kempers, whom "inexplicable 
chance " had apparently delivered into the snare of 
Spanish justice, found themselves once more in their 
customary refuge. 

Williams at once called out a company of militia 
for patrol duty at Pinckneyville and another on the 
Ticfau Bayou. Having thus prepared himself against 
any hostile move on the part of his Spanish neighbors, 
he proceeded to lecture Grand Pre for this technical 
invasion of American territory. Grand Pre's reply to 
the other's scarcely veiled threats was moderate, if 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 167 

not convincing. He pointed out that disturbances for 
which the Kempers were responsible accounted for the 
maintenance of the border patrol that had by chance 
encountered them. As those who apprehended the 
Kempers were American citizens, the Spaniards were 
not responsible for the initial outrage. The arrest of 
the guard and prisoners on the Mississippi was a viola- 
tion of the Spanish right to navigate that river ; so he 
requested the release of the patrol and the extradition 
of the Kempers for punishment. After an examina- 
tion before Judge Thomas Rodney the Spanish sub- 
jects were released and the Kempers bound over to 
keep the peace.^^ 

There is little in the career of these outlaws to sug- 
gest the border hero, or even the victim of Spanish 
persecution ; but Jefferson, needing material to arouse 
the country against Spain and to exert a favorable 
effect on our negotiations for the Floridas, resorted 
to the use of a partial statement of the Kemper and 
Flannigan incidents. Casa Yrujo, after the president's 
message, did not hesitate to supply additional facts, in 
a statement to his fellow-diplomats. This speedily 
reached the public prints, but elicited no reply from the 
incensed Madison. The Spanish minister pointed out 
that such disturbances were bound to occur in an un- 

38 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 683-689; 
Grand Pre to Folch, Dec. 23, 1804, Legajo 5546, Estado, 
Archive Historico Nacional (A. H. N. hereafter), Madrid. 



l68 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

settled border population served by irregular militia 
officials, and that they became important only when 
one government or the other sanctioned them or re- 
fused satisfaction upon complaint. In spite of the 
malice of this suggestion he was more charitable than 
Grand Pre, who thought that the American govern- 
ment was simply using the occurrence as a pretext for 
hostility, or Folch, who in a private letter marvelled 
that the American president " could separate himself 
so far from the truth. "^® 

A less dramatic but more persistent series of prob- 
lems centered around Mobile Bay and its affluents. 
The inadequate and temporary privilege granted by 
Morales, at Wilkinson's request, in the summer of 
1803, led Claiborne to undertake a more comprehensive 
agreement with Folch. The Indian agent Chambers 
wrote that he could not continue his trading house at 
St. Stephens if obliged to pay duty to the Spaniards 
at Mobile on such goods as he needed. Claiborne 
pointed out to Folch that this trade kept the Indians 
contented and thus assisted the United States in ful- 
filling its treaty obligation to keep them quiet; but to 
no effect. Perhaps Folch knew a better way to re- 
strain them. Claiborne then advised Chambers to pay 
the duty under protest, and took the same course in 
the matter of provisions for Fort Stoddert. In the 

s^ Casa Yrujo to Someruelos, June 18, 1806, Legajo 1708, 
Folch to Casa Yrujo, Feb. 17, 1806, Legajo 185, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 169 

autumn of 1804 the question recurred. The collector at 
Mobile permitted a vessel loaded with military stores to 
proceed to Fort Stoddert, upon the promise of its cap- 
ant at Mobile, Joaquin de Osorno, reported that John 
them. In the spring of 1805 Chambers went to New 
Orleans, and through the intervention of Casa Calvo 
secured temporary permission, pending royal decision, 
to bring out his cargoes of furs and to take in free of 
charge such supplies as were needed at his factory 
and at Fort Stoddert.^^ 

But private commerce must look out for itself, and 
according to rumor it was ready to do so in typical 
frontier fashion. In September, 1804, the command- 
ant at Mobile, Joaquin de Osorno, reported that John 
Caller, a miHtia colonel, and James, his brother, justice 
of the peace in Washington County on the Tombigbee, 
were threatening to capture and burn every Spanish 
vessel that came up the river and throw its crew over- 
board. Their utterances suggest a desire to rival 
the Kempers. The Spaniards were inclined to regard 
them as mere empty threats; but as the American 
frontier magistrates, according to Osorno's superior, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Howard, were often ignor- 
ant and half civilized, no one could expect wisdom or 

*o American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 67^6^', 
Charleston Courier, May i, 1804; Claiborne to Madison, with 
enclosures, Mar. 30, 1805 (Parker 7181, 7182, 7183). 



170 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

moderation from them. So the incident in time swelled 
the Spanish diplomatic correspondence.*^ 

A proposal for a general embargo that then appeared 
in the National Intelligencer aroused Casa Yrujo's ap- 
prehensions. In connection with random newspaper 
comment on the commerce at Mobile and proposals to 
retaliate by restricting Spanish commerce on the Mis- 
sissippi, he believed it indicated a settled spirit of 
hostihty against Spain. When Jefferson referred to 
exactions on the Mobile, in his annual message of 
December, 1804, Yrujo was more than ever confirmed 
in his view. In a vigorous rejoinder, in which he in- 
cluded the Kemper affair of that year, he pointed out 
that the duties were moderate — only six per cent. 
Navigation existed there only by the courtesy of Spain, 
and could not be claimed as a right. Spain did not 
interfere with commercial regulations at Fort Stod- 
dert, nor should the United States complain of those 
at Mobile.*^ 

The situation on the Mississippi afforded the 
Spaniards some opportunity for counter-attack. The 
Americans permitted vessels to pass New Orleans for 
West Florida only under adequate bond and close in- 

*i (Casa Calvo) to Howard, Oct. 8, 1804, Legajo 55, Folch 
to Someruelos, Aug. 12, 1804, Legajo 1558, Papeles de Cuba; 
Casa Yrujo to Madison, Oct. 19, 1805, Spanish Notes, MS., I, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

^2 Annals of Ninth Congress, Second Session, 690; Casa 
Yrujo to Cevallos, Nov. 20, 1805 (Robertson, 5056). 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 17I 

spection. This care was deemed necessary to prevent 
smuggling, but the Spaniards regarded these regula- 
tions as designed to restrict their commerce altogether. 
The Americans did not permit vessels loaded with 
slaves to go up the river at all, for this would measur- 
ably defeat their regulations against this traffic in 
Orleans Territory. Yet they did not think that these 
restrictions paralleled those on the Mobile. Naturally 
the Spaniards did not accept this view, Casa Yrujo 
least of all.*^ 

In addition to the perennial commercial problem, the 
Spanish possession of West Florida presented another 
of minor but irritating character. One of the two 
natural postal routes to New Orleans passed thither 
from Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee by way of 
Natchez, St. Francisville, and Baton Rouge. The 
other extended from Muscle Shoals to Mobile, thence 
to the mouth of the Pascagoula, and on by the lakes 
to the city. In either case the Spaniards controlled an 
important stretch of the route. Acting upon Madi- 
son's suggestion, Claiborne, in the summer of 1804, 
arranged to have the mail by the western route pass 
through Baton Rouge. Samuel Fulton was designated 
as a " discreet person " to open the mail-bags and dis- 
tribute the portion belonging to residents in that juris- 
ts Robertson, Louisiana, II, 188; Madison to Claiborne, Dec. 
15, 1804, Domestic Letters, MS., Vol. 14, 41S, Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives (Parker, 71 14). 



172 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

diction.^* In the following year Claiborne tried to 
arrange for a like privilege through Mobile. Casa 
Calvo favored his request, but Casa Yrujo refused to 
sanction it. He did, however, use the president's ap- 
plication as a text for a well-merited lecture on Ameri- 
can pretensions and encroachments.'*^ 

In May, 1805, under the mistaken impression that 
Folch was actually constructing a military road from 
Mobile to Baton Rouge, Jefferson felt that he might 
reasonably ask for the postal privilege. He instructed 
Claiborne to approach Folch directly, while the Ameri- 
can representative took up the matter at Madrid. 
After several unsuccessful attempts, Claiborne's secre- 
tary, John Graham, finally reached Pensacola in the 
fall of 1805. In an interview with Folch he learned 
that the other had no objection to the proposal. The 
post-riders were to proceed from Fort Stoddert by 
water to New Orleans, although the president hoped 
later to extend the land route to the mouth of the 
Pascagoula or the Pearl.*^ 

The failure of Monroe's negotiation caused intense 
anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic. Nowhere was 

** Madison, Writings, II, 203 ; Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 5, 
1804 (Parker, 7665). 

*5 Casa Yrujo to Madison, Mar. 12, 1805, Spanish Notes, 
MS., I, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

46 Jefferson Papers, MS., Third Series, Vol. 10, No. 300, 
Vol. II, Nos. 26, 2,ZTf Library of Congress. Cf. Parker, 7244, 
7249, 7250. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 73 

this more felt than on the exposed Florida border. 
Grand Pre confidently expected an attack from Mis- 
sissippi, and recent events did much to justify his 
fear. The arrival of some three hundred and fifty 
additional soldiers at Pensacola in the fall of 1805 
gave Claiborne equal concern. He expected the 
greater part of them to reinforce Mobile and Baton 
Rouge, and wondered how he should meet them, in 
case of emergency, with less than three hundred regu- 
lars in New Orleans and not more than five hundred 
reliable men all told. Yet Folch denied any actual 
increase in his garrisons and Claiborne's messenger, 
John Graham, could find no direct evidence to the 
contrary. Folch told Graham that the Kemper affair 
and the threats of the Tombigbee settlers would war- 
rant such an increase in his forces, especially as the 
Americans seemed to be strengthening their garrisons 
at New Orleans and Fort Stoddert. He had not com- 
plained of the latter fact, and he commended his course 
to the other. Rumors that the Spaniards were tamper- 
ing with the Indians seemed equally groundless. But 
the course of the astute governor was not wholly dis- 
ingenuous. He earnestly besought the captain-general 
to send him more men, and even attempted to purchase 
some French cannon still remaining in New Orleans. 
The consul refused to sell them, but assured him that 
the Americans should not get them.*^ 

47 Claiborne to Madison, Oct 24, 1805 (Parker, 7291) ; same 



174 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

In the autumn of 1805 Claiborne also ventured, 
through the obliging Casa Calvo, to renew his in- 
quiries into the land sales of Morales. The intend- 
ant's recent activity betokened an attempt to profit to 
the uttermost from a transfer which his government 
resisted but could not prevent. Many unprincipled 
Americans were ready to encourage his double-deal- 
ing. The only security lay in stopping these sales 
entirely. After a heated correspondence, carried on 
through Casa Calvo, the American governor peremp- 
torily ordered Morales to discontinue his sales at once 
or leave the province. By complying Morales pro- 
longed for some months his residence in New Orleans. 

Rumor involved Casa Yrujo in Morales' transac- 
tions, but that minister's correspondence does not re- 
veal his complicity. Casa Calvo repudiated the in- 
tendant's policy, although he tried, at the same time, to 
bind Claiborne not to sell any land beyond the Missis- 
sippi. This continual attempt to balance territorial 
complaints, coupled with a reference to the undue ex- 
pansion of republics, caused Claiborne to resent the 
continuing residence of the marques. Casa Calvo 
assumed the functions of a diplomat and did more 
than a diplomat's work. His presence kept alive a 
feeling of loyalty to Spain and gave force to the per- 

to same, Dec. 9, 1805 (Parker, 7312) ; Folch to Someruelos, 
Jan. 31, 1806, Legajo 1559, same to same, Mar. 12, 1806, Le- 
gajo 185, Morales to Soler, Apr. 30, 1806, Legajo 2330, Des- 
forgues to Folch, Mar. 10, 1806, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 75 

sistent report that the United States would exchange 
the west bank of the Mississippi for the Floridas. 
Claiborne devoutly wished to be rid of him and all 
other busybodies.*^ 

There was much in the official correspondence of 
the Spaniards, had he but known it, to justify his wish. 
Morales urged his countrymen at all cost to regain 
the right bank of the Mississippi and the Island of 
New Orleans, and thus break up the rapidly increas- 
ing illegal trade that centered at the latter port. If 
Spain should offer the right of deposit at New Orleans, 
the Americans, with their repugnance to high war 
taxes, would be led to make a peaceful exchange for 
the Floridas. But an ideal policy would be to keep 
the Americans wholly away from the Gulf. Mobile 
and Pensacola in their hands would inevitably become 
centers of contraband trade.*^ 

From the tone of the president's message of Decem- 
ber, 1805, Casa Yrujo and Folch, in common with most 
American citizens, were led to anticipate a speedy 
declaration of war against Spain. They preferred to 
meet the peril by military measures rather than terri- 
torial bargaining. They proposed first to insure the 
safety of Mobile and Pensacola by seizing the Ameri- 
can forts on the Tombigbee. Then they would at- 

^8 Claiborne to Madison, May 19, 1805 (Parker, 7217)- Cf. 
also 6997, 7255, 7258, 7259, 7270-727^. 

*9 Morales to Soler, Sept. 20, 1805, Legajo 595, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



176 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

tempt to reduce New Orleans and Natchez, as a pre- 
liminary step in acquiring the western bank of the 
Mississippi. At the same time they hoped to stir up 
sedition in Kentucky and Tennessee. This marks a 
recurrence to the outworn separatist intrigue, but even 
so they were not more blind than was the American 
administration a year later. In their judgment any- 
thing was preferable to a mere defensive policy. A 
general council of war, convened by Folch, devised 
plans in keeping with these suggestions.^^ 

At least one among the American officials had some 
inkling of these plans. Harry Toulmin, a recent ap- 
pointee from Kentucky, was the federal judge in the 
eastern or Tombigbee district of Mississippi Terri- 
tory. Interested in all that advanced the material and 
moral interests of his adopted home, he did not hesi- 
tate to point out some of the perils that threatened it. 
Although one of the most exposed regions in the whole 
United States, the Tombigbee country mustered 
barely three hundred militia. While this number 
might suffice to take Mobile, he anticipated, in case of 
war, that the Spaniards would be forewarned and 
would attack first, probably with the aid of the Indians. 
But if the American settlers were ready for a quick, 
bold stroke and could be reinforced by a thousand 
militia from Tennessee and Kentucky, they could 

'^^ Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 20, 1806, Legajo 1559, Folch to 
Casa Yrujo, Feb. 17, 1806, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 77 

readily secure the Floridas and also gain the good-will 
of the savages. The country could provision a reason- 
ably large force even if the enemy consumed most of 
the surplus food. Although the Spaniards had recently 
been reinforced, and were establishing beacons and 
block-houses along the coast, they were lately becom- 
ing polite to the Americans ; but he was uncertain 
whether this betokened peace or war.^^ 

In his reference to Spanish politeness Toulmin could 
hardly have had in mind the Spanish attitude toward 
the Mobile trade, in which he was vitally interested. 
In July, 1805, he reported that there were two vessels 
at Fort Stoddert loading with cotton and that they 
would attempt to pass Mobile without paying the duty. 
One of them actually did so, using the eastern fork 
of the river; but on the return voyage the owners 
directed her captain to call at the port and pay duty 
on the previous cargo, as well as on the one she then 
carried. The incensed Spaniards seized both vessel 
and cargo, although part of the latter belonged to the 
government trading house. Toulmin, who was also 
interested in a schooner loaded with goods for the 
Indian factor. Chambers, tried to discuss with Colonel 
Maximilian de St. Maxent, then commanding at Mo- 
bile, the right and the advisability of the Spanish prac- 
tice in levying duties at Mobile, but he met with no 

'^^ Toulmin to Lattimore, Feb. i, 1806, Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 30, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

13 



178 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

encouragement. An appeal to Congress through the 
territorial delegate, Hugh Lattimore, was equally fruit- 
less. The House referred the matter to the secretary 
of state, but Madison's previous discussions with Casa 
Yrujo did not encourage a second resort to the mooted 
question.^2 

Claiborne also intervened in the dispute. In Oc- 
tober, 1805, he tried to find out from Morales when 
the Spaniards began to lay duties at Mobile, and asked 
him to discontinue the practice, pending an appeal to 
their governments. Incidentally the American took 
occasion to intimate that the claim of the United States 
to West Florida gave his country the exclusive right 
to navigate the river, but he tried not to be offensive 
about it. In view of his other disputes with Morales, 
Claiborne could hardly expect the intendant to second 
his efforts, but that official promised to write Folch 
about the duties, and in the meantime to do nothing 
to disturb the existing harmony. The only result of 
the intendant's inquiry was to add to the bitterness 
already existing between him and Folch. The latter 
resented his intermeddhng and refused to mix up in 
any way with the other's intrigues.^ 



53 



52 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 683 ; Toul- 
min to St. Maxent, Oct, 4, 1805, Mobile Records, MS., County 
Court House, Mobile, Ala. ; Petition of William Harvey and 
William and John Pierce et al., Dec. 22, 1805, Miscellaneous 
Letters, MS., Vol. 30, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; cf. 
also Parker, 4403. 

53 Claiborne to Morales, Oct. 22, Morales to Claiborne, Oct. 



1 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 79 

The American governor also addressed himself 
directly to Folch, and instructed John Graham to bring 
up this subject, in connection with a discussion of 
postal routes, increase of garrisons, and other points 
at issue. Folch assured Claiborne's messenger that 
the objectionable duties were already established when 
he assumed office, so that he could not change them, 
but he was willing to suspend them temporarily, pro- 
vided Graham could give him satisfactory assurance 
regarding vessels bound for Baton Rouge and other 
points in West Florida. If the Americans did not 
detain these vessels at New Orleans or force them to 
pay duties on goods reexported to those points, he 
would, pending royal decision, prove equally accom- 
modating on the Mobile.^* 

Graham could not give him the assurance required. 
Claiborne, when the other brought back the proposal, 
feared that it was simply a pretext to estop his com- 
plaint. He learned upon inquiry that there were no 
duties such as Folch mentioned and that vessels loaded 
with slaves could not pass up the river. This restric- 
tion would probably be sufficient to confirm the Spanish 

23, Morales to Folch, Oct. 25, Folch to Morales, Nov. 28, 1805, 
Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba; American State Papers, Foreign 
Relations, II, 682, 

s* Claiborne to Folch, Oct. 31, 1805 (enclosed in Parker, 
7294?); Folch to Claiborne, Nov. 28, 1805 (Parker, 7308, 
7310). 



l80 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

governor in his attitude.^^ During Claiborne's absence 
from the city Graham held a conversation with Morales 
on the subject, and found him even less amenable 
than the other. Morales said that the Treaty of 1795 
did not justify any foreign commerce whatever on the 
Mobile, not even on paying the six per cent duty. The 
question was one for a full treasury council to decide, 
not for a single subordinate official.^^ In view of the 
attitude of the American officials toward him, the un- 
graciousness of Morales is not surprising. 

The Spanish officials were neither consistent nor 
united among themselves, as the Mobile records of the 
period abundantly attest. James Innerarity, the rep- 
resentative of John Forbes and Company, continued 
the customary traffic in furs that his firm had always 
enjoyed, and even employed American vessels for this 
purpose. Although the Spaniards bought foodstuffs 
above the line, they would not permit William 
Kennedy, a physician at Mobile, to send supplies to his 
brothers on the Tombigbee. As Joseph Kennedy was 
a noted opponent of the Spaniards, this refusal is not 
surprising. But the case that caused the most serious 
dispute was that of the schooner Mary. St. Maxent 
had previously allowed an American brigantine to 
obtain provisions and water at Mobile, upon paying 

^5 Claiborne to Folch, Dec. 7, 1805 (enclosed in Parker, 
7312?). 

56 Graham to Morales, Dec. 23, Morales to Graham, Dec. 24, 
1805 (Parker, 7317, 7318). 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES l8l 

the customary charges. His subordinate, Eslava, de- 
cided that this justified him in permitting the skipper 
of the Mary to land part of her cargo at Mobile and 
sell it, and then proceed up the Tombigbee. Later the 
vessel conveyed a cargo of lumber from Mobile to 
Havana. Morales called Folch to account for per- 
mitting the trade at all. He cited royal approval of 
his own course in 1803, when he refused Wilkinson's 
request to permit general trade on the Mobile. The 
Americans were not accommodating them, so why 
should they do more than the treaty prescribed ?^^ 

Morales was enraged because the Americans had 
finally expelled him from New Orleans. For months, 
during the summer and early fall of 1805, the admin- 
istration came to no decision about a Spanish policy. 
For a time Jefferson pondered over certain measures 
to strengthen the weak American border. He wished 
Congress to authorize land bounties for settlers in the 
Tombigbee region and other strategic points, in return 
for partial military service during the first seven 
years of residence. He considered measures for more 
effectively organizing the younger militia.^^ But in 
the end he preferred an indefinite negotiation abroad 

^7 Mobile Records, MS., 1805, passim ; Parker, 7365 ; St. 
Maxent to Folch, Feb. 26, 1806, Legajo 61, Morales to Folch, 
Mar. 3, 1806, Legajo 185, Morales to Soler, Apr. 30, 1806, 
Legajo 2330, Papeles de Cuba. 

^8 Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 442; Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 31, 
1806, Legajo 1559, Papeles de Cuba. 



1 82 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

to these and other measures of national preparedness. 
There was, however, one measure that he and Madison 
were determined to carry out, and ultimately they per- 
suaded the entire cabinet to sanction it. Casa Yrujo, 
Casa Calvo, and Morales must be forced to leave the 
country. As a preliminary step the president re- 
hearsed, in his message of December, 1805, the long 
catalogue of Spanish aggressions and acts of un- 
friendliness, to which we have referred. Among 
other points he severely criticized the commercial 
exactions at Mobile. Casa Yrujo, who had intimated 
that he would leave the country when agreeable to 
himself and his nation, and who wished to make his 
further stay as disagreeable as possible, readily de- 
fended the obnoxious duties. He said that they were 
moderate. The United States could claim no exemp- 
tion on the ground that West Florida formed part of 
the Louisiana Purchase. France had joined Spain in 
disposing of that pretext. 

Governor Folch believed the message to be a char- 
acteristic display of American arrogance. Evidently 
the administration demanded for itself the exclusive 
right to levy duties and to pay none.^® His colleagues, 
Morales and Casa Calvo, were the destined victims of 
American displeasure. After prolonged controversy 
and delay, Claiborne, in obedience to instructions from 
Washington, peremptorily ordered Morales to leave 

^59 Annals of Ninth Congress, Second Session, 687-693. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES J 83 

New Orleans. By the end of January, 1806, he did 
so. With equal difficulty, although in a less disagree- 
able manner, Claiborne shortly persuaded Casa Calvo 
to follow.«« 

Folch did not welcome Morales at Pensacola, and 
consented only with bad grace to recognize his official 
presence there. He soon found reason to regret the 
other's interference. Morales regarded the traffic at 
Mobile as contrary to what he believed to be the settled 
Spanish policy. When St. Maxent brought a case to 
his attention, in March, 1806, Morales reiterated the 
rule that he had laid down three years before. Ves- 
sels in the military service of the United States might 
be permitted to pass Mobile under special permit from 
the Spanish authorities. But Spanish subjects could 
not trade with foreigners, except in case of urgent 
necessity, nor Americans with them.®^ Folch pre- 
ferred to permit this commerce, upon payment of the 
six per cent duty, and claimed that he found the prac- 
tice already established when he assumed control. He 
intimated that the intendant had then allowed it, in 
the hope that by thus courting favor with the Ameri- 

^^ Claiborne to Madison, Jan, 12, 28, 1806, with enclosures 
(Parker, 7329-7334, 7340) ; Morales to Soler, Feb. 28, Mar. 
31, 1806, Legajo 267, Folch to Someruelos, Apr. 4, 1806, Le- 
gajo 1559, Papeles de Cuba; Cevallos to Erving, June 24, 1806, 
Spanish Dispatches, MS., X, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; 
Gayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 131. 

61 Morales to Soler, Apr. 30, 1806, Legajo 2330, Papeles de 
Cuba, 



184 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

cans he might carry on his speculations in New Or- 
leans unchecked. Disappointed in this and enraged at 
his expulsion, he now demanded a war with the United 
States, in order to soothe his wounded pride.®^ 

Morales would neither accept responsibility for the 
questionable traffic nor remain silent under Folch's in- 
sinuations, but proceeded to lay the blame on Joaquin 
de Osorno, the former commandant at Mobile, who 
had permitted some thirty infractions of his orders 
in the previous eighteen months. The quarreling offi- 
cials then appealed to their respective superiors.^^ 
The vessel that had provoked the dispute was forced 
to return to New Orleans. It was rumored that the 
Spaniards would also prevent the transit of mails 
through West Florida. Claiborne interpreted these 
hostile tokens as retaliatory acts for the expulsion of 
Morales and Casa Calvo.^* The people of Washing- 
ington County, Mississippi, passed resolutions declar- 
ing these restrictions a violation of their treaty rights, 
and characterized as " an enemy to his country " 
every one who should sell provisions to Spanish sub- 
jects, or transact other business with them. Those 
who aided agents or vessels of the Spanish king ex- 
posed themselves "to all the pains and penalties of 

62 Folch to Someruelos, May 13, 1806, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba. 

63 Morales to Folch, May 22, 1806 (Robertson, 5094). 

6* Claiborne to Madison, Mar. 14, 15, 18, 1806 (Parker, 7360- 
7362) . 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 85 

high treason against the United States." Colonel John 
Caller immediately ordered the militia to close the river 
to provision boats. Reports that the regular troops 
were massing at Fort Stoddert more seriously alarmed 
St. Maxent at Mobile. His trusty mulatto spy, Regis 
Duret, shortly assured him that the latter news was 
false, while Judge Toulmin with some difficulty per- 
suaded Caller to abandon the idea of a secret attack 
on Mobile.®^ 

The summer of 1806 was marked by some shifting 
of officials in the disturbed area. Lieutenant E. P. 
Gaines, later dubbed by the Spaniards "the Cock of 
Stoddert," took command of the American troops at 
that post. Francisco Collell replaced St. Maxent at 
Mobile, and during Folch's illness Lieutenant-Colonel 
Carlos Howard assumed temporary control at Pensa- 
cola. Gaines made some pointed inquiries about the 
transmission of the mails. These inquiries, and the 
presence of loaded vessels at Mobile, led Morales to 
believe that the American administration, taking ad- 
vantage of the French war with Prussia, was delib- 
erately seeking to embroil itself with the Spanish fron- 
tier officials. Sufficient time had elapsed since Wil- 
kinson first presented the issue of Mobile commerce 

65Gazeta de Mexico, XIII, 379; St. Maxent to Folch, Mar. 
19, 1806, Legajo 61, same to same, Mar. 29, 1806, Legajo 61, 
also Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba; Swaine to Mead, Aug. 15, 
1806, Mississippi Territorial Archives, MS., Vol. 6. 



1 86 FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 

to settle it by diplomacy, and the failure to do so in- 
dicated premeditated hostility.^® 

Although he still firmly held the opinion that the 
commerce was contrary to the treaty and to express 
royal orders, Morales now favored concession. With 
an empty treasury and uncertain credit he could not 
even meet the regular requirements of the Indian 
trade. He longed to rid himself of an office that 
promised nothing but disgrace, but he must continue 
in the post where fate had placed him. The only 
course was to restore the commercial privilege that 
had prevailed before the preceding March. This 
would permit the Americans to move their crops and 
introduce new goods subject to the six per cent duty. 
If it were not done before the middle of October, 
he and his colleagues must prepare for hostilities. 
Made up as the American militia was of ungovern- 
able men, it could readily starve out or overrun the 
province. The concession would remove any hostile 
pretext, preserve the national honor, and bring in some 
greatly needed revenue. 

The captain-general eagerly seconded this solution 
of the difficulty, and advised the governor and the 

66 Gaines to Collell, Aug. i6, 1806, and reply, Aug. 17, Legajo 
61, Papeles de Cuba; Morales to Folch, Aug. 20, 1806 (Robert- 
son, 5101) ; Morales to Howard, Sept. 11, 1806, Legajo 1561 ; 
St. Maxent to Howard, Sept. 10, 1806, Legajo 74, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



FRONTIER PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES 1 8/ 

intendant to confer over the details.®^ Folch's illness 
prevented the conference, but Morales did not inter- 
fere with such concessions as Howard and CoUell 
chose to grant. At the same time the American offi- 
cials submitted a frank statement of trading condi- 
tions on the Mississippi.^^ As a result of this frank- 
ness and mutual forbearance the Florida frontier re- 
mained quiescent during the crisis that in the early- 
autumn of 1806 threatened the Texas border. It was 
simply the calm that preceded the storm ; and the gath- 
ering tempest, commonly called the Burr Conspiracy, 
was destined to exert an influence on American fron- 
tier problems out of all proportion to the real peril 
involved. 

67 Morales to Collell, Sept. 13, 1806, Howard to Someruelos, 
Sept 2^], 1806, Legajo 1561, Papeles de Cuba; Someruelos to 
Morales, Nov. 14, 1806 (Robertson, 5109). 

68 Toulmin to Mead, Oct. 20, 1806, Mississippi Territorial 
Archives, MS., Vol. 6; St. Maxent to Howard, Oct. 29, 1806; 
E. P. Gaines to Commander of Mobile, Nov. 5, 1806, Legajo 
74, Papeles de Cuba. 



CHAPTER VI 

The Burr Conspiracy and the Embargo 

It is extremely doubtful just what Aaron Burr in- 
tended to accomplish by his mysterious conspiracy. 
Perhaps he planned a more dramatic appeal to western 
sectionalism than had yet been made. As a confirmed 
opportunist he certainly would not neglect this senti- 
ment, should it appear wide-spread or influential 
enough to promise success. It is more likely that 
Mexico was his objective point, with West Florida, 
and especially Baton Rouge, as an important way sta- 
tion. His proposed visit to St. Augustine in the sum- 
mer of 1804; his activity at Washington during the 
following winter, when he and Wilkinson frequently 
busied themselves in mapping Spanish territory, in- 
cluding West Florida; the attempts of these confed- 
erates and their friends to gain for Burr the governor- 
ship of Orleans Territory and "to send to the devil 
that idiotic boaster W. C. C. Claiborne " ; and the 
warnings of the Spanish minister that Burr was a 
British spy, planning to explore the Floridas, — all 
these point to the conclusion that Burr's presence was 
fraught with danger to the Spaniards, especially in 
West Florida. Accordingly Casa Calvo and Folch 

188 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 1 89 

were warned to watch him closely, and the latter was 
empowered to arrest him should he give occasion for 
such a step.^ 

Burr's actions in New Orleans during his brief visit 
there in June and July, 1805, increased their apprehen- 
sion. Casa Calvo, to whom Wilkinson commended 
him, had contemplated using Burr's plan, whatever it 
was, to advance his favorite project — the exchange of 
the Floridas for Louisiana and New Orleans. To his 
mortification Burr avoided his society, but consorted 
with James Workman and other members of the 
"Mexican Association." These conspirators planned 
to capture Mobile and Pensacola as a first step toward 
the more distant goal. So Burr's presence boded im- 
mediate peril. Moreover he was intimate with Daniel 
Clark, the reputed accomplice of Morales in West 
Florida speculations, to whom, as Wilkinson intimated 
in his letter of introduction. Burr probably communi- 
cated many " things improper to letter." But despite 
these well-founded suspicions, Burr afforded them no 

1 A, Burr to Governor Enrique White, Sept. 22, 1804, East 
Florida Papers, MS., Library of Congress ; Report of the 
Committee appointed to inquire into the conduct of General 
Wilkinson (Ezekiel Bacon, Chairman), 203; Wilkinson to 
Casa Calvo, Mar. 18, June 2, 1805, enclosed in Casa Calvo to 
Cevallos, Aug. 22, 1805; Casa Yrujo to Casa Calvo, May 23, 
1805, Audiencia de Santo Domingo, MS., 87-1-10, Archivo 
General de Indias, Seville. 



190 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

occasion to apprehend him as he passed through West 
Florida on his devious way northward.^ 

Before Burr returned to Washington, his agent, 
Jonathan Dayton, asked the Enghsh minister for some 
British vessels to assist a projected revolt among the 
people of West Florida.^ Casa Yrujo grew still more 
suspicious when he noted Burr's intimacy with Day- 
ton, another person of broken fortune. Dayton told 
him that Burr planned to seize the Floridas, revolu- 
tionize the western States, and possibly invade Mex- 
ico. The Spaniard did not regard the Mexican pro- 
ject as serious, and felt that Dayton's whole purpose 
was to extort money from him and the Enghsh min- 
ister. Wilkinson had evidently taught Dayton how 
easy this was, for that adventurer, like the general, 
offered to reveal secret views of the president. Casa 
Yrujo scaled Dayton's reward to one fourth the origi- 
nal demand, but his superiors refused to consider it 
even at this figure.* 

In May, 1806, Casa Yrujo reported that Burr's plan 
was suspended to await the outcome of the Florida 
negotiation. If that region passed under the control 

2 Casa Calvo to Cevallos, Aug. 2.2, 1805, Audiencia of Santo 
Domingo, MS., 87-1-10, A. G. I., Seville; Documentos His- 
toricos Mexicanos, I, i-ioo, passim (Mexico 1910) ; Wilkin- 
son, Memoirs, II, Appendix, LXXI. 

3 Merry to Lord Mulgrave, Nov. 25, 1805, MS., British 
Foreign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 45, 

* Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, Jan. i, Feb. 13, 1806, Legajo 5546, 
Estado, A. H. N., Madrid. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO I9I 

of the United States he would include it in his plan 
for western separation. Thus the territory would fall 
into his possession without cost or without stirring 
up trouble with Spain.^ In October, Casa Yrujo ad- 
vised the West Florida governor that Burr was about 
to initiate his projected western revolt and that he 
might attempt to seize the Floridas in order to make 
his enterprise more popular; so he warned the other 
to keep a sharp lookout for his jurisdiction. When 
Burr started a second time down the Ohio, Casa 
Yrujo still counseled vigilance. He thought the ad- 
venturer had possibly abandoned his plan to invade 
Mexico, for Burr had requested him to secure the re- 
moval of commercial restrictions on the Mobile and 
to detain the mails when the insurrection broke out. 
Instead, the Spanish minister warned Folch to be 
doubly watchful.® 

In August and September of 1806 the Spaniards 
were more interested in the movements of Wilkinson 
than in those of Burr. By this time the American reg- 
ulars and militia, already under arms to repel reported 
Spanish aggressions, were preparing to act against 
Baton Rouge as well as Texas. At the former post 
Grand Pre determined to put up a good defense, al- 
though he had only sixty men, one half of them in- 

5 Same to same, May 14, 1806 (Robertson, 5093). 
® Casa Yrujo to Folch, Oct. 30, 1806, Legajo 104, Casa Yrujo 
to Someruelos, Dec. lo, 1806, Legajo 1708, Papeles de Cuba. 



192 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

valided, and an uncertain militia largely composed 
of Americans/ Wilkinson himself, as he descended 
the river, was uncertain whether to attack West Flor- 
ida or Texas. Pensacola in his estimation could de- 
fend itself, and no more. Mobile was menaced by 
American regulars and militia on the Tombigbee. 
The ruined fort at Baton Rouge was a mere holding 
point surrounded by a hostile population ready to 
overthrow it themselves or to do so in conjunction 
with the American garrison at Point Coupee. A cam- 
paign against the Floridas might easily be combined 
with his first forward movement "toward the Grand 
river. ^ 

Some maneuvres among the American forces seemed 
to make this certain. The alarmed Spaniards called 
a council of war at Pensacola. Those present agreed 
that it would be useless to reinforce Baton Rouge 
should the Americans attack that post, for both time 
and transports were lacking. Under the circum- 
stances Grand Pre should yield the post, after render- 
ing the artillery useless. Early in November Howard, 
the temporary commander at Pensacola, learned that 
Wilkinson had already begun hostilities, and that in 
consequence the militia on the Tombigbee had been 
summoned to rally at Wakefield on the last Saturday 

7 Acta de Junta de Guerra, Pensacola, Sept. i6, 1806, Le- 
gajo 74, Papeles de Cuba. 

8 Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, Appendix LX. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 1 93 

in October. As he obtained this information from an 
American, " drunk as is usually the case with all of 
that nation who come daily to this plaza," it naturally 
aroused some doubt in his mind. St. Maxent, on his 
advice, sent his trusty agent Regis Duret to investi- 
gate, but he observed no unusual change in the garri- 
son at Fort Stoddert.^ Wilkinson, as the Spaniards 
soon learned, had no intention whatever of stirring up 
a border war. Having formed the Neutral Ground 
Agreement, he temporarily left the people on the Tom- 
bigbee to shift for themselves, while he prepared to 
open the most reckless and far-reaching intrigue of 
his whole career.^^ 

Early in the autumn of 1806 Folch was informed 
from New Orleans that in the following spring ten 
thousand Kentuckians and three thousand regulars 
were to descend the Mississippi for a projected expe- 
dition against Mexico. They were to be joined by 
eight or ten thousand Louisiana militia and five thou- 
sand negro slaves, who were to be liberated for this 
purpose. A portion of this motley host was to be de- 
tached to hold New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Pen- 
sacola, while the main body invaded Mexico by way 
of Natchitoches and the mouth of the Rio Grande. 

9 Howard to Someruelos, Nov. 2, 1806, Legajo 1574; St. 
Maxent to Howard, Nov. 10, 1806, Legajo 74, Papeles de Cuba. 

10 McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, Ch. V, VI, VHI, 
gives the best summary of these events. 

14 



194 



« 

THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 



This information was too exaggerated to be true ; but 
when Folch later received a newspaper chpping de- 
scribing Burr's movements along the Ohio, he felt it 
worth while to pay more attention to the project. 
The later item reached him through Wilkinson's con- 
fidant in New Orleans. Perhaps the other came from 
the same source. Both reports formed part of the 
general's plan to betray Burr.^^ 

In this connection Wilkinson also determined to 
blackmail the Mexican viceroy. To accomplish this 
he must create the impression that Burr's project was 
most serious and its frustration most desirable. To 
this end Wilkinson evidently wished to work upon 
the viceroy through Governor Folch. Accordingly he 
advised the latter that a confidential communication 
was on its way, at the same time assuring him " on 

11 A French copy of this original project, signed by Folch 
and dated at New Orleans, Oct. i, 1806, is in Marina, 1805- 
1808, MS., (Archive General de Mexico) (cf. Bolton, Guide 
to Materials ... in the Principal Archives of Mexico, 183). 
Another copy in Spanish is in Legajo 1574, Papeles de Cuba. 
Wilkinson is probably the source of the project, by which he 
evidently wished to arouse Spanish fears. He may even then 
have intended to betray Burr, seeing that the latter had failed 
to obtain money from the French or English minister, and 
convert the intricate plot into a mercenary intrigue, from 
which he alone should profit. The second copy of the project, 
with the newspaper clipping, reached Folch in December 
through Wilkinson's confidant, Louis De Clouet, after the 
general had come to New Orleans from the Texas frontier. 
He had then dispatched his messenger, Burling, to the viceroy. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 1 95 

his honor as a soldier" that such measures as he was 
taking were for the interest of Spain as well as of the 
United States. Then his messenger followed with a 
detailed account of Burr's proposed plan against Lou- 
isiana and Mexico.^- Wilkinson employed Spaniards 
to aid him, but they refused to take any definite meas- 
ures against the predicted danger without word from 
Folch. Leonard had also warned Morales about the 
Mexican Association. Friar Antonio Sedella and Rich- 
ard R. Keene, residents of New Orleans, gave addi- 
tional information. They tried to implicate the Amer- 
ican government in a wide-spread plot in which Daniel 
Clark, Wilkinson, and Burr played important but un- 
certain parts. Such rumors served only to confuse 
the situation. Each interested reporter wished to be 
the first to give information to the higher authorities 
and was naturally inclined to exaggerate whatever he 
learned. ^^ 

Folch, already recovered from the illness of the pre- 
ceding summer, was at Mobile. After receiving Wil- 
kinson's letter, he determined to visit Baton Rouge. 
Wilkinson was pleased at this evidence of faith in 
him and his government, and as further testimony sent 
the Spaniard Jefferson's proclamation against Burr, 

12 Wilkinson to Folch, Dec. 6, 1806, Legajo 5546, Estado, 
A. H. N., Madrid; De Clouet to Folch, Dec. 12, 1806, Legajo 
61, Papeles de Cuba. 

13 Morales to Soler, reservado, May 23, 1806, same to same, 
Nov. 8, 1806, Legajo 267, Papeles de Cuba. 



196 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

which he felt sure would convince the most incredu- 
lous. Burr was then approaching, so Wilkinson ad- 
vised Folch to hasten his coming and asked him to let 
American troops pass Mobile on their way to New 
Orleans. As this transfer was to protect Mexico as 
well as Louisiana and the western States against a 
common enemy (for so Wilkinson chose to regard his 
former confrere), and as his officers promised to keep 
the troops in order and in other ways preserve the 
status quo which the president desired to maintain, he 
felt that there could be no objection to his request.^* 

By this time Folch was persuaded that Burr would 
not attempt to attack Mobile or Pensacola by way of 
Muscle Shoals. He therefore complied with the 
other's advice to make his headquarters at Baton 
Rouge. Before moving thither he almost wrecked 
their proposed joint action by refusing to let the Amer- 
ican troops pass Mobile. Lieutenant E. P. Gaines and 
Captain Thomas Swaine, commanding the detachment 
destined for New Orleans, vainly sought this privilege, 
but Folch was unwilling to grant it without the previ- 
ous consent of Someruelos. Time was pressing, so 
Swaine loaded his troops on a schooner and dropped 
down the river toward Mobile. When the amazed 
Folch ordered two vessels to intercept him, Swaine 
discreetly took the eastern fork of the river, and 

1* Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 6, 1807, Legajo 5546, Estado, 
A. H. N., Madrid. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 1 97 

after safely reaching the bay sent an officer to inform 
the Spaniard of what he had done. The other af- 
fected anger, but we may well believe that this was 
merely a pose to avoid any disagreeable consequences 
with his superiors. He told the officer at Mobile to 
let the incident make no change in his relations with 
the Americans. Later the captain-general permitted 
American troops to pass Mobile in small parties, tar- 
rying there as briefly as possible.^^ 

Although Wilkinson had aroused Folch and started 
him westward toward Baton Rouge, he could not per- 
suade Grand Pre to pay any attention directly to his 
many warnings. In January Burr reached Natchez. 
Wilkinson advised Folch and Morales of the fact, and 
suggested that they should concentrate forces at Baton 
Rouge, secure the artillery there, and check any plan 
to attack Mobile or Pensacola. At the same time he 
informed them that good faith and national interests 
authorized him to make common cause with them in 
defending their respective posts. He was ready, there- 
fore, to consider any plan that promised substantial 
agreement. Apparently the administration did not in- 
struct him to take this specific step. Very likely he felt 
that he could control the situation to better advantage 
by securing the chance to direct the Spanish forces as 
well as his own. At any rate he would be able to disarm 

15 Folch to Someruelos, reservado, Dec. 13, 1806, Legajo 
1576, Papeles de Cuba. 



198 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

possible criticism of his own course by showing that 
the neighboring Spaniards were pursuing a similar one. 
One is inclined to suspect him of thinking that if he 
could induce Folch to make common cause with him 
and then incidentally pose as the saviour of West Flor- 
ida as well as Louisiana and Texas, he could better 
persuade the viceroy of New Spain to pay the money 
that he had demanded. Wilkinson also desired to 
hold a personal interview with Folch in order to secure 
from him a statement that he had never been a Spanish 
pensioner. Influenced by his proposals for joint ac- 
tion, Governor Folch on his journey westward planned 
to visit New Orleans, confer with Wilkinson and Clai- 
borne on their common peril, and then proceed to 
Baton Rouge by way of the Mississippi.^^ 

Meanwhile the exaggerated reports of Burr's ad- 
vance had so excited the volatile population of the 
Creole capital that Governor Claiborne, ignorant of 
the general's necessity, refused to allow Folch and his 
officials to enter the city; and Wilkinson was con- 
strained to support him. Captain Daniel Hughes, 
Wilkinson's aide, urged Folch to disregard the appar- 
ent discourtesy of their refusal and come on any- 
how, promising that Claiborne would not oppose such 
a move. Hughes himself says that he tried to in- 

1" Wilkinson to Jefferson, Dec. 18, 1806, Bacon's Report, 
429; Wilkinson to Folch and Morales, Jan. 5, 1807, Legajos 
1574 and 267, Papeles de Cuba; Clark, Proofs, 64-67. Cf. 
also my article in American Historical Review, XIX, 804 ff. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 1 99 

duce Folch to meet Claiborne and Wilkinson at the 
St. Jean Bridge, on the canal outside the city limits. 
The incensed Spaniard did not believe it in accordance 
with his dignity as "the Governor of a Province and 
an officer of His Catholic Majesty " to hold an inter- 
view within sight of New Orleans while he was de- 
nied permission to enter it, and proceeded immediately 
to Baton Rouge. Although Folch thus refused to 
meet him, Wilkinson, through mutual friends, suc- 
ceeded in obtaining from him the statement explain- 
ing his former relations with the Spaniards. While 
not wholly satisfactory, he used it in a defense that 
he published later in the year.^^ 

Even the prospect of common action with the Amer- 
icans had not led Folch and Morales to neglect ordi- 
nary precautions. Morales opened the year 1807 by 
appealing to the citizens of Pensacola for funds to 
meet the projected attack of the Kentuckians.^^ Folch 
was inclined to find encouragement in the reputed op- 
erations of these insurgents. He distrusted Burr and 
believed the United States unfriendly, but such a pro- 
ject as was under way betokened the ultimate separa- 
tion of the West from the Union. In this way only 

1"^ American Historical Review, X, 832 ff. ; Folch to Some- 
ruelos, reservado, Feb. 3, 1807, Legajo 1574, Papeles de Cuba; 
Report of Daniel Hughes to (Wilkinson), Jan. — , 1807, Let- 
ters Received, MS., War Department. 

18 Edict of Morales, Jan. i, 1807, Legajo 185, Papeles de 
Cuba; cf. also Robertson, 5121, 5128, 5129. 



200 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

could the marvelous progress of the American States 
be checked. Otherwise they would soon overthrow 
all European establishments on this continent. For 
this reason he was prepared to support the insur- 
gents, if they asked for aid, and advised Grand Pre to 
observe a neutral attitude between them and the 
United States, but to be prepared to repel an attack 
from either. His most pressing problem, however, 
was the financial one, and he must look to Mexico, the 
objective point of the invasion, for its solution. 

Other wild reports of the number and purpose 
of these insurgents had come to Folch while on his 
way westward. After seizing the various posts in 
Louisiana and the Floridas and making sure of the 
artillery and munitions in them, they were to under- 
take an expedition against Mexico. When that re- 
gion proclaimed its independence, it would join the 
western States and form a new power. The thirteen 
thousand men already enlisted for this campaign would 
shortly increase to thirty thousand. Ten thousand of 
them were already rallying at the mouth of the Cum- 
berland. On reaching Baton Rouge Folch immedi- 
ately planned to get the artillery out of their reach. 
All pieces not absolutely necessary should be sent to 
Vera Cruz. The forts were to be repaired and placed 
in the best possible state of defense. The one at 
Baton Rouge was so ruined as to be indefensible. 
The Spaniards must have a new one there if they 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 201 

wished to preserve the Floridas and cause the Ameri- 
cans to respect their rights on the Mississippi. 

Wilkinson reported that Grand Pre disregarded his 
warnings against Burr. Folch found his subordinate's 
course unaccountable. Grand Pre preserved a mys- 
terious silence in the midst of disturbing rumors, and 
neglected to carry out Folch's suggestions for strength- 
ening that part of the province. The latter's own ac- 
tivity in moving westward and in embodying the militia 
there disconcerted the insurgents and caused them to 
abandon the attack on Baton Rouge that the Spaniards 
momentarily expected. Folch, therefore, while await- 
ing a remittance from Mexico, had merely maintained 
a policy of watchful waiting, and put in force meas- 
ures for the better organization of the district. Never- 
theless, he did not cease to ponder over the attitude of 
the American government, and he even imagined that 
the British government might also be involved in the 
puzzling conspiracy.^® 

The suspicion that existed between himself and 
Grand Pre found its counterpart above the line. On 
the day that Wilkinson and Claiborne refused Folch 
permission to pass through New Orleans, they advised 
Cowles Meade, acting governor of Mississippi, "to 

19 Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 8, 1807, Legajo 5546, Estado, 
A. H. N. ; same to same, Feb. 10, July 28, 1807, Legajo 1562, 
Papeles de Cuba; Folch to Iturrigaray, Feb. 15, 1807, Marina, 
1805-1808, A. G., Mexico; Morales to Soler, Jan. 31, 1807, 
Legajo 267, Papeles de Cuba. 



202 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

keep a strict eye upon the Spaniards." Folch was re- 
ported to be taking four hundred men with him to 
Baton Rouge. While they desired his cooperation 
against Burr, the relations between the United States 
and Spain were so uncertain that they must exercise 
extreme vigilance in regard to their neighbors. Yet 
Meade was more inclined to be suspicious of Wilkin- 
son than of the Spaniards, and warned Claiborne to 
watch out for him and for Daniel Clark as well.^'' 
Late in February, Wilkinson reported to the secretary 
of war a rumor that Casa Calvo had returned to Ha- 
vana and was to bring reinforcements to Baton Rouge. 
The American general was going to divide his forces 
and place enough men in Fort Adams to capture Baton 
Rouge, if hostilities should break out.-^ We may in- 
terpret this and his other report to the secretary as 
attempts to conceal his real relations with Folch. 

Wilkinson's hatred of Burr had by this time become 
extreme, and he determined to get the other into his 
power. For this purpose he commissioned one of his 
aids. Captain Moses Hooke, to go to Mississippi Ter- 
ritory, seize Burr at the first opportunity, and bring 
him under military guard to New Orleans. In com- 

20 Bacon's Report, 429, 430 ; Mead to Claiborne, Nov. 23, 
1806; Claiborne and Wilkinson to Mead, Jan. 21, 1807; Row- 
land, Third Annual Report of the Department of Archives 
and History of the State of Mississippi, 146, 162. 

21 Wilkinson to Dearborn, Feb. 20, 1807, Letters Received, 
MS., War Department. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 203 

pliarice with this commission Captain Hooke repaired 
to Natchez, where he watched developments closely, 
yet did not feel justified in attempting to kidnap Burr. 
The civil authorities, represented by Judges Rodney 
and Bruin, subjected Burr to a strict inquiry. In addi- 
tion Cowles Meade had a reserve warrant issued by 
Toulmin, to be used in case the other judges released 
Burr. Hooke, therefore, was unwilling to use violent 
measures, especially as the naval officers refused their 
cooperation.^^ The scheme on the whole was a des- 
perate one and shows the length to which Wilkinson 
would go in feeding his enmity against his former 
friend. Burr evidently had some inkling of Wilkin- 
son's attitude, and this may have led him to attempt 
to escape into the Floridas. 

It is also possible, as Judge Toulmin afterwards 
surmised,^^ that Burr still hoped to profit by some des- 
perate stroke near Mobile. A position near that port 
would enable him to open relations with its officials, 
if that were his plan, as many suspected; or with his 
slender band as a nucleus, he might organize the people 
of the Tombigbee settlements for their long threat- 
ened attack upon their commercial oppressors. In 
either case he would have Mobile for his base of opera- 

22 Hooke to Wilkinson, Feb. 20, 1807, Letters Received, MS., 
War Department; cf. also the statement dated Feb. 16, 1807, 
of the officers accompanying Hooke in Wilkinson Papers, III, 
MS., Chicago Historical Society. 

23 Toulmin to Madison, Apr. 14, 1807, Madison Papers, MS. 



204 '^^^ BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

tions, and this would be nearly as favorable as the 
one he may have planned to establish at Baton Rouge. 
Claiborne vi^as at first inclined to believe that the 
Spaniards would gladly receive Burr and assist him 
to dismember the American union. But Casa Yrujo's 
warnings against him had already aroused the fron- 
tier commanders.^* Their attitude confirms the im.- 
pression that Burr had no agreement with them, but 
desired to take advantage of Folch's absence in the 
West to strike at Mobile or Pensacola. Wilkinson 
professed to fear that Burr had a number of restless 
confederates in that locality.^^ The fact that John 
Adair, the Kentucky senator, was journeying tO' New 
Orleans by way of the Tombigbee was not without 
its significance.^^ It was with a feeling of relief, 
therefore, that both the Spanish and the American 
authorities learned of Burr's arrest near Wakefield. 
Morales believed that this dissipated all projects for 
invasion and rendered further precautions useless. 
Folch was inclined to adopt the contrary reasoning. 
Both continued to distrust the American government. 

24 Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 20, 1807, Papers in Relation 
to Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, De- 
partment of State. 

25 Wilkinson to Jefferson, Feb. 17, 1807, ibid. ; Toulmin to 
Madison, Apr. 14, 1807, Madison Papers, MS., Library of 
Congress. 

26 Morales to Soler, reservado No. 70, Feb. 28, No. 7, Le- 
gajo 267; Folch to Someruelos, July 28, 1807, Legajo 1562, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 205 

Wilkinson no longer harbored any fears of the "Dons," 
if he ever had experienced any except in regard to 
their strong box, and assured Jefferson that he would 
keep a vigilant eye on them.^^ He had a very personal 
reason to inspire his watchful zeal. 

While Folch was preparing to defend Baton Rouge, 
he adopted some financial measures that later ex- 
posed him to severe criticism. He arranged for a 
loan of twenty thousand pesos, through Fortier and 
Son, a New Orleans firm of " tested integrity and well 
known fidelity." He could do so only by securing per- 
mission for them to introduce at Vera Cruz an equal 
amount of goods, free of duty. He also indorsed the 
petition of Louis De Clouet to transfer settlers from 
West Florida to some point on the Mexican coast, 
preferably New Santander. These people, so the peti- 
tion ran, feared the possible transfer of West Florida 
to the Americans and were weary of the constant 
menace of invasion. The viceroy and his advisers, 
however, could see nothing in these two applications 
but an attempt to establish clandestine trade between 
New Orleans and Vera Cruz. The American vessel 
bearing Folch's agent and cargo was ordered to leave 
Vera Cruz without unloading, and Folch was in- 
structed to send no more on such an errand.^^ 

27 Wilkinson to Jefferson, Mar. 3, 1807, Papers in Relation 
to Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library. 

28 Folch to Iturrigaray, Feb. 15, 1807, Marina, 1805-1808, 
A. G., Mexico; De Clouet to Folch, Feb. 20, May 19, 1807; 



206 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

With the dispersion of Burr's followers, Folch began 
to transport his extra troops to Mobile, for he could 
not provision them at Baton Rouge. Wilkinson also 
desired to return a portion of his own force to Fort 
Stoddert. It was difficult to do so overland, but transfer 
by the Mobile was problematical, in view of Swaine's 
insulting passage in December. He and Claiborne 
had refused Folch permission to enter New Orleans 
in January, and they ought not to expect a privilege 
they were unwilling to grant. Wilkinson proposed to 
attempt the passage by water, instructing the officer 
in charge to pass Mobile at night. If stopped by the 
Spaniards, he should return for further orders. Some 
inkling of this reached Folch, who ordered St. Maxent 
to resist any such attempt. That officer stationed a 
vessel so as to guard against another violation of 
Spanish territory.^^ Wilkinson had no desire to pro- 
voke Folch further, and informed the secretary of 
war that he would suspend action for the present. 
He did not believe that Folch's refusal justified an ap- 
peal to arms, but even in such a contingency he was 
confident of his ability to reduce Mobile and Pensa- 
cola in three weeks. Such an outcome would be 

Folch to Iturrigaray, Mar. 20, 1807; De Clouet to Iturrigaray, 
Apr. 16, 1807, Report of Fiscal, May 11, July 16, 1807, Legajo 
185, Papeles de Cuba. 

29 St. Maxent to Folch, Mar. 26, Apr, 7, Legajo 62; Folch 
to St. Maxent, Apr. 4, 1807, Legajo 55, Papeles de Cuba; of. 
also Robertson, 5141, 5144, 5145, 5148. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 207 

highly honorable to the national arms and a personal 
triumph for himself ; but he hesitated to press the con- 
troversy to the breaking point.^^ His forbearance 
would be more convincing were he not about to in- 
crease his own obligations to Folch. 

Governor Claiborne, distrusting Wilkinson, but ig- 
norant of his real relations with the Spaniard, must 
perforce second his action. He faithfully detailed to 
Madison Folch's continued unfriendliness, further 
marked by the detention at Mobile of the sloop Castor 
loaded with military stores as well as private goods. 
Wilkinson had already reported these conditions, so 
Claiborne saw no reason to interfere.^^ He too was 
in no position to offend Folch. Wilkinson's arbi- 
trary course at New Orleans, in which he had acqui- 
esced, aroused serious opposition in the territorial leg- 
islature. To neutralize this and to prevent that body 
from adopting a protest, Claiborne and Wilkinson in- 
vited Folch to visit New Orleans on his return to 
Pensacola. He did so, late in April, and by his suc- 
cessful manipulation conclusively showed that, after 
four years of American occupation, his influence in 
the provincial capital was still more potent than that 

30 Wilkinson to Dearborn, Mar. 23, 1807, Letters Received, 
MS., War Department. 

31 Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 21, 1807 (Parker, 7459); 
Claiborne to Madison, May 21, 1807, Papers in Relations to 
Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library. 



208 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

of its chief executive or its self-constituted defender.^^ 
We may well believe that he did not render this 
service to heap coals of fire on their heads. The 
safety of his province, as he told his superior, not to 
mention his own future status, was dependent on his 
having friends on both sides of the border. What- 
ever his motive, his conduct contrasts favorably with 
that of his opponents. 

Among the suspected accomplices involved in Burr's 
trial, if not in his chimerical plan, were the American 
senators John Adair of Kentucky and John Smith of 
Ohio. The former journeyed to New Orleans, where 
Wilkinson dramatically apprehended him, by way of 
the Tombigbee, and was supposed to have imparted 
Burr's schemes to some of the leaders of that region. 
At least the adherents of the administration and the 
Spaniards as well reported this as his probable pur- 
pose.^^ John Smith was looking after his land inter- 
ests in West Florida during the summer following 
Burr's arrest. Learning that he was implicated in the 
conspiracy, he offered to surrender himself to Gov- 
ernor Williams, rather than to Claiborne, who had 
threatened to send him north in chains. Williams 
furnished him with a small guard, and graciously per- 

32 American Historical Review, X, 837-840, 

33 McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 222, 223 ; The 
Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical So- 
ciety of Ohio, IV, 125. Also Adair to Madison, Jan. 8, 1809, 
Madison Papers, MS. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 209 

mitted him to journey to Richmond by way of Cin- 
cinnati, and in a state compatible with his official posi- 
tion and the public interests.^* Although as in the 
case of the chief conspirator the department of justice 
failed to fix the charges against Adair and Smith, they 
both resigned from Congress. Adair, as we shall see, 
sought to reinstate himself with Madison, in connec- 
tion with subsequent developments in West Florida. 
Smith later fixed his residence at Pensacola, a victim, 
as he professed, of Jefferson's persecution.^^ 

The Burr episode greatly intensified the problems 
that worried Spanish officials in the Floridas. They 
continued to hear of projects similar to his, while the 
original conspirator vainly sought assistance in Europe. 
Their exposed position gave them the more concern. 
Their restless neighbors, whom a weak federal gov- 
ernment could not restrain, flattered themselves that it 
would be easy to invade these provinces. British 
naval activity and the necessities of the home govern- 
ment lessened their resources for defense and ren- 
dered doubly necessary the presence of skilled officials, 
such as Folch and Casa Calvo. Their anxiety, how- 
ever, was echoed across the line, where some high in 
office still feared the spectre of disunion. Casual mi- 

34 Rowland, Third Annual Report, 84-89 ; Annals of Tenth 
Congress, First Session, I, 55-62. 

35 Cf. p. 640; also Smith to Pickering, June 6, 1812, His- 
torical Index to the Pickering Papers, 48, Collections of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 6th series, Vol. VIH. 

15 



210 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

grations suggested a Spanish plan to introduce sol- 
diers disguised as settlers into Orleans Territory. 
The Spaniards also provoked the usual charge that 
they were tampering with the Indians and making 
them promises that could not be fulfilled.^^ Folch, it 
must be confessed, was all too ready to appeal to sec- 
tionalism or to savagery, but he was too shrewd to do 
so without some prospect of success. 

Wilkinson's departure from New Orleans left Clai- 
borne exposed to the full attack of Burr's adherents — 
a danger that, as usual, he was not inclined to mini- 
mize. The discontent reported to exist in West Flor- 
ida afforded him a new cause for alarm. The people 
there seemed inclined to seek a British alliance, if the 
United States failed to protect them. He wrote Wil- 
kinson — at least we may ascribe to him a letter of this 
period — "to feel Jefferson's pulse" in this matter.^^ 
The executive was already excited over the Chesa- 
peake outrage, so the interview, if it ever occurred, 
was unproductive. Early in 1808 Folch's superiors 
asked him to investigate the rumor about possible 
British interference. He did so but was unable to 
substantiate it. 

36 Silas Dinsmoor to Williams, May 14, 1807, Mississippi 
Territorial Archives, MS., Vol. 7; Folch to Someruelos, Aug. 
14, 1807, Legajo 1563, Papeles de Cuba; Casa Yrujo to Ce- 
vallos, Sept. 9, 1807, Legajo 5546, Estado, A. H, N., Madrid. 

37 McCaleb, Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 307; American His- 
torical Review, XVII, 295. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 211 

However, Folch found evidence that Burr still had 
many adherents there. He believed that there was 
some sort of connection between Burr and Miranda, 
and that both were seeking British assistance in their 
schemes to revolutionize the Spanish colonies. If the 
Federalist party should succeed in defeating Madison 
for the presidency, as was likely to happen, he ex- 
pected the United States to make a formal alliance 
with Great Britain against France and Spain. In 
that event he planned to stir up the Indians and or- 
ganize an insurrection in Louisiana. He asked Som- 
eruelos to advise him where to send his troops in case 
the struggle went against him. Folch also had to ex- 
plain his recent interviews in New Orleans with the 
French refugee. General Moreau, whose presence on 
the border seemed to indicate a possible connection 
with Burr, and whose intimacy with Folch aroused 
Claiborne's suspicions.^^ 

To the West Florida officials living in this atmos- 
phere of intrigue and suspicion the intendant at Ha- 
vana submitted a tentative proposal to cut down their 
already too slender garrisons. Morales preferred to 
sell the province to the Americans. The expense of 
maintaining a hopeless front against these restless 
neighbors, with no local revenues, with uncertain sub- 
sidies from Mexico, with fortifications in ruins and 

38 Folch to Someruelos, May 23, 1808, same to same, Aug. 
13, 1808, Legajo 1564, Papeles de Cuba. 



212 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

with no possibility of increasing their defenders, 
seemed to him the determining factor. Pensacola and 
Mobile could not support their combined population 
of about fifteen hundred, including soldiery. Baton 
Rouge contained four or five thousand people, mostly 
of Anglo-American extraction, scattered through the 
straggling parishes. More productive than the other 
two centers, it was so enclosed by neighboring Amer- 
ican territory as to be defenseless. If his superiors 
wished to dispose of these three jurisdictions in West 
Florida they possibly might take advantage of the 
American desire to round out their dominions, and by 
adding East Florida, gain the territory west of the 
Mississippi. This would keep their undesirable neigh- 
bors far from New Spain. If, however, the Spanish 
authorities preferred to keep the province and cut down 
its garrisons, Morales suggested one company each for 
Baton Rouge, Mobile, and Pensacola, and the aban- 
donment of the general settlement at the last named 
place. They should provide some artillerists, and if 
necessary some subalterns for drilling the militia, the 
proper number of staff officers, and the necessary 
priests, cutting off useless offices and reducing salaries 
to the bare cost of living. They could dispense with 
war vessels and new fortifications, but must continue 
the customary Indian subsidies. But even with this 
retrenchment, the province would cost more than it 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 213 

was worth, and local influences might oppose the sug- 
gested reductions.^^ 

Morales did not need to go very far to discover op- 
position. Folch did not believe in practicing economy 
with the eyes shut, especially in view of the " repub- 
lican insolence of the power that surrounded " the mis- 
erable province that he and Morales administered. 
His irritation was increased by his absolute penury, 
which contrasted so clearly with the resources of his 
opponents and caused galling references to Spain's 
supposed decadence. A timely subsidy of two hun- 
dred thousand dollars relieved the situation only tem- 
porarily. It was difficult to conceal their condition 
from ambitious neighbors, who were only too ready 
to invade their dominions or stir up insurrection there- 
in. Previous to the Treaty of 1795, Georgia was 
their nearest neighbor, and its people gave them little 
concern. But as a result of the treaty the Americans 
approached within twenty-five leagues of New Or- 
leans, and were only half as far away from Mobile 
and Pensacola. By the cession of Louisiana the Flor- 
idas were thrust into their territory. The earlier 
treaty and the later cession marked the advance of a 
decade — an advance that should have occupied cen- 
turies. With appetite whetted rather than appeased by 
these successes, the Americans now openly boasted that 
if Spain did not cede the Floridas by treaty they would 

39 Morales to Rombaud, June i, 1807 (Robertson, 5149). 



214 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 



take them by force. The recent attempt of Burr, fol- 
lowing the lines he had predicted three years before, 
demonstrated that the Floridas could not long continue 
under the present regime.*^ 

Folch's province and the neighboring East Florida 
formed the most difficult posts in the Spanish colo- 
nies. The existing war with England cut off sup- 
plies from Havana and in many cases prevented Folch 
from receiving orders from the captain-general, or 
from carrying them out after they reached him. Un- 
der such circumstances connection with Mexico was 
easier and more certain than with Cuba. If the 
United States should attempt hostilities, it would be 
easy to combine forces with the internal provinces 
against Louisiana, whose people were not greatly at- 
tached to the American government. To facilitate 
such operations the two Floridas should be combined 
under a captain-general. At best an officer of that 
rank in Havana knew less of conditions in the prov- 
inces than the immediate commandants. Yet the peril 
and expense that the latter faced made frequent trans- 
fers to less exposed commands necessary. The only 
remedy was to create the more honorable and better 
paid position on the exposed frontier. Its incumbent 

40 Report of Junta de Guerra, June i8, 1807, Folch to Some- 
ruelos, June 22, 1807 ; Folch to the Prince of the Peace, reser- 
vado, Aug, 5, 1807, Legajo 185, Morales to Soler, Feb. 29, 
1808, Legajo 2330; Folch to Someruelos, Aug. 20, 1808. Le- 
gajo 1565, Papeles de Cuba. Cf. note 16, p. 198. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 2I5 

should know his neighbors, their maxims and poHcy, 
and for this reason should speak both French and 
English. Folch did not hesitate to suggest that his 
long service in the region entitled him to favorable 
consideration, if the government contemplated the 
change.^^ 

In the meantime the commercial question did not 
become less troublesome. In the spring of 1807 the 
American Congress passed an act subjecting all the 
commerce on the Ohio and the Mississippi to the juris- 
diction of the custom house at New Orleans. Warned 
by the Mobile Act, Casa Yrujo searched this new act 
carefully for any phrases capable of double meaning. 
Despite later assurance that it was not designed to ad- 
vance the administration's territorial pretensions, he 
was directed to show that it could not in any way 
apply to West Florida.*- At the same time Folch 
and Claiborne " ventilated " another phase of this 
problem. The Spaniard permitted the Americans to 
land some military stores at Mobile and later to send 
them to their destination on the Tombigbee. In turn 
Folch asked if he might send some arms to Baton 
Rouge by way of the Mississippi. In granting this 
Claiborne used the expression " mutual navigation." 
The other protested that there was no mutual right 

*i (Folch) to the Prince of the Peace, Aug. 8, 1807 (Rob- 
ertson, 5154). 

^2 Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, Mar., Apr. 1807, passim, Legajo 
5548, Estado, A. H. N. 



2l6 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

involved. Spain secured the privilege of navigating 
the Mississippi by definite treaty, but there was no 
such action in regard to the Mobile. On occasion he 
had tolerated commerce there, but had withdrawn the 
privilege when the United States began to restrict 
Spain's right on the Mississippi. Claiborne accepted 
the favor the other extended, without continuing the 
discussion. Possibly he found Folch more accommo- 
dating because J. P. Kennedy and his friends were 
sending petitions to the president on the subject of 
Mobile commerce and threatening to take matters in 
their own hands if nothing was done to favor them.'*^ 
In renewing the discussion of this problem with his 
superiors, in June, 1808, Folch showed that he was 
ready to concede the free navigation of the Mobile to 
the Americans. The situation was similar to that of 
house tenants using a common staircase. The dweller 
on any particular floor had the right to go in and out. 
Under this concept, fortified by Vattel, he thought that 
the navigation of the Mobile should be common to 
Spain and the United States. The only drawback to 
Spain would be the loss of the six per cent duty, 
which during 1807 amounted to some 6264 pesos. 

43 St. Maxent to Folch, May 27, 1807, Folch to St'. Maxent, 
June 6, 1807, Legajo 1574, Papeles de Cuba; Folch to Clai- 
borne, June 15, 1807 (Parker, 7462, 7475) ; Folch to Claiborne, 
Oct. 14, 1807, Legajo 1565, Papeles de Cuba; Toulmin to Wil- 
liams, Sept. I, 1807, Mississippi Territorial Archives, MS., 
Vol. 7. 



Mt 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 217 

This was a negligible sum in view of the damages 
that a denial of the commerce might cause. 

Folch believed that in case of war Spain was likely 
to lose the Floridas; hence his willingness to concede 
the long contested privilege. At the same time the 
concession would afford additional proof of Spain's 
justice and good faith. In contrast he dwelt on the 
inconsistency of the American government, that " sub- 
lime composition of egoism and machiavellism," which 
alleged reasons based on Vattel for navigating the 
Mobile, and then quoted the same authority to deny 
the Spaniards the use of the Mississippi. Jefferson, 
prompt to take advantage of the detention of some 
American vessels at Mobile, had charged Spain with 
unfriendliness. This was in keeping with his usual 
artifice. As for himself, he favored placing both 
Baton Rouge and the Tombigbee settlements on the 
same basis. The United States might derive the 
greater benefit from this arrangement, but its recent 
policy in forbidding the introduction of slaves from 
abroad would probably afford Mobile and Baton 
Rouge a chance to profit through clandestine trade.** 

There were rumors elsewhere to this effect, but it 
was not the prospect of irregular gains from this 
source that wholly moved Folch to concession. The 
American government was now attempting to enforce 
its long threatened embargo. This promised new dif- 
ficulties to Spanish frontier officials, for the people of 

** Folch to Cevallos, June i, 1808 (Robertson, 5157). 



21 8 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

West Florida largely obtained their food supply from 
American territory. On the other hand, if the Amer- 
icans failed to include the province in their commercial 
prohibition, it would suggest that they already re- 
garded it as their own. Either dilemma was unac- 
ceptable enough to the Spaniards. 

Folch was in New Orleans when, in January, 1808, 
the embargo went into effect at that port. In the 
course of the following month he asked Claiborne 
about possible exceptions to it. He wanted to pur- 
chase two vessels in New Orleans, in order to convey 
artillery and ammunition from Baton Rouge to Pen- 
sacola. He wished to know if the armed Spanish ves- 
sels on the lakes might, as heretofore, obtain provi- 
sions from New Orleans. He also inquired if all West 
Florida ports were considered as foreign; and if so, 
if Spanish vessels might ascend the Mississippi to 
Baton Rouge and there obtain provisions for Mobile 
and Pensacola. Claiborne answered that he could not 
suspend any provisions of the embargo until he learned 
the president's decision upon Folch's questions. In 
transmitting these questions he advised Madison that 
if the Spanish vessels were given an uninterrupted 
passage up the Mississippi, or if the embargo was not 
in force against West Florida, then Baton Rouge, Mo- 
bile, and Pensacola would become places of deposit 
for western produce.*^ 

45 Folch to Claiborne, Feb. 11, 1808, Legajo 185, Papeles de 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 2I9 

Folch was an honored guest at the banquet in cele- 
bration of Washington's birthday. He took Claiborne 
home in his carriage, and finding him inclined to talk, 
elicited some further evidence of American unfriend- 
liness. Claiborne confessed that he was ordered to 
station gunboats on Lake Pontchartrain so as to cut off 
all communication with West Florida and to blockade 
Bayou Manchac. His latest instructions were, so 
Folch reported, " that the rigor of the law which the 
embargo imposes should be observed with all severity 
against our neighbors and . . . upon no pretext should 
you have any compliance with them." In Folch's es- 
timation, this showed that the American government 
designed to use the embargo to starve the Spaniards 
out of West Florida.^® 

Valentin de Foronda, whom Casa Yrujo had left 
behind in Philadelphia as charge d'affaires, found in 
the embargo another cause for complaint. Senator 
Campbell, in a bill to amend the Mobile Act, seemed 
to regard that town as an American port. Foronda 
asked the president to explain the ambiguous phrase. 
His question was turned over to Gallatin, who stated 
that the bill simply referred to goods passing from 

Cuba (cf. Parker, 7485-7487). Folch was then using his best 
efforts through Vidal, the vice-consul at New Orleans, to get 
flour despite the American prohibition. Cf. Morales to Some- 
ruelos, Feb. 15, 29, 1808, Legajo 2330, Papeles de Cuba. 

46 Folch to Foronda, Mar. i, 1808, Legajo 185, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



220 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

New Orleans to the American settlements on the Tom- 
bigbee or other affluents of Mobile Bay. If duties 
were paid on such goods at Mobile itself, they were 
not thereby to be regarded as foreign. "We uni- 
formly consider territory in Spanish possession as 
Spanish for revenue purposes whatever our claims," 
wrote the secretary .^^ Gallatin, it may be well to note, 
did not favor American pretensions to the utmost. 

Folch had busied himself, while in New Orleans, in 
measures to circumvent the embargo, as well as in at- 
tempts to find out how effectively it might be enforced. 
Starvation threatened the soldiers and civilians at Mo- 
bile and Pensacola unless he could secure an adequate 
supply of flour. For weeks his efforts to that end 
were unavaiHng. Some were afraid to run the block- 
ade that Claiborne had established on the lakes ; others 
regarded such an attempt as unpatriotic. Finally, 
through the influence of Abner L. Duncan, Wilkin- 
son's legal adviser, Folch succeeded in making a con- 
tract for the delivery at Pensacola of fifteen hundred 
barrels of flour, at twenty dollars a barrel. It is not 
difficult to perceive a mutual basis for this contract. 
Wilkinson, through the recent revelations of Power 
and Clark, was facing a congressional investigation and 
desired another exculpatory letter from Folch ; the lat- 

• 47 Foronda to Madison, Feb. 20, 1808, Gallatin to Madison, 
Feb. 26, 1808, Spanish Notes, MS., II, Bureau of Indexes and 
Archives; Foronda to Cevallos, Feb. 22, 1808, Legajo 5549, 
Estado, A. H, N., Madrid. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 221 

ter needed an immediate supply of flour. Claiborne 
innocently furthered the application for the letter, 
while Jose Vidal, the Spanish vice-consul, lent his per- 
sonal credit, along with Morales and Folch, to secure 
the flour. In this way Wilkinson was exerting his sin- 
ister influence against the president's policy, even 
while that executive was his chief protector.*^ Folch 
also arranged for a small subsidiary supply of flour 
from Mexico, and urged Foronda to send him some 
necessary hospital supplies.*^ 

While such methods for evading the embargo robbed 
it of much terror, its enforcement proved sufficiently 
annoying to the Spaniards. The American blockade 
of Bayou Manchac would prevent Folch from send- 
ing assistance to Baton Rouge, should that be neces- 
sary. He charged the Americans with landing infan- 
trymen on Spanish territory, killing Hve stock, and 
committing other outrages. Their naval commanders 
stopped and searched vessels on the lakes, including 
Folch's schooner, the Vivora, and did not hesitate to 
arrest deserters within his jurisdiction. In the latter 
stages of the embargo they closed the Mississippi to all 
Spanish commerce, except in connection with govern- 
ment business. Folch then planned to send vessels up 
that river to bring out cotton from Baton Rouge. He 

48 American Historical Review, XIX, 806-809. 

49 Folch to Vidal, Feb. 26, 1808, Vidal to Folch, Mar. 2, 1808, 
Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 



222 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

had no way of retaliating unless he encouraged the 
African slave trade through his territory or refused 
to deliver up fugitive slaves and criminals. His lot 
was a difficult one. He must do nothing to provoke 
aggression, and at the same time preserve the honor 
of his flag and feed a scattered dependent population.^" 
The embargo rendered other local problems more 
troublesome. The shadow of Burr appeared in a 
rumored plot of J. P. Kennedy and F. L. Claiborne 
to plunder Mobile at the head of a party of six hun- 
dred. ^^ In August, 1808, Judge Toulmin proposed 
by joint action to prevent the bandits of either juris- 
diction from committing depredations with impunity. 
He offered to try to punish a Spanish murderer whom 
he had apprehended, or to acquiesce in the Span- 
iards' doing so.^^ The apparent harmony of this in- 
cident was unique. In the same month John Owens, 
commander of gunboat Number 26, seized an Amer- 
ican deserter Armstrong, living along Bayou Manchac. 
Samuel Fulton and Philip Hickey, local officials of 
West Florida, immediately reported this to Grand Pre, 
who directed a vigorous protest to Claiborne. In his 

sopolch to Someruelos, Mar. 26, Apr. 19, 1808, Legajo 1574, 
Papeles de Cuba; Foronda to Madison, Apr. 8, 26, 30, 1808, 
Spanish Notes, MS., II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; cf. 
Parker, 7533, and Robertson, 5160. 

51 Folch to St. Maxent, Jan. 31, 1808, Legajo 55 ; Folch to 
Someruelos, May 23, 1808, Legajo 1564, Papeles de Cuba. 

52 Toulmin to Commandant of Mobile, Aug. 28, 1808, Mobile 
Archives, MS., County Court House. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 223 

reply Claiborne reported that New Orleans was over- 
run with Spanish criminals and deserters, while West 
Florida probably contained a large number of Amer- 
ican undesirables. He regretted that they had no plan 
for mutual extradition. 

In his second demand for the release of the deserter, 
Grand Pre quoted a letter of Cowles Meade to justify 
himself for not having delivered up American refugees. 
When Folch learned of the correspondence, through 
the New Orleans papers rather than from Grand Pre, 
he took his subordinate to task for engaging in the 
controversy without consulting him. Ultimately For- 
onda brought this incident to Madison's attention. It 
was such a flagrant violation of Spanish sovereignty 
that orders were issued to restore Armstrong and two 
others, similarly apprehended, to the outraged Span- 
iards.^^ 

In December another violation of Spanish territory 
occurred on the Mobile frontier. A customs officer, 
with a guard of soldiers, seized two vessels on the 
Tensaw, within Spanish territory. Salazar, then com- 
mandant at Mobile, immediately protested. He did 
not think the Americans were at war with Spain, but, 
if so, they should proceed with their "accustomed 
generosity " and not as bandits. He advised Folch to 

53 Someruelos to Folch, Oct. 22, 1808, Legajo 1565, Papeles 
de Cuba; Someruelos to Garibay, Feb. 6, 1809, Legajo 5543, 
Estado, A. H. N. ; Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 24, 1809, Legajo 
1566, Papeles de Cuba; cf. also Parker, 7509, 7513, 7515, 7529. 



224 ^^^ BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

Station armed vessels, with a supporting military de- 
tachment, on the Tensaw. Captain Gaines at once 
released one vessel but detained the other, whose 
owner seemed to be using it in contraband trade.^* 

The first rigors of the embargo led Folch to surmise 
that it would lead to an alliance between Great Britain 
and the United States with a declaration of war 
against France and allied Spain. Great Britain would 
cement the new pact by seizing the Floridas and deliv- 
ering them to the United States. Folch might only 
prevent this by occupying Louisiana at the first news 
of hostilities. To effect this he needed fifteen hundred 
men with fifty pieces of artillery — an estimate which 
he doubled within a few months. As it was he could 
muster only three hundred and eighty-one men and was 
in danger of losing the Floridas. With the larger 
force, and with the aid of the discontented Indians, 
who feared the land hunger of the Americans, he 
might be able to stir up a rebellion in Louisiana. But 
he must be supported by a movement from the interior 
provinces of Mexico, which was threatened by re- 
newed activity on the part of the revolutionary junta 
in New Orleans.^^ 

Foronda had already laid Folch's complaints before 
Madison. Jefferson inspired the answer, but it gave 

54 Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 27, 1809, Legajo 1566, Papeles 
de Cuba. 

55 (Folch) to Caballero, Apr. 25, 1808, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 225 

no promise of lightening the embargo. Spanish rights 
on the Mississippi should be balanced by American 
privileges on the Mobile. The United States claimed 
to the Perdido, but it would not bring the disputed 
region under its laws until the title was clearly settled. ^^ 
This reply, with its continued emphasis upon Amer- 
ican pretensions to West Florida, gave the Spaniards 
little satisfaction. When Folch later complained of 
the embargo and of the concurrent violations of Span- 
ish territory, the captain-general in Cuba reported the 
affair from Havana to the Regency, then carrying on 
the struggle against Napoleon. 

In their name Cevallos discussed these insults with 
George W. Erving, the American charge, and quoted 
Folch's determination to use force, if they continued. 
Erving excused the occurrences as due to a desire to 
carry out the embargo rather than to show hostility to 
Spain or force that power to cede the Floridas.^^ 
With a continuance of the alleged insults, and with a 
reported increase in the American army of six thou- 
sand regulars and four times as many volunteers, the 
Spaniard recurred to the subject. Spain was now in 
friendly alHance with England against the ambitious 
Napoleon, and her ministers could affect greater inde- 

56 Foronda to Madison, Oct. 14, 1808, Spanish Notes, MS., 
II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; Foronda to the Captain- 
General of Cuba, Nov. 3, 1808, Legajo 1708, Papeles de Cuba. 

^"^ Erving to Cevallos, Nov. 12, 16, 1808, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., XI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 
16 



226 THE BURR CONSPIRACY AND THE EMBARGO 

pendence. Erving refused to continue the discus- 
sion.^^ Greater issues now claimed the attention of 
himself and of the administration at home. To ap- 
preciate their meaning we must review the course of 
the Florida negotiation since Monroe's failure at Aran- 
juez. 

f's Minute to Foronda, May 19, 1809, Erving to Martin de 
Garay, July 2.2, 1809, Legajo 5549, Estado, A. H. N. 



CHAPTER VII 

American Bickering and French Bargaining 

The diplomatic authorities of the interested coun- 
tries variously reflected the uncertainty following 
Monroe's failure. French officials watched the out- 
come with interest, not unmixed with guile. The 
Spanish ministers of state regarded the unsettled ques- 
tions with increasing indifference as they saw their 
country sinking more and more under the influence 
of Napoleon. From that subserviency Jefferson and 
his advisers hoped to profit either by some despairing 
attempt of Spain to ward ofif the inevitable blow or 
by the deliberate action of the French emperor. Yet 
in their desire to gain the Floridas without insuf- 
ferable conditions, they wavered between a mainte- 
nance of the existing status, a closer union with 
France, and a possible alliance with Great Britain. 
Amid the general irresolution, Armstrong's proposal 
to abandon the claim to West Florida and occupy 
Texas had at least the merit of reasonable definiteness. 
Even the doubtful Monroe, as we have seen, fell under 
its spell and advised immediate action in keeping with 
it.^ Yet he did not cease to think that Armstrong, 

^ Cf. p. 129. 

227 



228 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

like Livingston, might be influenced by some merce- 
nary motive in urging it. 

Early in August the American administration 
learned of Monroe's failure. The mild but hopeful 
Madison suggested that the negotiation might profit- 
ably be transferred to the United States. Jefferson 
thought that this would merely invite another failure. 
In turn he proposed an aUiance with Great Britain. 
The prospect of peace in Europe, with American con- 
troversies unsettled, alarmed him. They could not 
even hope to maintain the status quo without some 
sort of diplomatic backing. Madison had earlier 
hinted at a British alliance, but now he intimated that 
Great Britain would not fight their battles without an 
awkward stipulation to her own advantage. He could 
propose nothing more definite than an appearance of 
greater friendliness for Merry, the British minister.^ 

Gallatin, whose opinions were entitled to careful con- 
sideration, wrote Madison that he thought the Ameri- 
can demands too difficult for Spain to meet. They 
could be pressed only at the risk of lowering our na- 
tional reputation. The rejection of our claims did not 
justify war, nor would the Floridas afford compensa- 
tion for its cost. Livingston and Monroe were at fault 
in not insisting upon definite boundaries for Louisiana. 

2 Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 374, 377. The three following para- 
graphs are based on the excellent resume to be found in 
Adams, History of the United States, III, Ch. III. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 229 

He favored a renewal of the negotiation with an offer 
to accept the Sabine and the Perdido as its proposed 
limits. In the meantime Congress might organize the 
militia and build up the navy, although he hesitated 
to trust his colleague Robert Smith with its manage- 
ment. 

Armstrong's proposal to seize Texas seemed more 
acceptable to the president. On September i6, 1805, 
the latter incorporated this suggestion with his own 
project for a British alliance. Madison thought that 
an agreement with Great Britain should not prevent 
them from making separate terms with Spain, when- 
ever attainable. At the same time Armstrong should 
disabuse the French government of any idea of finan- 
cial profit and suggest the possibility of an alliance 
with Great Britain. By October he was again unde- 
cided, for that power had recommenced a commercial 
policy that did Httle to invite closer relations. Jeffer- 
son expected the war in Europe to keep Napoleon busy 
for the next two years. This would enable the United 
States to engage in hostilities against Spain, if it 
seemed desirable; or if not, to make another attempt 
at peaceful settlement. By the middle of October he 
was willing to initiate the negotiation at Paris, with 
Armstrong, or Monroe, or both, as negotiators, with 
France as the mediator, and to pay a round sum for 
the Floridas without regard to the final recipient. 
France must, however, undertake the part of mediator 



230 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

at once. The United States would resist any attempt 
by Spain to change existing conditions. Thus the 
president sought peace with well- feigned vigor. 

It is not surprising that after four months of in- 
decision the cabinet, at its meeting on November 12, 
failed to adopt a warlike policy. Its last effort at 
amicable settlement with Spain was to be directed to 
the French government. The United States was 
ready to pay a sum of money for the rights of Spain 
east of the Iberville, and to cede a portion of their 
Texas claim. In addition Spain must assume a cer- 
tain sum for spoliations. The limit of the sum to be 
offered for the Floridas, which was the " exciting mo- 
tive " with France, was fixed at five millions of dollars. 
Gallatin did not like this appearance of purchasing 
peace, but the others were influenced by the fact that 
such action would undoubtedly secure our commerce 
on the Mississippi and the Mobile. In addition to 
this main point, Casa Yrujo must be expelled from the 
country together with Casa Calvo, Morales, and other 
Spanish officials at New Orleans. This part of the 
program, as we have already seen, was more easily 
realized than the other. 

During this critical summer the French minister, 
Turreau, assured his government that it was a cardi- 
nal principle of the Americans to acquire territory 
without war. For this reason their ideas were exclu- 
sively directed against Spain, their weaker southern 



/ 

/ 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 23I 

neighbor. He urged Napoleon to take the Floridas 
and Cuba in order to baffle their plans.^ This pro- 
posal recalls Talleyrand's "wall of brass," and was 
doubtless inspired by the complacency with which the 
Americans had already met his previous demands in , 
regard to Moreau and the trade with Santo Domingo. 
But Jefferson and Madison had already begun to cul- ) 
tivate closer relations with Merry, much to that min- 
ister's surprise. The mystery was explained when the 
president frankly told of the relations between Spain 
and the United States. Should hostilities result, his\ 
country could easily occupy the Floridas and Cuba. , 
Such a necessary move for self-defense should cause 
no change in the policy of Great Britain, although by -, 
this time her new commercial exactions showed that 
the United States could expect nothing more than an ^\ 
uncertain neutrality.* At this point Skipwith brought ) 
the despatch from Armstrong that renewed the prom- >}. 
ise of a closer French connection. 

In the midst of the busy Austrian campaign Tal- 
leyrand still sought to profit from the Florida ne- 
gotiation. His agent Ouvrard told Armstrong that / 
Napoleon would use his influence to get the Floridas ^' 
from Spain and establish a suitable western limit for 
Louisiana. A portion of the commercial claims in 
which France was concerned were to be dropped, and 

3 Adams, History of the United States, III, 85, 86. 
* Ibid., loi, 102. 



232 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

the remainder to be paid by bills on the Spanish colo- 
nies. In addition the United States should pay ten 
milHons of dollars ostensibly to Spain, in reality to 
France. After vigorous argument following Arm- 
strong's rejection of these propositions, the money 
payment was reduced to seven millions. Armstrong 
simply sent Jefferson a full report of the transaction. 
The affair had been managed in such an irresponsible 
way that he thoroughly distrusted it.^ 

The cabinet had already concluded that it would be 
wise to offer five millions for the Floridas. This was 
a smaller sum than the French proposition contem- 
plated, with more uncertainty about the recipient. But 
they might scale the French price to correspond with 
their own. After careful advisement, therefore, the 
cabinet agreed to pay the five millions for the Floridas 
as soon as Spain should make a treaty on the lines 
suggested, and to make no mention of those French 
claims which had contributed to the former diplo- 
matic failure.^ This plan promised to settle a long 
standing dispute on favorable terms at a time when 
England was resuming a most irritating commercial 
course. 

It was one thing for the cabinet to contemplate 
spending five millions in setthng its disputes with 
Spain. But, unfortunately, in addition to the remain- 

5 Adams, History of the United States, III, 103-106. 

6 Ibid., 106, 107. 



/ 
/ 
/ 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 233 

ing commercial claims, Jefferson needed two millions 
in cash to carry out his plan. He must secure this 
from Congress. He preferred to approach that body 
indirectly, for in his subserviency to France he seemed 
virtually to lose the previous antipathy to foreign al- 
liance that he had expressed in his inaugural. More- 
over his course was open to attack on moral grounds. 
Accordingly, as we have noted, he worded his annual 
message so as to arouse public opinion in favor of a 
vigorous foreign policy. He promised to follow this 
within a few days by a more confidential communi- 
cation.'^ Congress naturally expected vigorous sug- 
gestions in keeping with his first utterance, and was 
disappointed when the secret message actually ap- 
peared. This paper reviewed recent diplomatic rela- 
tions with Spain, mentioned the Spanish protest 
against the cession of Louisiana and the Mobile Act, 
and emphasized the Spanish view that the United 
States was entitled to no territory east of the Iber- 
ville, and to a " string of land only " west of the Mis- 
sissippi. The position of France in this negotiation 
was equivocal; but she favored the Spanish preten- 
sions in regard to the territory east of the Mississippi, 
although her silence in regard to the western boun- 
dary led him to infer that she might there favor the 
United States. With this merely formal recital of 
differences, the message referred the whole subject to 

^ Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 390, 391. 



234 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

Congress for such action as its wisdom and zeal should 
approve.^ 

The wisdom of the Ninth Congress proved to be an 
almost negligible quantity and its zeal, personified in 
John Randolph, a most persistent obstacle in the pres- 
ident's path. That statesman refused to favor the ap- 
propriation, even if it were asked for openly, and in- 
stead his Committee on Ways and Means, after con- 
siderable discussion, reported on January 3, 1806, in 
favor of increasing the national forces along the south- 
ern border.^ By this measure of preparedness he de- 
signed to arouse in Spain a wholesome respect for our 
power and intentions. His actual purpose was to settle 
the outstanding territorial disputes by a peaceful ex- 
change of territorial claims west of the Mississippi for 
those of Spain to the eastward. Randolph's willing- 
ness to follow the suggestions of Casa Calvo and his 
confreres was, however, more apparent than real. 
Hatred for Madison rather than admiration for the 
Spanish controversialists determined his action. 

The friends of the administration succeeded in 
amending Randolph's resolution in the committee of 
the whole so as to appropriate the two millions that 
Jefferson required. But they refused to substitute 
the phrase " east of the Perdido " for " east of the Mis- 
sissippi " in the preamble of the act. This unwilling- 

8 Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 397-402. 

^Annals of Ninth Congress, First Session, 1117-1118. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 235 

ness to jeopardize the negotiation by claiming^, too much 
was in harmony with Randolph's position. During 
the ensuing debate in the House the Virginian com- 
pletely reversed himself on the West Flc'o'ida dispute, 
and stated that Spain had a perfectly good claim to the 
territory between the Iberville and the Perdido. Mad- 
ison had grossly mismanaged the v hole subject of 
Louisiana boundaries and by false ir^ferences had led 
the House into such questionable < neasures as the 
Mobile Act. 

Notwithstanding his previous bungling the secre- 
tary had now, so Randolph charged, persuaded the 
administration to adopt a new regotiation involving 
an expenditure, including claii^is, of five millions. 
This new proposition was simply an attempt to buy 
territory which a highwayman " was trying to wrest 
from its rightful owner. The true course of honor, 
the overridden chairman contended, was to assume a 
strong position on the bord^x and await a favorable 
turn for negotiation. This,'^however, should contem- 
plate a real exchange of territory, with no payment of 
money either directly to Spain or indirectly to France. 

Randolph was too rabid to, gain more than casual 
support for his bizarre policy of economy and pre- 
paredness. The majority preferred to entrust the de- 
fense of the frontiers to the regular militia and to 
expend the two millions necessary to complete the 
purchase of the Floridas. By this means they would 



/ 

/ 

236 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

acquire undoubted Spanish territory as well as the 
portion in dispute, and it would cost far less than a 
war in whicfi France would probably support Spain. 
It was no cdacern to them what became of the pur- 
chase money ; their government was in no sense the 
guardian of Spain. With such arguments the ma- 
jority justified th^eir action in attempting to purchase 
peace rather than in asserting a vigorous national pol- 
icy.^° The " Two Million Act " that passed was based 
upon that which authorized Monroe's special mission 
three years before. The circumstances surrounding 
both were in many rases identical. The former ap- 
parently contributed 'to bring about the Louisiana Pur- 
chase. It was not celtain that the outcome of the lat- 
ter would be equally '.^idvantageous. 

The determining factor in the earlier transaction 
was the willingness of our diplomats to meet Na- 
poleon's monetary demands. The attempt in the 
second to scale these frokn seven to five millions, of 
which two millions only «"as to be paid in cash, was 
not a favorable symptdtm. In 1803 the diplomatic 
principals, despite their mutual distrust and jealousy, 
acted together in essential matters, while their fellows 
in London and Madrid loyally seconded their efforts. 
It remained to be seen if their successors would do 
as well three years later. The stake — the peaceful 
possession of the Floridas — was the same ; but the situ- 

10 Annals of Ninth Congress, First Session, 1133-1138. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 237 

ation both at home and abroad was infinitely more 
compHcated. 

Of the previous diplomatic group, Monroe was the 
only one in active service. From his post in London 
he could play only a subordinate part in the Florida 
negotiation and that largely in an underhand way. In 
the summer of 1805 James Bowdoin, the new minister 
to Spain, was with him in London. After consulting 
together they decided that if Bowdoin went straight- 
way to Spain, it would create the impression that the 
United States was taking Monroe's failure altogether 
too easily. As it was desirable to have a representa- 
tive there, they concluded to send George W. Erving, 
Bowdoin's secretary, to act as charge, while Bowdoin 
himself went to Paris, the real diplomatic center.^^ 
By this decision, whether they willed it or not, and by 
the secret correspondence which the three subsequently 
maintained, they established a Massachusetts-Virginia 
combination against the Empire State group that Arm- 
strong represented. Partisanship did not in this case 
cease at the water's edge, nor was faction controlled 
within the party ranks. To this fact we may in part 
attribute the failure of the negotiation that now fol- 
lowed at Paris. 

The decision at London was naturally displeasing to 

11 Bowdoin to Madison, July 8, 31, 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., IX, Erving to Madison, Aug. 24, 1805, Spanish Dis- 
patches, MS., X, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



238 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

Armstrong. He wrote Monroe that the mere pres- 
ence of Erving at Madrid would probably do no harm, 
but any overtures on his part to the Spanish govern- 
ment would result in "nothing but mischief. "^^ Erv- 
ing believed that Armstrong wanted to handle the 
negotiation himself at Paris. He also noted that the 
French government still hoped to make money out of 
the quarrel and that the course of some of his fellow- 
countrymen tended to confirm it in this hope. Arm- 
strong had indiscreetly permitted one of these irre- 
sponsible agents, Daniel Parker, agent of the banking 
house of the Hopes, to learn his instructions. Parker 
declared that France had interfered in the negotiation 
much less than the Americans believed, and would not 
interfere unless both disputants appealed to her as um- 
pire. He thought Erving blustering when the latter 
denied that the American government intended to 
make such an appeal. H it did not, it should pursue 
a more vigorous and consistent commercial policy to- 
ward England. The recent exactions of that power 
must soon lead France to make similar exactions, and 
thus affect the whole negotiation adversely.^^ 

Bowdoin, when he reached Paris, also recognized 
the general diplomatic benefit of emphatic protests 
against England's policy. But it would be still more 

12 Armstrong to Monroe, Sept 18, 1805, Letters to Monroe, 
Lenox MSS. 

13 Erving to Monroe, Sept. 20, Oct. 10, Nov. 25, 1805, Lenox 
MSS. ; Adams, History of the United States, III, 379. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 239 

serviceable to occupy part of the disputed territory 
and get rid of the money-jobbers. These were de- 
termined to convert the American commercial claims 
into bills of exchange on the Spanish colonies and in 
addition make the United States pay well for the 
Floridas.^* Thus American desire and Spanish weak- 
ness were to minister to French needs. Napoleon's 
corrupt agents, rather than Napoleon himself, seemed 
responsible for most of this jobbery. Its prevalence 
and Armstrong's reticence led Bowdoin to write Erving 
that affairs did not look so propitious as he had 
expected. ^^ 

Since Armstrong did not welcome Bowdoin's pres- 
ence in Paris, the latter had to " skrew and wire draw 
to obtain the most simple facts" from him. Armstrong 
advised him to remain in Paris until they learned the 
result of the proposition he had sent home, but he gave 
him no copy of it, and in the interim favored no new 
application to Talleyrand. This imparted to Arm- 
strong's course " an odd appearance," and caused 
Bowdoin to " augur no good " from " these intermixed 
jurisdictions."^^ Erving, playing the usual waiting 
game at Madrid, coincided with his opinion. He did 
not anticipate any serious negotiation " with baseness 

^* Bowdoin to Monroe, Nov. 25, 1805, Adams, History of 
the United States, III, 379. 

^'^ Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 254, Proceedings of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 7th Series, Vol. VI. 

1® Ibid., 261-265. 



240 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

and apathy on one side, and the most barefaced cor- 
ruption on both." The young charge was hardly war- 
ranted in characterizing the situation so bluntly, but 
he wished to discourage the corrupt intermediaries. 
" We must have more regard for our own honor than 
their wants." The Americans must also remove the 
idea that their " pacifick system " would never be 
changed. "A blow must be struck which will arouse 
it [i. e., the Spanish government] from its lethargy 
and convince France that we are no longer to he trifled 
with before we shall be able to negotiate zvith any 
probability of success/' In accounting for the sub- 
serviency of the Spanish government, he wrote : " They 
have no statesmen, no force, no money."^'' 

It is interesting to note how quickly Bowdoin as- 
sumed the hopeless tone of Monroe at Aranjuez. 
" Present interest and not great principles rule on the 
continent now."^® After another of Parker's financial 
propositions early in December, he wrote discourag- 
ingly. " More Jesuitness can hardly be conceived . . . 
nothing but a wish to serve our country could induce 
me to bear with such legerdemain."^^ The only ground 
for hope was the fact that the French government 
would not care to have its part in the negotiation pub- 
lished. Apparently Talleyrand's agents were deter- 

i'' Ibid., 257. The italicized portions were written in cipher. 

18 Bowdoin to Madison, Dec. 7, 1805, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., IX, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

19 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 269. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 24I 

mined to force the relinquishment of the commercial 
claims and the payment of a substantial sum for the 
Floridas.^^ Talleyrand's absence in. Austria seemed 
merely to thicken the atmosphere of jobbery at Paris. 

Early in January, 1806, Bowdoin reported to Monroe 
that Parker had broached to him a new plan, fathered 
by one of Godoy's agents. The net proceeds from the 
Floridas were to be fixed at four millions. Spain 
should turn that sum over to France as if in payment 
of a debt that the latter power had guaranteed; or 
France might assume the hypothetical debt, take the 
Floridas in payment, and then sell them to the United 
States. Bowdoin was unwilling to consider a cash 
payment above two millions and wrote to Monroe for 
advice.^^ 

At the same time he charged Erving to be very care- 
ful about mentioning these rumors in Madrid. Godoy 
hated the French and they were jealous of him. It 
might be possible to convince the Spanish minister that 
France must keep out of the controversy and give 
Spain the entire benefit of any money payments. 
Perhaps it would be well to hint that a cession of 
Texas to the United States would increase the value 
of Godoy's land claims in that province. If by any 
means Erving should induce the other to say that he 
would accept the two millions for the Floridas in addi- 

20 Bowdoin to Monroe, Dec. 17, 1805, Lenox MSS. 

21 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 279-282, 

17 



242 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

tion to our claims, Bowdoin would at once leave for 
Madrid. He might thus avoid the financial schemes 
that Talleyrand and Parker were trying to put through 
in Paris.^^ A month later he wrote Erving to disre- 
gard these suggestions. Armstrong was more uncom- 
municative than ever, and there was a rumor that 
Casa Yrujo had been empowered to take up the nego- 
tiation in Washington.^^ 

The return of Napoleon and Talleyrand to Paris 
early in February, after the successful Austrian cam- 
paign, encouraged Bowdoin, if not Armstrong. The 
tone of the president's recent public message might 
strengthen Talleyrand's antipathy to the American 
administration and influence his imperial prompter. 
England's commercial policy was unfavorable also to 
the negotiation. In March Armstrong told Bowdoin 
that Talleyrand would not act until he heard definitely 
from his unofficial proposals of the preceding au- 
tumn.^* Bowdoin was inclined to put more confidence 
in the good intentions of Napoleon, if the stock jobbers 
would only let him alone. Yet he suspected that the 
success of the Louisiana Purchase had led all French- 
men, including the emperor himself, to anticipate 
another easy subsidy. 

A new overture from a Spanish contractor, Ouvras 

22 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, ^2-287. 

23 Ibid. 

2* Bowdoin to Madison, Mar, 9, 1806, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., IX, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 243 

[Ouvrard?] by name, had mentioned six millions as 
the prospective sum required. ^^ Bowdoin had no in- 
structions to guide him and Armstrong still maintained 
"the same foolish senselessness of reserve."^^ But 
the former was more concerned over " ye same cool- 
ness and neglect from Mr. T[alleyrand]," whom he 
had not yet met, despite several mortifying attempts 
to do so. On March i, 1806, in a long communication 
to Jefferson reviewing conditions to date, he called 
Spain a province of France with the Prince of the 
Peace as its prefect. Any dispute with the former 
power, therefore, was to be regarded as a dispute with 
France. He and Armstrong were more likely to settle 
it while the two powers were still at war with England ; 
and he believed that three or four millions, with the 
allowance of certain commercial claims and a suitable 
western boundary, would be sufficient for the purpose. 
This would certainly be the case if France were to be 
beneficiary, and would permit some allowance for in- 
terested speculators. But Bowdoin desired to keep 
clear of all such.^^ 

Before the despatch from the discouraged envoy 
reached America, Madison had penned the new in- 
structions that were to guide him and his unwilling 
colleague in their joint mission.^^ After reviewing 

2=5 Bowdoin to Monroe, Feb. 24, 1806, Lenox MSS. 

26 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 307. 

27 Ibid., 294 ff. 

28 Madison to Armstrong and Bowdoin, Mar. 3, 1806, In- 
structions, MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



244 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

Armstrong's despatch of the previous September, he 
stated that the president's impulse was to repo'rt the 
failure of the negotiation to Congress for such action 
as seemed best, together with a covert threat against 
the French government. When, however, the presi- 
dent received Armstrong's later communication, he be- 
lieved that he might proceed as he had done in 1803, 
and had laid the matter before Congress at its regular 
session. After a delay caused by " some variances of 
opinion " (thus does he pass over Randolph's revolt) 
Congress acted as he wished. The two commissioners 
in Paris were to inform the French government at 
once that they were ready to act under its friendly 
auspices. He left to them the method and the place for 
presenting this overture, as well as the definite language 
in which it should be expressed. 

The essential points of the negotiation were the 
Floridas, the spoliations, and a suitable western bound- 
ary. The article in regard to West Florida, for many 
reasons the crucial one, was to be worded in accord- 
ance wnth Spanish feelings rather than American 
claims. As Madison suggested in his draft, Spain 
should " acknowledge and confirm to the United States, 
West Florida and cede to them forever the same and 
East Florida," or "(if unattainable in that form), 
Spain cedes and confirms forever to the United States, 
East and West Florida." By so wording the article, 
the secretary pointed out, the commissioners would 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 245 

date the cesssion of the disputed territory from the 
Louisiana Purchase, and thus invaHdate subsequent 
land sales. At the same time Madison observed that 
if Spain could be brought to acknowledge more com- 
pletely the right of the United States to the Perdido, 
the Americans should use that river rather than the 
Appalachicola as a future divisional line. 

The observations of the secretary would hardly make 
his proposals more agreeable to Spain. Nor were his 
measures to cut off stock jobbing calculated to make 
them acceptable to France. Yet he and his sponsors 
affected a virtue by this means even while acceding in 
part to Talleyrand's dubious proposals. Having thus 
alienated the two nations most intimately concerned, 
they were unable, because of Great Britain's com- 
mercial policy, to anticipate aid from that quarter. 
Moreover the opposition of Randolph, which even 
Merry noted in his correspondence, had delayed action 
too long to be effective, had it been in keeping with 
French desires. Talleyrand was ready, therefore, in 
response to Masserano's prayer for intervention, to 
favor Spain rather than the United States in the 
troublesome controversy. Merry's warning also set 
the English government against any possible triple 
entente. Skipwith, he informed his superior, took 
back with him the copy of a resolution to prohibit the 
importation of British manufactures.^^ 

29 Merry to C. J. Fox, June 29, 1806, MS., British Foreign 
Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 49. 



246 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

The jealousy and suspicion that then ruled among 
the American representatives was in itself sufficient to 
wreck the negotiation. Skipwith, Bowdoin, and the 
latter's secretary, James Sullivan, united in charging 
Armstrong with desiring to exclude Bowdoin from the 
negotiation. Armstrong's reputed indebtedness, his 
intimacy with the untrustworthy Parker, and his 
duplicity in recommending a vigorous course toward 
Spain while encouraging secret financial intrigues, all 
conspired to arouse in them the same distrust that 
formerly hampered Livingston. 

The little coterie at Paris tried to share their opin- 
ions with Erving and Monroe. To the latter Skip- 
with wrote : " In other words the General has become 
the conductor to our good President of Parker's spe- 
cifics. ... If they succeeded he might gain in popu- 
larity and perhaps participate in the emoluments 
anticipated by the quack; while should Parker's pre- 
scriptions fail, our Diplomat still expected to hold his 
last Trump in his own hands by resorting to the 
dignified grounds on which he had ostensibly placed 
himself with you. He is as little your friend, I give 
you my word, as he is the Friend of virtue and dignity 
in any other man." Bowdoin sent Sullivan to give 
Monroe a personal report of the situation. Armstrong 
treated him with neglect and was too intimate with 
Parker. The jobbers would not let Spain compose 
her own quarrels. All that the Americans could do, 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 247 

in Bowdoin's opinion, was to threaten the French and 
Spanish colonies and what was left of their commerce.^^ 
Monroe still expressed hope. At any rate, since the 
administration had finally determined upon a policy, 
they should all join to push it through. By so doing 
they might unite factionsat home and settle all pend- 
ing issues in Europe.^^ Monroe's philosophy always 
surpassed his performance. 

The negotiation at Paris promptly took the usual 
course that characterized Talleyrand's control. One 
of his former attaches, M. Dautremont, told Skipwith 
shortly after his return, that the emperor detested 
American principles. This was very probable. But 
Dautremont advised the American to see M. Roux, 
Talleyrand's man of affairs, and offered him an invita- 
tion to dine with M. Doyen, another of the minister's 
panderers, through whom he could meet Sefior 
Izquierdo. The latter was Godoy's confidential agent, 
and if Skipwith objected to meeting Izquierdo directly, 
he might make Doyen his intermediary.^- 

These proposals smacked strongly of the X. Y. Z. 
affair of the previous decade. Bowdoin advised Skip- 
so Skipwith to Monroe, May 3, May [?], 1806, Sullivan to 
Erving, May 5, 1806, Bowdoin to Monroe, May 30, 1806, 
Lenox MSS. 

31 Monroe to Bowdoin, June 24, 1806, Lenox MSS. (Ford 
Collection). 

32 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 309; Adams, History of 
the United States, III, 379. 



248 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

with to draw Dautremont out, but to refuse all per- 
sonal relations with those whom he mentioned. When 
the agent found that his suggestions elicited no profit- 
able proposals from Bowdoin, he ceased for the time 
being to make them. This gave the Americans a 
chance to approach Talleyrand directly. Bowdoin, 
although associated with Armstrong in the commission 
to the French government, had never been presented 
to the minister of foreign affairs ; consequently Arm- 
strong had to conduct all the personal interviews. On 
Muy I he informed Talleyrand that his country was 
prepared to renew the negotiation " under the auspices 
of a common friend," but was not yet ready to make 
overtures. "The first steps must be taken by Spain 
and be the result of her own reflections or counsels 
given her." Obviously Armstrong expected the em- 
peror to give them. "The views of the United 
States," to quote from his later note, " have been ex- 
clusively directed to His Imperial and Royal Majesty " 
as the only possible mediator.^^ 

The emperor's first response was little in keeping 
with Armstrong's obsequious approach. He permitted 
Talleyrand, on May 3, to show the American a formal 
declaration from the Spanish king that he would in 
no manner dispose of the Floridas. Talleyrand had 
previously not known of this declaration, and its effect, 

33 Armstrong to Talleyrand, May 6, 2^, 1806, Spanish Dis- 
patches, MS., IX, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 249 

backed up by books, maps, and formal arguments, was 
inconsistent with his previous statement that the king 
had placed the whole matter in the emperor's hands. 
To forestall this charge, Talleyrand intimated that the 
Spanish sovereign had changed his mind because Bow- 
doin had told Erving that the French proposed to turn 
the negotiation into a job. Talleyrand had no author- 
ity for this insinuation, but his immediate purpose was 
to relieve himself of criticism, to sow dissension among 
the American negotiators,^* and to regain control of 
the affair. 

To serve the last named end he made a long report 
to the emperor, dated May 6, 1806. In this Talley- 
rand mentioned that the commission to Armstrong and 
Bowdoin gave him an opportunity once more to ex- 
press his opinion on the dispute between the United 
States and Spain. The commercial claims were fully 
covered by the treaty of September, 1800. The Amer- 
ican claim to West Florida would not bear the least 
examination, although he discussed it sufficiently to 
prove his point. He had asserted this so often that 
he did not think the United States would recur to the 
repeated discussions with France and ought not to 
do so with Spain. If its representatives did so, the 
French government ought formally to oppose them, 
but if they wished to discuss amicably the acquisition 
of Florida, they might address themselves simply to 
Spain. 

»* Adams, History of the United States, III, 376-378. 



250 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

Talleyrand showed that West Florida had no im- 
portance except for the navigation of its rivers and 
its situation on the Gulf. In the hands of the United 
States its commerce and population would rapidly in- 
crease, but never while Spain controlled it. That 
nation desired to retain the Floridas, especially after 
the transfer of Louisiana, in order to exclude the 
United States from the Gulf. West Florida was liable 
to be a serious cause for quarrel because no natural 
barrier separated it from the contiguous American 
territory, where the population was continually increas- 
ing. The United States was more interested in ac- 
quiring this area and the remaining territory east of 
the Mississippi than Spain with its stationary popula- 
tion was concerned in retaining it. 

Talleyrand intimated that Napoleon had sold Loui- 
siana to stimulate commercial rivalry between the 
various States of the Union and emphasize western 
separatism. The same reason might lead him to favor 
the American acquisition of the Floridas, unless he 
wished them for himself or to serve some ulterior ne- 
gotiation. Since the recent French victories the Amer- 
ican government had showed itself more compliant, but 
it must go to still greater lengths. It must cease exag- 
gerating the pretended inroads and commercial exac- 
tions of the Spaniards, and restrain such projects as 
Miranda's. In behalf of France it must relinquish the 
trade with Santo Domingo, and adopt com.mercial 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 25 1 

measures against Great Britain. It might thus bring 
the negotiation to a successful conclusion. He inti- 
mated, however, that as the Americans desired the 
Floridas so greatly, they might seize them by force. 
The emperor should determine whether or not it was 
to his advantage to keep alive a dispute so dangerous 
that it must inevitably involve the Spanish colonies. 
In any case he should permit only a settlement that 
was favorable to Spain.^^ 

Talleyrand worked upon Armstrong to bring about 
a second application to the emperor by assuring the 
American minister that His Majesty was ready to lend 
his good offices to settle the controversy. Then he 
instructed Vandeul, the French minister at Madrid, to 
act in keeping with his report. The United States 
ought not to ask for any commercial claims or demand 
any part of the Floridas. It must purchase the latter 
entire, and settle the western boundary of Louisiana 
with due regard to Spanish susceptibilities and with 
proper indemnity for any territory yielded. The 
French representative was to express no opinion about 
the Floridas, but he might intimate the commercial 
advantages that the United States expected to gain 
from possessing them, and also suggest how easily 
it could invade them. Unless Spain were determined 
to preserve these colonies, she might listen to these 

^5 Archives des Affaires fit'rangeres, fitats Unis, MS., Vol. 
59, 133-138. 



252 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

American propositions with favor, and content herself 
with the thought that they would be much more valu- 
able to the United States than to herself. The em- 
peror would be glad to see this dispute settled, and 
Vandeul was to do all possible to favor this, without, 
however, intervening officially or displaying more than 
casual interest.^® 

The situation was not hopeful. Cevallos and Mas- 
serano were both complaining about the expulsion of 
Casa Calvo and Morales, and later about Miranda, 
with the evident object of preventing friendly discus- 
sion. Godoy told Vandeul that ''everything stood 
well and there was no necessity for negotiation^ 
When Vandeul urged the wish of the emperor to see 
the affair settled and reported what steps had already 
been taken to bring this about, Godoy consented to 
undertake the negotiation. The Frenchman hastened 
to inform Talleyrand and Erving of his initial success. 
In a second interview a few days later he attempted 
to settle the details. At first Godoy insisted upon 
negotiating at Madrid, or knowing the views of the 
United States, before agreeing to abide by the result, 
but finally yielded to the arguments of the French min- 
ister. These were backed by assurances that his gov- 

3^ Talleyrand to Vandeul, May 28, 1806, Archives des Af- 
faires fitrangeres, fispagne, MS., Vol. 669; Talleyrand to 
Armstrong, June 4, 1806, Spanish Dispatches, MS., IX, Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives ; Adams, History of the United 
States, III, 380. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 253 

ernment would not support the American claim to 
West Florida and by a frank warning that the United 
States might seize the region. Under such pressure 
Godoy then reluctantly consented to refer the whole 
affair to French arbitration. Vandeul regarded this 
as safer than leaving so delicate an adjustment ex- 
posed to the factitious complaints of Cevallos or the 
uncompromising Americanism of Erving.^^ 

Vandeul was moving too rapidly for his superiors, 
or at least Napoleon affected to think so. In the 
course of the severe reprimand that Talleyrand, upon 
the emperor's order, administered to him, he told the 
charge that however much Napoleon might desire to 
see the differences between Spain and the United 
States settled, " the terms and the way must be left to 
them; affairs of this delicacy . . . [must] be man- 
aged very carefully." Talleyrand closed his rebuke 
with this sentence : " The government alone can know 
whether this step is consistent with its interests of the 
moment and with the general plan it has formed for 
itself." Probably he only meant that Napoleon had 
determined to use the Floridas as a means of coercing 
the United States to support his commercial policy ; 
but, in the words of Izquierdo to Godoy, " Who is able 
to divine the mind of M. Talleyrand ? "^^ 

^''Vandeul to Talleyrand, June 16, 19, 26, 1806, Archives des 
Affaires fitrangeres, fispagne, MS,, Vol. 670; Adams, History 
of the United States, III, 381-385. 

88 Bowdoin to Madison, Aug. 22, 1806, Spanish Dispatches, 
MS., IX, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



254 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

During the summer of 1806 the Spanish Court be- 
came enraged over Napoleon's design to give the Ba- 
learic Islands to the Bourbons, whom he had driven 
from Naples. Some inkling of their rage may have 
reached the emperor at Paris and induced him to 
suspend the Florida negotiation. If Spain were be- 
coming restive, it would be advisable to keep the con- 
troversy open. But a series of contemporary memoirs 
may have assisted to confirm him in his purpose or 
reconcile Talleyrand to it. One of them, written by 
Pinckney Horry, a nephew of General C. C. Pinckney 
and a naturalized French subject, displays all the neo- 
phyte's zeal in behalf of his adopted country. He ad- 
vised that France secure for herself East Florida, 
which would afford her a favorable position for exert- 
ing pressure on both Spaniards and Americans. By a 
measured and pliant conduct it might be possible to 
neutralize the jealousy that her presence there might 
cause; for possession was less important than her 
conduct as a neighbor. The ruling class of the Caro- 
linas and Georgia, pleasure-loving and honorable 
men, were easily led by those who knew them. They 
still felt a bitter hatred for England, and would pre- 
vent the English party in the United States from at- 
tempting hostile measures against the French. Spain 
should acquiesce in their occupying the peninsula 
rather than permit the United States to get it. She 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 255 

could not adequately defend it herself, and risked the 
loss of all her colonies by attempting to hold it.^^ 

Another memoir was the work of a certain M. Vez- 
monnet, who had recently returned from the United 
States. That power, as the president had avowed, 
expected soon to purchase the Floridas or take them 
by force. West Florida was the key to Louisiana, 
and there could be no permanent tranquility between 
Spain and the United States until the latter got it. 
Then it would share with England the commerce of 
Cuba and Mexico and inoculate those colonies with 
the views of independence. The emperor alone could 
prevent this.^^ Still later an anonymous memoir 
stated that the Floridas might yet cause Jefferson to 
draw the sword instead of the pen. His enemies had 
criticised the acquisition of Louisiana, and this had led 
to his obsession for the Floridas and his insistence 
upon the claim to the Perdido. While internal dissen- 
sion among the Americans might suffice to protect the 
Floridas and Mexico from the torrent o'f independ- 
ence that was sweeping toward them, French assist- 
ance was also essential and must not be ignored.^^ 
None of the nations of that period had any inten- 
ds The memoir bears the date June 25, 1806, Archives des 
Affaires £trangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 59, 215 ff. 

*^ The memoir is dated Aug. 6, 1806, Archives des Affaires 
£trangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 59, 240-246. 

*^ The memoir is dated Nov. ?, 1806, Archives des Affaires 
fitrangeres, fitats Unis, MS., Vol. 59, 310. 



256 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

tion of ignoring France ; Spain least of all. But for a 
time resentment over the Balearics led Godoy intO' a 
mad attempt at independent action. This will par- 
tially explain the course of Izquierdo, his agent at 
Paris. Izquierdo did not welcome his principal's un- 
willing instructions to undertake a territorial negotia- 
tion that involved little honor and less financial return. 
He told his friend, M. Cazenove, who had urged him 
to treat with Armstrong, that they could do no more 
than examine documents at Paris. Those in the 
Spanish embassy had already been turned over to him, 
when he learned of the emperor's change of mind and 
returned them forthwith. The imperial decision gave 
him no less satisfaction than it did his superiors. 

For a time Godoy and Cevallos thought of having 
Casa Yrujo bring this decision to the attention of the 
American government and publish it in the American 
papers. But still distrusting their imperial ally, they 
contented themselves with giving their representative 
a resume of the decision and made no mention of 
Izquierdo's brief agency. Casa Yrujo would know 
how to make the most of it.*^ The emperor had 
already taken pains to have the American government 
informed of his position. He regretted its settled 
spirit of animosity toward Spain. Turreau was to in- 

42 Izquierdo to ?, June 27, 1806, Izquierdo to Cevallos, Aug. 
8, 1806, Cevallos to Casa Yrujo, Aug. 22, 1806, Legajo 5542, 
Estado, A. H. N., Madrid. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 257 

form Madison that neither that power nor France 
recognized the claim to West Florida and that it was 
useless for the United States to insist upon it. If she 
wished to acquire the Floridas, let her consult the inter- 
ests of Spain. Moreover any attempt to interfere 
with the Spanish colonies would result in European 
intervention.*^ 

Madison was already directing his course in keeping 
with this fiat. If the negotiation for the Floridas 
should again fail, as seemed likely, he instructed Arm- 
strong and Bowdoin to secure the status quo, the navi- 
gation of the Mobile, and the ratification of the claims 
convention of 1802. He had hoped that Monroe and 
Pinckney would secure these very points at Aranjuez 
the year before. This, according to the meek and 
patient secretary, would insure the continuance of an 
honorable peace with Spain and give needed time for 
further consideration of the disputed points. It would 
also insure "the increase of the relative power of the 
United States, for which time alone is wanted."** 
Madison here mentioned the factor that was ultimately 
to determine the ownership of the desired territory. 
It was likewise the factor that most greatly aroused 
Spanish concern. 

The change in Napoleon's policy put still farther 

*3 (Talleyrand) to Turreau, July 31, 1806, Archives des 
Affaires Etrangeres, fitats Unis, MS., Vol. 59, 233-226. 

** Madison to Bowdoin and Armstrong, May 26, 1806, In- 
structions, MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 
18 



258 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

asunder those who were joined in the trying negotia- 
tion. Neither Armstrong nor Bowdoin could at first 
explain Izquierdo's failure to pursue the task already 
initiated. Bowdoin was indined to think that Godoy 
had appointed his agent, a " Spaniard of no great con- 
sideration," an " artful and intriguing man " like him- 
self, and then had refused to give him the necessary 
powers to treat. By this means the Spaniard would 
avoid unacceptable action. The Americans believed, as 
was natural, that the course of both principal and 
agent was determined by Talleyrand himself, or by 
the stock-jobbers who hoped to profit by the transac- 
tion. In this number Bowdoin was ready to class his 
colleague, Armstrong, who was inclined to excuse 
Izquierdo and intimated that perhaps the Spanish 
agent's instructions required some amendment. Arm- 
strong intimated that Bowdoin must restrain his im- 
patience or they would lose the initial advantage.*^ 

At this juncture Talleyrand's agent, Dautremont, 
paid Skipwith another visit. He assured the Amer- 
ican that the recent capture of Buenos Ayres by the 
British rendered a settlement between Spain and the 
United States more imperative than ever. Contrary 
to report Dautremont insisted that Izquierdo was em- 
powered to treat with the Americans, subject to 
French control. All depended on Talleyrand. Skip- 
with ought to know how important it was " to smooth 

*5 Bowdoin to Monroe, Aug. 16, 1806, Lenox MSS. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 259 

the way by reconciling public measures to the interests 
of influential individuals." 

In view of the X. Y. Z. episode, this " reconciling " 
must take some other form than a direct bribe if the 
" influential individuals " were " to procure the salu- 
tary purposes intended." In the course of their inter- 
view Skipwith learned that this was to take the form 
of a land grant to Talleyrand's favorite brother. The 
family name was not to appear in the transaction. 
Izquierdo could sign the necessary papers and Dautre- 
mont and Skipwith receive a share in the profits. 
Skipwith refused to entertain the proposal and Bow- 
doin commended him for his straightforwardness. 
Policy as well as common honesty should lead them to 
reject every suggestion of the sort, which could only 
delay the desired acquisition and defer permanent 
peace.*^ 

Bowdoin, however, was anxious to settle the issues 
with Spain before England should make peace with 
France, and urged Monroe to use his efforts to that 
end. When the early days of September arrived with- 
out further move, he feared that France and Spain 
were delaying the settlement until a general peace 
should occur. He reminded Armstrong that the 
American people expected some effective action and 
that right soon. Disturbances on the Louisiana fron- 
tier betokened early hostilities. Congress was to as- 

^6 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 309. 



260 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

semble in early session to learn the news from Paris. 
He suggested another and more vigorous representa- 
tion to one or both of the recalcitrant governments. 

Bowdoin made this suggestion to Armstrong by let- 
ter, following the custom he now pursued. On the 
next day Armstrong replied that he only expected the 
French government "to rescue the negotiation from 
the torpor" in which it lay. If Talleyrand should not 
do this the Americans could not induce Izquierdo to 
negotiate, and still less to agree to what they wished. 
Bowdoin ought not to regard France as the leading 
party to the negotiation; that attitude smacked of the 
" heterodoxy of Mr. J. Randolph." Such prospects as 
they had for the negotiation were due to Napoleon. 
In view of the way he was being criticized in both 
hemispheres he might well decline to go further. 
Armstrong felt that this " would be a matter for regret 
but not for blame."*^ If the negotiation succeeded 
people would say that he was bought with American 
gold ; if it failed, that he kept Spain from acting so as 
to assume the principal part himself. 

Possibly Armstrong desired to excuse their prospec- 
tive failure by what he termed irrational public criti- 
cism. Bowdoin thought they ought to ignore what 
was said across the Atlantic. France had more than 

*^ Bowdoin to Armstrong, Sept. 8, 1806, Armstrong to Bow- 
doin, Sept. 9, 1806, Spanish Dispatches, MS., IX, Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives ; Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, ^^S. 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 26 1 

a passing interest in the relations between Spain and 
the United States. If she were involved in a war with 
the latter along with Spain, she would lose her West 
India colonies and the remnant of her commerce under 
the American flag. Commercial reasons would lead 
Great Britain to take the side of the United States and 
continue the war with France to the bitter end. The 
reiterated hope of British cooperation suggests the eve 
of the Peace of Amiens, but the United States was far 
from being as well represented abroad as on that 
occasion. 

On the evening of September 9, when he penned the 
above letter Bowdoin received assurance from Erving, 
based on a statement of Vandeul, that neither Izquierdo 
nor Masserano had been empowered to treat with Arm- 
strong and himself, and that Godoy did not intend to 
send such powers. This misinformation completely- 
changed his estimate of the emperor's action. "The 
saddle should rest on the right back," he wrote, and by 
this he meant on Parker and the money jobbers whose 
intrigues with Armstrong, he felt, had done the mis- 
chief. He advised Erving to continue his relations 
with Vandeul so as to obtain further information of 
conditions at Paris. He was inclined to believe with 
Erving that Napoleon would act even if the Spanish 
government would not.*^ Armstrong doubted the re- 
liabiHty of Erving's information, and suggested that 

*s Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 325. 



262 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

it would be more in keeping with Bowdoin's " preach- 
ing" and his own "practice" to furnish him with a 
copy of Erving's letter, so that he could judge for 
himself.^^ 

Bowdoin wished his colleague to join him in a note 
to Talleyrand that would show that they knew of his 
agency in holding up the negotiation.^^ At the same 
time they should jointly ask Cevallos, through Erving, 
if Spain was going to consider the American propo- 
sitions. Armstrong, possibly with undue caution, re- 
fused to entertain either suggestion. He and Bowdoin 
were not sure enough of their ground to make such a 
representation to the French government, while direct 
communication with the Spanish government would 
violate their instructions.^^ One might suggest that 
on a preceding occasion American commissioners, spe- 
cifically committed to French guidance, had broken 
their instructions and had gained decidedly thereby. 
But such was not likely to be the case in the latter 
part of 1806. 

At one time Bowdoin contemplated carrying out 
his plan alone, but he did not have the courage to 

^9 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 329. 

50 Armstrong had contemplated a note to Talleyrand, com- 
pelling him to explain the failure to act under the instructions 
to Izquierdo, but Talleyrand and Duroc dissuaded him. 
Adams, History of the United States, III, 386. He does not 
seem to have confided this to Bowdoin. 

51 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 330-336. 



% 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 263 

follow Jay's bold example. He wrote Monroe that 
France and Spain were playing the same game that 
had proved so effective in 1805, but the instructions to 
himself and Armstrong did not permit them to force 
Spain to negotiate.^^ That power feared some con- 
cession if she did, and steadfastly refused to initiate 
the necessary parleys, and the French government 
made no effort to compel her to adopt a contrary 
course. He told his doubting colleague that if the 
United States could settle its disputes with Great 
Britain and join a league of the northern European 
powers against Napoleon, the league would speedily 
bring the evasive Talleyrand to terms. ^^ In a letter 
to Erving he pointed out what he considered the whole 
difficulty. Within five days after Skipwith arrived in 
Paris with the new instructions, in the preceding May, 
Parker told him that they " were not relished and 
would not go down." All subsequent French efforts 
in behalf of the negotiation were mere pretexts. 
Armstrong's course was thoroughly contemptible. 
The whole situation was the legacy of " that old villain 
from New York [Livingston]."^* 

Shut off from direct approach to the French foreign 
office, but continually subjected to the importunities of 
its corrupt agents, Bowdoin naturally attributed to 
the latter an undue importance. He could not know 

52 Bowdoin to Monroe, Oct. i, 1806, Lenox MSS. 

^^ Cf. note 51. 

5* Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 340; see note, p. 'JZ- 



264 AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 

that they represented the weakest side of Talleyrand's 
work, and realized only dimly that the arch plotter 
himself was then passing from power. Talleyrand 
preferred a more direct attitude toward the United 
States. He had no desire to pose as Spain's champion 
or as an exemplar of directness, but he despised both 
contestants and believed he could be ruthless in deal- 
ing with them. He may also have wished some fur- 
ther hoard to tide over the lean years before him, 
and sought this in the present negotiations. But Na- 
poleon overruled his schemes for petty plunder as he 
did his more far-reaching commercial measures by 
depriving him of all direct agency in the negotiation. 
Armstrong suspected the emperor's agency, but he 
could not definitely interpret it. When on September 25 
Napoleon left Paris to wage war against Prussia and 
took the unwilling Talleyrand with him, Armstrong 
recognized that there was no immediate prospect of 
negotiation, and sought a vacation in southern France. 
Before leaving he thanked the absent emperor, or 
rather Talleyrand, for his specious interest in the nego- 
tiation, as shown in the note of June 4. He also told 
his doubting associate that Izquierdo had really been 
empowered to treat with them, but that his powers 
had been immediately revoked, and instead he had 
been instructed to initiate parleys for a treaty between 
Spain and France and Great Britain. If Bowdoin 
thought that they should send the French government 



AMERICAN BICKERING AND FRENCH BARGAINING 265 

a vigorous note on the anomalous situation, he sug- 
gested that Bowdoin should employ the " greater leis- 
ure" in prospect in composing an appropriate draft.^^ 
Armstrong's sarcasm did nothing to soften Bow- 
doin's asperity or to convince him of the truth of his 
statement. He felt that he had " thoroughly sifted " 
his colleague's course, and wrote of him to Erving: 
"His conduct sufficiently speaks for itself." Iz- 
quierdo without power to treat had gone to Holland. 
France was indifferent and Spain obstinate, while both 
powers disparaged the friendship of the United States 
and despised its hostility. Left behind in the deceitful 
atmosphere of Paris jobbery, commended to no person 
of influence, subject to expenses more than double 
his salary, it is little wonder that Bowdoin found his 
diplomatic career anything but pleasant. He could 
only pour out his woes in a long personal letter to 
Jefferson in which he castigated with equal fervor the 
machinations of the stock-jobbers, the dilatory atti- 
tude of Spain, and the dupHcity of Talleyrand. If the 
United States attempted to come to terms with France 
and Spain it might be disappointed in the cardinal 
points of the negotiation. He therefore advised the 
president to fortify the western country and be pre- 
pared for any eventuality.^® 

^5 Armstrong to Talleyrand, Oct. 15, 1806, same to Bowdoin, 
Oct. 18, 1806, Spanish Dispatches, MS., IX, Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives ; Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 343. 

^6 Bowdoin to Jefferson, Oct. 20, 1806, Bowdoin and Temple 
Papers, II, 343. 



CHAPTER VIII 
The Shadow of the Corsican 

The latter part of 1806 marked a critical stage in 
American diplomacy. Territorial disputes with Spain 
were still unsettled. Great Britain multiplied her com- 
mercial exactions and her grudging concession to the 
joint efforts of Monroe and William Pinkney was 
so unacceptable that Jefferson would not even sub- 
mit the treaty to the Senate. Napoleon, victorious at 
Jena and Auerstadt, was determined that there should 
be no more neutrals, and in December issued from 
Berlin the decree that intensified the isolation of the 
United States. Spain became restive under French 
domination, and in October Godoy ventured to call 
the nation to arms and to take tentative steps toward a 
British alliance. For the time being Napoleon ignored 
this rash move of the upstart puppet, but the latter 
knew that he was marked for subsequent vengeance. 

Bowdoin noted Godoy's restlessness, and this led 
him, on October 30, 1806, to enquire of Erving 
whether, " in a certain event, Spain would settle their 
disputes." This event — the possible defeat of Na- 
poleon — was now the task of the Muskovite rather 
than the Hohenzollern, but Godoy quickly relapsed 

266 



THE SHADO.W OF THE CORSICAN 267 

into his former subserviency and lost his chance for 
independent action. Had he persisted he might have 
been led into an alliance with Great Britain. Bowdoin 
perceived this, and advised the immediate seizure of 
the Floridas, should such an alliance be formed. This 
would be merely a precautionary measure, and a pre- 
text to justify it could be found in the recent Spanish 
incursion along the Sabine. Later the report that 
Casa Yrujo was empowered to treat at Washington — 
a report that proved to be without foundation^ — seemed 
to render further negotiation at Paris useless.^ 

Napoleon's action at this juncture, had Bowdoin but 
known it, was in keeping with this conclusion. In No- 
vember, 1806, he sent Eugene de Beauharnais as am- 
bassador to Spain. Talleyrand, who was now display- 
ing, in token of speedy official demise, his new title, Duke 
of Benevento, wrote his instructions. He was to pre- 
vent the quarrel between Spain and the United States 
from becoming sharper, but not to assume the role of 
formal intermediary. " The affairs of France are to- 
day in Europe," the ennobled secretary warned him, 
"those of America are of secondary order. "^ 

A confidential memoir of the same month informed 
Talleyrand that if the United States were forced into 
the European war, it would probably ally itself with 

^ Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 349, 351, 353. 
2 Talleyrand to Beauharnais, Nov. 9, 1806, Archives des 
Affaires fitrangeres, fispagne, MS., Vol. 670, 413. 



268 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

England. Federalist attacks upon the purchase and 
exploration of Louisiana had compelled Jefferson to 
emphasize the importance of the Floridas. At the 
same time Spain preferred to check his aspirations by- 
stimulating internal disturbances in the United States, 
rather than by calling in the aid of France.^ Beau- 
harnais found that Erving was keeping up a continual 
complaint against Spain's failure to settle the dispute 
and was threatening to leave. This threat suggested a 
possible alliance with Great Britain and the promotion 
of revolt in the Spanish colonies. Eugene curtly advised 
him to adopt mo're friendly relations with Cevallos.* 
Across the Atlantic, Turreau, the French minister, 
watched the situation closely for the first signs of an 
alliance between Great Britain and the United States. 
He was also instructed to maintain a good understand- 
ing between the latter and Spain, without taking a direct 
part in the negotiation. He found his influence wan- 
ing because of illicit commerce between Spain and 
Great Britain. In order to deal effectively with this 
and the general diplomatic tangle he advised his gov- 
ernment to secure Cuba. France needed it anyhow if 
she expected to build up a colonial empire in the West 
Indies. When it was once in her possession she could 
ward off any danger that threatened from the United 

3 Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, fitats Unis, MS., Vol. 
59, 310. 

* Beauharnois to Talleyrand, Apr. 23, 1807, Archives des 
Affaires £trangeres, fispagne, Vol. 671, 264. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 269 

States. This fact ought to reconcile Spanish pride to 
ceding it. By giving up one colony it might save all 
from a common danger that threatened them.^ 

The hopeless situation in which Bowdoin was placed 
led him to criticise the executive as well as his col- 
league. He was dissatisfied with the peaceful tone of 
Jefferson's last message. Furthermore he believed 
that the president had acted with insufficient energy 
against Burr and Miranda. Even Merry reported 
that the latter's expedition was a stumbHng-block to 
the furtherance of the negotiation.^ Toward his col- 
league Bowdoin grew more bitter. Armstrong had 
returned post-haste to Paris when he learned of the 
Berlin Decree, but, as his colleague expressed it, he 
thought more of "a salve for past folly" than of the 
public good. At any rate Bowdoin feared that he still 
cherished the purpose to put through some sort of land 
deal with Izquierdo, Parker, and their abettors. Bow- 
doin also warned Erving to see that Godoy and his 
confederates did not grant away all the desirable land 
in Texas and the Floridas, in case they abandoned 
hope of keeping them.'' Jefferson, who was greatly 

^Turreau to Talleyrand, Apr. 10, May 20, 1807, Archives 
des Affaires fitrangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 60, ^^-'i2, 
111-123. 

« Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 366, 376; Merry to Fox, 
Nov. 2, 1806, MS., British Foreign Office, America, II, 5, 
Vol. 49. 

'^ Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 354-356, 367, 370. 



270 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

concerned over the lack of harmony between his agents 
in Paris, had for a time planned to send William Short 
to act as arbiter between them. Such an appointment 
would simply have added to the strife already existing 
there.^ 

In the early part of 1807 Armstrong schemed to get 
an invitation to Warsaw, where Talleyrand was tem- 
porarily located. But he failed in his attempt to get 
away from his unwelcome colleague. Armstrong had 
criticised the course of Spain in appointing Izquierdo 
to treat with them and then withdrawing his powers. 
At the same time he indicated a complete surrender 
to the French point of view by stating that the western 
boundary of Louisiana was now virtually the only 
point at issue between Spain and the United States. 
The emperor had expressed his opinion so thoroughly 
in regard to the eastern boundary that he hoped he 
would now favor them with his opinion on the western 
limit.^ Armstrong was undoubtedly anxious to reach 
Warsaw before Napoleon made his treaty with the 
czar. But Talleyrand was too busy with the prelim- 
inary parleys at Tilsit to consider such minor matters 
as American territorial claims, even after Armstrong's 
abject submission. 

Madison promptly protested against Armstrong's 

^ Jefferson to William Short, June 12, 1807, Ford, Jefferson, 
IX, 69. 

9 Armstrong to Talleyrand, Feb. 5, Mar. 5, 1807, Archives 
des Affaires fitrangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 60, 33-35, 69. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 2/1 

deference to the emperor. The Americans were will- 
ing to welcome Napoleon's intervention "to promote 
justice and peace," but they made a distinction between 
his personal opinion and his authority as umpire. To 
the latter they were absolutely opposed. ^° Yet Casa 
Yrujo wrote that a majority of the American people 
did not support the territorial pretensions of the ad- 
ministration. The latter asserted them simply to gain 
an advantage in diplomatic bargaining. If Spain pro- 
tested with moderation the United States would have 
to give them up.^^ This statement upon the alleged 
authority of an important member of Congress was 
not calculated to clear the atmosphere at Paris or 
Madrid. 

Nor did personal missives from Jefferson and his 
advisers tend to improve matters. "We ask but one 
month," wrote the former, exasperated at what he 
termed Spanish "perfidy and injustice," "... to be 
in possession of the city of Mexico."^^ Conditions on 
the Mobile, according to Madison, were "kindling a 
flame which was not easily manageable. "^^ The Amer- 
ican people, wrote Secretary Dearborn, would show 

10 Madison to Armstrong, Oct. i8, 1807, Instructions, MS., 
VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

11 Casa Yrujo to Cevallos, Apr. 10, 1807, Legajo 5548, Es- 
tado, A. H. N., Madrid. 

12 JefiFerson to Bowdoin, Apr. 2, 1807, Bowdoin and Temple 
Papers, II, z'j2. 

" Madison to Armstrong, May 22, 1807, Instructions, MS., 
VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



272 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

little reluctance to a "brush" with Spain. "We 
could in a very short time," he added, " dispossess His 
CathoHc Majesty of all his possessions north of . . . 
the Isthmus of Darien. We do not covet their terri- 
tories or their mines, but they are certainly in our 
power, as much so as the British provinces of Canada, 
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick are."^* In the 
course of the next few years Dearborn himself was to 
demonstrate the inanity of this boast at the head of a 
division of the American army. Now he could only 
bemoan the fact that Napoleon had so many more im- 
portant things to consider that he could not decide 
what Spain should do. On the contrary Napoleon 
had already determined that precise thing. Obviously 
his views did not correspond to the American's hopes, 
as Armstrong was to discover. 

Undeterred by previous rebuffs, Armstrong on June 
1 6 sent to Talleyrand certain "hypotheses" as a basis 
for ending the protracted and irritating negotiation. 
Spain might now be willing to part with her territory 
east of the Mississippi, or she might part with the ter- 
ritory between the Mississippi and the St. Mark (Ap- 
palachicola), or with all the territory east of the Mis- 
sissippi. Upon the first of these hypotheses, the Mis- 
sissippi and the Bravo were to be taken as the limits of 
Louisiana following Napoleon's opinion and the decla- 
im Dearborn to Bowdoin, Apr, 24, 1807, Bowdoin and Tem- 
ple Papers, II, 376. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 273 

ration of Laussat. On the second, the United States 
would yield the territory between the Colorado and 
the Bravo for that between the Mississippi and the St. 
Mark. On the third hypothesis, the United States 
would pay Spain — millions of dollars and take the 
Sabine as the western boundary of Louisiana, with a 
line drawn from its source to include the drainage area 
of the Mississippi ; or the United States would pay a 
larger sum and take the Colorado. All claims against 
Spain were to be paid according to the terms of the 
Treaty of 1802 or in bills drawn on the Spanish 
colonies.^^ 

These unsought advances from Armstrong must 
have caused Talleyrand to smile even in the midst of 
the busy days at Tilsit. On July 6 he replied, excus- 
ing his failure to answer sooner on account of the im- 
portant business that had recently engrossed him, and 
expressing the pleasure that His Majesty felt in seeing 
affairs between Spain and the United States once more 
in process of settlement. This letter was hardly what 
Armstrong wanted, although it was all that he might 
reasonably expect. A week later, Talleyrand wrote 
him from Koenigsburg, announcing peace between 
France and Russia. He was flattered that Armstrong 
had reposed such confidence in his government. He 
was pleased that all discussions in regard to the eastern 

^'Armstrong to Talleyrand, June 12, 16, 1807, ibid., 385, 
387-389. 

19 



274 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 



limits of Louisiana were abandoned, and he hoped that 
there would be no wordy discussion in regard to the 
western limit, where few people were concerned. He 
believed that the appointment of commissioners to 
meet at Madrid was a proof of this. His Majesty ap- 
proved such friendly negotiation and would frown 
upon a contrary policy. Early in August Armstrong 
replied that Talleyrand had mistaken his meaning. 
No negotiation was going on, nor on account of the 
hostile attitude of Spain was there likely to be any 
negotiation.^^ 

This communication remained unanswered, but it 
represented the most advanced point in the negotiation 
since the Spanish government had withdrawn Izqui- 
erdo's powers a year before. Champagny, Talley- 
rand's successor, continued in his footsteps. This 
was only natural, for Napoleon had definitely deter- 
mined the pathway for both. The negotiation had 
now reached the point when the diplomatic burden was 
to be shifted from West Florida to Texas, as Arm- 
strong had indicated in his latest advances. Yet the 
uncertainty that still marked the controversy led Na- 
poleon for months to dangle the Floridas before 
Jefiferson's eyes whenever he wished to entice him to 
support his commercial policy. 

Bowdoin viewed with apprehension the treaty be- 
tween Napoleon and the czar. The failure to include 

^6 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 389-393. 






THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 275 

England in it was bound to have some influence on 
the dispute with Spain, but he did not know what. In 
the latter part of the summer the Chesapeake outrage 
was to complicate American affairs still more. In 
the midst of the excitement aroused by this the presi- 
dent urged Bowdoin to go to Madrid unless he pre- 
ferred to return home. Spain had recalled Casa Yrujo 
and would probably appoint another minister. Evi- 
dently the president regarded prospective hostilities 
with England as an inducement for Spain to make 
better terms with him. Madison's instructions of that 
date seemed contrary to Jefferson's advice. He told 
Bowdoin and Armstrong that the Florida negotiation 
should be suspended, unless any payment incurred by 
it could be postponed until after the expected clash 
with Great Britain. If Bowdoin did go to Madrid, he 
should try to get more favorable commercial relations 
with Cuba.^^ 

Bowdoin had already notified his colleague that he 
would leave for the United States as soon as the 
Spanish business was settled. In order to hasten 
matters he wished to be presented to the emperor after 
the latter's return from Tilsit, and asked Armstrong 
to procure the necessary credentials. This request led 
to an open break in their relations. Armstrong re- 
plied that none but duly accredited ministers could be 
admitted to the emperor's receptions. Bowdoin 

1^ Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 396-401, 403, 404. 



276 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

thought that his pecuhar mission entitled him as a rep- 
resentative of the United States to some recognition, 
and intimated that Armstrong had not properly pre- 
sented his case or obtained for him an early interview 
with Talleyrand. Armstrong retorted that he had only 
conformed to prevalent usage, and twitted Bowdoin 
with attempting to secure an interview with Talley- 
rand without his knowledge, when he first came to 
Paris. The result had been most mortifying to Bow- 
doin, and he evidently did not relish this reference. 
As little was he pleased with Armstrong's parting in- 
junction to find some other person upon whom to dis- 
charge " the irritations of ill health and ill humor," of 
which his associate was heartily tired. After receiv- 
ing this " ill-judged, unauthorized, and abusive letter," 
Bowdoin determined to trouble the other no more.^^ 

By this time Armstrong believed that France would 
not favor the United States in the negotiation, and 
this belief probably made him less careful of his col- 
league's personal feelings. French preparations on 
the Spanish border now betokened a design to in- 
vade the Iberian Peninsula. Bowdoin therefore deter- 
mined to accept the permission of the administration 
to retire, but did not leave France without other ill- 
judged controversies with his unacceptable colleague, 
who, he believed, had imposed on the president. From 
Cherbourg he wrote to Erving that the president might 

18 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 401, 407, 409, 416-419, 421. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 277 

appoint another minister to pursue the deceptive 
schemes marked out by "Armstrong and his motley 
coadjutors," but if so, '' a chapter of accidents " rather 
than " regular and progressive negotiation " would 
bring success to the United States. He also warned 
Erving not to commit the " unpardonable sin " of inti- 
macy with Monroe, or to give his confidence too freely 
to Madison.^^ With this parting advice against do- 
mestic intrigue, Bowdoin left Europe, an intensely 
disappointed man ; but he was neither the first nor the 
last diplomatic sacrifice to the untenable West Florida 
claim. 

Champagny, the successor to Talleyrand, met Arm- 
strong's first advances in a friendly, if somewhat in- 
definite, spirit. This led the administration at home to 
anticipate an early adjustment of the vexatious con- 
troversy. In August, 1807, Madison suggested that 
the situation on the Mobile might yet lead to forcible 
measures, if not satisfactorily adjusted before the next 
meeting of Congress. In bringing this implied threat 
to Champagny's attention, Armstrong explained it as 
partially due to the prospective rapprochement between 
Spain and Great Britain. At all events the United 
States must be ready to prevent the latter power from 
acquiring the Floridas.^* 

19 Bowdoin and Temple Papers, II, 406, 412, 426, 433, 443- 

20 Cf. note 13; Adams, History of the United States, IV, 
306. 



278 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

Early in February, 1808, the emperor was ready to 
take final measures against the Bourbon monarchy in 
Spain. He then intimated, through Champagny, that 
the Americans had his permission to occupy the 
Floridas, provided they first declared war against Eng- 
land. If they openly became his allies, he might induce 
Spain through his influence to consent to the arrange- 
ment. His evasive promise was evidently designed to 
tempt the United States to adopt a general commercial 
policy favorable to himself. When Armstrong tried 
to bring out this purpose more clearly, the emperor 
retorted, on February 11, by scolding the American 
minister for his country's subserviency to Great 
Britain. The disgusted Armstrong then advised the 
administration to select either France or England as its 
chief enemy, but to seize the Floridas at once.^^ On 
May 2, after a delay that was more than seemly, Madi- 
son's instructions assumed a mildness that little com- 
ported with Armstrong's advice. The United States, 
he said, had no reason to suppose that the emperor 
would approve the seizure of the Floridas. The sec- 
retary advised Armstrong to assure the emperor that 
they "had chosen as the bases for their policy a fair 
and sincere neutrality among the contending Powers," 
which they were unwilling to abandon " for the pur- 
pose of obtaining a separate and particular object, 
however interesting to them." Yet they might be led 

21 Adams, History of the United States, IV, 293-295. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 2/9 

by British hostility to occupy the Floridas, and in that 
case were pleased to know " that the measure received 
His Majesty's approbation."-^ 

Possibly the failure to settle commercial and other 
disputes with Great Britain accounted for the com- 
plaisant attitude of the administration. But Napoleon 
needed something more than special missions, with 
which he had already been sufficiently favored; or a 
general embargo — for that measure of retaliation was 
now in force — to serve his immediate purpose in the 
American colonies of Spain. When at Bayonne late 
in June he received the substance of Madison's missive, 
he determined to humiliate the minister who dared to 
transmit it, even if he could not directly affront the 
secretary who wrote it. He directed Champagny to 
inform Armstrong that the latter had misunderstood 
his previous communication. He would not approve 
the occupation of the Floridas by the United States, 
even in case of British attack, unless the king of Spain, 
now his brother Joseph, permitted or requested it.^^ 

An unsigned minute, dated at Bayonne on June 30, 
was in keeping with this declaration. It stated that His 
Majesty, presumably Joseph Bonaparte, proposed to 
follow the system of " good understanding and strict 
friendship" which Spain had always observed toward 
the United States. Yet, as if to leave the American 

22 Adams, History of the United States, IV, 306. 

23 Ibid., 311. 



280 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

some faint hope, he promised on his arrival in Madrid 
to appoint a representative to confer with Armstrong 
upon the outstanding disputes.^* From this vague and 
obviously inspired despatch, possibly an indirect result 
of the "Dos de Mayo," the impatient Armstrong de- 
rived no comfort and advised his own recall. 

Nor did Turreau, across the Atlantic, afford the ad- 
ministration any greater comfort. Armed with in- 
structions similar in tone to the message of Cham- 
pagny to Armstrong, he obtained late in June an inter- 
view with Madison. He was unable to influence the 
secretary with his tantalizing offer of the Floridas. 
Nor did he succeed better with Jefferson, who met him 
with a long list of unfriendly acts committed by his 
government. He answered the president's strictures 
on the Florida imbroglio by saying that the negotia- 
tion ought to fail. The laws of Spain did not permit 
any alienation of territory, and France could not lend 
itself to an attempt to plunder an ally. The United 
States offered no adequate compensation for the de- 
sired cession. If England attempted to occupy it and 
thus threatened Louisiana, the Americans should unite 
with Spain against their common enemy without any 
regard to disputed limits.^^ This affectation of virtue 
seemed to silence for the time being the president's 
complaints. 

2*Legajo 5542, Estado, A. H. N., Madrid. 
25 Turreau to Champagny, June 28, 1808, Archives des Af- 
faires £trangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 61, 166. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 28I 

Turreau devoted his despatch, a few days later, to 
the reputed views of Madison. Like Jefferson, the 
heir apparent of the administration seemed determined 
to secure the Floridas. Such a purpose filled Turreau 
with alarm. ** The cession of the Floridas," he wrote, 
" soon or late will be a mortal blow to the Spanish pos- 
sessions in America. It will remove all hope of a new 
arrangement with the generous Louisianians who 
scarcely bear the American yoke and who wish to pre- 
serve their attachment for France." After indicating 
the common interest of his own country as well as 
Spain in this territory, he went on to say that if France 
must make the sacrifice, she should first force Spain 
to cede the territory to her and then carry on the 
negotiation with the United States. If then obliged 
to abandon the Floridas, France should employ all 
possible means to counteract the effect of this act. 
The cession of Cuba to France, the surrender of a 
portion of the right bank of the Mississippi to Spain, 
the free navigation of that stream, special commercial 
privileges for a term of years, a large money indemnity 
with the renunciation of all commercial claims, an 
American alliance against England — these were some 
of the factors that might be used to counterbalance 
the loss of the Floridas. In any case the Americans 
must not know of the cession of Cuba to France until 
the Florida question was settled. 

Turreau advised the abandonment of the Floridas 



282 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

because he was sure Great Britain had already offered 
to conquer and cede them to the United States. The 
French government must be willing to make a similar 
cession, or at least be willing to give up the commercial 
duties at Mobile. Jefferson's harping on that subject 
had evidently impressed Turreau and caused him to 
reverse his previous advice. But he felt that Na- 
poleon must do something to keep his influence over 
Madison and at the same time insure the latter's 
popularity as a presidential candidate. The French 
minister was dangerously near meddling in domestic 
politics, but his predecessors afforded him more than 
one precedent for his course.^^ 

Of a contrary tenor were a series of contemporary 
memoirs prepared by the traveler C. C. Robin. He 
pointed out the desirability of securing the Floridas 
for France, in case *' notable changes " should occur 
in Spain. The French might occupy that region, pos- 
sibly by corrupting Folch and his fellow-officials, and 
then use it as a base of operations against the United 
States or Spanish America. In this way alone could 
France exert proper pressure in Louisiana and re- 
strain the pretensions of the Americans.^^ The sug- 
gestion reverts to the French policy in the Mississippi 
Valley during the previous decade. 

The Emperor of Western Europe, apparently su- 

26 Turreau to Champagny, July 3, 1808, ibid. 

27 Archives des Affaires £trangeres, fispagne, MS., Vol. 
676, 198. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 283 

preme in his chosen field of action, needed neither 
memoir nor ministerial note to determine his policy. 
His former ally, Charles IV, having abdicated the 
regal power that he had exercised so ill, was now 
his abject hostage. The miserable Prince of the 
Asturias, recently proclaimed Ferdinand VII, was 
likewise a pitiful French captive. Spain lay helpless 
before him. In the distance beckoned a still more 
tempting prize — her American colonies. He might 
insure himself a free hand there if he could involve 
the United States in hostilities with Great Britain. 
At any rate he desired its neutrality. The Floridas 
would be a cheap price to pay for either contingency. 
For many years Napoleon had used the coveted terri- 
tory as a bait; now he proposed to let the president 
swallow it, hook and all. But he distinctly warned 
him to behave circumspectly with reference to the 
other Spanish colonies. 

Scarcely five years had passed since Napoleon Bona- 
parte had planned to establish a colonial empire in the 
region about the Gulf of Mexico. The persistent re- 
volt of the blacks in Santo Domingo had then defeated 
his purpose. Now the uprising of the Spanish people 
defeated his second attempt at American dominion and 
led to consequences which even he could not foresee. 
In retrospect we may note that the famous " Dos de 
Mayo " marked the beginning of the end of Bourbon 
rule in the New World, as well as the decline of 



284 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

Napoleon's power. In common with the other por- 
tions of Spanish America, West Florida was bound to 
feel its influence and thereby increase the concern 
of its northern neighbors. 

To Jefferson the rising of the Spanish people seemed 
to present another opportunity to gain the Floridas. 
The revolt, it is true, did not greatly arouse his sym- 
pathy. His "pursuit of Florida," to quote Henry 
Adams, had enmeshed him too completely for that. 
He rather expected England to make up with the 
United States, while Bonaparte was occupied with 
Spain. Then without committing himself to either 
contestant, he expected to seize the territory to the 
Perdido as a rightful possession and "the residue of 
the Floridas " in lieu of his commercial claims against 
Spain. His policy was wholly selfish. Moreover the 
increase in the army that Congress had just author- 
ized would give him the means to carry it out. He 
proposed to gather the new recruits and armed vessels 
at strategic points, ready to act as soon as Congress 
should give its consent. There was already a suffi- 
ciently large American force near Baton Rouge to 
overcome its slender garrison. The embargo afforded 
him the necessary pretext for stationing other troops 
on the St. Mary's and the Tombigbee for the seizure 
of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine.^^ 

28 Ford, Jefferson, IX, 203; cf. my article on "The Pan- 
American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson," in Quarterly 
of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, I, 212-239. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 285 

Early in September popular sentiment, according to 
Gallatin, seemed generally to favor the Spanish 
patriots.2^ The victories of the latter over the French 
rendered Napoleon less formidable, but increased the 
possibility that England might become the protector 
of the Spanish colonies. With this in mind the 
Cabinet agreed, at its meeting on October 22, not to 
interfere with these colonies if they wished to remain 
under nominal Spanish control, but to oppose their 
incorporation with England. Claiborne was author- 
ized to express this sentiment to any of the neighbor- 
ing colonial officials, while assuring them of warm 
friendliness. "We consider their interests and ours 
the same," the president added, "and that the object 
of both must be to exclude all European influence from 
this hemisphere."^^ 

General Wilkinson supported this new Pan-Ameri- 
can policy with enthusiasm. On August 25, 1808, he 
warned Folch that Spain was bound to succumb to 
Bonaparte. This would give the Spanish colonies an 
opportunity to declare their independence, or at any 
rate present to them the necessity for defending them- 
selves, and in either event Folch was destined to play 
an important part. He later warned Folch against de- 
pendence upon Great Britain. That power could not 

29 Jefferson Papers, MS., Series 3, Vol. 7, No. 71, Library 
of Congress. 

30 Writings of Jefferson (Memorial edition), XII, 186. 



286 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

save them or the mother-country from Napoleon, 
but was planning ultimately to exploit both. "My 
country," he generously wrote, "must undoubtedly 
sympathize with Spanish America and if called on 
will help her." But he added : " In the meantime save 
your province from any European power and let 
Someruelos take care of Cuba which may slip into 
the hands of a false friend. "^^ 

It will be noted that the new spirit of friendliness 
for the Spanish colonies was accompanied by a re- 
newed fear of British aggression in the neighboring 
Floridas. Wilkinson emphasized this in a letter to 
Jefferson. Expressing the " liveliest hopes " in the 
speedy emancipation of Mexico and South America, 
and mentioning the desirability and necessity of an 
" excision of our transatlantic connections," he re- 
gretted the credulity with which the " feeble, unin- 
formed Spaniards" were surrendering themselves to 
"the interested officious interference of the British." 
Agents should be sent to warn them against these 
" insidious encroachments " and to assure them of 
American sympathy. He offered to convey such a 
message to the Marques de Someruelos, whose femi- 
ninity and " feeble intellect " might otherwise enable 

31 Wilkinson to Folch, Aug. 25, 1808, enclosure in Folch to 
Someruelos, reservado, Jan. 2^, 1809, Legajo 1566, Papeles de 
Cuba. The same material is in Legajo 5559, Estado, A. H. N., 
Madrid. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 287 

the British to ''cajole or frighten him" out of Cuba 
and the Floridas.^^ 

Possibly Wilkinson was led to propose this " season- 
able counteraction " from wholly selfish motives. He 
told his patron that he longed for " some interesting 
appointment " that would enable him " by irref ragible 
evidence to strike dumb " his annoying " slanderers 
and revilers." Yet he continued to assure Folch that 
he and his fellow-officials might count on the assistance 
of the United States. When reporting his proposed 
mission to Havana and Pensacola, in consequence of 
his orders to assemble in New Orleans " as large a 
body of troops as possible," he again warned Folch 
that the " magnanimous sons of the Peninsula " would 
find the armies of Bonaparte, backed up by those of 
Alexander, irresistible. The only hope for the Spanish 
colonies lay in their union and subsequent alliance with 
the United States. In these movements Folch's " sur- 
passing talents in political science" should receive 
adequate recognition.^^ 

Wilkinson's patronizing air nettled Folch no less 
than his predictions regarding Spain. The proposed 
mission to Havana and Pensacola caused him and Som- 
eruelos serious misgivings. Wilkinson's statement that 
he was to assemble seven thousand men in New Or- 

32 Wilkinson to Jefferson, Oct. i, 1808, Jefferson Papers, 
MS,, Series 2, Vol. 85, No. 109, Library of Congress. 

33 Wilkinson to Folch, Nov. 5, i8o8, Legajo 1566, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



288 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

leans aroused their profound alarm. Although the 
number reported by the newspapers was only four 
thousand, even this was sufficiently disquieting. Pre- 
texts for this unexampled increase in military strength 
on the Mississippi were not lacking. The embargo 
was to be more strictly enforced ; the Burr conspiracy 
was reviving; the British were to send a squadron 
from Halifax to the West Indies, obviously to occupy 
the Floridas. The Spaniards felt that these news- 
paper rumors were designed to conceal the real pur- 
pose of their unquiet neighbors — to seize the Floridas 
for themselves. 

Folch had already noted increased activity among 
the New Orleans militia. Other military measures 
convinced him that the American government had 
sold itself to France in return for a promise of the 
Floridas and Canada. The presence in the United 
States of French agents, who were later to visit the 
Spanish colonies, and the rumor that Napoleon was 
indifferent to the fate of the Floridas or to the inde- 
pendence of Spanish America, tended to strengthen 
this impression.^* The English representative even 
told him that the American government had refused 
the advances of a revolutionary party in Cuba, because 
they expected to gain that island from Bonaparte.^^ 

3* Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 26, 1809, Legajo 1566, Papeles 
de Cuba. 

35 Erskine to Canning, May 4, 1809, British Foreign Office, 
MS., America, II, 5, Vol. 63. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 289 

Under the circumstances loyal Spaniards every- 
where viewed with suspicion the new protestations of 
American friendship. Folch and his advisers particu- 
larly distrusted their former pensioner. Folch wrote 
that if he did not know Wilkinson so thoroughly he 
would not encourage his proposed visit to Pensacola. 
As it was he might gain from him some information 
that would prove serviceable in this crisis. Somer- 
uelos warned Folch to be very circumspect in his deal- 
ings with "No. 13," with whom in less critical times 
" His Majesty had some relations. "^^ The Council of 
the Regency at Seville regarded Wilkinson with suspi- 
cion because of his recent part in Pike's expedition. 
His ambition might lead him to excite insurrection in 
the Spanish provinces. ^^ Foronda at Baltimore and 
Vidal at New Orleans reinforced these suspicions, and 
the British government, upon application from its ally, 
instructed its new representative, Francis James Jack- 
son, to make the necessary protests to the American 
government.^^ Wilkinson, the new apostle of Pan- 
Americanism, seemed destined to attract as little honor 
outside his country as within its borders. 

Nor were the Spaniards silent in regard to the more 

36 Someruelos to Folch, Feb. 28, 1809, Legajo 1566, Papeles 
de Cuba. 

37 Apodaca to Garay, June 9, 1809, Legajo 5559, Estado, A. 
H. N., Madrid. 

38 Apodaca to Canning, May 18, 1809, MS., British Foreign 
Office, Spain, Series "72, Vol. 84. 

20 



290 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

threatening perils that his mission portended. Ceval- 
los, in the name of the Regency, told Erving that any 
attempt by the French to sell the Floridas to the 
United States would be absolutely null and would be 
insulting to his nation. Erving assured him that there 
was nothing of the sort under way, and as proof pre- 
sented a newspaper item to the effect that the appro- 
priation for this purpose was now to be used for the 
Dutch debt.^^ The colonial authorities, including 
Folch, were warned, in case of hostilities, to avail 
themselves of all possible means to seize Louisiana. 
Foronda, encouraged by the reports of the recent 
Spanish victories, asked Madison to explain why the 
administration planned to concentrate 4000 men in 
New Orleans. He expected only an " oracular re- 
sponse" from the secretary, nor was he disappointed. 
But he and his fellows of the consular service thor- 
oughly warned the frontier officials against Wilkinson. 
Foronda also mentioned to Someruelos another of Jef- 
ferson's emissaries, " the assumed consul Anderson." 
He hoped the captain-general would refuse to receive 
them, for neither had a passport from him.*° 

It was by conduct of this same Anderson that Wil- 
kinson informed Someruelos that he was coming to 
confer "on subjects of interest to our respective gov- 

39Legajo 5549, Estado, A. H. N., Madrid. 
*o Foronda to Captain-General of Cuba, Jan. 6, 20, 1809, 
Legajo 1708, Papeles de Cuba. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 29I 

ernments." His progress, as usual, failed to keep 
pace with his predictions. He embarked from Balti- 
more late in January, 1809. Touching at Norfolk, 
he was there tendered a public dinner at which he gave 
the toast, " The New World, governed by itself and 
independent of the Old." This, as was to be expected, 
aroused the sensibilities of both Foronda and Turreau. 
Detained by bad weather at Charleston, he did not 
reach Havana, on board the sloop of war Hornet, 
until March 23. Here he found in progress a series of 
riots against the French. So great was popular re- 
sentment against all foreigners that Wilkinson secured 
but one interview with Someruelos. On this occasion 
he presented the latter an unsigned note which the 
captain-general answered on the 30th. Three days 
later Wilkinson continued his voyage to Pensacola.*^ 
The brief interview and the note constituted, if we 
may trust the captain-general's account, his sole deal- 
ings with Wilkinson. We may attribute the contents 
of the missive to Jefferson rather than the general. 
It began by expressing sympathy for Spain in her 
struggle for independent existence and regret that 
the police regulations necessary to enforce the em- 
bargo had inconvenienced " innocent neighbors." 
After this introduction of marked friendliness there 

*^ Wilkinson to Someruelos, Feb. 22, 1809, Someruelos to 
Garibay, Apr. 7, 1809, Legajo 1708, Papeles de Cuba; also 
Legajo 5543, Estado, A. H. N., Madrid. 



292 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

followed the statement that Wilkinson was to rein- 
force New Orleans for the sole purpose of protecting 
recognized American territory. The United States 
neither intended nor desired to usurp any region occu- 
pied by Spain. For the present it would not even 
reopen its claim to West Florida. But if an " inimical 
power" attempted to use that territory in attacking 
the American possessions on the Mississippi or in dis- 
embarking troops in East Florida, then the United 
States would " regard itself as authorized (without 
any hostile view against Spain or its interests) by 
well-known principles in time of war, and by natural 
law and the law of Nations, to oppose such an at- 
tempt by all possible means ; counteracting the designs 
of its enemies by such movements and seizures as cir- 
cumstances should dictate." Such was the message 
that Wilkinson was charged to deliver in the "true 
spirit of conciliation and good will." 

Jefferson's combined condolence and threat exerted 
little effect on the captain-general. He had been suf- 
ficiently schooled to meet it by Folch and Foronda. 
He informed Wilkinson that his missive suggested 
momentous diplomatic questions that only those " es- 
pecially appointed for the purpose" could discuss. 
He mentioned the ruin that threatened most European 
peoples and warned against trusting the unnamed Cor- 
sican. With his note he enclosed a proclamation that 
he had lately used to arouse the people of Cuba. Thus 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 293 

he foiled Wilkinson's attempt either to seduce or to 
frighten him. At the same time he sent to Mexico 
a call for help that caused the officials there to re- 
double their defensive efforts and to adopt at their 
chief seaports a more intolerant attitude toward for- 
eign commerce. 

Wilkinson's widely heralded journey gave rise to 
another incident in the perennial Mobile controversy. 
The American schooner Victoria, carrying supplies 
for the Indian factory at St. Stephens, was detained 
at Mobile because she also bore a quantity of powder 
and lead for troops at Fort Stoddert. In default of 
a higher executive officer, the factor, George T. 
Gaines, asked Judge Toulmin to secure the release of 
the vessel and goods. The new commandant received 
Toulmin's advances with courtesy, and permitted the 
vessel to proceed after storing the powder and lead 
at Mobile, and shortly after gave the same permis- 
sion to another vessel loaded with military stores. 
Folch released even this ammunition upon receiving 
Toulmin's assurance that "it was intended for the 
Indians." He avoided arousing the resentment of the 
Indians at a possible failure to receive their supplies, 
and gave the Americans no further cause for such 
suspicious movements as Wilkinson's coming.*^ 

The general did not find Folch at Pensacola when 
he reached there early in April, 1809. The governor 

42 Toulmin to Madison, Feb. 25, 1809, Madison Papers, MS. 



294 "^^^ SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

had already gone to Baton Rouge, the anticipated 
scene of danger, just as he had done in 1804 and 1807. 
The general immediately proceeded to the mouth of 
the Mississippi, and wrote the new secretary of war 
that "the awfully critical situation of Spanish Amer- 
ica imperiously enjoins it on us to strengthen this 
feeble, remote, and exposed quarter." He may have 
felt that Great Britain's forces in the West Indies 
constituted a serious menace, for he offered to seize 
West Florida before that power could do so. Per- 
haps he was merely expressing his resentment at the 
apparent failure of his mission; or in view of that 
failure was trying to secure himself with the new ad- 
ministration. He did suggest that such a seizure 
might " affect Cuba and Mexico to our injury."^^ 
Certainly neither would ally itself with the United 
States after such a forcible act. Great Britain might 
even venture to forestall further hostilities of the sort 
by occupying Cuba herself. 

The delays that hampered Wilkinson's progress may 
have caused the president to doubt his ultimate success. 
At any rate he determined to let the Spanish authori- 
ties know how benevolent his sentiments were toward 
them as he quit office. Possibly he could at the same 
time determine the policy of his successor. He ac- 
cordingly furnished Claiborne with instructions similar 
to those borne by Wilkinson. The two men were 

*3 Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 344-349. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 295 

thus associated in the new propaganda, but the younger 
was not, as on former occasions, left largely in the 
dark as to his elder colleague's aims and purposes. 
In fact he was surprisingly prepared for the part he 
was to play. Before receiving the president's in- 
structions he wrote Secretary Madison, on March 19, 
1809, that two officers, whom he regarded as spokes- 
men for Folch, had told him that they thought their 
country must shortly yield to Bonaparte. In that case 
the Spanish colonies would declare their independ- 
ence.** 

The incident may represent Folch's method of test- 
ing the earlier cryptic utterances of Wilkinson. If so, 
Claiborne's first reactions were not illuminating. Nor 
did the vice-consul, Jose Vidal, succeed better. He 
noted the continuous arrival of American recruits at 
New Orleans. He knew that Wilkinson was on his 
way thither and that he purposed to call on Folch and 
Someruelos. But it was impossible to learn the im- 
port of these movements. He could only surmise 
that the United States was anxious to cultivate 
friendly relations with the Spanish colonies, in order 
to forestall Great Britain. He felt that the Amer- 
ican officials were wholly under French influence, and 
that in this way they hoped to acquire the Floridas 
and make sure of their hold on Louisiana. Other- 

** Claiborne to Secretary of State, Mar. 19, 1809 (Parker, 
7560). 



296 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

wise Great Britain might enable Spain to keep the one 
and recover the other. 

Late in March, in keeping with Jefferson's instruc- 
tions, Claiborne called on Vidal and explained the 
mystery. The United States desired a friendly alliance 
with the Spanish colonies. Vidal thanked Claiborne 
for his friendly overtures and promised to transmit 
his message to the Mexican viceroy. Although not 
empowered to discuss these matters officially, he ven- 
tured to remind the other that the Spanish colonies 
would never forget the heroic efforts of England in 
behalf of the mother-country.*^ 

Claiborne fared somewhat better with Folch. In 
April the New Orleans executive was at Pointe Coupee, 
opposite Baton Rouge. Folch was then at the latter 
place and immediately invited the other to dine with 
him. The American is our only authority for what 
took place, for Folch himself evidently did not report 
this interview to Someruelos. Yet we may be certain 
that Claiborne represents the Spaniard's views with 
reasonable accuracy. According to him, Folch thought 
that Spain still had a chance to oppose Bonaparte. 
In any event, the colonies, especially Cuba and Mex- 
ico, would never recognize a dynasty that he sup- 
ported, but upon the first intimation of Spain's fall 
would proclaim their independence. Folch professed 

*5 Vidal to Garibay, Apr. 10, 1809, Marina, 1809-1814, A. G., 
Mexico. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 297 

to believe that the Floridas must inevitably pass into 
the possession of the United States, for they were of 
value only to that power; but he voiced the resent- 
ment of the Regency over the report that Joseph 
Bonaparte proposed to sell them to the United States. 
Folch assured Claiborne that Spain desired to culti- 
vate friendly relations with the United States. He 
also referred to her debt of gratitude to Great Britain. 
Perhaps this was his way of intimating that the 
United States might profit more from the friendship 
of these two powers than from its former subservience 
to France. Claiborne stated that it was not the policy 
of his country to interfere directly in European af- 
fairs. Noting how interested his government was in 
Spain's struggle for independence, he said that it would 
acquiesce in her continued control over Cuba and 
Mexico; but it earnestly desired to exclude all Euro- 
pean, and particularly British and French, influence 
from this continent. These expressions, accompanied 
by appropriate disavowals, apparently gave Folch all 
he needed to know of Jefferson's purpose in regard to 
the Spanish colonies.^*^ At the same time he had 
aroused American expectations in regard to the Flor- 
idas, and to these in some degree he was later to be 
a vicarious sacrifice. In this respect his attempted 
finesse overreached itself, but for the time being he 
parried unwelcome overtures from his neighbors. 

*6 Claiborne to Smith, Apr. 21, 1809 (Parker, 7567). 



298 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

Wilkinson's long delay in reaching New Orleans 
made his part in Jefferson's plan a distinct anticlimax. 
His interviews with his former friends, Vidal and 
Folch, were as fruitless as his brief visit to Havana. 
To Vidal he reported the substance of his communica- 
tion to Someruelos, which did not differ materially 
from what Claiborne had already told the vice-consul 
about the views of the American government. Vidal 
insisted that Spanish America would follow the lead 
of the mother-country and maintain friendship with 
Great Britain. Wilkinson seemed ready to accept that 
power as a member of the proposed Pan-American 
alliance. In this concession Vidal believed that Wil- 
kinson spoke for the administration.*'^ It is likely 
that he was looking out for his personal interests as 
well. The Spanish authorities already knew that 
they had nothing to fear from Wilkinson's undisci- 
plined levies in New Orleans, now rapidly being deci- 
mated by disease. His enemies were using the con- 
dition of these forces to renew their attacks upon him. 
He must therefore employ every possible means to 
strengthen his tottering influence. To the adminis- 
tration he proposed a comprehensive plan for the im- 
mediate occupation of West Florida and the defense 
of New Orleans. Thus he would recommend himself 
to his superiors, if they still pursued Jefferson's de- 

47 Enclosure in Vidal to Garibay, Apr, 10, 1809, Marina, 
1809-1814, A. G., Mexico. 




THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 299 

vious policy.^^ With the Spaniards he determined to 
urge the feasibihty of combining Anglo-American and 
Spanish- American influences. By means of some ght- 
tering generalities of this sort he might persuade his 
friend Folch to take some compromising step. Then, 
whatever the outcome of the wider plan of alliance, 
Folch would probably have to deliver the Floridas to 
the United States. Such a consummation would en- 
able him to defy his most persistent foes. 

In pursuit of his plan, therefore, Wilkinson held his 
last series of interviews with Folch at New Orleans in 
April and May, 1809. He has given us two accounts 
of these, but we may accept the first as being the more 
likely. It has the merit of being in keeping with the 
contemporary report of Claiborne, and is, in itself, 
significant in view of Folch's later relations with the 
American government. 

According to the American general, Folch fully ex- 
pected Bonaparte to subdue Spain. He desired to ob- 
tain an order from the existing national Junta for the 
delivery of West Florida to the United States, and 
requested Wilkinson to loan him a swift despatch ves- 
sel to send to Cadiz for that purpose. In case the 
Junta should already have succumbed to the French, 
he proposed to apply to the viceroy of Mexico, with 
whom he had some influence, for conditional authority 

48 Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Apr. 13, 1809, Wilkinson, 
Memoirs, II, 344-349- 



300 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

to surrender his province to the Americans. Then 
after a short pause, he added : " Now I will open my 
Heart to you — If they do not listen to me, I shall con- 
sider myself abandoned by me [my] Country, and will 
make direct application to the President of the United 
States — I mentioned to Him the views of the British 
to Florida. That grows out of the corruption of their 
understanding. What do they want it for? to go to 
War with you? they shant have it, for it is as neces- 
sary to the United States, as the drawer to the Case." 
After cautioning Madison to treat this information 
with " entire reserve," Wilkinson hinted that the 
United States might obtain " prompt possession " of 
West Florida by " an indemnity " to its leading offi- 
cials.*^ This is a suggestion more in keeping with 
the general's character than with Folch's. The lat- 
ter's own letters express thorough loyalty to Ferdi- 
nand Vn. His subsequent course certainly shows 
him to have been in no sense a champion of Spanish- 
American independence. Yet it is probable that the 
reports of Wilkinson and Claiborne about his wil- 
lingness to deliver West Florida may have some foun- 
dation, for later he actually made such an offer. For 
this reason, when the oft'er came, it aroused extrava- 
gant hopes on the part of the administration. On the 

^^J. W. to Madison, May i, 1809, Madison Papers, MS.; a 
variant copy is in Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 38, Bureau 
of Indexes and Archives, filed under the year 1813. Cf. also 
Claiborne to Smith, May 14, 1809 (Parker, 7567). 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 30I 

Other hand it is equally probable that while conferring 
with them, the Spaniard knowingly conveyed more 
than his real views. He despised Claiborne and dis- 
trusted Wilkinson, and may have thought himself jus- 
tified in deceiving them and the government they rep- 
resented. From it, if not from its immediate agents, 
he apprehended the most threatening peril to his do- 
minions. 

Folch's letters from New Orleans seem to show that 
Wilkinson's mission was simply to reassure him upon 
this point. The general gave him a statement, simi- 
lar to the one already given Someruelos, which ex- 
plained the assembling of American troops at New 
Orleans. Folch admitted that this movement had 
caused him some anxiety, appreciated the good inten- 
tions of the United States, and assured Wilkinson of 
his own friendliness. When, however, he returned 
to Pensacola, he unbosomed himself to his superior. 
He then showed that he regarded Wilkinson's elab- 
orate explanation of the presence of troops in New 
Orleans as a pretext suggested by Jefiferson to con- 
ceal his real purpose — the opening of diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Spanish colonies.^" 

In reporting Folch's course to his superiors, Som- 
eruelos criticized him for venturing to discuss such 

^0 Wilkinson to Folch, May 3, 1809, Folch to Wilkinson, 
May 4, 1809, Folch to Someruelos, May 23, 1809 (Robertson, 
5168-5170). 



302 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

delicate subjects with the Americans. He had advised 
him, he reported, to shun this course in the future, for 
the Americans simply desired to draw out his views 
in order to turn them to their own advantage. He 
should uniformly reply to suggestions of independence 
and alliance that Spaniards would die to preserve the 
union of the two Americas with Spain.^^ Notwith- 
standing his firm tone, we may readily believe that he 
foresaw the crisis of the next year and wished to avoid 
any responsibiHty for it. Folch likewise apprehended 
this crisis, and may have aroused the hopes of the 
Americans in regard to his province so as to establish 
his influence with them in case of dire need. When 
the crisis actually came, more than a year later, he was 
able to invoke the aid of American officials to save 
Mobile from filibusters and at the same time escape 
the peril of disloyalty. Folch did not spend twenty 
years on the Florida frontier in vain. 

Wilkinson had failed as a diplomat, but he might 
still retrieve his reputation as a general. On May 12, 
while Folch was still in the city, and while his own 
force was daily falling into greater disorganization, 
he sent to the secretary of war an elaborate plan for 
the defense of that area. West Florida constituted 
the danger point and he recommended its capture. A 
week later, after the Spanish governor had departed, 

'^i Someruelos to G. F. O., Oct. 8, 1809, Legajo 157, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 303 

but before he had reached Pensacola, Wilkinson re- 
ported that a threatened " commotion " in that city was 
likely to overwhelm Folch, either "by the usurpation 
of the Spanish subjects or by the enterprise of the 
American settlers." The Spaniard might call upon 
him for assistance, and he wished instructions to cover 
the case at the earliest possible moment.^" In reply 
the secretary of war wrote him, July 22, 1809: "It is 
the continued wish and instruction of the President 
that no interference of any kind in the affairs and ter- 
ritories of Spain should take place, or be encouraged, 
or permitted, by any person or persons, whether civil 
or military belonging to or under the authority of the 
United States. "^^ Some weeks later public outcry, 
caused by the ravages of disease among Wilkinson's 
green levies, and his own manifest incapacity forced 
the administration to order him before a court-martial. 
Thus ended in utter fiasco an effort that may be termed 
the first Pan-American mission. 

The dictum of the administration concerning in- 
terference in the Spanish colonies, including West 
Florida, seemed final. To account for it we must 
review the course of events in Washington since Jef- 
ferson had provided for Wilkinson's mission. The 
president did not wholly rest his hopes of the Floridas 
on a Pan-American alliance, as was shown in his letter 

^^2 Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 351. 
53 Ibid., 357. 



304 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

to Monroe, January 28, 1809. He believed, though 
unwillingly, that Napoleon Bonaparte would subdue 
Spain. France and England might then relax their 
exactions on neutral commerce, in order to monopolize 
the Spanish colonies. At any rate Napoleon planned 
to do so and might try to secure the neutrality of the 
United States by repealing his decrees and offering 
the Floridas.^* He thus implied that he was willing 
to profit by the Napoleonic intervention, even while 
urging the Spanish colonial authorities to unite with 
him in excluding it and British influence from this con- 
tinent. But a few weeks later he wrote Dupont de 
Nemours : " All these concerns I am now leaving to 
be settled by my friend, Mr. Madison. "^^ 

That was precisely what Jefferson could not do. 
He could not forbear meddling with a negotiation 
that had so thoroughly engrossed him. On April 10, 
1809, he wrote his successor: "I suppose the conquest 
of Spain will soon force a delicate question on you 
as to the Floridas and Cuba, which will offer them- 
selves to you. Napoleon will certainly give his con- 
sent without difficulty to our receiving the Floridas, 
and with some difficulty possibly Cuba." Eight days 
later he added: "Napoleon ought to conciliate our 
good will because we can be an obstacle to the new 
career opening to him in the Spanish colonies." The 

5* Writings of Jefferson (Memorial Edition), XII, 240. 
55 Ibid., 259. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 305 

Floridas alone would not be a sufficient reward for 
American neutrality. The United States would ac- 
quire them anyhow at the first outbreak of war and 
until then did not need them. Napoleon must also let 
the United States acquire Cuba, if he wished a free 
hand in Mexico and the remaining colonies. In case 
Napoleon continued his commercial exactions, as Jef- 
ferson wrote W. C. Nicholas, the people of Cuba and 
the Floridas might proffer themselves to the United 
States.^^ The situation had greatly changed since the 
preceding autumn. Then neither France nor Great 
Britain showed any disposition to compose her differ- 
ences with the United States. Now Madison thought 
that the former was inclined to be more conciliatory. 
If, then, Napoleon should attempt to keep the United 
States from trading with the Spanish colonies, as he 
had formerly done with Santo Domingo, and should 
couple this requisition with an offer to cede the 
Floridas, it " would present a dilemma not very pleas- 
ant."^^ Evidently Madison was less ambitious than 
Jefferson, or possibly more scrupulous. At any rate 
Turreau did not keep him waiting long for a 
" dilemma." 

The French minister was incensed at the repeal of 
the embargo. Without an accompanying declaration 
of war against England, he regarded this proceeding 

56 Writings of Jefferson (Memorial Edition), XII, 27^,2^7. 
" Hunt, Madison, VIII, 53. 
21 



306 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

as a pro-British measure. The operation of the Non- 
Intercourse Act strengthened his conviction, and he 
prepared for a diplomatic rupture. He threatened 
such a break by withdrawing from Washington, with- 
out paying his respects to the new president. From 
Bahimore, on April 15, he directed an informal note 
to Robert Smith, the new secretary of state, asking 
him to explain some current rumors affecting Na- 
poleon's other pet hobby — the Spanish colonies. The 
French minister professed to believe that these reports 
were circulated by those who wished to sever the 
harmony existing between his nation and the United 
States, yet he had reported them to his court and 
awaited with interest an explicit answer from the 
American authorities.^^ 

Turreau had already charged the new administra- 
tion with a desire to gain the Floridas, just as the 
preceding one had gained Louisiana.^^ Now he told 
Champagny in his dispatch of April 22 that the con- 
centration of American troops in New Orleans under 
Wilkinson was part of a scheme to cooperate with a 
party in the Floridas favoring independence. He 
credited the American authorities with inciting secret 
assemblies there and in Cuba similar to those that 
Miranda had attempted to organize at Caracas. The 

58 Turreau to Smith, Apr. 15, 1809, Archives des Affaires 
fitrangeres, fit'ats Unis, MS., Vol. 62, 123. 

59 Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 
62, 13, 79, 81. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 307 

administration, according to an anonymous note, which 
he attributed to a clerk in the State Department, was 
sending revolutionary agents to both localities and also 
to Mexico. Wilkinson's toast at Norfolk and his visit 
to Havana were in keeping with this policy. The only 
remedy was for France to seize Cuba immediately. 
The riots against the French on that island, riots that 
had interfered with Wilkinson's mission, would afford 
sufficient pretext for that action. Having forestalled 
the Americans there, the French might later occupy 
the Floridas and Mexico.^^ 

Could Madison have perused this dispatch, he would 
have been still more thoroughly confirmed in his belief 
that Cuba would "be a cardinal object with Napoleon." 
But desiring above all things to avoid a rupture with 
France, he requested Gallatin to visit the minister, 
on his way northward, and explain the real sentiments 
of the administration. Evidently Gallatin beheved 
that the president's views were the same as his own ; 
otherwise, it will be difficult to reconcile them, as re- 
ported by Turreau, with Madison's later action. 

Gallatin told the French minister that the admin- 
istration disclaimed all responsibility for Wilkinson's 
utterances. They were to be attributed to " the vanity, 
the indiscretion, and the ordinary inconsistencies of 
that General," whom the other knew as well as they. 

^0 Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 
62, 121, 122. 



308 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

If Turreau imagined that Mr. Madison desired the 
Floridas, he was mistaken. That was Mr. Jefferson's 
hobby, but did not represent the views of his cabinet. 
The Floridas would be desirable only because their 
possession might prevent misunderstandings with 
Spain and secure an outlet for the southern States. 
The administration was in no way responsible for 
such popular meetings as had taken place there. As 
for Cuba, the United States would not take it as a 
gift.^i 

Gallatin's assurances evidently failed to convince 
the other. In reporting them he called the attention 
of his superiors to the fact that they were accom- 
panied by no favorable action in regard to commercial 
policy. At the same time Secretary Smith instructed 
Armstrong at Paris to say that while the general 
policy of the United States was to preserve neutrality 
toward the Spanish colonies, it would feel free to 
act otherwise, if necessary to preserve its territorial 
claims.^^ When the Erskine agreement resulted in a 
fiasco, Jefferson wrote Madison that if Bonaparte were 
wise enough to change his attitude toward the United 
States he must inevitably lead it to declare war against 
England. In that event he advised the immediate 
occupation of Baton Rouge in order to forestall the 

61 Adams, History of the United States, V, Z7, 38. 

62 Smith to Armstrong, May i, 1809, Instructions, MS., VII, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 309 

British. Our claim to this territory would justify 
the step.^^ 

Inconsistencies thus characterized Jefferson and Mad- 
ison's commercial policy toward Spanish America and 
even toward the neighboring West Florida. Jefferson 
was ready to assist a revolt in the Spanish colonies 
should Bonaparte dominate Spain. For this he ex- 
pected the Floridas as his reward ; hence, his desire to 
open diplomatic relations with them, even through the 
untrustworthy Wilkinson. At the same time, if Bona- 
parte should pursue a more favorable commercial 
policy toward us, he might purchase our neutrality in 
respect to his own Spanish-American plans by the 
bribe of the same Floridas with Cuba included. His 
own cabinet did not seem to approve his views, but 
he persisted in setting them on foot, and even exerted 
pressure on his successor to continue them. On as- 
suming office, the latter was led by Turreau's protests 
to repudiate them. To this change in policy we may 
attribute the instructions that bade Wilkinson refrain 
from all interference in the neighboring Spanish prov- 
inces. 

Some echoes of Wilkinson's fruitless mission ap- 
peared in the correspondence of Francis James Jack- 
son, who succeeded the unfortunate Erskine. He was 
not able to bring about the recognition of Luis de 
Onis, the recently appointed envoy of the Spanish 

63 Writings of Jefferson (Memorial Edition), XII, 304. 



310 THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 

Regency; but he was able to assure the British min- 
istry that neither England nor Spain need feel any 
concern over the situation in New Orleans. The raw 
troops, who were being decimated by disease, were a 
greater danger to themselves than to any prospective 
enemy. Their incompetent commander was about to 
face a court-martial. Secretary Smith had assured him 
that any changes in the military establishment there 
were only intended to overawe the turbulent popula- 
tion of New Orleans, and had added : *' I have no 
hesitation in declaring to you without reserve that we 
have no views or intentions whatever, that can or 
ought to give the slightest umbrage to the Spaniards."^* 
Perhaps Smith was protesting too much, as he did 
a year later in regard to West Florida. ^^ At any 
rate Jackson felt that he had more im.portant ques- 
tions to settle with the Americans than this intermin- 
able Florida controversy. He affected greater con- 
cern over the presence on the threatened frontier of 
Major Z. M. Pike, Wilkinson's protege, who had re- 
cently returned from the Interior Provinces of Mexico, 
and over the report that Humboldt was to come to 
America as Napoleon's agent. The recent influx of 
French refugees from Cuba, too, caused both the 
Spaniards and the Americans to become more cau- 
tious in their dealings with each other. 

6* Jackson to Canning, Oct. i8, 1809, British Foreign Office, 
MS., America, II, 5, Vol. 64. 
65 Adams, History of the United States, V, 313. 



THE SHADOW OF THE CORSICAN 3II 

About the same time a would-be agent of the Corsi- 
can was earnestly addressing himself to the French 
foreign department. Aaron Burr proposed to seize 
the Bahamas and the Floridas, attract to his standard 
friends from Georgia and the western States, and then 
resume his former plan to conquer Mexico. The one 
element to determine the success was possession of the 
Floridas, even if this should involve the hostility of the 
United States. Napoleon did not favor his project.^^ 
A year later Burr suggested a more fantastic scheme 
to reconcile France and England and with their joint 
forces subdue the United States and conquer Mexico. 
Burr himself was to operate in the South where he had 
many adherents. This plan probably represents the 
final despairing effort of the political adventurer.^^ 
Shortly afterwards he returned to the United States, 
a disappointed man, universally shunned by his former 
associates. He disappeared as an important political 
factor, although his name was associated with nearly 
every disturbance in the Southwest during the follow- 
ing decade. 

6® Roux to Cadore, Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, £tats 
Unis, MS., Vol. 63, 39-42. 

^'''Anonymous letter dated Dec. 10, 181 1, in the Madison 
Letters, Lenox MSS. 



CHAPTER IX 

The Movement for Self-Government at Baton 

Rouge 

From the Napoleonic intervention we may date the 
series of revolts that ultimately gave each of the 
Spanish colonies a republican form of government. 
In common with these dependencies West Florida 
felt this revolutionary impulse, but its past history, 
its position, and its population had already determined 
its ultimate incorporation with the American Union. 
Napoleon's action gave the signal for initiating the 
movement. Jefferson had for some years anticipated 
this event, and as we have just seen, undertook new 
measures to hasten it. The inhabitants of the terri- 
tory itself were scarcely less backward; but it was 
incumbent upon them to proceed with great caution 
and finesse. 

In 1807, shortly after the Burr fiasco, Claiborne had 
reported serious discontent among his people, and ex- 
pressed the fear that the prospective insurgents there 
might appeal to Great Britain for aid.^ In June, 1808, 
a certain Major John Ellis was brought to task for 
saying that Grand Pre was incompetent, the govem- 

^ See page 210, 

312 



■MMMMHki 



mtmummf 






5 «i QC ^ Q. I 

I o R^ ^ 'c^ I 

1*^ ^ ii i^ i& 

tk CQ ^ r- <0 




MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 313 

ment that he represented extremely weak, and the 
fort at Baton Rouge a tempting object of attack. His 
remarks were discourteous, even profanely so; but 
the authorities could not prove him disloyal, although 
they tried to connect him with those evil spirits of the 
frontier, Reuben Kemper and Aaron Burr.^ 

The events of the next few months seemed measur- 
ably to confirm Ellis's opinion of Grand Pre. In July, 
1808, he entertained a distinguished visitor, as he sup- 
posed "an official of a friendly nation," General 
Octaviano Davilmar. He was one of those agents 
whom Napoleon, months before he revealed his pur- 
pose in regard to Spain, was sending to the Spanish 
colonies. Davilmar had already had a varied experi- 
ence in Europe and the West Indies. Reaching Phila- 
delphia early in 1808, he held a brief conference with 
Moreau after the latter returned from the South, and 
then started for the same region. Both Wilkinson 
and Claiborne informed Vidal of his approach, 
designating him as " General Alvina." Vidal at once 
informed the Mexican viceroy, and later wrote that 
Davilmar was " a man of talent, high enterprise, with 
no morality ; cruel, and with his apparent and assumed 
affability, capable of insinuating himself into the 
hearts of the most imperturbable and of playing upon 
the ignorant at will." Davilmar evidently used these 

2 Baton Rouge Records, MS., County Court House, Baton 
Rouge, La. 



314 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

talents with success upon Grand Pre. That official 
treated him most hospitably, and even furnished him 
with a boat for his journey up the Red River toward 
the Texas frontier. The general left a trunk with 
his host, possibly as a pledge of good behavior, and 
Grand Pre placed this in a public storeroom, without 
suspecting it or its owner. Soon, however, came the 
news of Napoleon's designs against the Spanish 
monarchy. Then followed tidings of Davilmar's 
arrest in Texas. More serious still, Folch had re- 
ported the Frenchman's presence at Baton Rouge in 
such a way as to implicate his unsuspecting host. Ac- 
cordingly Someruelos instructed Folch to order Grand 
Pre to Havana, where he wished to consult him upon 
"interesting affairs." This order was the first com- 
munication that Folch had sent his subordinate for 
nearly a year.^ 

The intervention of Napoleon in Spain, the Ameri- 
can embargo, and the recall of Grand Pre appeared 
to the people of the Baton Rouge district as distress- 
ing calamities, but of the three, the last was the worst. 
To his mild control they attributed the prosperity of 
their community. As one of their addresses stated: 
" In all the time of your rule you have exerted your- 
self to perceive our wants. You have heard our peti- 

3 Vidal to Iturrigaray, Apr. 7, July 25, 1808, same to Gari- 
bay, May 2, 1809, Marina, 1809-1814, A. G., Mexico; Folch to 
Someruelos, Aug. 29, 1808, Legajo 1565, Papeles de Cuba. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 315 

tions. Every individual always found free access to 
you and you never refused to listen to the general voice 
or to individual representations which were for the 
public good or to remedy some evil." To give point 
to their petitions for his retention, the militia organ- 
izations passed resolutions in which they commended 
the stand of their "brothers and fellow citizens in the 
mother country " and offered their " ardent desires and 
prayers for its prosperity." Precluded by distance 
from taking direct part in its defense, they promised 
in their own locality to " sustain the monarchy or 
remain buried in its ruins."* As this address came 
from Feliciana, Grand Pre was probably led to dis- 
count its language. 

In another address protesting against the embargo 
the signers asserted that it was their "constant ambi- 
tion ... to keep forever the designation of Span- 
iards." In their love and loyalty to the Spanish crown 
they expressed deepest sympathy for their fellow- 
citizens who were struggling so gloriously in Spain. 
Such an opportunity to risk life and fortune for their 
country aroused their envy. After congratulating 
themselves upon the peace and prosperity they had 
enjoyed under Grand Pre, they suggested that if in- 
trusted with the defense of their personal rights they 

* Address of thirty-five residents of New Feliciana to 
Grand Pre. It bears date of May 27, 1808, but this should 
obviously be later, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 



3l6 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

would be quick to follow "the Glorious example of 
our brothers in Spain. "^ Even the fulsome tone of 
this address cannot wholly conceal the sinister import 
of their suggestion for independent action. 

This suggestion and the imminent danger of recall 
gave Grand Pre an additional motive for organizing 
his militia more effectively. The people needed pro- 
tection from the " roving bands of murderous Ameri- 
can highwaymen " that continually infested the country. 
Moreover Napoleon's course made it necessary to take 
precautions against Frenchmen wherever found. In 
Cuba the Spaniards were forcing them to leave. It 
would be exceedingly dangerous to attempt this in 
West Florida, where Folch estimated the French as 
comprising two fifths of the population — double the 
number of Spaniards. Those who were thus ex- 
patriated would unite with the " followers of Robes- 
pierre " in Louisiana and disturb the whole region.^ 
Yet they were being continually reinforced by refugees 
from Cuba, and it was necessary to take some measures 
to organize his jurisdiction for defense. Accordingly 
in October, 1808, he nominated additional militia 
officers and designated the following April as the time 
for final organization and a general review. To such 
members as were then assembled he delivered a vigor- 

5 Representation to Grand Pre, Oct. 19, 1808 (Robertson, 

5159). 

6 Folch to Someruelos, reservado, Aug. 25, 1808, Legajo 
1565, Papeles de Cuba. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 317 

0U3 patriotic address and urged them to cheer the 
hearts of their fellow-patriots in Spain by a spirited 
defense of this exposed outpost. Those present then 
took an oath of allegiance and loyalty to their ** au- 
gust, legitimate, and well-beloved king," Ferdinand 
VII.'^ If we are to judge from their later acts, most 
of them did so with mental reservations. 

Belated pledges of loyalty could not save the com- 
mandant who had incurred Folch's distrust and shown 
hospitality, although unwittingly, to a French adven- 
turer. Moreover Davilmar in his confessions had im- 
plicated Grand Pre, and the New Orleans papers pub- 
lished the charges. He must take steps to clear his 
reputation. So, early in December, 1808, in the pres- 
ence of his successor and several of his former subor- 
dinates, he gathered testimony of Davilmar's move- 
ments and opened the trunk that the Frenchman had 
left in his keeping. It contained nothing more danger- 
ous than French uniforms, a copy of Machiavelli, a 
treatise on the art of war, and some comments on the 
same. The fateful trunk was then sealed up and the 
superseded commandant prepared to accompany it to 
Havana.^ 

A number of those who were present at this exami- 
nation determined to take advantage of their meeting 

''Discourse of Grand Pre, Nov. 15, 1808, Legajo 185, Pa- 
peles de Cuba. 

^ Report of Junta at Baton Rouge, Dec. 3, 1808, Legajo 185, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



31 8 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

and of Grand Pre's necessity to advance the popular 
interests. After discussion, one of the group, Thomas 
Lilley, the syndic of Springfield, addressed to' Grand 
Pre a letter, dated December 4, 1808, in which he 
mentioned the prevalent unrest and suggested that he 
should authorize the alcaldes and syndics to meet at 
some central place to discuss the best means for quiet- 
ing the public mind. To this representation, accom- 
panied by others. Grand Pre acceded. It was neces- 
sary for the petitioners to hold this meeting before 
Grand Pre's departure. They agreed therefore to 
assemble on the following Wednesday morning at 
Thompson's Creek in the Feliciana district. In addi- 
tion to the regular officials, they determined to invite 
soriie of the leading residents who were most in touch 
with popular sentiment. Despite the shortness of the 
intervening time they were fairly successful in secur- 
ing a good attendance. 

When they met at the agreed time, William Harris 
was first nominated as presiding officer, but he de- 
clined in favor of Thomas Lilley, who seems to have 
been the prime mover. John Murdock became secre- 
tary. After stating the purpose of the meeting and 
reading Lilley's letter to the commandant and the 
latter's response, the members engaged in a frank, 
candid, and moderate discussion. As a result of this 
exchange of views, they unanimously resolved to peti- 
tion Captain-General Someruelos to defer the de- 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 319 

parture of Grand Pre until the existing crisis was 
over. They appointed a committee of five to draw 
up this address and at the same time present a similar 
one to Grand Pre. Then the members unanimously 
adopted a resolution opposing a report in the Orleans 
Gazette that Grand Pre and the people of West Flor- 
ida were accomplices of Davilmar. They sent a copy 
of this to Claiborne and requested him to apply recent 
English practice to those guilty of such libels. 

Their petition to the captain-general mentioned the 
circumstances that led to their meeting and emphasized 
the necessity of doing everything possible to tran- 
quiHze the minds of the people. For this purpose 
they wished Grand Pre to continue in his position until 
his successor gained full knowledge of their needs and 
character. Though Grand Pre had assured them that 
the new official was even better qualified than he for 
the post, yet the people could only gain full confidence 
in him through actual experience. They assured Som- 
eruelos that no other portion of the king's dominions 
contained more loyal subjects than they. 

In addition to this petition and an address to Grand 
Pre, those irrepressible Anglo-Americans displayed a 
tendency that augured the speedy end of the Spanish 
regime in West Florida. A number present expressed 
the "desire to discuss subjects of highest import to 
the colony " — an unknown and unnecessary procedure 
under the Spanish government. They first consid- 
22 



320 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

ered the embargo — a serious grievance and one which 
they regarded as contrary to their treaty rights. They 
discussed the duties which they paid at New Orleans 
and considered the estabhshment of similar duties in 
their jurisdiction. This suggested a possible revenue, 
and they proposed to use such sources of income for 
the benefit of Spain, in return for her past generosity. 
At the same time, they wished to offer their worthy 
executive a good salary as a token of personal esteem 
and as a recognition of his just administration. It 
was a critical moment when those assembled thus 
proposed to assume the financial administration of 
the province. If they were in earnest, the step meant 
the recognition of the principle of representative gov- 
ernment ; if not, it was a step toward revolution and 
Grand Pre was to be bribed to favor it. In either 
case it was contrary to the existing system of control. 
Before adjournment, they took a still more unprece- 
dented step. Believing that every person in the juris- 
diction was interested in the common good, although 
not able to meet with them on this occasion, they 
called a meeting for December 21. To this meeting 
the several officers v/ere instructed to invite "those 
calculated to give the best advice." 

In their address to Grand Pre these self-constituted 
intermediaries between him and the people attempted 
to justify the call for this second assemblage. They 
needed a wider expression of public opinion before 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 32 1 

they could take any definite measures to calm the pre- 
vailing unrest. For this purpose they had requested 
the militia . officers and other respectable citizens to 
meet with them. They thanked Grand Pre warmly 
for permitting the first meeting, and in view of the 
general uncertainty in administrative affairs, requested 
him to remain until they heard from their petition to 
Someruelos. At any rate they hoped he would not 
leave before their next meeting.^ 

The action of the assembly added materially to 
Grand Pre's embarrassment. He had felt obliged to 
sanction their first meeting, for a refusal might have 
precipitated worse consequences. But the whole pro- 
cedure was extra-legal in character, and speedily be- 
came distinctly illegal. Yet they used it as a pre- 
cedent for a second meeting before learning whether 
Grand Pre's superiors approved of the first. The 
captain-general would examine closely whatever hap- 
pened on the eve of Grand Pre's departure. He 
would naturally suspect collusion when an assemblage 
that Grand Pre permitted petitioned for his retention. 
In this way its members, whether they willed it or 
not, were proceeding at the expense of the executive 
for whom they professed so much admiration and re- 

9 Journal of Events in the Assembly of Alcaldes and Syn- 
dics of the Colony of Baton Rouge in West Florida. Address 
of Assembly, etc., to Marques de Someruelos, Dec. 9, 1808, 
Address of Assembly, etc., to His Excellency M. de Grand 
Pre, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 



322 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

spect. On the other hand, their action was personally 
complimentary to Grand Pre and all their acts were 
apparently dictated by candor and good faith. He 
must, therefore, express his disapprobation of the sec- 
ond meeting in a very guarded manner. Accordingly, 
on December 17, he wrote Lilley, who acted as inter- 
mediary, that the existing confusion and uncertainty 
greatly distressed him. His successor would certainly 
continue to advance the best interests of the colony. 
His own responsibility to his superiors and especially 
to Someruelos made it his duty to visit Havana. Yet 
he proposed to delay his departure for a few days, and 
he charged Lilley to make this known. Two days 
later a more intimate letter made Lilley think that 
Grand Pre did not approve of the proposed meeting. 
But this would occur on the morrow, and the mem- 
bers were probably already on the way. By approving 
their report in his letter of the 17th, Grand Pre had 
tacitly favored a second meeting. So Lilley and two 
others who were with him determined to proceed 
with it. 

At the same time he wrote Lilley, Grand Pre sent 
Thomas Estevan a different type of letter. Estevan 
had already protested against any steps to impede 
Grand Pre's departure. Such action could only com- 
promise him. The sooner he departed, the sooner he 
might return. Estevan gained many adherents to this 
view. In consequence, on December 20, he wrote to 



i il 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 323 

John Murdock, at whose house the meeting of the 
21 st was to occur, that Grand Pre disapproved of 
their proceedings and, accordingly, the alcaldes and 
syndics ought not to meet again. This communica- 
tion reached Murdock early on the appointed day. 
While the members then assembled felt that Estevan 
labored under some misapprehension in regard to their 
objects, they were unwilling to place themselves in 
opposition to the constituted authorities, and ad- 
journed without further action.^^ 

George Harris of Montesano, who translated the 
official proceedings, personally explained the motives 
of those who promoted the two meetings. He be- 
lieved that Grand Pre had not acted unwisely in per- 
mitting them, and the conduct of the members showed 
that they merited the executive's confidence. He de- 
plored the mistaken policy of Estevan, who dispersed 
the brave men coming from a distance and misinter- 
preted their motives. They desired to make a contri- 
bution to the mother-country, but, much to their mor- 
tification, were regarded as disturbers of the peace. 
One must not judge the people of West Florida by 
the neighbors that surrounded them and flattered the 
lowliest elements of the multitude in order to gain its 
purpose. He forbore to dwell on this point, for 

10 Journal of Events, Nos. 16, 19, 21, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba. Estevan was in charge of a small guard at Bayou 
Sara. 



324 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

Grand Pre knew better than he that "one can make 
of these people (so singularly composed of diverse 
elements) all that one wishes by mildness, but that 
amid the singular circumstances in which we are, it 
will throw itself into the arms of our neighbors, if 
one affronts it and above all when it is opposed in its 
good dispositions, or its pretensions of a reasonable 
nature."^^ 

With this as his bon voyage, Harris closed his ac- 
count of the first orderly attempt at independent ac- 
tion in West Florida. Because it was orderly it dif- 
fered from the earlier projects of the Kempers, and 
for this reason was supported by the better elements 
of the population. Although undertaken in the name 
of Ferdinand VII, few were at a loss to detect the 
trend of the movement. But its leaders had so skill- 
fully combined Grand Pre's interests with their own 
desires that it was hard to separate them, or to lodge 
a charge of disloyalty against any one individual. It 
is no wonder, then, that Turreau and Foronda asso- 
ciated these assemblies with Wilkinson's mission and 
that the American administration felt compelled to dis- 
claim any connection whatever with them.^^ 

In making use of the local municipal officers to 
form this assembly, its leaders were reverting, albeit 

^^ George Harris to Grand Pre, Dec. 27, 1808, Journal of 
Events, No. 21, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 
12 See page 308. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 325 

unconsciously, to an earlier Spanish practice. In the 
crisis caused by Napoleon's intervention others were 
employing the same means throughout Spanish Amer- 
ica, notably in Mexico. Possibly some news of this 
reached West Florida, and suggested similar action. 
If so, the experiment was to benefit Grand Pre as 
little as the action in Mexico did Iturrigaray. Both 
were deprived of their office and called to answer for 
their conduct, but there were fewer forceful mani- 
festations of displeasure in the case of the minor of- 
ficial. Yet it is likely that the perplexities of these 
months materially hastened Grand Pre's death. This 
occurred in Havana shortly after he reached there to 
give an account of his troubled stewardship.^^ 

Despite the failure of the attempt at self-govern- 
ment, its protagonists did not abandon similar meas- 
ures under Grand Pre's successor. One of the most 
significant was taken as a result of the American em- 
bargo. After a petition to the new executive, Carlos 
Dehault de Lassus, a committee was appointed to ex- 
amine Bayou Manchac and the Iberville, in order to 
determine if the channel could be deepened for com- 
mercial purposes or if a road could be constructed along 
the northern bank for use during low water. Early in 
January, 1809, this committee, consisting of Samuel 
Fulton, Philip Hickey, Joseph Sharp, and John Dry- 

13 Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 28, 1809, Legajo 1566, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



326 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

enport, reported that the project was feasible. They 
even believed that it would be possible to consider the 
often suggested plan of constructing a canal to join 
the Mississippi with the Iberville and the Lakes. In 
accordance with their report, the alcaldes and syndics 
of the locality, including the above committee, came 
together some two weeks later in an assembly presided 
over by De Lassus to consider means to facilitate the 
project. Their proposal was in keeping with the pol- 
icy already initiated by Grand Pre to meet the situa- 
tion caused by the blockade. This general meeting 
determined to construct a road along the bayou, and 
appointed the same four as a committee to ascertain 
the expense and supervise the work. This assump- 
tion of the money power for a measure of common 
action marked a very practical step toward self-gov- 
ernment.^* 

We have already noted that John Adair was brought 
to trial as an accomplice of Burr. Escaping, like the 
principal, with nothing more serious than Jefferson's 
enmity, he spent the next two years on the Florida 
border, pursuing his private business. Evidently he 
felt that the change in administration gave him a 
chance to reinstate himself with the dominant party, 
for on January 9, 1809, he took occasion to inform 
Madison of existing conditions in the territories of 

1* Relation to De Lassus, Jan. 11, 1809, Report of industrial 
council, Jan. 25, 1809 (Robertson, 5 161, 5162). 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 327 

Orleans and Mississippi and in West Florida. Pos- 
sibly we may discount his report of foreign and Fed- 
eralistic influences in the two territories, the opposi- 
tion aroused there by the embargo, the desire for 
statehood, and other causes that weakened the hold 
of the government upon all but an inappreciable ele- 
ment of the population. 

He seems to speak with more certainty in regard to 
West Florida. He had sojourned there for a con- 
siderable period despite the opposition of Wilkinson's 
creatures, and we may accept his conclusions with 
some confidence. According to him, five sixths of the 
wealth and population of West Florida were west of 
the Pearl River. Nine tenths of the people there 
were Americans. All except a very few persons of 
former Tory persuasion preferred the American gov- 
ernment to any other. These few individuals of 
talent and wealth gave some influence to the British 
party. The French and Spanish interests were not 
worth naming. The three or four hundred men com- 
prising the garrison at Pensacola were veritable sans 
culottes, without clothing, rations, money, or credit. 
Under the circumstances the people of West Florida 
were "as ripe fruit waiting the hand that dares to 
pluck them." 

British agents, Adair stated, were making some 
impression by offering commercial advantages that 
proved doubly attractive during the embargo, and 



328 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

must inevitably draw a considerable emigration from 
the Southern States. If in addition the British should 
land a small force there and offer commercial privi- 
leges to the surrounding American territory, it would 
work incalculable harm.^^ Thus he and Wilkinson 
alike urged the fear of British intervention. But 
Madison's hand was not yet nerved to pluck the fruit 
that he had so long craved. It must be still more defi- 
nitely forced upon him. The population of the Baton 
Rouge jurisdiction, as Adair suggested, was ready to 
do this. By the early part of 1810, Samuel Fulton, 
one of their number, ventured to call Madison's at- 
tention to the situation. He wrote that Spain would 
probably yield to Bonaparte and that this would neces- 
sitate some changes in West Florida. If the Ameri- 
can government desired to take possession of the terri- 
tory, he might be able to render it effective assistance, 
and would be glad to do so. 

Fulton's offer, w^hich may be regarded as typical, 
was by no means an empty one. We have already 
noted his presence among the earlier adventurers of 
the Florida border. After a number of years in 
French service, he offered himself to Madison in 1803, 
on the strength of the secretary's previous friendli- 
ness. As Madison could not then use him, Fulton be- 
came a Spanish citizen at Baton Rouge. As adjutant- 
general of the West Florida militia, he thoroughly or- 
is Adair to Madison, Jan. 9, 1809, Madison Papers, MS. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 329 

ganized that body and also took a prominent part in 
public affairs. His defection would seriously embar- 
rass the existing regime.^® 

A letter from Governor Holmes of Mississippi, 
bearing date of June 20, 1810, described the condition 
in West Florida more clearly. Complete anarchy pre- 
vailed there. The regular authorities had altogether 
ceased to exercise their functions and voluntary police 
associations were wholly ineffective. The people were 
divided into different national factions, each uncertain 
of its future action. The most numerous one desired 
ultimate annexation to the United States, but its 
leaders did not favor immediate action for fear of 
involving themselves in a premature revolt. Yet 
Holmes felt that they would run this risk rather than 
submit longer to anarchy or to foreign rule. The 
slave population and the refugee element were to be 
feared because of their influence upon contiguous 
American territory. Holmes did not expect any 
power to intervene with the possible exception of 
Great Britain, and the Washington authorities would 
best know how probable this intervention was.^^ 

Holmes had not spent many months on the fron- 
tier, but his letter marks him as a shrewd observer of 

16 Fulton to Madison, April 20, 1810, Madison Letters, Lenox 
MSS. 

1'^ Holmes to Smith, June 20, 1810, Governor's Correspond- 
ence, Mississippi Territory, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library 
(Parker, 4366). 



330 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 






events in the neighboring jurisdiction. His neighbor, 
Claiborne, who was then in Washington, made a simi- 
lar report to the administration. Furthermore he had 
persuaded the president to adopt his plan of inter- 
vention, suggested three years before. As a result he 
1 4^^ was empowered to enlist the aid of William Wykoif, 

^^•M ^ Jr., a member of the executive council of Orleans 
Territory. On June 14, 1810, Claiborne wrote the 
latter that the prospect of independence in South 
America might likewise lead West Florida to declare 
itself free. In view of the American claim to the ter- 
ritory, this meant intervention. But it was highly de- 
sirable to have intervention come through invitation 
of its people. " Can no means be devised," the gov- 
ernor queried, "to obtain such a request?" There 
was a French, an English, and an independent party 
among the people, but none of these could control the 
situation. " Nature has decreed the union of Florida 
with the United States," he affirmed, "and the wel- 
fare of her inhabitants demands it." Wykoff was 
thereupon empowered to visit West Florida as an 
emissary of the United States, to assure its inhabi- 
tants, including the Tories, that they would be wel- 
comed by our government, and to suggest a conven- 
tion of its people, as far east as the Perdido, as the 
best means of bringing about a united request for 
American intervention. He promised Wykoff his ex- 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 33I 

penses, and advised him to send his communications 
unsigned if he thought it necessary. ^^ 

One is incHned to suspect that the letters of Holmes 
and Claiborne are not merely coincident but collusive. 
Yet the situation they portrayed was sufficiently evi- 
dent to any interested spectator. Claiborne's letter, 
it is true, clearly indicates that the American govern- 
ment was now ready to abandon oblique diplomacy 
for underhand intervention. The change did not 
mark a higher moral purpose ; but in view of the pre- 
carious hold that the Spaniards then had on the Flor- 
idas, the possibility of British intervention, and, above 
all, its own lack of preparedness, some finesse, to use 
no uglier word, seemed necessary. A revolt, or at 
any rate, a united representation, exhibiting every 
appearance of spontaneity, would best serve the pur- 
pose. To such a task the administration now directed 
its energies. In Claiborne and Holmes it had two ad- 
mirable agents for its purpose. But Robert Smith, 
who as secretary of state would naturally direct 
their movements, was unequal to the task. Madison, 
therefore, had to assume direct executive control, but 
even he, on occasion, paused for helpful suggestions 
from Jefferson or Gallatin. 

Smith's immediate reply to Holmes was to the effect 
that the situation in West Florida "very properly en- 
gaged his attention." The government had already 

18 Claiborne to Wykoff, June 14, 1810 (Parker, 7460). 



332 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

taken measures to ascertain the views of the people in 
West Florida, and ^e should aid in this task as much 
as possible.^^ On Att^it 19 the president suggested 
more explicit instructions. Governor Holmes was to 
keep a " wakeful eye " on West Florida and promptly 
transmit any interesting reports therefrom to the seat 
of government. He was likewise to have his militia 
ready; and in case of foreign intervention or "inter- 
nal convulsions " he was to protect the rights and in- 
terests of the United States "by every means within 
the limits of executive authority." So far Madison's 
advice might apply to any frontier commander in any 
emergency, but in view of Claiborne's letter to 
Wykoff, the president's closing words were extremely 
suggestive : " Will it not be advisable to apprize Gov- 
ernor H[olmes] confidentially of the course adopted 
as to W[est] F[lorida] and to have his cooperation 
in diffusing the impressions we wish to be made 
there ? "^^ 

In keeping with the president's direction, Smith 
sent Holmes copies of the instructions already sent to 
Wykoff, and advised him to cooperate with Boiling 
Robertson, who was then in temporary charge of Or- 
leans Territory. But before these instructions reached 
him, Holmes had used his "wakeful eye," and the 

19 R. Smith to Holmes, July 12, 1810, Mississippi Territorial 
Archives, MS., Vol. 9; cf. also Domestic Letters, MS., Vol. 
14, Bureau of Indexes and Archives (Parker 4369). 

20 Madison to Smith, July 17, 1810 (Parker, 4370). 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 333 

citizens of West Florida were acting in a manner that 
showed Httle necessity for " diffusing impressions." 
Holmes, a former Virginian, with a long service in 
Congress, probably knew thoroughly the wishes of 
the administration. With only a few months' ex- 
perience as governor, his tact, geniality, and common 
sense had already established his hold upon his own 
people and had recommended him to the people of 
the neighboring territory. He knew of but one solu- 
tion for the problem before him : ultimate annexa- 
tion to the United States. To this end, therefore, he 
worked, slowly, but cautiously, and much of the credit 
for the final peaceful result is due to his common 
sense, his frank and sincere interest in the task before 
him, and the prudence which marked each successive 
step in his policy. Moreover, it should be remem- 
bered that he acted for months without instructions 
from the seat of government, aside from Smith's first 
non-committal letter. 

The general discontent in West Florida came to a 
head in the turbulent district of Bayou Sara. The 
people there complained bitterly of De Lassus, of his 
secretary, Raphael Crocker, and of the 'military com- 
mandant, Thomas Estevan. Taxes were high, fees 
exorbitant, and officials open to bribery. In many 
legal cases it was necessary to make costly journeys 
to Baton Rouge. Some of the associates of De Lassus 
thought that he felt resentful because the people mani- 



334 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

fested so much regret at Grand Pre's departure. He 
objected to imputations against his secretary Crocker, 
even in the form of remonstrances from his fellow- 
officials. It was about De Lassus and Crocker that 
complaint centered. Most of them were exceedingly- 
general, but there is at least one definite charge of 
bribery against the latter. Crocker later characterized 
this as a pretext of embryo insurgents to justify their 
later revolt, and claimed that American officials in- 
spired it. His fellow-officials, who were not par- 
ticularly favorable to him, found no definite founda- 
tion for it. Possibly one of these, Juan Metzinger, 
expressed the real cause of the trouble : " The laws, 
our lovely laws were dead."^^ 

These popular complaints, whether well founded 
or not, led directly to a movement for betterment. 
This occurred in May and June, 1810, and was pos- 
sibly timed so as to take advantage of Folch's absence 
in Havana. Crocker later attributed it to the machi- 
nations of a group of physicians, who were accus- 
tomed to hold frequent meetings with some wealthy 
Americans in Bayou Sara. Neither Estevan, the com- 

21 Copy of the Summary upon the Manner in which the 
Fort of Baton Rouge was surprised, Legajo 163, Papeles de 
Cuba. This copy, which will be referred to as " summary," 
consists of 384 folios and is the most complete Spanish source 
for the revolt at Baton Rouge and the causes leading up to it. 
The statements in the above paragraph are based on folios 4, 
5, 14, 20, 26, 67, 78, 82, 243, 249, 251. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 335 

niandant there, Lennan, the curate, nor others of 
Spanish leanings attended these meetings. Estevan, 
who was very unpopular, knew of them, and of the 
frequent attacks on the government that emanated 
from them. But he trusted no one in his jurisdiction, 
and was wholly uncertain what course De Lassus 
wished him to pursue.^^ 

At the same time, another storm was brewing at Ba- 
ton Rouge. In June two Frenchmen from New Orleans 
began to hold nightly assemblages among the French 
in the vicinity, under pretext of defending them- 
selves from Spanish plots. These meetings alarmed 
the Spaniards and afforded a prospect of speedy col- 
lision. At the same time, De Onis informed De Las- 
sus through Diego Morphy, now vice-consul at New 
Orleans, that several French emissaries from New 
Orleans planned to raise a revolution in West Flor- 
ida. One of these had already proposed to capture 
Baton Rouge and Pensacola. While these machina- 
tions seem only a natural surmise from Napoleon's 
intervention, De Lassus regarded them as part of a 
general propaganda against his jurisdiction. He de- 
termined, therefore, to expel all these malcontents 
and their followers, and he gave them three days in 
which to leave the province. Most of them crossed 
the Mississippi to Iberville Parish, from which they 
threatened to return and overwhelm the government 

22 Summary, fs. 202, 217, 225. 

23 



336 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

that had dispossessed them. They could probably do 
this with little difficulty, unless the American authori- 
ties prevented them, for De Lassus' resources con- 
sisted of a ruined fort with barely ten men com- 
petent to defend it.^^ 

The action of De Lassus was probably unwise. 
Many of those expelled had long resided in the 
province, had taken the oath of allegiance to Spain, 
and had served in the local militia. Yet he believed 
that his action was justified because of the general 
attitude of his fellow-officials against the French, and 
because of the fact that their presence disturbed the 
better classes of people, who were sincerely attached 
to Spain. Their threats to return and dispossess him 
caused him to issue orders for assembling the terri- 
torial militia and to prepare for instant defense. 

The news from Estevan at Bayou Sara confirmed 
him in his course. That officer reported the circula- 
tion of an anonymous petition calling for a popular 
convention. Estevan, distrusting everybody, wished 
De Lassus to consult with him at Bayou Sara. De 
Lassus regarded the peril from French refugees in 
his own vicinity as greater than any danger threaten- 
ing the other, but sent Philip Hickey and George 
Mather to advise Estevan. He suggested that they 

23 Summary, fs. 216, 217; St Maxent to Someruelos, reser- 
vado, July 10, 1810, Legajo 1574, Morales to Captain-General, 
Aug. 12, 1810, Legajo 1708, Papeles de Cuba; Natchez Weekly 
Chronicle, June 18, 1810. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 337 

should call the inhabitants together, read them the 
letters from Morphy, and show them that any in- 
ternal disturbance would favor the enemies of the na- 
tion. The selection of Hickey was hardly in keeping 
with Spanish interests. He had been prominent in 
the abortive attempt to call a convention in December, 
1808, and we may well beHeve that he would not neg- 
lect this opportunity to further the same end. Hickey 
had always appeared well aflfected toward the Spanish 
government, was a close friend of De Lassus, and 
during the succeeding days often assured the latter 
that the resulting assemblage was thoroughly loyal. 
Yet he was suspected of being the author of the anony- 
mous paper that brought it together. He was either 
an astute politician, or else Governor De Lassus griev- 
ously misjudged him.^* 

Rumor, according to Morphy, credited the people 
of Bayou Sara with anticipating an advance in land 
values from a change in government. Such a reck- 
less speculation seemed to him far more dangerous 
than the threats of French refugees.^^ A few weeks 
later he was to know that his fears were only too 
well grounded. In the meantime, before Hickey and 
his companion reached the disturbed area, a group 

24 Dispatches of St. Maxent and Morales as above; Este- 
van to De Lassus, June 23, and De Lassus to Estevan, June 
25, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles de Cuba. 

25 Morphy to Captain-General, Aug. 12, 1810, Legajo 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



338 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

of its militia officers, among who'm John H. Johnston 
figured, persuaded Estevan to summon a convention. 
That official was then ill ; but when he was visited by 
the petitioners in a body, he ordered the alcaldes, 
syndics, militia officers, and other leading inhabitants 
to form a general meeting for discussing measures to 
restore public tranquility.^^ Thus he not only an- 
ticipated De Lassus in calling the people of West 
Florida together, but forestalled Claiborne's agent, 
Wykoff. 

Madison was to learn of the situation in West Flor- 
ida from still another source. After a residence of 
nine years in the Bayou Sara region, William Barrow, 
a native of North Carolina, enjoyed considerable popu- 
larity on account of his wealth and worth. For this 
reason the Spanish authorities, despite his well known 
American proclivities, had not ventured to molest him. 
Early in June, Barrow wrote to his old friend, Dr. J. 
R. Bedford of Nashville, that he was greatly alarmed 
over the situation in West Florida. He feared their 
existing government was " quite done," and he had 
little hope that the United States would take possession 
of the region. The people were divided in sentiment, 
with no able men to advise them. He asked Bed- 
ford to consult with " men of talents and honor " in 
his vicinity and give him the best advice possible. 

26 Estevan to De Lassus, July i, 1810, enclosed in Folch to 
Someruelos, Aug. 29, 1810, Legajo 1561, Papeles de Cuba. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 339 

Barrow wished to act justly and with due regard to 
the safety and honor of his fellow-citizens. 

Bedford celebrated the national holiday by sending 
President Madison a copy of this letter, together with 
some comments of his own. From other sources he 
felt sure that a revolution would shortly occur in West 
Florida. The inhabitants there might " disclaim all 
subordination or allegiance to the mother country, or 
the Usurper, and cooperate with the other Spanish 
provinces to form a new nation ;" or they might de- 
clare themselves wholly independent and establish a 
government upon "economical and liberal principles 
... to endure no longer than it may be reciprocally 
eligible to become an integral part of the United 
States." The people of the South desired its annexa- 
tion, and would do nothing to prevent such a step. 
Hence Bedford's direct appeal to the president and 
his willingness to receive in return any suggestion from 
him.^^ 

Bedford's action was entirely satisfactory to Bar- 
row. Whether it was equally so to Madison we have 
no direct means of knowing. Along with the reports 
from Holmes and Claiborne, it may have stimulated the 
later instructions to the Mississippi executive. De- 
spite Bedford's injunctions to secrecy, some inkling 
of the purpose of the people in West Florida may 

27 Bedford to Madison, July 4, 1810, enclosing Barrow's 
letter of June 4, Madison Papers, MS. 



340 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

have leaked out and inspired those reports that they 
had declared their independence. These caused some 
premature rejoicing in the American press and at the 
same time called forth greater vigilance on the part 
of De Lassus. Some of the people of West Florida, 
as Barrow later wrote, were ready to take this serious 
step and call upon the United States to aid them, 
without knowing whether it would do so or not. It 
was necessary to restrain their impatience and at the 
same time establish a more adequate local govern- 
ment. 

In consequence of the events already described, a 
number of those residing in Feliciana (which in- 
cluded Bayou Sara) met at the farm of Mr. Sterling, 
some fifteen miles from the Mississippi and about ten 
miles below the line of demarcation. Their ostensible 
object was to secure themselves against foreign in- 
vasion and domestic disturbance. The leaders of the 
meeting submitted a prearranged plan which was 
adopted, with eleven dissenting votes only out of about 
five hundred. Under this plan the people selected 
four of their respectable and wealthy neighbors, and 
empowered them to ask each of the remaining six 
districts of the province to elect a single representa- 
tive. This council of ten, provided the others ac- 
cepted the proposal, was to be invested with the gen- 
eral powers of government, which they were to ad- 
minister in a manner best calculated for the common 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 34I 

good. It was tacitly understood that the Spanish offi- 
cials were to continue in office provided they submitted 
to the new authority. "You may readily conjecture," 
wrote Holmes on the nth, "how this business will 
eventuate."^^ 

Notwithstanding his confidence in the outcome of 
this movement. Holmes " utterly f orebore to express 
his opinion as to the probable action " of his govern- 
ment. While the large majority of the wealthy and 
respectable element favored an appeal to the United 
States, a few regretted this movement because of at- 
tachment to the British government, or for more per- 
sonal reasons. Philip Hickey and the curate Lennan 
informed De Lassus that a plan was on foot to seize 
the fort at Baton Rouge and deprive him of his com- 
mand. This, however, was to be suspended while 
awaiting the action of the proposed convention. De 
Lassus regarded this report as exaggerated, and de- 
spite Hickey's suspicious attitude, continued to employ 
him to tranquilize the people. His only precaution 
was to double the guards in his ruined fort, although 
he did nothing to repair it. He had ample warning 
of the dangerous movement now under way, and 
might have crushed it in its incipiency. Because he 
did not, his superiors were inclined to regard him as 
an accomplice in the events that followed.^^ 

The action of New Feliciana quickly affected the 

28 Holmes to Smith, July 11, 1810 (Parker, 4368). 
29Folch to Someruelos, Aug. 29, 1810; cf. note 21^. 



342 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

other portions of the jurisdiction. On July 6 the 
people of Baton Rouge asked permission to call a 
similar assembly, and there was every prospect that 
St. Helena and Tanchipaho were ready to cooperate. 
Among those at Baton Rouge who signed the petition 
were George Mather and Philip Hickey, who had 
already acted as messengers to Estevan ; Joseph Sharp 
and Samuel Fulton, whom Claiborne had mentioned in 
his letter to Wykoff ; Fulwar Skipwith, who had lost his 
position in Paris and was now seeking to recover his 
political and financial standing in West Florida; An- 
drew Steele, Thomas Lilley, John Davenport, George 
Harris, and others, fourteen in all, who had been or 
were soon to be prominent in West Florida history. 
It is to be noted that the list contains no name of 
Spanish origin. 

In his answer of the; same date De Lassus claimed 
that the petition had grown out of his letter of June 
25 to Thomas Estevan. Its purpose was evidently to 
preserve intact the dominions of the Spanish mon- 
archy and sustain the laws. As such action would in- 
sure the tranquility and well-being of each citizen, he 
permitted the people in the districts of Baton Rouge, 
Bayou Sara, and St. Helena to hold the desired as- 
semblies. Acting under this permission, the people 
of Baton Rouge assembled at the house of Samuel 
Fulton to choose their delegates. 



30 



30 Petition to De Lassus, July 6, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 343 

Not all the people within these localities welcomed 
the innovation. Many who were attached to Spanish 
interests did not understand the course of events and 
wondered at the compliance of the governor. They 
imagined that he was either deceived or else lacked 
sufficient troops to check the movement. Among 
these was Shepherd Brown, the commandant at St. 
Helena, who had received a number of unsigned docu- 
ments from Baton Rouge, indicating an intention to 
establish " a new order of things." Among them was 
the permission of De Lassus to hold popular assem- 
blies. This appeared so extraordinary to Brown that 
he feared the other had been compelled to issue it be- 
cause he lacked the means to discover and punish 
those who were behind the movement. Accordingly, 
he sent a trusty militia lieutenant, Joseph Thomas, to 
learn definitely whether De Lassus had given the 
order voluntarily or if it had been extorted from him. 
He desired the executive's express assurance that he 
was acting of his own free will and that his course 
was designed " to preserve intact this part of the king- 
dom and of our loved and worthy sovereign, Don 
Ferdinand VH, and to sustain his government and 
wise laws." If, on the contrary, his permission had 
been extorted by fear, Brown wished him to know 
that the inhabitants of St. Helena desired no change 
in government. Five hundred militia were ready to 
sacrifice their lives for the honor of the Spanish flag, 



344 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

and would obey his word without delay.^^ Despite 
this assurance, it is doubtful if any such number were 
ready to follow Brown into an actual clash with their 
fellow-citizens. 

In his reply De Lassus assured Brown that he had 
in no way been forced to permit the assemblies. 
Those who asked for them did so with all possible re- 
spect. He was persuaded that the inhabitants were 
well disposed toward him and desired only an oppor- 
tunity to show their fidelity to Ferdinand VII, as his 
messenger would personally tell him.^^ This reply to 
Brown and the previous communications to Estevan 
indicate that De Lassus knew he could not meet the 
peril confronting him and that he was too proud to 
acknowledge it. One can, of course, reason equally 
well that he knew the conditions and was ready to 
make a corrupt bargain for his tacit consent, or was 
unwilling to resist because he saw the futility of such 
a course. 

Upon receiving this word, Brown arranged to elect 
the delegates from St. Helena, As it was difficult to 
find a common meeting-place for all the inhabitants of 
his jurisdiction, he divided it into four precincts, one 
of which was to select two delegates and the others 
one each. As a result of his influence, he secured the 

31 Summary, f . 205 ; Shepherd Brown to De Lassus, July 
10, 1810. 

32 De Lassus to Brown, July 13, 1810, 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 345 

election of what he termed "five faithful vassals,"^^ 
for whose " zeal and patriotism " as well as obedience 
to De Lassus' wishes he personally vouched. In his 
action at this time and subsequently Brown seems 
much more loyal than De Lassus. Folch later 
thought that the commandant made a military mistake 
when he rejected Brown's proffered aid, and a polit- 
ical one when he permitted widely separated districts 
to meet in a common assembly. By so doing he 
made all acquainted with the disaffection that pre- 
vailed in Bayou Sara. 

Thus the irregular meeting in^ that region led to a 
general assembly for the whole jurisdiction of Baton 
Rouge. Despite the criticism that other officials 
passed on De Lassus' action, it is hard to see what else 
he could have done. He afterward claimed that he 
had asked for reenforcements from Pensacola and 
that he did not consent to the assembling of the con- 
vention until he had learned that they would not be 
forthcoming. In permitting this significant step he 
only designed to temporize with the prospective in- 
surgents and thus gain time for later assistance. He 
expected the assembly to take no more positive action 
than to express the reasons that led to its meeting. 
Yet at that very time popular report credited it with 
intending to establish a better system of justice, repair 
fortifications, nominate local officials, and in other 

33 Brown to De Lessus, July 2Z, 1810, ibid. 



346 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

ways relieve the people of the abuses under which they 
were suffering. Yet all was to be done in the name 
of Ferdinand VIL«* 

On July 25 the greatly feared convention assembled 
at St. John's Plains in the house of Richard Duvall, 
some five leagues from Baton Rouge. The members, 
numbering fourteen, comprised four each from New 
Feliciana and St. Helena, five from Baton Rouge, 
and one from Tanchipaho. They organized by choos- 
ing John Rhea as chairman, and Dr. Andrew Steele as 
secretary. Of their number Manuel Lopez was the 
only one who bore a Spanish name. He and those 
who had been selected through Brown's influence were 
probably ready to support the governor. John W. 
Leonard was an adherent of De Lassus, as was Samuel 
Crocker, one of the clerks.^^ 

The members naturally hesitated to proceed along 
the unaccustomed path of self-government. Their 
experience under the Spanish regime and a certain 

3* Summary, f s. 65, 68, 83, 218, 230. 

35 Folch to Someruelos, Sept, 29, 1819, Legajo 1568, Papeles 
de Cuba; National Intelligencer, Sept. 24, 1810. The list of 
names given is as follows : from New Feliciana, William Bar- 
row, John H. Johnston, John Mills, John Rhea ; from Baton 
Rouge, Philip Hickey, Thomas Lilley, Manuel Lopez, Edmund 
Hawes, John Morgan ; from St. Helena, Joseph Thomas, John 
W. Leonard, William Spiller, Benjamin C. Williams; from 
Tanchipaho, William Cooper. Cf. account given by Henry 
L. Favrot in Publications of the Louisiana Historical Society, 
Vol. I, Part II, 41-43. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 347 

mutual distrust caused them to avoid hasty action 
until each had disclosed his attitude. Some of them 
were ready for common action and were doubtless 
responsible for circulating an anonymous code that 
had already been favorably received. This was de- 
signed to place all political power in the hands of the 
convention, acting jointly with De Lassus. At the 
same time, there were reports in circulation above the 
line that the convention would declare its independ- 
ence and that a filibustering party would be formed 
to assist in this movement. Governor Holmes later 
solemnly denied this, but the rumor naturally caused 
the Spanish officials to regard the meeting with sus- 
picion and to fear American complicity. 

According to Holmes the majority of the conven- 
tion undoubtedly favored annexation to the United 
States. A strong minority, still attached to the Span- 
ish system, industriously circulated a report that Folch 
had returned from Havana and would employ the 
military forces at Pensacola to break up their delibera- 
tions. The majority hesitated to ask openly for Amer- 
ican assistance, for they might thus be overwhelmed 
before the United States could act upon their applica- 
tion. In fact, they did not know how such an applica- 
tion would be received. Thus it was impossible to 
obtain any expression of their real sentiments. On 
the other hand, De Lassus trembled for his person 
and position, yet he had neither the courage nor the 



348 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

resources to precipitate a struggle. This led him to 
acquiesce in whatever the convention undertook.^^ 

One of its first acts was to pass a comprehensive 
resolution defining its powers : " Resolved, That this 
Convention created by the whole body of the people 
of the government of Baton Rouge, and by the previ- 
ous consent of the Governor, is therefore legally con- 
stituted to act in all cases of national concern which 
relate to this province, to provide f or the publick safety, 
to create a revenue, and with the consent of the Gov- 
ernor, to create tribunals civil and criminal, and to de- 
fine their own powers relating to other concerns of 
the government, when to adjourn, when to meet again 
and how long to continue their session." 

After enumerating this catalogue of powers in 
which the executive was to appear only as an occa- 
sional accomplice, the members proceeded to express 
his position still more clearly : '''' Resolved that it is the 
unanimous wish of this Convention to proceed in all 
our deliberations for the public welfare with the en- 
tire approbation of his Excellency Charles Dehault 
De Lassus, our present Governor and that we become 
responsible with him to the superior authorities for 
the expediency of the measures which may be adopted 
with his concurrence, that we engage to support him 
as our Governor, with the emoluments appertaining 

36 Folch to Someruelos, Sept. 29, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles 
de Cuba; Holmes to R. Smith, July 31, 1810 (Parker, 4373). 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 349 

to his present office, and to give him all the aid in our 
power in the execution of the duties thereof." 

As if to make this forced complicity more agreeable, 
the members graciously thanked him for permitting 
them to meet and for discovering that he was author- 
ized to divest himself of civil and military power. 
They wished to break the force of the latter sugges- 
tion, however, by offering to continue his present sal- 
ary.^'' After thus taking power into their hands in a 
way unknown to Spanish procedure, they continued 
their deliberations on the second day by stating a 
series of grievances which they proposed to use as a 
basis for drawing up a formal frame of government. 
Their statements merely added insult to injury, but 
they were so presented as to compromise nearly all of 
their number. 

Grievance number one, as stated by Lilley and sanc- 
tioned by Harris, was to the effect that the province 
was a refuge for criminals, while men of fortune and 
character were barred out of it. Hickey and Barrow 
suggested that in the defenseless state of the province 
it was a grievance to have no means for organizing 
the militia. This seems to be hardly true, if we may 
judge from recent occurrences. Cooper and Miller 
deplored the lack of facilities for the speedy adminis- 
tration of justice, and Johnston and Barrow claimed 

^"^ Clipping from Natchez Chronicle, Aug. 6, 1810, enclosed 
in Holmes to Smith, Aug. 8. Cf. n. 42. 



350 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

that they had no competent tribunals to administer 
justice in their own language. Barrow and Spiller 
objected to the proposed system for resurveying their 
lands ; Thomas and Hickey called attention to the neg- 
lect of all laws relating to roads, slaves, and live stock. 
Thus asserting their power and airing their griev- 
ances, they appointed a committee consisting of John 
H. Johnston and John Mills o'f New Feliciana, John 
W. Leonard of St. Helena, and Philip Hickey and 
Thomas Lilley of Baton Rouge, to draw up a plan 
for redressing these grievances and providing for the 
defense of the province. Then Lopez and Hickey 
discovered a grievance in the fact that there was no 
regularity in official fees, while Leonard and Spiller 
asked for a uniform system of weights and measures. 
The latter pair also deplored the presence of French 
refugees in the province. Williams and Spiller 
claimed that many who had long resided in the prov- 
ince were unable to obtain titles to their lands. At 
this juncture Hickey and Lilley resolved that it was 
their duty to relieve the mother-country as much as pos- 
sible while she was engaged in a doubtful contest for 
her very existence. They must find within the col- 
ony the necessary funds for its government. Lopez 
and Lilley likewise desired a popular counsellor who 
could give opinions in cases that arose under the 
Spanish law. This suggestion might convey the idea 
that the existing authorities were incompetent. Fi- 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 35 1 

nally the members concurred in a general resolution 
for self-protection by asserting that they should be 
free from arrest during attendance upon the conven- 
tion and while traveling to and from its sessions. 
John Morgan of Baton Rouge and William Cooper of 
Tanchipaho were the only members whose names did 
not appear in connection with these grievances.^^ 

Having taken this significant forward step, the con- 
vention adjourned until the second Monday of August. 
Before separating, the members gave De Lassus a ful- 
some address, through a committee composed of 
Manuel Lopez, Joseph Thomas, and Philip Hickey. 
In such action they doubtless felt safe in giving his 
friends a majority. They spoke of the satisfaction 
that they derived from his approval of their action. 
In the name of their constituents they thanked him 
for his efforts "to preserve popular tranquility in a 
time of general anxiety and alarm." Then they stated 
that the object of their deliberations was "to promote 
the safety, honor, and happiness of our beloved king, 
Ferdinand VII, to guard against his enemies, foreign 
and domestic, and to punish wrongs and correct abuses 
dangerous to the existence and prosperity of the prov- 
ince." They hoped that their future action would 
meet with his approval, quoted their resolutions in 
regard to the powers of government and his salary, 
notified him of the appointment of a committee to 

2s National Intelligencer, Sept, 24, 1810. 
24 



352 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

redress their grievances, and stated their intention of 
reassembhng on August 14, " to receive the report of 
said committee and to proceed in the discharge of 
other duties enjoined by our constituents." After 
thus divesting him of his ordinary authority, the clos- 
ing stock phrase '* May God preserve yo'u many years " 
seemed bitterly ironical.^^ 

William Barrow's neighbors, to paraphrase his re- 
port, had been weak enough to choose him as a dele- 
gate, and he had taken a prominent part in the conven- 
tion. Shortly after its adjournment he wrote to his 
friend Bedford that notwithstanding the apparent har- 
mony, which he hoped would continue, the delegates 
were at a loss what course to adopt. Some were for 
the United States, some for Great Britain, and many 
for Ferdinand VII. For the present, therefore, they 
had determined to continue the Spanish laws with 
necessary amendments, put reliable men into office, 
and treat all with equal justice. In the midst of the 
popular confusion and ignorance his fellow-citizens 
wished to know what they might reasonably expect 
of the United States. They had no desire "to cast a 
stigma on themselves or risk their best rights and in- 
terests." He hoped the measures taken would quiet 
the minds of the people and give the leaders oppor- 
tunity to determine the best method of procedure. 

39 Address to De Lassus, July 27, 1810, enclosed in letter of 
Holmes, Aug. 8, 1810. Cf. n. 42, 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 353 

As the United States had excited them by laying claim 
to the territory, it was in duty hound to advise them 
in the present crisis, and to act as was becoming to 
"a free and independent nation." Unfortunately, as 
we have seen, the course of the American government 
in reference to this very region had measurably de- 
prived them of that status. Barrow mentioned a re- 
port that soldiers were to be sent from Pensacola to 
restore the old order of things, and regarded such a 
possibihty with apprehension. The people had defi- 
nitely chosen their delegates, and he believed they 
would support them if in danger.*^ 

Bedford sent this communication to Madison al- 
though he had not heard from his , previous one. 
His apology for intruding a second time upon the 
president was a sincere desire to advance the interests 
of the United States as well as those of his friends in 
West Florida. These were to a certain extent recip- 
rocal. Barrow had v/ritten Bedford that he firmly 
believed they were absolved from allegiance to the 
mother-country and had a natural right to assume 
self-government. In time West Florida must become 
a part of the United States. To facilitate this step it 
might be better, pending action by the latter, to form 
a temporary independent government and to include 
East Florida if the latter desired to cooperate. As 

*^ Barrow to Bedford, Aug. 5, 1810, enclosed in Bedford to 
Madison, Aug. 26, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



354 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

Bedford did not know that the executive had the 
right or the desire to act alone in this matter, he sug- 
gested that the people of West Florida should con- 
tinue "their present quiet situation" until Congress 
could meet and act upon their application for incor- 
poration with the Union, as it would promptly do. 
Bedford believed that the American government was 
friendly and solicitous for the people of Florida; that 
it conceived itself to be the lawful owner of the terri- 
tory; but that the "peaceful and neutral disposition" 
of the government would forbid any attempt to acquire 
it by other than mild measures, unless these became 
" hopeless or rather obstructive."*^ 

A correspondent from this convention wrote in a 
similar vein to the Natchez Weekly Chronicle. His 
letter appeared in the issue of July 29, and likewise 
afforded Holmes a text for his own of July 31. 
After quoting from it. Holmes mentioned the desire 
of the people in West Florida to join the United 
States, but said that they feared to take the necessary 
steps before they knew the attitude of its government. 
A week later, acknowledging the receipt of Smith's 
cautious letter of July 12, he assured the secretary 
that he was observing carefully the situation in West 
Florida and would report fully and promptly thereon. 
His informant had recently returned to Natchez from 
West Florida, and had given him additional details, 

41 Bedford to Madison, Aug. 26, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 355 

including a copy of the address of the convention to 
the governor. From the style of this paper one might 
infer that the people wished merely to redress griev- 
ances and support their present administration; but 
Holmes had already shown that these public acts re- 
vealed the views neither of De Lassus nor of the con- 
vention. The former had simply sanctioned what he 
could not prevent. The greater part of the people 
desired American intervention, as he had previously 
reported, but would adopt no direct means to bring 
this about before they learned the attitude of the 
United States. Although this was a matter for his 
superiors to determine, he ventured to suggest that 
West Florida could then be obtained without any ma- 
terial expense or the loss of a single life. Should 
some powerful nation invade the region or send emis- 
saries into it, the condition might change. Under the 
circumstances he would gladly receive the instructions 
of the president that Smith promised, and would faith- 
fully observe them.^^ 

In an early August issue of the Natchez Weekly 
Chronicle there appeared a review of the situation 
that was evidently intended to hurry on American 
action. Its closing paragraphs stated : " Idle dema- 
gogues and declaimers may endeavor to alarm the 

*2 Holmes to Smith, Aug. 8, 1810, enclosing clipping from 
the Natchez Weekly Chronicle (Parker, 4374, 4375). 



356 MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 

fears of the people and may threaten them with 
French vengeance, but if the deputies are faithful to 
Florida, adhere to principle, and pursue a wise and 
just policy, they will acquire for themselves immortal 
honor, and secure a free and equitable government to 
their posterity. 

"As far as we have seen an expression of public 
sentiment, there is not one American heart that does 
not beat in unison with the people of Florida ; and the 
prayers of seven millions of freemen are daily offered 
up to this fountain of all good for the civil and political 
freedom and universal prosperity of our enlightened 
neighbors. The people of the United States and of 
Florida have the same object in view, the same end 
to accomplish. They are all nations of this soil and 
they must preserve it inviolate. Never must they 
permit this hallowed haunt of liberty to be polluted 
by the followers of the Corsican. Let the Florida 
Convention cast a retrospective eye over the miseries 
of Spain, and remember that these evils have been 
brought about her by the intrigues of the French, and 
that torrents of blood, similar to those which have 
flowed in the mother country, will deluge their happy 
land, the moment they are led astray by the siren 
songs of Toryism. Let the American Congress and 
the Florida Convention perfectly understand each 
other, unite in measures of defense, and plant on the 



MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 357 

shores of the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, a bar- 
rier that will secure us forever against the corrupting 
influence of French politics. By this means they will 
not only preserve liberty to themselves, but will trans- 
mit it unimpaired to their latest posterity."^^ 

*3 Cf. Parker, 4375. 



CHAPTER X 
Drifting Toward Insurrection 

The meeting at St. John's Plains marked the end of 
the first step toward American intervention. The 
measures then taken to secure provincial self-govern- 
ment were largely farcical, and none knew it better 
than De Lassus. As he was not ready, however, to 
break with the popular leaders, three days after the 
convention adjourned he replied to its address through 
the spokesman of the committee of five, Thomas 
Lilley. His words were as courteous as their own and 
equally sincere. He was gratified to note the unanim- 
ity with which they desired to promote the interests 
of Ferdinand VH. His confidence in their loyalty led 
him to take such measures as he had employed to quiet 
the people of Bayou Sara. These measures had nat- 
urally resulted in the present assembly. 

Those whom he addressed doubtless appreciated the 
naturalness of this result more than did his immediate 
superiors. Both Folch and Morales later regarded 
him as weak, or worse than weak, for ever permitting 
the convention to assemble, and even at that late date 
thought he ought to have proceeded against its leaders. 
But in his letter to Lilley, De Lassus went on to state 

358 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 359 

that he expected tranquihty to follow the meeting 
and it was that expectation which had caused him to 
approve the measures. He declared that he was always 
ready for common action, provided the members in- 
tended nothing contrary to the laws and instructions 
which he must follow. He asked them to report to 
him any specific cases of injustice, and insisted that 
they must reveal the authors of certain seditious broad- 
sides advising independence. He would be glad to 
accede to their proposals if he could do so ; or if not, 
he would hasten to send these to his superiors, for he 
was persuaded that they would ask nothing but what 
was in accord with the laws under which they lived so 
happily. Thus they would cooperate as faithful vas- 
sals to preserve the dominions of Ferdinand VII. 
He was flattered by their desire to continue him as 
chief, and were it possible, such an expression of con- 
fidence would cause him to redouble his efforts in their 
behalf. He appreciated their offer to share with him 
any responsibility for necessary changes in the admin- 
istration, but as chief executive he alone was re- 
sponsible under Spanish law, so that he could not ap- 
prove their generous offer. Nor could he accept the 
compensation they mentioned, for his salary from the 
royal treasury was sufficient for his needs. We may 
note in passing that at this time he bitterly complained 
to Folch about the lack of funds. Yet he added that 
if they determined upon a sum, he would inform his 



360 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

superiors so that they could use it as seemed best. 
He approved the membership of the committee of five 
and also the resolution of the convention to meet 
again in August. Mills, the chairman of the commit- 
tee, expressed his gratification at the tone of this com- 
munication, and promised to give it to the convention 
as soon as it reassembled.^ 

This letter is in striking contrast to one that ap- 
peared in the National Intelligencer. The correspond- 
ent wrote of the convention as proceeding " with cau- 
tion and prudence, but as cognizant of [its] rights." 
While professing allegiance to Spain, the delegates de- 
cided all local matters for themselves, and upon the 
definite subjection of the mother-country would prob- 
ably declare their independence. This would present 
a serious problem to the southern part of the United 
States. When a country was conquered, its dependen- 
cies might submit or resist as they saw fit. No one 
could doubt the choice of the Florida people. To give 
point to this view, there was published a report from 
Pinckneyville that five hundred men were on their 
way to Baton Rouge to support the executive. This 
rumor was probably based on Shepherd Brown's offer, 
and the writer suggesting it stated that if the people of 
West Florida were wise, they would take the fort ere 
these reenforcements arrived. Moreover there were 

1 De Lassus to the Committee, July 30, 1810, Mills to De 
Lassus, Aug. 3, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 36 1 

suggestions in the press of New Orleans and else- 
where that a declaration of independence by the 
people of West Florida would probably be followed by 
annexation to the United States.^ 

These reports greatly encouraged Holmes, but 
alarmed Folch. The latter naturally associated this 
movement with the contemporary declaration of in- 
dependence in Caracas, which elicited favorable com- 
ment from the American newspapers. On returning 
to Pensacola from Havana, he found dispatches from 
De Lassus, bearing the date of June 20 and 22, which 
had come by way of New Orleans. They were ac- 
companied by papers reporting later and more serious 
events, and by some information from St. Helena, 
which also aroused his keen distrust. He immediately 
wrote for an explanation and promised on receiving 
it to leave for the threatened region. But everything 
depended upon the requisite funds. 

By the end of August, Captain Luis Piernas ar- 
rived at Pensacola with a remittance of fifty thousand 
pesos. Folch immediately sent him with six thousand 
pesos as his special messenger to De Lassus. He was 
to observe and report in detail upon everything hap- 
pening in Baton Rouge. Folch wrote his ill-fated 
subordinate that he was sending a special messenger, 
because De Lassus' silence was causing him to believe 
that he could not otherwise communicate with him. 

2 National Intelligencer, Sept. 24, 26, 1810; Democratic 
Clarion and Tennessee Gazette, July 27, 1810. 



362 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

He advised the executive, if possible, to retire to the 
Chifonte under pretext of ill health, and said that he 
would try to meet him there.^ 

Shortly after he had dispatched Piernas to Baton 
Rouge, Folch received from De Lassus a communica- 
tion, dated August 4, giving a resume of events to' 
that date. This was his first definite information re- 
garding actual events in Baton Rouge, but the fact 
that five weeks had elapsed since it was penned did 
not relieve his anxiety or give him renewed confidence 
in De Lassus. Both he and Morales believed that it 
was possible for him to have proceeded against the 
convention even at that late date. He should have 
dissolved the committee of five, prohibited the reas- 
sembHng of the deputies, seized their journal, and 
taken other measures to preserve the royal authority. 
Yet he had done none of these things, and thus laid 
himself open to charges freely made in the Orleans 
papers, that he was an accomplice in the project for 
independence. His own attempt to explain his course 
simply added to the suspicions. Although Folch had 
been his fast friend, even he could no longer approve 
his course. But he and Morales felt that the Amer- 
icans were secretly behind the movement for inde- 
pendence.* 

3 Folch to Someruelos, Aug. 6, 8, 27, 1810, Legajo 1568, Pa- 
peles de Cuba. 

* Morales to Hormazas, reservado, Sept. 30, 1810, Legajo 
267, Papeles de Cuba. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 363 

When the representatives of the people of Baton 
Rouge reassembled in convention, on August 13, the 
Mississippi executive followed Secretary Smith's sug- 
gestion and sent his own personal agent, Colonel 
Joshua G. Baker, to ascertain their real views and 
those of their constituents. The convention remained 
in session for three days, and then adjourned to per- 
mit De Lassus to act upon its measures. Among 
others, the members favored arming the entire militia. 
As the people cherished no resentment against the 
government under which they lived so happily, the 
authorities, they said, had nothing to fear from this 
action. Significant as this measure was, it was less 
important than "an ordinance for the public security 
and good administration of Justice within the jurisdic- 
tion of Baton Rouge and in West Florida," which they 
proposed to put into force at their next meeting. Ac- 
cordingly they asked De Lassus to approve it without 
referring to any superior authority. A desire he had 
always shown to favor them made them think that he 
would so so, especially as they had agreed to share all 
responsibility with him. Only by so acting could they 
save the country from anarchy.^ 

Despite their open assurance, the members of the 
convention did not expect De Lassus to sanction their 
action. One of their number wrote Boiling Robert- 

5 Address to De Lassus, Aug. 15, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba. Cf. Robertson, 5173. 



364 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

son, at New Orleans, that De Lassus would probably 
"accede to nothing without consulting higher author- 
ity, and his refusal might be attended with serious 
consequences." The majority of the office-holders 
were English in sympathy, and this constituted the 
principal obstacle to independence. If the United 
States did not countenance their efforts, they would 
probably send a messenger to England to propose an 
alliance with that government.^ 

WiUiam Barrow, whom we have already noted as 
one of the leading members of the American party, 
accompanied Baker back to Mississippi. His pur- 
pose was to give Holmes a personal report of the pro- 
ceedings in the convention and to reinforce it with 
letters from his associates. Like Robertson's corre- 
spondent, he did not expect De Lassus to approve the 
work of the convention. The delegates were anxious 
to learn whether Holmes would intervene in case they 
needed his aid. Through Barrow the presiding officer, 
John Rhea, informed Holmes that the members of the 
convention were anxious for immediate annexation to 
the United States. He wished to know if their re- 
gion would be acknowledged as a sister State or at- 
tached to one of the adjoining territories. The body 
over which he presided had been elected by the people 
with the full consent of De Lassus, and so was em- 

« Robertson to Smith, Aug. 2^, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 365 

powered to act in a sovereign capacity for itself/ We 
may surmise that its adjournment for a week was as 
much to lay the situation before Holmes as to give 
De Lassus an opportunity to render his decision. 

One of the important members of the convention, 
John H. Johnston, was prevented by illness from at- 
tending its second meeting. Colonel Baker called on 
him while on his way thither, and Johnston naturally 
interpreted this visit as displaying more than a passing 
interest in West Florida affairs. He immediately in- 
formed Governor Holmes of his gratitude for this 
favor, and frankly expressed his opinion on existing 
conditions. Corrupt and " villainous Court syco- 
phants " were enabled to " batten on the spoils of the 
land " because so large a portion of the population 
consisted of American refugees or ignorant time- 
servers. These classes rendered necessary the devious 
methods which the " reformers " were pursuing. The 
population needed to be placed " under the conduct of 
a wise guardian who will transform them from slaves 
to men." They beheld such a guardian in the United 
States, their mother-country, but he confidently as- 
serted that two thirds of the people regarded her tardi- 
ness and neglect as worthy only of a stepmother. 

The Conventionalists feared the possibihty of Span- 
ish vengeance should they break openly with their 

^Enclosure in Holmes to Smith, Aug. 21, 1810 (Parker, 
4378). 



366 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

executive. Johnston was prompted to ask whether, in 
the event of a break, the United States would receive 
them into her "bosom." He then inserted an illumi- 
nating question: "If it is necesary for the convention 
to formally declare the province independent of Spain 
and call upon the United States for protection, will it 
not be proper to insert therein two or three stipula- 
tions of consequence to us but not interesting to the 
United States?" Aside from these conditions, which 
could not be considered "after annexation," they 
would "cheerfully submit in all things to the federal 
constitution." His " stipulations " were that British 
land titles should be disregarded when the same hold- 
ing was covered by a Spanish title ; that actual settlers 
should be entitled to as much land as the Spanish gov- 
ernment had habitually granted ; and, with certain ex- 
ceptions, that a general amnesty should be granted to 
all Tories, deserters, and fugitives from justice.^ 

These conditions seem to imply that the aims of 
the " reformers " were not wholly unselfish. They 
evidently expected a reward for the risk involved in 
their devious method of bringing about American in- 
tervention. It is, however, possible to interpret their 
stipulations as something more than a bid for free 
lands. The third proviso, though rather indefinite, 
was in keeping with the later recommendations of 
Claiborne and Holmes. The proposition in regard to 

s Johnston to Holmes, Aug. 14, 1810 (Parker, 4379). 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 367 

British titles probably arose from the fact that some 
lands in West Florida had been abandoned by their 
owners during the confusion that existed from 1779 
to 1 781, and were later occupied by immigrants who 
derived their title from Spanish sources alone. This 
would explain the proviso in regard to the size of land 
grants. There is a possibility that some of the lands 
in question had been acquired from Morales since 
the Louisiana Purchase, and that title to them might 
prove defective in view of the American claim to 
this territory, unless there was an expressed stipu- 
lation to the contrary. 

Holmes was naturally impressed by Rhea's and 
Johnston's letters and by Barrow's personal report. 
He frankly told Barrow, however, that he had no 
instructions to justify his interference in West Flor- 
ida. He was merely to collect and transmit to the 
seat of government information of the events that 
might happen there, but personally he hoped that all 
these "would eventuate" for the good of the people. 
In his letter to Secretary Smith he cautiously ven- 
tured to arouse the administration by calling atten- 
tion to a newspaper report that Governor Folch was 
at Pensacola, having just returned from Havana with 
a large force destined for service at Baton Rouge. ^ 

Meanwhile, at that center, George Mather and 
Philip Hickey were striving to induce De Lassus to 

^Holmes to Smith, Aug. 21, 1810 (Parker, 4376). 
25 



368 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

accept the measures of the convention. These two 
men had acted as his personal representatives during 
the first disturbance at Bayou Sara and were able to 
give reliable information of existing conditions. Pos- 
sibly Hickey was a biassed adviser, for he had been 
identified with the earlier movements for a convention 
that occurred late in 1808. This fact and his subse- 
quent activity in the present developments, as Folch 
later remarked, should have disqualified him. But 
he and his com.panion now assured -the executive that 
he could save his jurisdiction from anarchy only by 
approving the action of the convention. 

Its proposals, they contended, were neither disloyal 
nor unreasonable. Some anonymous papers, revolu- 
tionary in character, were, it is true, being circulated 
by individuals who had little to lose in an era of dis- 
order. The calling of the convention had been the 
work of the more respectable elements of the popula- 
tion. To hold this element, there must be adopted 
a less costly and elaborate method of administering 
justice, one requiring in trivial cases fewer journeys 
from remote settlements to Baton Rouge and fewer 
appeals to more distant tribunals. These people also 
complained of some of the subordinate officials, es- 
pecially the surveyors. At the time when the mother 
nation was fighting for its very life against the 
usurper, many believed that they should provide for 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 369 

the maintenance of their own government.^^ We may 
note in this defense the unexpressed but yet definite 
corollary, that the control of funds must also rest 
with the people. 

Another member of the convention was not so favor- 
ably impressed with its work. Manuel Lopez at- 
tended the first two meetings, serving as interpreter 
as well as representative of the governor. When the 
convention began to suggest other matters than the 
repair of fortifications or the preservation of the rights 
of Ferdinand VII, Lopez protested and retired to 
Baton Rouge. Yet at the request of De Lassus he 
returned to that body until he had finished translating 
a copy of the new ordinance. John W. Leonard also 
represented the Spanish party, but Lopez suspected 
his loyalty. Lopez sent Morales copies of the docu- 
ments that he translated. Possibly by this means he 
and his fellow-intermediary, Eulogio de las Casas, 
the magazine guard, hoped to secure themselves from 
disagreeable consequences if the higher officers should 
ever attempt to investigate the untoward happenings 
at Baton Rouge. ^^ 

By this time De Lassus seemed ready to come to 
a direct understanding with the convention. On 
August 19 he gave a dinner to its members, to which 

10 Mather and Hickey to De Lassus, Aug. 15, 1810, Legajo 
185, Papeles de Cuba. 
1^ Summary, f. '](), cf. n. 21, p. 334. 



370 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

he invited other citizens ; the latter, however, did not 
generally attend. Besides the commandant, the offi- 
cial staff was represented by St. Maxent, Crocker, 
Morejon, the younger Grand Pre, and Leonard. At 
this feast there were many toasts to Ferdinand VII, 
with an expression of hope for his speedy restoration 
to the throne. The occasion closed with a salute of 
twenty-one guns. A few days later another feast oc- 
curred at the house of Mr. Foulquier, some distance 
from Baton Rouge, at which the executive and his 
secretary met the deputies. At this gathering, accord- 
ing to the testimony of one witness, the list of toasts 
included one to the president of the United States. 
It was then, apparently, that De Lassus announced 
his acceptance of the proposed ordinance.^^ 

In addition to these two large gatherings, there 
were frequent small dinners at which De Lassus en- 
tertained two or four guests from Bayou Sara. Phile- 
mon Thomas, commander of the militia, was fre- 
quently present. Not all of these gatherings were 
harmonious. At the conclusion of a stormy session 
attended by some eight or ten persons, the executive 
was overheard to say : "If I do not govern well, 
take this baston and govern." Among the officials. 
Las Casas, and Juan Metzinger, lieutenant of ar- 
tillery, refused to attend, for they felt that no good 
Spaniard could countenance such proceedings. Las 

12 Summary, fs. 53, 104. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 37 1 

Casas was also unwilling to supply the powder for 
the salute on the 19th, and finally did so only on ex- 
press orders from De Lassus. Celestino de St. Max- 
ent, according to Metzinger's later testimony, re- 
ported Crocker's alleged exactions to the executive 
and was, in effect, told to mind his own business. 
Crocker himself later tried to show that he had re- 
monstrated with De Lassus about the ruined condi- 
tion of the fort, but the other excused it because of 
lack of funds.^^ This statement, however, has the 
appearance of being an afterthought. 

While the convention was preparing its statement 
for De Lassus, additional alarming tidings came from 
Bayou Sara, the storm center. A certain John Mur- 
dock discovered a broadside affixed to a tree and 
reported the matter to a constable. When this official 
arrived at the spot, the paper had been removed; but 
Lennan, the curate, later secured a copy and sent it to 
De Lassus. At the same time Estevan, the com- 
mandant, expressed his anxiety over the critical situ- 
ation in which he was placed, and begged De Lassus 
to send him a boat in which he and his garrison of 
" four unhappy soldiers " might retire if necessary. 
He was ready to sacrifice himself, but he did not care 
to have his men become unnecessary victims of public 
vengeance. He also suggested that De Lassus should 
get a " proper person " to translate the broadside and 

1^ Summary, fs. 60, y6, 77, 205, 247-251. 



372 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

strive to counteract any possible mischief from it.^* 
The anonymous proclamation that aroused Este- 
van's apprehension was signed "The friend of the 
people." It began by saying that the man who de- 
stroyed it deserved to live forever under a despotic 
government. The writer then urged the people of 
Florida to declare themselves independent, just as the 
people of Spanish America were doing. He drew 
unfavorable contrasts between the administration of 
justice in their territory and in the United States, and 
cited cases of forcible imprisonment from which re- 
lease was secured only by bribery. Those who knew 
republican institutions should not exhibit less cour- 
age than the residents of other Spanish colonies. He 
referred sarcastically to Ferdinand VH, absent on a 
visit to his friend Bonaparte, and intimated that the 
Floridians should throw off allegiance to him and seek 
union with the neighboring American territory. The 
result of such a movement would be to encourage im- 
migration from the United States, elevate the charac- 
ter of the people, and give value to their lands. They 
had already taken one step toward self-government 
and should now take another. Having elected men 
who were recognized as of firm character, just prin- 
ciples, and republican spirit, they should further their 
efforts to the uttermost. Spanish oppression was no 

i^Estevan to De Lassus, Aug. 14, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 373 

more. They might freely communicate with each 
other and adopt a form of government that afforded 
them protection and Hberty. For this purpose, let 
them form little parties among their friends and send 
to other representatives the report of their action. In 
this way the convention would know that the people 
were ready to sustain them in every step toward in- 
dependence and would proceed to that end with firm- 
ness and decision. As their representatives had al- 
ready heard from those who wished to continue the 
Spanish system, they should now be given the views 
of the friends of liberty and justice. Such com- 
munications would be kept secret so that their authors 
need fear no betrayal. 

The writer of this broadside stated that he was 
known to many of his fellow-citizens, although he 
withheld his name. Along with others he had long 
suffered the evils flowing from despotism. He as- 
sured them that the party in favor of independence 
was growing, and that their "brothers of the United 
States" would fervently rejoice in their return to 
liberty and a system of "pure republicanism." They 
should repose confidence in their delegates and sus- 
tain their actions, and thus avoid the necessity of 
calling another convention before they were ready to 
choose an independent legislative body.^^ 

This information from Bayou Sara naturally in- 

1^ Robertson, 5172. 



374 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

creased the distrust with which De Lassus regarded 
the delegates who came from that locahty. A com- 
munication received from Shepherd Brown called into 
question the loyalty of those from St. Helena and Tan- 
chipaho. The people of these localities were aroused 
by a report that the former commander, Hevia, was 
about to resume control on the Ticfau. Their atti- 
tude and the report of disturbances in New Feliciana 
also led Brown to distrust his militia officers. The 
representatives from his locality had joined their com- 
panions in accepting the proposed legislative reforms, 
and this exerted a prejudicial effect upon their con- 
stituents. Yet Brown felt that the greater portion of 
the people would be loyal, and only feared that French 
refugees might cause serious disturbance in case hos- 
tilities should occur.^^ 

Following Brown's missive came a more alarming 
dispatch from Estevan. He reported that members 
of the convention, since their adjournment, were car- 
rying on a sort of referendum among their constituents. 
As they knew De Lassus could not grant their de- 
mands, their action was a virtual " lifting of the 
mask." Captain Johnston, Estevan had just learned, 
had ordered his company to be ready to join with 
others in a march on Baton Rouge. Those who were 
concerned in this movement were largely "laborers, 

16 Brown to De Lassus, Aug. 19, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba (Robertson, 5174). 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 375 

low tavern keepers, and traders, captained by the 
enemies of our government." More than half the 
people were opposed to this action, but they dared not 
show their disapproval, nor could the Spanish authori- 
ties support them. In a later letter Estevan promised 
to declare who were the enemies and who the friends 
of the Spanish regime. At present his life was in 
danger and he was without resources. De Lassus, 
therefore, need not be surprised to hear that he had 
taken refuge at Pointe Coupee.^^ 

On the following day, August 21, De Lassus as- 
sembled a general junta in the government house at 
Baton Rouge, to consider the critical situation. There 
were present on this mournful occasion Gilbert Leon- 
ard, Celestino de St. Maxetit, Raphael Crocker, Fran- 
cisco Morejon, Luis de Grand Pre, Cristobal de 
Armas, and other officers of the military establish- 
ment. De Lassus told them that he adopted this 
course to avoid any calumniating attacks on his own 
character. Although without resources, he had sought 
by all means possible to avoid insults to his flag. At 
the time of his accession to office he had warned his 
superiors what must inevitably happen. He could 
not depend on the militia in case of a popular move- 
ment, and therefore needed veteran troops. Early 
in 1809 he had reported that the fort was -useless; and 

1'^ Estevan to De Lassus, Aug. 20, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles 
de Cuba (Robertson, 5775). 



376 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

although nothing alarming had since occurred, he had 
received no reenforcements nor any reply to his re- 
ports. 

He had absolutely nothing with which to undertake 
repairs. The government owed both its employees 
and its contractors, but the storehouses were nearly 
empty and the treasury was absolutely without funds. 
Notwithstanding his utmost efforts he could obtain 
no credit even for urgent needs. All the patriotic 
contributions consisted only of promises to pay. 
When the first rumors of disturbances in Bayou Sara 
arose, he requested assistance from his superiors, but 
so far without response. His action in sending special 
representatives to that district had resulted in a con- 
vention from which arose the present demand for a 
constitution. He had reported this to the consul at 
New Orleans, but also without result. The new con- 
stitution at least professed loyalty to Ferdinand VH. 
If he did not accept it, he would expose his flag to 
greater insults and his employees and himself to vio- 
lence. With his existing forces he could not check 
the movement. The disturbers of peace, joined by 
roving vagabonds, would lay siege to the fort at the 
first moment of opposition and visit their rage on the 
peaceful inhabitants. The militia officers informed 
him that their men were on the point of rebellion, 
and he had advised his superiors of this condition. 
He thought that the Floridas, like the rest of the 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 377 

Spanish dominions, were menaced by French in- 
trigues, so that he need expect no aid. In fact, when 
he informed them that the one drummer of his force 
had died, they asked him for the drum. His request 
for powder in the preceding February had ehcited 
nothing more substantial than a promise to send some. 
Thus at each salute his artillery approached useless- 
ness, even if it had not already reached that point 
through lack of carriages and other fittings. Pending 
the decision of his superiors, De Lassus believed that 
he was under the necessity of accepting the program 
of the convention, in order to save the province from 
civil strife. He and his colleagues thought that they 
could safely do so, with the exception of the provision 
for salaries, as long as the delegates maintained an 
appearance of loyalty and seemed to be working to 
preserve the province for Ferdinand VH. On the 
first indication of a contrary purpose, he and the others 
would repair to the fort and defend themselves to the 
last extremity. Such was the decision reached by the 
assembled company after two hours' deliberation.^^ 

This quahfied approval did not indicate that these 
subordinates assumed any of the responsibility belong- 
ing to De Lassus. One who is inclined to believe that 
the latter did not overestimate the difficulties of his 
position may still speculate on the action of a more 

18 Report of the Junta in Baton Rouge, Aug. 21, 1810, Legajo 
185, Papeles de Cuba (Robertson, 5176). 



378 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

determined executive, De Lassus then had the tacit 
support of his associates with the possible exception 
of Juan Metzinger and Luis de Grand Pre. His 
superiors were later inclined to doubt his absolute lack 
of resources. They wondered why he had not told 
the others of Shepherd Brown's ofifer to bring five 
hundred men to his defense. But it seems Hkely, as 
Crocker explained, that he lacked confidence in the in- 
habitants even of that jurisdiction.^^ Then, too, he 
may have feared that such an appeal would result in a 
bloody outbreak, which he hoped to prevent by tem- 
porizing. In time he might receive sufficient aid to 
restore conditions as before. Owing to the fact that 
the great majority of the people were Americans, he 
could not hope to overawe one portion by appealing 
to the uncertain loyalty of another. 

On the day following this meeting the members 
of the convention, with but one dissenting vote, passed 
a resolution which may be regarded as a fresh attempt 
to grasp power for themselves. Disguising it as a 
practical expression of loyalty to Ferdinand VII, they 
told De Lassus that in such a time of danger as now 
threatened the Spanish monarchy, they wished to con- 
tribute to its necessities. They could best do so by 
assuming their own expenses, and this would neces- 
sitate some changes in their form of government. It 
would be well to allow the people to select represen- 
ts Summary, f s. 206, 228-230. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 379 

tatives, who should apportion the taxes and also es- 
tabHsh new judicial districts, where rich and poor 
might receive equal justice without delay. By speed- 
ily approving their general plan, he would create con- 
fidence, stimulate their eagerness to assist the mother- 
country, and enable them to avoid threatening dangers. 
They assured De Lassus of their anxiety in behalf of 
the national cause and their readiness to obey the 
laws of their legitimate sovereign when he should be 
restored to the throne.^^ This action may have been 
taken at a gathering held at Foulquier's house. 

Urged on by the supporters of the new constitution 
and with the tacit consent of his associates, De Lassus, 
on August 23, sanctioned the measures taken by the 
assembly for public security and better administra- 
tion of justice. This action, proclaimed as a joint 
agreement pending the decision of the captain-gen- 
eral, gave these measures the force of law. In the 
interim the executive begged all good citizens to re- 
main peaceful, for he and the representatives were 
working in their behalf. They had no intention of 
punishing those who had hitherto been guilty of dis- 
order, yet they would do so in the case of future dis- 
turbers of the peace. The name of Philemon Thomas 
appears among the signatures and that of William 
Cooper is lacking. On the same date Rhea in- 

20 Representation to De Lassus, Aug. 2-2, 1810 (Robertson, 
5179). 



380 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

formed De Lassus that the convention would continue 
to hold its meetings at the house of a certain Egan 
until they could finish the business on hand, but 
would notify him if they deemed it necessary to con- 
tinue their sessions longer or to adjourn elsewhere.^^ 
On the 29th the members adjourned to meet again 
on the first Monday in November. Before separat- 
ing they took some further significant action. With- 
out any dissent they authorized the establishing of a 
printing-press and the formation of a medical society. 
We may believe, however, that the last named organ- 
ization was not designed to purge the land of the dis- 
orders that beset it. Robert Percy of New Feliciana, 
Shepherd Brown of Ticfau, and Fulwar Skipwith of 
Baton Rouge were designated as associate justices to 
act with De Lassus. This seems to be the first time 
Skipwith's name is mentioned in these proceedings. 
Joseph E. Johnston of New Feliciana was appointed 
sheriff, and Andrew Steele registrar of land claims. 
Gilbert Leonard, Bryan MacDermott, and Daniel 
Raynor of St. Helena were to be civil commandants. 
Philemon Thomas was appointed colonel and com- 
mandant of all the militia, with Samuel Fulton as 
lieutenant-colonel, George Mather, Jr., first major, 
and Reuben Curtis second major. Isaac Johnson was 

21 Robertson, 5178, 5180; National Intelligencer, Oct. i, 
1810; Favrot, in Publications of the Louisiana Historical So- 
ciety, Vol. I, Ft. II, 44, 45. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 38 1 

major of the cavalry, which was to comprise three 
troops. The convention was also to nominate judges 
according to the system in vogue in the United States, 
and Skipwith's name appears in the list. Thus assum- 
ing control of the purse, the sword, and the scales of 
justice, the convention left little for De Lassus to do, 
yet it proffered him a salary of three thousand dollars.-^ 

In his next letter to Secretary Smith, Governor 
Holmes reported that contrary to general expecta- 
tions, De Lassus had sanctioned the measures pro- 
posed by the convention. By doing so he had " di- 
vested himself of most of the powers of his office," 
retaining little but the "name and salary." "It can 
scarcely be necessary to inform you that this sur- 
render of authority was not a matter of choice on 
[his] part," he added; but as a result of his seeming 
compliance, De Lassus and the convention jointly pub- 
lished their proclamation describing the new order of 
things. A knowledge that the harmony indicated by 
the joint proclamation was a forced one and that a 
majority of the people favored American intervention 
led Holmes to predict that their agreement would be 
of short duration. 

According to Holmes, no one thought that the terri- 
tory could long maintain a separate existence if the in- 
habitants should declare independence, nor escape the 
resentment of Spain if that power should regain con- 

22 Summary, fs. 89, 206; National Intelligencer, Oct', i, 1810. 



382 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

trol. But they were determined to hazard everything 
rather than submit to the Spanish officials. The 
French government was so obnoxious to all parties 
that it had scarcely an advocate in the province. The 
friends of Great Britain were numerous, intelligent, 
and active in seeking proselytes, and especially repre- 
sented the commercial advantages to be gained by 
union with that power. He believed that the Amer- 
ican party were determined to bring the subject be- 
fore Congress at its next session, unless the British 
agents persuaded them to act otherwise.^^ It is inter- 
esting to note that this same course of action — an ap- 
peal to Congress supported by the fear of British 
aggression — characterized certain stages of the later 
annexation movement in Texas and California. 

The convention had appointed a committee of three 
to act with De Lassus in administrative matters until 
it should reassemble. On September 12 De Lassus 
addressed these men, Philip Hickey, Thomas Lilley, 
and Manuel Lopez, in regard to a proposed change 
in the constitution. He wished to provide for a mili- 
tary official to act in his stead in the case of his absence 
or disability. This would make no substantial change 
in the form of government and he hoped they would 
agree to it. The commissioners objected because it 
would mean that such an official could perform judi- 
cial as well as military functions. They suggested, 

23 Holmes to Smith, Sept. 12, 1810 (Parker, 4381). 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 383 

therefore, that the matter should be submitted to the 
convention, which was to meet before the superior 
judicial tribunal held its first session. As in previous 
cases, De Lassus apparently acquiesced, although he 
reiterated his intention not to accept any salary until 
he heard from his superiors. In case any vacancy 
should occur in his staff, he and the deputies should 
determine the question of incumbent until the conven- 
tion could meet or the captain-general should decide 
otherwise.^* 

It was about this time that Captain Piernas, Folch's 
messenger, reached Baton Rouge. He found every- 
thing outwardly peaceful, very likely because De 
Lassus had recently accepted the new constitution. 
De Lassus showed Piernas that he had been obliged 
to take this step in order to preserve public tranquility. 
The other learned that not all the subordinate officials 
approved their commandant's course. They did not 
feel that matters had reached such an extremity as De 
Lassus had represented or that he had taken all the 
necessary precautions. Piernas heard no specific com- 
plaints against his administration, nor did he notice 
any of those social gatherings devoted to the entertain- 
ment of the delegation from Bayou Sara.^^ 

Piernas carried back to Folch a long explanatory 

24 De Lassus to Committee of Deputies, Sept 12, 1810, Com- 
mittee to De Lassus, Sept, 13, 1810, Proclamation of De 
Lassus, Sept. 14, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles de Cuba. 

25 Summary, fs. 242, 243. 

26 



384 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

letter from De Lassus. The latter felt assured, he 
wrote, that if the authorities in Pensacola had been in 
a situation to aid him when he appealed to them in 
July, they would have sent him reenforcements ; but 
he despaired when he learned that both Pensacola and 
Mobile were threatened by American invasion and by 
internal revolt. Because of this double peril and his 
own inability to trust the surrounding population, he 
was forced to communicate through the consul at New 
Orleans, and had done so early in August. By this 
time he was forced to agree with the convention in 
order to avoid more serious disturbances. He had 
hoped that the members of the convention would sim- 
ply voice their complaints and suggest remedies, but 
they were not content with such a moderate plan, for 
they evidently had contemplated another from the very 
beginning. Yet De Lassus had to agree with them 
pending the decision of the captain-general, otherwise 
the discontented element, joined by vagabonds and de- 
serters from the American territory, would have over- 
whelmed the rest of the population in the ruins of the 
fort. 

Before he was forced to yield to necessity, he had 
hoped to be relieved of command, as he had intimated 
to the captain-general. He trusted that Folch would 
not doubt his loyalty to their unfortunate sovereign. 
When Governor Claiborne warned him that the 
French refugees were planning to attack the colony, 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 385 

he had tried to ascertain who they were, but he did 
not have enough loyal Spaniards in his garrison to 
enable him to ferret them out or restore good order. 
The last letter he had received from Shepherd Brown 
justified his course, for that official acknowledged 
that his earlier proposal to assist him with five hun- 
dred men would have been pernicious in the extreme, 
especially after it was rumored that Lieutenant Hevia 
was to resume command in St. Helena. He had tried 
to reach Folch through one of Brown's messengers, 
but had received no vrord as to the result. This 
caused him. to be doubly grateful for the opportunity 
to communicate through Piernas. He v/as unable to 
meet Folch at the Chifonte as the other suggested, for 
the people would interpret such a movement as a flight. 
However, he believed that Folch's presence there would 
encourage the better element in his jurisdiction.-^ 

^lorales had characterized a previous letter as an 
unavailable attempt by De Lassus to save his reputa- 
tion. The people had violated Spanish sovereignty in 
electing deputies, and De Lassus had been equally 
culpable in sanctioning their proposed regulations. 
Folch, his former friend, believed that De Lassus had 
failed in ever}' way to forestall a revolutionar}- move- 
ment and had omitted ordinarj^ precautions after he 
was duly warned of its existence. He employed Philip 

26 De Lassus to Folch, Sept. 18, 1810, Legajo 185, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



386 DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 

Hickey as his agent, when he had every reason to dis- 
trust him. He made no attempt to use Brown's offer 
of reenforcements. He permitted discontent to be- 
come general by caUing its devotees together instead 
of crushing it out in the locahty of its origin. The 
intendant was incHned to think that the New Orleans 
papers were right in charging De Lassus with com- 
plicity in this movement, and recommended his imme- 
diate removal from command.^^ 

Captain Luis Piernas returned to Pensacola during 
the first week in October. He bore no reassuring 
tidings from Baton Rouge and definitely alarming 
messages from the district farther to the east. Among 
other missives he gave Folch a letter from William 
Cooper, dated at Tanchipaho, September 12, 1810. 
The latter felt bound to report the dangerous situation 
at Baton Rouge. The inhabitants of Bayou Sara, who 
had been in a rebellious condition since the preceding 
spring, had finally secured permission to hold a con- 
vention which Cooper attended. At the very first 
meeting some of the members were ready to declare 
their independence, but Cooper and a few others, con- 
stituting a vigorous minority, declared in favor of 
the Spanish regime. The majority appointed a com- 
mittee of five to make a code of laws depriving the 
Spanish officials of all power. From that moment 

2^^ Morales to Secretary of State for the Treasury Depart- 
ment, Sept. 12, 1810, Legajo 267, Folch to Someruelos, Sept. 
29, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles de Cuba. 



DRIFTING TOWARD INSURRECTION 387 

Cooper was certain that the malcontents desired to 
overthrow the existing system. The greater portion 
of the people were opposed to this attempt, but De 
Lassus had put it out of Cooper's power to support 
them. Hence they earnestly desired the presence of 
Folch. 

Cooper believed that the convention at its next meet- 
ing would overthrow the last vestiges of the Spanish 
system, together with the officials, would estabhsh 
new laws, and would select its own agents. Accord- 
ingly he and Captain Jones desired Folch's presence 
and protection before the meeting occurred, in order 
to save the unfortunate but well-disposed inhabitants of 
the country. This appeal led Folch to determine upon 
going to St. Helena at once, with a force of one hun- 
dred and fifty men. Pensacola and Mobile would be 
left uncovered, but after once landing in the West, he 
could readily advance along the lakes toward the storm 
center. In order to make this movement a success, 
he determined to ask for reenforcements.^^ Before 
he sent his message, however, more distressing tid- 
ings caused an entire change in his plans. 

28 Cooper to Folch, Sept, 12, 1810, Folch to Someruelos, Oct. 
8, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles de Cuba. 



CHAPTER XI 

Baton Rouge — Insurgent and Militant 

Up to the middle of September, 1810, the interven- 
tionists at Baton Rouge managed to conceal their 
real sentiments. So far their course resembled that 
pursued by similar juntas in Spanish America and in 
Spain itself. The moderate elements were satisfied 
and the more radical ones appeased by measures that, 
with as little change as possible in the old system, 
assured the people a voice in their affairs. But the 
apparent calm was deceitful. Both Conventionalists 
and commandant were sparring for time. One of 
the former charged that " the violent aristocrats and 
the old American Tories " were arming and organiz- 
ing to combine with the force that Folch, upon De 
Lassus' urgency, was leading toward Baton Rouge. 
Known French and American sympathizers, " not per- 
mitted to carry a fowling piece," trembled for their 
safety and prepared for flight. John Ballinger, a re- 
cent immigrant from Kentucky, Thomas, and a few 
more resolute spirits determined to act ere Folch could 
arrive, and raised volunteers for the capture of the 
fort, with or without an order from the convention. 
A rumor which even Skipwith would not vouch for 

388 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 389 

credited the Spanish governor with plans to stir up 
the slaves and enlist the Indians against the popular 
party.^ The volunteers hardly needed this threat of 
civil strife, intensified by the dread of Morro Castle 
and its dungeons, to say nothing of savage pillage and 
butchery, to spur them to the task before them. 

On the other hand, if we may believe the testi- 
mony of his fellow-officials, De Lassus made no at- 
tempt whatever to repair the fort or to resist an at- 
tempted surprise. His secretary Crocker stated that 
he had advised the governor to summon all the in- 
habitants and their negro slaves for the purpose of 
putting the fort in better shape, but De Lassus re- 
fused to do so. He had no engineer, and he was un- 
willing to incur the expense without authorization 
from Morales. Crocker pointed out that the junta at 
Pensacola had passed a resolution which would jus- 
tify the step, but the executive believed that his only 
recourse was to gain time by pretended concessions. 
Crocker then forbore to press the matter.^ 

De Lassus himself frequently mentioned the ruined 
condition of fort and equipment. There were large 
gaps in the stockade which constituted its chief de- 
fense. As there was no outer ditch, attack was pos- 
sible from any direction. The gate marked a guard 

^ Ballinger to Toulmin, Nov. 3, 1810, Skipwith to Constit- 
uents, Apr. I, 181 1, Madison Papers, MS. 

~ Confession of Rafael Crocker, Aug. 13, 1812, Summary, 
fs. 246-250, 



390 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

station rather than an essential point for defense. 
The arsenals and storehouses were inadequately sup- 
plied with provisions and munitions of war, and the 
officials in charge did not reside within the fort. 
There were twenty cannon in good condition on the 
walls and four others scattered through the fort. Two 
of these, pointing toward the river, were loaded with 
round shot, and two loaded with grape pointed toward 
the plain. Other testimony doubled these figures. 
Two others were charged with powder for the pur- 
pose of giving an alarm, but the others were usually 
unloaded except when used for salutes, as was the 
case on September 20. Salutes to American gun> 
boats and American officials passing up and down the 
river were of frequent occurrence, although De Lassus 
complained that he had little powder on hand. Offi- 
cers and men alike displayed a lamentable ignorance 
about the artillery.^ 

The garrison was in as distressing a condition as 
the fort. Later evidence showed that there were 
fourteen members of the Louisiana regiment within 
the defenses on the morning of September 3. There 

3 Summary, f s. 7-103, passim. The testimony on which these 
and the statements in the following paragraph are based come 
largely from De Lassus' subordinates, including private sol- 
diers and non-commissioned officers. These references are 
so numerous and so complicated that it seems advisable not 
to give what would be only a catalogue of numbers. Single 
definite references will, however, be indicated. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 39I 

were four others in the hospital and two absent from 
command. In addition to these regulars, whose poor 
condition De Lassus had frequently reported, ten or 
twelve men formed a militia guard, changed at fre- 
quent intervals, in which the commandant had little 
confidence. A corporal and three artillerymen under 
Lieutenant Metzinger had charge of the ordnance. 
The lieutenant had quarters within the fort, but the 
corporal and one artilleryman were married and lived 
outside, as did the magazine guard and his assistant. 
Nor did they entrust their keys to the keeping of any 
officials within.* 

The physical condition of this force was not flat- 
tering, nor was its regimen well adapted to preserve 
discipline. The militia lived in the village and came 
to the fort only when detailed for guard duty. De 
Lassus had a corporal and three men around his 
house, and they were changed every other day. The 
other men comprising the detail of thirty-two privates 
and non-commissioned officers from the Louisiana 
regiment were on detached duty or at the hospitals. 
Estevan and three soldiers were at Bayou Sara until 
just before the attack. Captain Crocker had a soldier 
cutting wood for him under contract some months 
previous to that event. During this time the soldier 
did not perform regular guard duty more than twice 
a month, but he noted that Crocker paid into the piquet 

* Summary, f s. 2, 218. 



392 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

fund the money due for his services. Grand Pre had 
not resided in the fort, nor did De Lassus on succeed- 
ing him; nor did Crocker or St. Maxent or Lieuten- 
ant Morejon. Lieutenants Luis de Grand Pre and 
Metzinger were the only commissioned officers within 
the enclosure. 

About the middle of September it was currently re- 
ported that the people of Bayou Sara intended to take 
" friendly " possession of the fort, relieve De Lassus 
of his command, and administer justice in the name 
of Ferdinand VIL The reason for this step was the 
alleged tyrannical course of the commandant and 
Crocker. It was commonly believed that the former 
knew of this plan and of the way in which the people 
regarded his subordinate and himself. After occu- 
pying the fort, the Bayou Sara contingent would re- 
pair it and pay off the tro'ops. Metzinger later re- 
ported a variation of this rumor to the effect that a 
party of French brigands was being organized in New 
Orleans to attack the fort. The Bayou Sara militia 
were to come down and assist in its defense, so that 
if they were seen approaching the fort they were not 
to be fired upon. This was evidently designed to 
allay suspicion if they approached in the night.^ At 
least the Spaniards so interpreted it. Despite these 
rumors De Lassus made no attempt to repair the fort 
and took no other precautions. Estevan, who reached 

^ Summary, f. 207. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 393 

Baton Rouge with his slender force on September 21, 
found everything quiet there with no signs of prep- 
arations against attack. It is Httle wonder that wit- 
nesses who daily observed its unchanging defenseless 
condition later charged De Lassus with complicity 
in its capture. 

Estevan was reheved of the command at Bayou 
Sara through the influence of the convention. In 
obedience to order he turned over the property and 
the stores there to Major John H. Johnston, and with 
his four men reached Baton Rouge the following day. 
Francisco Lennan, who had served as curate at Bayou 
Sara, accompanied him. When they left the region 
they noticed nothing out of the ordinary. The people 
were not gathering arms, but they already had them 
or readily obtained them from the Americans. There 
were rumors that they were to meet and choose new 
officials on the following Sunday. On their arrival 
Estevan was ill, and took up his quarters at a private 
house where one of his soldiers attended him.® 

On the day that this guard left Bayou Sara (Thurs- 
day, September 20), De Lassus held his last social 
meeting with the representatives of that district. 
Thomas and some twelve others met with the execu- 
tive, Crocker, and Leonard. None of the immediate 
officers of the garrison were present, although some 
had previously attended similar functions. At this 

6 Summary, f s. 4-27, passim. 



394 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

meeting there was a salute of twenty-one guns, doubt- 
less to commemorate the harmony which existed be- 
tween the people of Bayou Sara and the executive 
since his last concessions. Yet in view of the fact 
that the stock of powder was very low, with no pros- 
pect of its being replenished, this salute seems highly 
indiscreet. Some of the guests from Bayou Sara 
hastened from this assemblage, while the salute to 
harmony was still ringing in their ears, to organize 
the revolt that was at length to break their absurd 
union with the Spaniard.''' 

The conspirators naturally threw the onus of this 
revolt on De Lassus. Thomas had intercepted a letter 
from the executive to Shepherd Brown, which the 
latter was to forward to Folch. In this De Lassus 
urged the governor to send an armed force to his 
relief. While the self-constituted leaders of his for- 
mer subjects treated him with outward courtesy, they 
had deprived him of all vested authority and would 
resist any independent action on his part. The execu- 
tive's appeal was most natural and so was the subse- 
quent action of his opponents. They affected to be- 
lieve that he intended to apprehend them and send 
them to Pensacola on a galley recently arrived at Gal- 
veztown. Concealing their purpose from De Lassus 
during their last conference, possibly held with a 
design to lull his suspicions, they hastened their prep- 

''■ Summary, fs. 12-54. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 395 

arations with secrecy and effectiveness. Two days 
were necessary to bring their plans to fruition. A 
majority of the convention came together on Septem- 
ber 22, and ordered Philemon Thomas to assemble 
as many of the militia as he could and march against 
Baton Rouge. ^ 

For De Lassus the 22d was a day of frequent but 
unnoticed warnings. He spent the morning at the 
house of Phihp Hickey, who, with his relatives, the 
elder and younger Mather, showed De Lassus in an 
unmistakable manner the hostility of the people at 
Baton Rouge. Morejon reported that on this morn- 
ing a messenger from Bayou Sara intimated that the 
people there cherished the same hostile intent. Be- 
tween four and five in the afternoon another person 
arrived with a similar message. John Murdock of 
Bayou Sara had sent one messenger by water and the 
other by land. Crocker, the secretary, afterwards tes- 
tified that he did not know of either of these mes- 
sages until after the attack, nor did De Lassus take 
any precautions as a result of the warning. Such con- 
duct seems absolutely criminal, and it is not surpris- 
ing that the executive was held responsible for the 
ensuing events. 

On the fatal night of the 22d the doomed fort con- 
tained a little garrison of twenty-eight men, including 

^ Favrot, in Publications of the Louisiana Historical So- 
ciety, Vol. I, Part II, 45, 46. 



396 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

Lieutenants Grand Pre and Metzinger. These offi- 
cers seemed destined by their presence to be the vic- 
tims of De Lassus' neglect and resentment. The ten 
militiamen were stationed at the guard-house with 
three sentinels on duty. Two of the four artillery- 
men were present, with four or possibly eight of 
their twenty-four pieces loaded, but without necessary 
utensils for firing them. Fourteen non-commissioned 
officers and privates of the Louisiana regiment, in- 
cluding two of Estevan's squad, were in the citadel. 
From a defensive standpoint this part of the fort was 
certainly ill named. On the side nearest the town 
the gate stood wide open and remained so. Fre- 
quent gaps in the opposite wall made that part of the 
defense useless, and there was no ditch to render the 
approach more difficult. The magazines were locked 
and the officers in charge of them were sleeping in 
town. This was the condition when at one o'clock 
on the morning of the 23d a third messenger from 
John Murdock reached Baton Rouge and informed 
Estevan that the insurgents planned to attack the 
fort before daybreak. Estevan immediately sent word 
to Morejon, who in turn informed De Lassus. It was 
then nearly two o'clock in the morning. 

The messenger who went to inform De Lassus 
paused on his way to arouse the corporal of the 
guard and to chide him sharply because of his care- 
lessness when the enemy was so close at hand. De 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 397 

Lassus' house was only two hundred paces from the 
fort, yet about a half hour elapsed before he ap- 
peared, in company with Morejon, and sent the cor- 
poral with his guard to the house, bidding him tell 
any who inquired that he was within the fort. But 
he did not remain there or take any precautions for 
its defense. Morejon later testified that before De 
Lassus sent this guard to his house they went to- 
gether to arouse Crocker ; after De Lassus arranged 
for the guard, they went again to Crocker's house to 
order him immediately to the fort. As the executive 
and Morejon started in that same direction, and while 
they were still a square away, they heard the shouting 
and firing with which the attack began. Crocker 
later claimed that he was then not half dressed.^ 

The warnings of the day had been only too true. 
In obedience to the orders given him that morning, 
Thomas directed Major Johnston to assemble the cav- 
alry while he himself hastened to Springfield. Here 
he found assembled a grenadier company of forty-four 
men under command of Colonel John Ballinger, "fit 
to fight a Battle for the freedom of the world." The 
readiness of this body suggests that all arrangements 
for this attack must have been made by the 20th, or 
just after the conference of that date with De Lassus. 
The leaders secured arms from the American side. 
At one on the morning of the 23d the forces of 

^ Summary, passim. 



398 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

Thomas, Ballinger, Captain George Du Passau, with 
twenty-one horsemen from Bayou Sara under Major 
Johnston, and Captain Griffith, and five or six other 
"patriotic gentlemen," numbering about eighty in all, 
joined together for the attack upon the fort. Thomas 
Lilley was later reported to be in this attacking force, 
and some of the Spaniards testified that the rebels 
completed their preparations at his house. When all 
was ready, they made the attack about two o'clock in 
the morning.^^ 

From the arrival of Murdock's third messenger, an 
hour before, great uncertainty prevailed among the 
officers in the fort. The subordinates claimed that 
De Lassus himself took no extra precautions, and 
that his only visit to the fort, which few speak of, 
was to secure a guard for his own house. The ar- 
tillery was useless with the keepers of the magazine 
outside of the fort. Luis de Grand Pre did not credit 
the tidings of the proposed attack, yet he assembled 
the members of the Louisiana regiment under his 
command, and attempted to unite them with the hand- 
ful of militia at the guard-house. A sergeant hastily 
summoned from the outside was assisting in this 
maneuvre when the attack occurred. The sentinel 
in the rear gave the challenge " Quien vive," while 

^^ Summary, f s. 223-225 ; National Intelligencer, Oct 26, 
1810; Favrot, Publications of the Louisiana Historical Society, 
Vol. I, Part III, 18; Ballinger to Toulmin, Nov. 3, 1810, Madi- 
son Papers, MS. 



BATON ROUGE INSURGENT AND MILITANT 399 

his fellow at the powder magazine exclaimed, "Here 
they are now." It was then too late to unite the two 
small groups that comprised the defenders of the 
fort. The enemy had crept upon them under cover 
of the darkness and fog, before the sentinel gave his 
first challenge. 

Shouting "Hurrah, Washington," and bidding the 
disorganized defenders lay down their arms and sur- 
render, the attacking force, horse and foot, swarmed 
through the undefended gate and the numerous gaps 
in the palisade without giving time for any opposition. 
Thomas said that his men had orders not to fire until 
they received a shot from the garrison. The Span- 
iards stated that the members of the attacking party 
were firing their pistols as they advanced. Both state- 
ments may be true. Thomas insisted that his order 
was " strictly attended to by the volunteers, until they 
received a charge of musketry from the guard-house " 
a few yards away, which "was briskly returned." 
Spanish testimony indicates that Grand Pre gave the 
order to fire, and possibly he and one soldier dis- 
charged their arms. However, whatever he said or 
did was the signal for his own doom, for he fell 
almost immediately, mortally wounded by two pistol 
shots and a sabre cut. At the same time a soldier, 
Manuel Matamoras, was killed and two militiamen, 
Francisco Ximenes and Andres Martinez, were 
wo'unded. Lieutenant Metzinger, who was at his 
27 



400 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 



quarters, reached the scene in time to receive two 
pistol balls. Not a single member of the attacking 
party was injured. In his report Thomas stated that 
the firmness and moderation of his men were " equal 
to the best disciplined troops." Ballinger claimed 
that two thirds of the enemy fled at the beginning of 
the attack.^^ 

Even the small loss of life on the part of the de- 
fenders seems unnecessary. This handful of disor- 
ganized men, surrounded and overwhelmed by num- 
bers, had no opportunity to defend themselves. The 
attacking forces, according to Thomas's report and 
the testimony of most of the Spaniards, numbered 
about eighty. Less than half of them were mounted, 
but they had numbers in their favor and also the ele- 
ment of surprise. Still one must not expect too much 
of untrained volunteers, who realized that they could 
not take many chances. Grand Pre had given the 
order to fire, and his fate was only what every soldier 
must expect. There is much to justify the suspicions 
of Metzinger, who narrowly escaped being a fellow 
victim, that both were sacrifices to the neglect, if not 
the resentment, of De Lassus. A month before they 
alone had opposed his policy in yielding to the con- 
vention. There seems to be a sort of sentimental 

11 Thomas to Rhea, Sept. 24, 1810, quoted by Favrot, in Pub- 
lications of the Louisiana Historical Society, Vol. I, Part III, 
18; Ballinger to Toulmin, Nov. 3, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 40I 

fitness in the death of Grand Pre, for a suspicion, 
however unfounded, rested on his grandfather's repu- 
tation. He may have felt that the family honor de- 
manded an exhibition of reckless bravery and loyalty. 
His last full measure of devotion, accentuated by the 
brutal details of his untimely death, evoked real regret 
in the region where his ancestor's mildness and justice 
were fondly remembered. In vivid contrast stood the 
cowardly course of De Lassus, a course that caused 
even his friend Folch, who had not adequately sup- 
ported Grand Pre, to abandon any attempt at de- 
fending him. 

Meanwhile what was happening outside the fort? 
According to the later testimony of Morejon, De 
Lassus and he were about a square away when the 
attack began. They both ran in that direction, but 
when they reached the vicinity, they found the rebels 
already in possession and venting their glee in shouts 
of " Uurra ! Waschintown ! " Several parties of 
horsemen coming from the fort met Colonel De Lassus 
face to face. "Alas what is this?" he exclaimed. 
He soon learned, for they seized him with some dis- 
play of violence and conducted him into the enclosure. 
Morejon dropped into a convenient gully, where he 
found the corporal, Andres Martinez, who had been 
wounded but who had escaped through one of the 
embrasures. Morejon then started in the direction o'f 
his own house, and soon encountered Crocker with 



402 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

four or five men as a nucleus for a force to retake 
the fort. Morejon told him that it was useless, but 
gave notice where he could be found if needed. Later 
the two came together on the outskirts of the town, 
where they watched the rebel cavalry going from 
house to house, evidently in search of stragglers. 
The two again separated and Morejon did not see 
Crocker again. Crocker later stated that at one time 
he succeeded in rallying a party of twenty men to 
retake the fort, but the enemy were pursuing him too 
closely to render this possible ; so after vainly attempt- 
ing to secure some of his household goods, he took 
refuge with relatives across the Mississippi.^^ 

After capturing the fort and apprehending the com- 
mandant, a party of thirty mounted men accompanied 
by eight or ten on foot came to his house, where the 
corporal's guard was stationed. Firing their guns 
and demanding the surrender of the guard, the in- 
surgents forced the doors, called for lights, and began 
a noisy search through the house. When they discov- 
ered the strong box with the six thousand dollars that 
De Lassus had received but neglected to distribute, 
they broke into cheers. Posssibly the contents of this 
box determined in a measure the time for attacking 
the fort. The members of the party did not touch the 
money themselves but delivered it to their officials, 

12 Testimony of Francisco Morejon, twenty-sixth witness, 
Summary, f. loo ff., also declaration of Crocker, ibid., f. 211 ff. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 403 

who had it duly counted in the presence of Spanish 
and rebel representatives. Meanwhile a party of in- 
surgents led by Thomas compelled Las Casas under 
threats to give up the keys of the magazine. Major 
Johnston dragged the Spanish flag through the village 
dust, while it was replaced by the rebel banner, a 
blue flag with a white star in the center. The same 
cheers of " Uurra ! Waschintown ! " accompanied its 
raising. 

The insurgents displayed considerable irritation at 
failing to find Crocker. His wife experienced some 
annoying surveillance at their hands, and temporarily 
the pair suffered the confiscation of their property. 
Even this was in large measure recovered when the 
American authorities took possession of the region. 
Crocker's enemies reported that he had prepared for 
the overturn by transferring his property to his father- 
in-law. Later Crocker came to New Orleans to join 
a force that proposed to recapture the fort. Then he 
went to Pensacola and tried to reach Havana. His 
actions did not betray any great fear of his superiors. 
He frankly informed them that he went to American 
territory, where his father-in-law lived, because the 
insurgents were too closely on his track to risk an 
attempt to reach Shepherd Brown in St. Helena. In 
view of his subsequent long imprisonment and com- 
paratively mild punishment, his conduct creates a more 



404 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

favorable impression than that of his superior, De 
Lassus.^^ 

Of the other Spanish officials, Morejon crossed the 
river and ultimately reached New Orleans, where he 
reported to the vice-consul. Gilbert Leonard was ar- 
rested after four days, but permitted to remain in his 
home. He was afterwards drafted for the Mobile ex- 
pedition, but he found a convenient refuge across the 
river while his son served in his place. Later he settled 
in the community, and on the following Fourth of July 
an orator mentioned his name as one dear to every 
Floridean.^* Las Casas, the magazine guard, left 
without orders to guide him, remained in Baton Rouge 
till the following December and kept a serviceable 
diary of the chief events that took place there.^^ The 
wounded Metzinger remained four days in Baton 
Rouge and then went to New Orleans for treatment. 
From this city he petitioned for his pay and for reten- 
tion in the royal service, but wished to remain in New 
Orleans until cured. ^^ The priest Lennan went to the 

1^ Summary, passim. 

i^West Florida Papers, MS., 126, Library of Congress. 
This collection, an important source for the following events, 
forms part of the Pickett Papers, one of the more recent 
acquisitions of the Library. Possibly the papers were turned 
over to Mr. Pickett by some of the later West Florida Claim- 
ants. That gentleman seems to have been active in present- 
ing to Congress claims of all sorts. See p. 659. 

1^ Summary, f , 75 ff. 

16 Ibid., f s. 202-210. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 405 

house of Celestino de St. Maxent, on Bayou Manchac 
about five leagues from the fort. He reported that 
St. Maxent, taking no measures to escape, was ar- 
rested ; and that Estevan retired to his home about 
eight leagues from the fort. Lennan himself went 
across the river to the house of Crocker's father-in- 
law — evidently a popular refuge — but finally reached 
Pensacola by way of New Orleans.^^ The regular 
soldiers were imprisoned in the fort as fast as appre- 
hended, but were soon released and mostly found their 
way to Pensacola. The militia were disarmed and 
kept in their homes. 

Governor Holmes was not greatly surprised when, 
on September 24, Abner L. Duncan placed in his 
hands some papers that indicated an immediate rup- 
ture between the convention and De Lassus. One of 
these may have been a copy of the order to take the 
fort. At midnight of the 25th Duncan again called 
and informed him that the Conventionalists had cap- 
tured Baton Rouge and with a force of some two 
hundred and fifty men were preserving order there. 
Duncan's information was derived from Dr. R. David- 
son of Pinckneyville, whose letter was accompanied by 
a numerously signed petition requesting a military 
patrol.^^ The promptness with which this request 

^■^ Summary, f. 25 ff. 

18 Holmes to Smith, Sept. 26, 1810, Governor's Correspond- 
ence, Mississippi Territory, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library. 
This with its enclosures is not listed in Parker. 



406 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

followed the capture of Baton Rouge conveys the im- 
pression that Duncan and Davidson had already de- 
cided upon this step and that they may have designed 
it to exert some influence below the line. Davidson 
even suggested the size of the patrol and the com- 
manding officers. 

Colonel Hugh Davis of Homochitto furnished an- 
other report of the capture. From the neighboring 
part of West Florida the men had flocked in such 
numbers to support the "American cause" in Baton 
Rouge that their unprotected families appealed to 
Davis for protection. He professed to fear a revolt 
among the negroes, encouraged by the Spanish fac- 
tion, which in time would spread into Mississippi and 
cause a " Santo Domingo " there. Many American 
citizens refrained from joining the insurgents only out 
of respect for the law. If the convention, as seemed 
likely, should deliver up all deserters and fugitives 
from justice, it would be well to have a mihtary patrol 
on the line to apprehend them and protect the law- 
abiding citizens.^^ 

Following this double appeal. Holmes at once re- 
quested Colonel Cushing to employ one or more com- 
panies of regulars in protecting American interests 
near Pinckneyville, while he prepared the militia for 
any emergency. In case of slave insurrection the 

19 Davis to Holmes, Sept. 25, 1810, Mississippi Territorial 
Archives, MS., Vol. 9. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 407 

latter were to patrol the line and apprehend and exam- 
ine all slaves, but in no case to cross the line or appre- 
hend white persons. Evidently Holmes did not expect 
many Americans to take part with the insurgents. 
Contemporary newspaper reports seem to indicate a 
contrary situation.-^ 

On September 29 Holmes received from the state 
department the long overdue instructions of July 21, 
together with a duplicate of those of July 12 and those 
sent to Robertson. He now learned that he had an- 
ticipated the wishes of the administration during the 
past anxious weeks and that he might m.eet the pres- 
ent crisis, with its possibility of Indian disturbance or 
slave insurrection, with still greater vigor. Accord- 
ingly he prepared to embody all the militia along the 
border, where his measures met with an alacrity that 
was promising, though somewhat suspicious. With- 
out deviating from the neutrality he had marked out 
for himself, he later confessed that the presence of 
the American regulars and militia doubtless assisted 
in quieting opposition to the convention. Order was 
so thoroughly maintained, both above and below the 
line, that the commanding officer soon withdrew the 
patrol of regulars to Fort Adams. -^ 

20 Holmes to Gushing, Sept. 26, 1810 (Parker, 4386, 4387) ; 
Holmes to Davis, Sept. 27, 1810, Proceedings Executive Coun- 
cil, Mississippi Territory, MS., I; Nashville Clarion and Ga- 
zette, Oct. 19, 1810. 

21 Holmes to Smith, Oct. 3, 1810 (Parker, 4383). 



408 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

In reporting the capture of Baton Rouge to Folch, 
Crocker attributed that event to the action of the con- 
vention party in forcing the people of the upper and 
lower regions near that center to act vi^ith those of the 
upper district against the Spanish authorities. He 
understood that the settlers along the Amite and the 
Comite and in the district of St. Helena, and the better 
elements generally, were in favor of the Spanish 
regime. He expected Michael Jones and Shepherd 
Brown to lead the opposition to the new system and 
to let Folch know of conditions in their respective dis- 
tricts. Four days later Brown himself informed 
Folch that the leaders in St. Helena were determined, 
pending instructions from Folch, to oppose the insur- 
gents. If the latter should come in person to lead 
them, he assured him of five hundred loyal men who, 
with a few regulars, would reestablish royal author- 
ity in Baton Rouge. With his lack of resources, de- 
lay was critical, for the insurgents were disarming the 
loyal citizens and strengthening themselves daily. He 
had only a small force at one little post, but expected 
to begin building another small fort at Springfield on 
the Nictalbany.^- Communication from St. Helena 
or from New Orleans, by land or water, was so diffi- 
cult that the first week of October had passed before 
Folch received the distressing information that he 

22 Crocker to Folch, Sept. 24, 1810, Legajo 63, Brown to 
Folch, Sept. 28, iSio, Legajo 1568, Papeles de Cuba. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 4O9 

already anticipated. This was speedily confirmed by 
an eye-witness of the capture of the fort. His first 
impulse was to lead a small force to St. Helena, rally 
its inhabitants, restore order elsewhere, and punish 
the insurgents. Morales advised a less precipitate 
policy. More alarming tidings from Pass Christian 
that the insurgents had already entered St. Helena and 
forced Shepherd Brown to flee to New Orleans, and 
that the American general, Hampton, had prepared 
eight hundred men for some secret service, gave point 
to his advice. Accordingly on October 13 he sum- 
moned a council of war.^^ 

Folch did not fear American intervention. He be- 
lieved that when the people of Baton Rouge learned 
that they would have to pay taxes under the new 
regime — a practice not required by the Spaniards — 
they would gladly rally round him. Aided by them 
and by a small force of regulars, he could easily quell 
the insurrection. It was true he lacked resources, a 
lack that he had thus far vainly asked Mexico to 
supply, but he was ready to barken to the demand 
for protection against domestic violence. He pro- 
posed to fit out the two small vessels in his service-— 
the Comet and the Vivora — and at once to gather 
provisions for two hundred men on credit, without 
awaiting the decision of the captain-general. His as- 

23 Folch to Someruelos, Oct. 8, 1810, Legajo 1569, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



410 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

sociates approved his plans ; but before the end of the 
week, some refugees who wished to settle in Mobile 
informed him that Brown had fled. The insurgents, 
to the number of three hundred, were advancing to 
the Pearl, and planned by the capture of Mobile to 
complete the independence of West Florida. The 
people of Pascagoula made no attempt to defend them- 
selves against their reported excesses. These tidings, 
although exaggerated, caused Folch to abandon all 
thought of an expedition westward. He determined, 
however, to take up his station at Mobile, while his 
subordinates, with the voluntary assistance of the resi- 
dents of Pensacola, prepared its fortifications for ef- 
fective resistance.^* 

Acting upon the advice of the council of war, Folch 
requested aid from both Mexico and Havana. From 
the former he received some money but no troops. 
Someruelos could do even less. When the captain- 
general learned of the earlier events at Baton Rouge, 
he agreed with his subordinates that De Lassus had 
not done his duty and should be deprived of his com- 
mand. He approved of Folch's earlier plan for re- 
storing order in the Baton Rouge jurisdiction ; for if 
the insurgents gained Mobile and Pensacola, they 
might send out corsairs to prey on Spanish commerce. 
When Folch's difficulties increased, however, he could 

24 Morales to Hormazas, reservado, Oct. 15, i8io, Legajo 
Q.^}"], Papeles de Cuba. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 41I 

send him no aid and could only second his subordi- 
nate's application to Mexico. From distant Cadiz, in 
the following July, came the same complaint of lim- 
ited resources. As Mexico was also in the throes of 
revolution, the captain-general was advised to do what 
he could by appealing to the savages. At the same 
time the Spanish representatives should make due 
complaint to the American government.^^ It was not 
strange that in view of the failure of all outside as- 
sistance, the despairing Folch was himself later 
tempted to abandon his struggle against domestic and 
foreign enemies. 

Meanwhile, as the reports showed, the insurgents 
were not idle. Every man that could be spared from 
the plantations rallied at Baton Rouge to support the 
convention. Thither came reports of opposition gath- 
ering head in St. Helena, of Folch's coming, of pos- 
sible Indian uprising or slave insurrection ; but for all 
that the men were generally in high spirits. On Oc- 
tober 2 Thomas received a welcome order to lead fifty 
men against some of Folch's troops that were expected 
on Bayou Manchac, and to disperse the malcontents 
further eastward. These formed a party numbering 
about eighty that Shepherd Brown had succeeded in 
enlisting. Some sixteen of these were left in the 
stockade at Springfield, while Brown used the others 
to reconnoitre the country. After four or five days 

25 Summary, f s. 103, 104. 



412 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

he returned, evidently dispirited at his failure to raise 
his boasted five hundred loyalists, and advised his fol- 
lowers to disperse and save themselves. He set them 
the example, by taking boat for New Orleans, but 
was later captured and suffered a brief imprisonment. 
Shortly after Brown's flight Thomas and his party 
appeared before the stockade on the Nictalbany. Its 
slender garrison fled across the river without any 
show of resistance, while its leader was captured, 
and afterwards killed when he attempted to escape. 
A Captain Michael Jones, earlier called a loyalist, made 
common cause with the rebels. These killed the stock 
and destroyed the property of William Cooper, and in 
other ways showed their animus against him because 
of his record as a former notorious Tory in North 
Carolina. The convention desired to avoid all bloody 
proscriptions and there was comparatively little con- 
fiscation or looting of property. With these successes 
in St. Helena all opposition practically ceased, al- 
though about the middle of October there was an in- 
effectual attempt to stir up a mutiny at Baton Rouge 
and release De Lassus. The dragoons from Bayou 
Sara quickly quelled the mutineers and banished them 
from the province.^^ 

26 Moses Hooker to Holmes, Oct. i, 1810, Samuel L. Win- 
ston to Holmes, Oct. 2, 1810, Mississippi Territorial Archives, 
MS., Vol, 9; National Intelligencer, Oct. 31, Nov. 9, 1810; 
Summary, f. 226; Folch to Someruelos, Oct. 23, 1810, Legajo 
1568, Papeles de Cuba. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 413 

The formal inquiry into the fall of Baton Rouge 
began at Pensacola in March, 1811. In the following 
December, while summarizing the testimony already 
taken, the fiscal at Havana severely blamed De Lassus 
and Crocker for the type of government they main- 
tained and for their failure to keep the fort in a defen- 
sible state. In the latter charge, Metzinger and the 
unfortunate Grand Pre were also implicated. It was 
necessary to give the three survivors a chance to defend 
themselves. When the examination was resumed, in 
June, 1 81 2, Crocker alone submitted to it in detail. 
An attempt to secure the presence of Metzinger and 
De Lassus in Havana was msuccessful. The latter 
refused point blank to obey the summons, while the 
other pleaded ill health on account of his wound. 
After a long delay, in August, 181 4, a courtmartial 
fixed upon the death penalty for the absent De Lassus, 
a year's suspension for Metzinger, and six months' 
further arrest for Crocker. This sentence ultimately 
received royal approval. De Lassus was thus made 
the scapegoat for a catastrophe which he could not 
prevent, but throughout which < he had certainly not 
acted a laudable part.^^ 

Following the successful coup at Baton Rouge, the 
members of the convention assembled at St. Francis- 
ville and formally declared the independence of West 

2''' The evidence submitted during this series of examina- 
tions is collected in the Summary to which we have made 
extended references. 



414 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

Florida. In justifying this step they mentioned their 
x/ earlier desire to remain faithful to Ferdinand VII. 
To this end they had agreed jointly with De Lassus 
upon certain regulations for the protection of their 
territory. These regulations, voluntarily sanctioned 
by him, constituted a solemn compact, which he tried 
later to use against them and thereby encompass their 
ruin. His action absolved them from allegiance to a 
government that could no longer protect them. In 
formally declaring their independence, they made the 
customary appeal to the Supreme Ruler of the Uni- 
verse, calling upon him to witness the rectitude of 
their intentions.^^ 

Governor Folch, for one, was not greatly impressed 
by this solemn procedure. Rather he regarded their 
whole attitude as thoroughly snake like. Most of those 
who signed the declaration, as he professed to believe, 
were fugitives from the United States. An appeal 
to the Supreme Being from such people was a profa- 
nation that would cause any government to hesitate 
long before recognizing them. Moreover the course 
of De Lassus could not be regarded as violating their 
joint measures. He was forced to sanction them, and 
in doing so he went beyond his powers.^^ 

One may not agree with Folch's harsh criticism, 
and yet he may doubt the sincerity of the declaration. 

28 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 396. 

29 Folch to Someruelos, Nov. i, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 415 

The letters of Skipwith and of Barrow and the con- 
current action of their associates show conclusively 
that it was a logical step toward American interven- 
tion. It is true, as Skipwith pointed out, that the 
people of West Florida had as much right to declare 
themselves independent as had the people in certain 
other Spanish colonies. The failure of the United 
States during the past seven years to make good its 
claim to the Perdido gave the residents of the disputed 
territory the opportunity to declare it free. But this 
was not their main purpose. They wished annexation 
to the United States, and to this wish the declaration 
would serve as a convenient cloak. They must act 
so as to create the impression that its government had 
not countenanced their measures, and thus it could re- 
ceive the province from them with undisputed title.^*^ 
In their formal address to the American govern- 
ment, accompanying their declaration of independence, 
the members of the convention expressed the hope that 
the policy of the American government, as well as the 
safety and happiness of its people, would lead to the 
immediate incorporation of West Florida into the V 
American union. Congress had so often declared 
them to be true children of the United States that it 
could not now abandon them to foreign or domestic 
foes. Holmes, who acted as their intermediary, called 

30 Skipwith to the President of the United States, Dec. 5, 

1810, same to John Graham, Dec. 23, 1810, Jan. 14, Apr. 11, 

181 1, Barrow to Bedford, Oct. 10, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 
28 




4l6 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

Secretary Smith's attention to the fact that through 
this appHcation "the views of our government have 
been in a great measure reahzed." Evidently he had 
in mind Claiborne's letter to Wykoff.^^ 
X While the sentiment at Baton Rouge was over- 
\/ whelmingly in favor of annexation, its exponents de- 
sired some voice in the terms on which it should be 
brought about. In his letter to Madison, October lo, 
1810, John Rhea asked for the pardon of all deserters 
from the American army, and a loan of $100,000 to 
be repaid from the sale of public lands. The members 
of the convention claimed all the unoccupied lands in 
the territory, for they had risked their lives to wrest 
the country from Spain. Presumably the United 
States had relinquished its own claim by acquiescing 
for seven years in continued Spanish control. If the 
United States granted their request for annexation, 
they were willing to be admitted into the Union as a 
separate State, or to form part of a neighboring ter- 
ritory, preferably Orleans. The United States cer- 
tainly could not give them back to the Spanish Regency 

31 Holmes to Smith, Oct, 3, 1810 (Parker, 4383) ; American 
State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 396. It is well to note 
that in the latter source there is no mention of communica- 
tions from Holmes bearing dates of September 26 and Octo- 
ber 3, 1810. Yet Madison could not have received Holmes' 
later communication of October 17 in time to use it as the 
basis of his proclamation on the 27th. Evidently the president 
had some reason for concealing the existence of the earlier 
communications from Holmes. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 



417 



or Junta, for it had never recognized that body. Na- 
poleon could not interfere, for he had incited the 
Spanish colonies to free themselves; nor could Great 
Britain, for annexation to the United States would 
keep the country out of the hands of the French 
exiles.^^ 

Madison hardly needed Rhea's latter assurances to 
determine him in favor of intervention. Nor did the 
War and State departments perceive any difficulty in 
extending pardon to deserters and other refugees. 
But no loan was forthcoming, nor could the insur- 
gents expect the United States to waive its claim to 
the vacant land between the Mississippi and the Per- 
dido. Its forbearance in enforcing the claim had not 
in the least militated against it. The government 
could not abandon to the exclusive use of West Flor- 
ida lands which were for the benefit of all. It would, 
however, treat all actual settlers with its usual liberal- 
ity and would give prompt attention to special needs. ^^ 

While this decision, when known, would probably 
check their zeal, the devotees of annexation deter- 
mined at the outset to leave no means untried to bring 
it about. Skipwith approached the administration 
through Boiling Robertson in New Orleans, General 
John Mason in Virginia, and John Graham in the 

32 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 395, 396. 

33 Smith to Holmes, Nov. 15, 1810, Domestic Letters, MS., 
Vol. 15, 452, 453 (Parker, 4398). 



4l8 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

State Department itself. On the very day that Rhea 
dispatched his second missive William Barrow re- 
ported to his friend Bedford what " rapid strides " 
they had lately made toward annexation, and ex- 
pressed the hope that the United States would pro- 
tect them and annex them to one of the neighboring 
territories. The present convention was wholly in 
favor of this step ; but another body might not be so. 
While liberty then had an "enchanting sound "and they 
were all in high spirits, militiamen were proverbially 
fickle. Those of West Florida might grow weary, 
or the convention might become divided, despite the 
good intentions of its present members. It therefore 
behooved the United States to act promptly. Bed- 
ford reported the substance of this letter to Governor 
Blount, and sent a copy to Madison with the remark 
that although the revolution in West Florida was still 
an experiment, it was working out as predicted.^* 

Barrow's letter seems to have been so timed as to 
give weight to Rhea's application. Early in the fol- 
lowing month John Ballinger, commanding the fort at 
Baton Rouge, wrote to Toulmin with the same object. 
After reviewing the events that led the insurgents to 
declare their independence, and giving some subse- 
quent details, he mentioned the diversion in their 
councils over the policy of pursuing the campaign 

34 Barrow to Bedford, Oct. 19, 1810, Bedford to Madison, 
Nov. 8, 1810, Sk'pwith to Graham, Jan. 14, Apr. 11, 1810, Skip- 
with to his Fellow Citizens, Apr. i, 181 1, Madison Papers, MS. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 419 

against Mobile with vigor or awaiting action by the 
United States. With regard to the latter policy he 
said: "I know the minds of the people, their preju- 
dices and their Resources — and to you as an American 
officer as a friend to the Government I wish to drop 
some hints. I wish the president and the whole Con- 
gress knew the minds of the people here as well as I 
do. Some may propose one thing and some another, 
but the Great Mass of the People wants nothing more 
than to become American Citizens. But they would 
prefer death Rather than again be subject to any of 
the dependencies of Spain. The United States cer- 
tainly has it in their power to obtain this Country and 
if they do not do so the people will accept of any other 
protection that they can obtain. Succours are now 
offered by the French equal to our present wants. 
And many true Americans who are well acquainted 
with the Cautious Policy of the United States have no 
confidence in their interference and are willing to 
accept. But the Majority will not consent to any 
propositions till they hear from the United States. 

" I could say much more. But I shall conclude by 
praying that the United [States] may save this Coun- 
try from the fangs of Joseph Napoleon. "^^ 

Toulmin brought this letter to Folch's attention, and 
added to it a stirring appeal : " O, that I had the 

35 Ballinger to Toulmin, Nov. 3, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 
This is partly quoted in Toulmin to Innerarity, Nov. 15, 1810, 
American Historical Review, II, 702. 



420 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

tongue of an angel, never would I cease to vibrate in 
the ears of the Spanish officers that by manly efforts 
on their part they should struggle to awaken the 
U[nited] S[tates] from their lethargy." As an in- 
direct result of his action and of the Spanish gover- 
nor's conditional proposal to surrender his province 
to the Americans, Folch became an indirect ally of the 
insurgents who were working for annexation. 

While awaiting the response to their appeals for 
immediate annexation, the Conventionalists proposed 
to change as little as possible the frame of govern- 
ment agreed upon with De Lassus. Yet the members 
had to maintain the semblance of political control. 
Accordingly they assumed the powers exercised by De 
Lassus and placed their seal upon such public prop- 
erty as fell into their hands. This included the chest 
containing the six thousand dollars, which was to 
serve as the basis for their finances. To those who 
had any claim on the money they issued script, re- 
deemable in the future at ten per cent interest. They 
also provided for a graduated land tax to be levied 
by the alcaldes of the various jurisdictions. A sug- 
gestive piece of legislation was the repeal of the tax 
on slaves, when introduced by actual or prospective 
residents of the new State. In place of the unwieldy 
body of five or six hundred militia that Thomas com- 
manded, the convention, on October 8, authorized 
John Ballinger to enroll one hundred and four regu- 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 42 1 

lars for duty in the fort. This structure was to be 
made smaller and more defensible. The military com- 
mittee tried to secure clothing by loan or otherwise 
from the federal officer in Mississippi Territory, but 
evidently without success. After appointing John W. 
Leonard, Edmund Hawes, and John H. Johnston as a 
committee of public safety, with power to draft a new 
constitution, the convention took a recess.^^ 

On October 10 this committee issued an address to 
the people of Mobile and Pensacola. In this docu- 
ment they averred that distance had hitherto prevented 
common deliberation, and announced the appointment 
of Reuben Kemper and Joseph White as commission- 
ers to bring about united action with their brethren 
in Mobile and Pensacola. Although they had not yet 
ventured to legislate for those unrepresented districts, 
their object was to secure the liberty and happiness of 
all the people of West Florida. For this reason they 
wished Mobile and Pensacola to authorize the present 
convention to act for them or to send deputies of their 
own to that body. They promised to observe good 
faith in all measures that served the common end.^^ 

Reports that originated with the refugee James Hor- 
ton, a former opponent of Kemper, and others of his 
sort, had already alarmed the people of these districts. 

86 Summary, fs. 51, 78, 225, 226; West Florida Papers, MS., 
29, Library of Congress ; National Intelligencer, Nov. 9, 1810. 

37 Address of the Convention, Oct. 10, 1810, Legajo 55, Pa- 
peles de Cuba. 



422 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

They were told that a force of sixteen hundred men, 
intent upon murder and plunder, had crossed the 
Pearl. Despite this manifest exaggeration, many 
from Mobile crossed the bay or took refuge within 
the fort. Some who were of French descent re- 
quested permission to move above the line, from which 
direction the Spaniards apprehended double danger — 
from the American government as well as from the 
filibusters. In view of the general fear, Folch wrote 
the captain-general that he must either display greater 
energy against his enemies or evacuate the province.^^ 
While Kemper was on his way from Baton Rouge 
to Mobile, rumor credited him with the capture of 
the Spanish post at the mouth of the Pascagoula. 
This was not true; but a part of the people of that 
region did attempt to cooperate with him against the 
authorities at Mobile. On November lo a number of 
them issued a statement that they were no longer 
Spaniards, but were entitled to the privilege of form- 
ing for themselves equal and just laws (which they 
had not recently enjoyed), just as the people of Baton 
Rouge had done. Thereupon they proceeded to or- 
ganize themselves " into a form of government on pure 
Republican principles Calculated to secure the happi- 
ness and prosperity of the People." They selected 
officials who should adopt regulations in accordance 

38 Kemper to John Rhea, Oct. 28, 1810, West Florida Papers, 
MS., 25, 26, Library of Congress ; Folch to Someruelos, Oct. 
25, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles de Cuba. 



BATON ROUGE INSURGENT AND MILITANT 423 

with the " principals " of the Baton Rouge Conven- 
tion and should correspond with that body or any of 
its agents. Among the thirty-four signers of this 
declaration were Sterling Dupree, William Eubanks, 
Solomon Armstrong, and John H. Gray, who were 
conspicuous in the succeeding events. Sterling Du- 
pree was selected as captain and Eubanks as second 
lieutenant of the military organization that they 
formed.^^ 

Unable longer to trust the Spanish officials, who 
had " deviated " from the path of justice, these new 
insurgents applied to Kemper for assistance through 
Gray, a man "well calculated for that business." 
Kemper was more than gratified to receive their ap- 
plication, and immediately wrote Dupree that the 
action at Pascagoula merited the "highest applause 
of the convention." He sent copies of its declaration 
of independence and of its address for distribution. 
Along with these he sent a copy of the commission 
just issued to Joseph P. Kennedy, which was to serve 
as a model for other volunteers ; and asked Dupree to 
give him any information that would strengthen their 
cause in the region. Gray would inform him when 
"the star [would] rise and shine upon the [region] 
south of 31 north latitude." Upon the suggestion of 
Colonel John Caller he was sending Major William 

39 Perez to Folch, Nov. 14, 1810, Legajo 63, Papeles de Cuba; 
Dupree to Kemper, Nov. 12, 1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 
44, Library of Congress. 



424 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

Hargreave, a justice of the Baldwin County Court, to 
act with Caller as Dupree's counsellor, and he urged 
Dupree to follow their guidance closely. Such volun- 
teers as he enrolled were to take the oath of allegiance 
annexed to the declaration. He was not to abuse those 
opposed to the Conventionalists, but to secure their 
property against loss and give them a fair trial, espe- 
cially in cases that involved personal animosity.*^ If 
we may judge from later reports, Dupree did not fol- 
low these instructions very closely. Gray's report was 
so favorable that Kemper authorized the raising of an 
additional company of volunteers with Solomon Arm- 
strong as captain. 

Under the personal direction of Gray and Har- 
greave, Dupree administered the oath of allegiance to 
the residents on the upper Pascagoula, who readily 
took it, and organized a military force to capture the 
fort at its mouth. The commander of its slender gar- 
rison had already placed his men and munitions on 
vessels, ready to sail for Mobile as soon as the foe ap- 
proached. In response to additional inquiries from 
Dupree, Kemper expressed his pleasure at the ready 
response of the people of Pascagoula to his sugges- 
tion, and advised the furnishing of volunteers with 
wholesome provisions to be paid for at nominal prices. 
Arms and military stores for the battalion must be 
obtained by capture or confiscation, giving in each case 

40 Kemper to Dupree, Nov. 12, 1810, West Florida Papers, 
MS., 44, 45, Library of Congress. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 425 

the necessary receipts, and requiring the same from 
each volunteer to whom they were entrusted. Har- 
greave and Kennedy, whose "hart" was with them, 
would give Dupree all necessary advice.^^ 

Hargreave not only assisted Dupree to organize his 
force, but accompanied him down the Pascagoula when 
he occupied the fort at its mouth and plundered some 
of the neighboring inhabitants. On his return Toul- 
min, who had heard of his activity below the line, 
issued a warrant for his arrest, but could find neither 
sheriff nor deputy in Baldwin County to serve it. As 
we shall see, Hargreave met his punishment else- 
where.*- His more fortunate but equally culpable as- 
sociate, Kennedy, openly boasted to Toulmin of their 
prospective force of sixty or more volunteers on the 
Pascagoula, although he had to confess that only a 
half of this number lived below the line. Kemper 
promptly warned Dupree not to communicate with 
him through the post-office, in which Toulmin served, 
but to send word through Benjamin O'Neal, whose 
father had been one of his adherents at Bayou Sara 
in 1804. He was as safe as John Johnson, Sr., an- 
other intermediary, and more conveniently located.*^ 

^1 Toulmin to Madison, Dec. 6, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. ; 
Dupree to Kemper, Nov. 18, 1810, Kemper to Dupree, Nov. 21, 
1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 54, Library of Congress. 

42 Cf. p. 484. 

43 Toulmin to Madison, Nov. 22, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. ; 
Kemper to Rhea, Nov. 23, 1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 55, 
Library of Congress. 



426 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

Dupree's course at Pascagoula was the subject of 
much subsequent controversy. Some six years later 
he wrote to Monroe, asking for compensation for his 
men and himself because they had risked their prop- 
erty and lives to add that region to the United States. 
Other testimony indicates that the risk largely con- 
cerned the property and lives of others. At the end 
of November, 1810, the very month in which Dupree 
enlisted in the service of the convention, Joseph Collins 
presented a petition to that body at St. Francisville in 
behalf of his client, Elizabeth Wilson. She charged 
that on November 2 Dupree, Armstrong, and eight 
others, all armed, seized some slaves, private papers, 
and $700 in cash belonging to her. This indicates that 
Dupree was already embarked in lawless plundering 
for which Kemper's commission gave him a welcome 
cover of legality. In seizing the fort at the mouth of 
the Pascagoula, his followers were charged with loot- 
ing the store of Joseph Krebs, the Spanish syndic. 
They seized some vessels, loaded them with plunder 
and slaves, and sent them up the river to his own habi- 
tation. There was also a report that some of Dupree's 
neighbors seized him with the intention of delivering 
him to the Spanish authorities, but a party under Arm- 
strong rescued him. Armstrong was killed in the 
skirmish.^* These events could not have given the 

4* Petition of Elizabeth Wilson, Nov. 28, 1810, West Florida 
Papers, MS., 60, Library of Congress; Meek MSS., Depart- 



BATON ROUGE INSURGENT AND MILITANT 427 

members of the convention a very high opinion of their 
new ally. 

Nor were Dupree's operations calculated to give the 
French denizens of the Pascagoula a high opinion of 
the American government. For a time, indeed, there 
was a prospect that they might appeal to the French 
minister for redress. Dupree not only plundered 
these inoffensive people to the extent of some ten or 
twelve thousand dollars, under pretext that he was 
confiscating the king's property, but continued his 
exactions after receiving copies of the proclamations 
issued by the president and Governor Holmes. He 
restored a part of his plunder, but disposed of the rest 
above the line. By conveying his property to his 
brother and availing himself of James Caller's in- 
fluence, he escaped the natural consequences of his 
course.*^ The incident presented another complica- 
tion when the American government moved to occupy 
West Florida. That the situation was due to Span- 
ish incompetency as well as American ambition does 
not relieve the United States from the major responsi- 
bility for it. 

On October 24 the convention reassembled and 

ment of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama; Toul- 
min to Madison, Dec. 6, 1810, Madison Papers, MS,; Dupree 
to Monroe, Nov. 16, 1810, Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 
52, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Claiborne, Mississippi, 
I, 305, 306. 

4f5 E. Lewis to Monroe, Feb. 15, 1812, Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 36, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



428 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

adopted a constitution based on that of the United 
States. This was to go into force the following 
month, and meantime the members appointed an exec- 
utive committee of five, of whom John H. Johnston 
had served on the previous committee. His associates 
were John Mills, Philip Hickey, John Morgan, and 
William Barrow. This body made St. Francisville its 
headquarters, but kept in close touch with Ballinger 
at Baton Rouge. The members charged him to keep 
the state prisoners and to maintain a strict discipline 
in his garrison, numbering one hundred and fifteen 
men. They cautioned him to guard against surprise 
and fire. He was permitted to salute the American 
gunboats passing up and down the river. His com- 
missary was to repair " the King's barge " and lay in 
a stock of provisions. More significant was the order 
to transfer six pieces of artillery, two hundred mus- 
kets, and some ammunition from Baton Rouge to 
Bayou Sara. Evidently the revolutionary leaders did 
not wholly trust the population around the former 
place.*^ 

In accordance with their plan to reduce Mobile, the 
executive committee, on November '12, authorized 
Philemon Thomas to embody a force of six hundred 
and eighteen militia for instant service in any part of 

46 Morphy to Secretary of Audiencia, Mexico, Nov, 14, 
1810, Historia, MS., Vol. 330, Archivo General, Mexico ; West 
Florida Papers, MS., 28, Library of Congress; Summary, fs. 
78, 80. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 429 

the territory. He was to appoint the necessary field 
officers when the force should be mustered for a 
formal campaign, provide for the payment of the men 
as regulars, and resort to a draft if the number of 
volunteers failed to equal the desired quota. In this 
operation they proposed to use a part of the six thou- 
sand dollar fund ; and in addition their agents in New 
Orleans, under the guarantee of Abner L. Duncan, 
contracted for supplies to the value of a thousand 
dollars.*^ 

The new authorities in West Florida suspected the 
loyalty of the French refugees. In their behalf C. M. 
Audibert assured the convention that their previous 
attachment to Bonaparte was feigned, in order to 
worry the Spaniards. They were now ready to shed 
their blood in defense of the common cause, and by 
wise distribution of some of the vacant lands among 
them, they might be enlisted in driving the enemy out 
of the province. By the middle of October the con- 
vention was ready to undertake this task. As Mobile 
was within the limits claimed by the United States, its 
reduction would strengthen their request for annexa- 
tion. For the sake of completeness they were also 
ready to undertake the siege of Pensacola. 

Some of the leaders of the convention were not in 
favor of the Mobile campaign. They preferred to 
await action by the United States on their application 

*^ West Florida Papers, MS., 42, Library of Congress. 



430 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

for annexation rather than pursue further aggressions 
against the Spaniards. This may account for the sig- 
nificant change in the membership of the executive 
committee after the second session in October.*^ In 
pursuance of the determination they agreed to supple- 
ment Kemper's efforts by two agents in New Orleans. 
These men were to purchase and equip two vessels to 
prey upon Spanish provision vessels on the lakes and 
the Gulf, and were also to enlist French and other 
privateers in the same service. Having provided these 
with the customary commissions, they might hope to 
provision their own army from the prizes and pay all 
the expenses of the campaign, especially if they cap- 
tured the vessels carrying money from Pensacola to 
Mobile. 

The New Orleans merchants, as usual, were will- 
ing to profit by these irregular operations, but they 
demanded more tangible security than West Florida 
paper. If the commissioners furnished this they could 
obtain two schooners, valued at $50,000. In addition 
the commissioners would need $3000 for equipment and 
bounties. They could obtain experienced men, who 
would give a good account of themselves in storming 
a fort, but they must pay them ten or twelve dollars 
apiece on enlisting. They must also advance the 
privateers a supply of ammunition, to be repaid from 
captures. Accordingly they urged the immediate es- 

48 See p. 428. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 43 1 

tablishment of an arsenal at the mouth of the Amite 
whence they might obtain regular supplies and whither 
they might convey their prize cargoes. 

These agents encountered serious opposition from 
British and Spanish interests. Like Kemper, they 
were hampered by a failure to receive information or 
definite instructions from Baton Rouge. But their 
most serious difficulty was a lack of money or credit. 
Abner L. Duncan vigorously seconded their efforts, 
but was unable to dispose of the West Florida state 
paper. Even the appointment of John McDonough 
as a second agent did not afford any material relief. 
The possibility of raising some money by buying goods 
on credit and selling them at auction for cash appealed 
to Mills and Audibert as the only way out of their 
difficulty, despite the ruinous discount involved in the 
process. As the latter pointedly reminded Skipwith, 
the new governor, " Arms and men cannot be provided 
with prayer and war cannot be made without money." 
They even determined to commission their recruits to 
attack the Spanish provision vessels in pirogues. 
But this modest method of initiating naval opera- 
tions was denied them. The unexpected tidings of 
the American intervention suspended their functions 
although it did not put an end to their anxieties. The 
owner of the two schooners for which they had bar- 
gained was unwilling to release them from their con- 
tract, although he received on it nothing more substan- 
29 



432 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

tial than West Florida securities. They could not pay 
other bills they had incurred, to say nothing of a thou- 
sand dollar draft from Samuel Baldwin, the naval 
agent. The disgusted commissioners seized the first 
opportunity to retire from so dishonorable a situation, 
and in this inglorious way brought to an untimely end 
the naval operations of West Florida.*^ 

Nor did the principals of this embryo State have a 
more agreeable experience. On Saturday, November 
10, the people of West Florida elected their senators 
and representatives. At their first meeting the for- 
mer classified themselves by lot. The senators-to-be 
from Mobile were to constitute the first class ; John 
H. Johnston and John Rhea the second class ; and 
Philemon Thomas and Champney Terry the third 
class. Leonard was made president pro tempore of 
the Senate and Dudley Avery, speaker of the House 
of Representatives. On November 26 the legislative 
assembly elected Fulwar Skipwith as governor of the 
State.^^ 

As Skipwith afterwards explained, this honor was 
not of his seeking. After losing his place in Paris 
through Armstrong's vindictiveness, he had come to 
West Florida to recover his family fortune, jeopard- 

*9 Mills and Audibert to Skipwith, Dec. 4, 6, 7, 10, 14, 1810, 
West Florida Papers, MS., 73-93, Library of Congress. 

50 Morphy to Secretary of Audiencia, Mexico, Nov. 14, 1810, 
Historia, MS., Vol. 330, Archivo General, Mexico ; Summary, 
f. 80. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 433 

ized by his brother-in-law's mismanagement. Aside 
from a share in the Maison Rouge grant in Louisiana, 
he had no other property interests than his estate at 
Montesano, near Baton Rouge. He was in no sense 
a mere land speculator as his enemies charged. His 
former official position and his connection with the 
Randolph faction in Virginia politics made him a de- 
sirable acquisition to the American contingent in West 
Florida. De Lassus had been friendly to him but 
would not grant him a legal residence. In common 
with most of the reform leaders, he had favored the 
"compromise" agreed upon with De Lassus and had 
accepted the office of associate judge under that agree- 
ment. He supported the declaration of independence 
from principle and because he believed that this was 
the best way to turn the province over to the United 
States. He accepted the governorship, not from van- 
ity, but because he hoped with the aid of Dr. Andrew 
Steele and other patriots to avoid anarchy and confu- 
sion until annexation could be consummated.^^ 

In his inaugural address Skipwith did not content 
himself with "ordinary profession," but advised the 
legislative assembly to adopt a better judicial sys- 
tem, an improved militia estabhshment, and a more just 
system of representation and apportionment of taxes. 
The last named object was especially necessary in view 

51 Skipwith to Graham, Dec. 23, 1810, Jan. 14, 181 1, Skipwith 
to Claiborne, Dec. 10, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



434 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

of the measures already under way for the reduction 
of Mobile and Pensacola. He reminded his hearers 
that they had a "natural right" to independence, but 
that neither gain nor the implied promise of protection 
led them to take this momentous step. Having dis- 
played a sincere desire for reform and a determina- 
tion to adhere to a policy once initiated, he urged his 
hearers to continue a course so honorable to them- 
selves, and closed by promising them his hearty co- 
operation. 

If Skipwith was conscious of playing a farcical 
part, he was wholly serious withal. A careful perusal 
of his turgid address and subsequent voluminous let- 
ters gives one the impression that while he was no 
great genius, he was wholly sincere in pursuing his 
tortuous program of annexation. One extract from 
his inaugural address is illuminating: "Wherever the 
voice of justice and humanity can be heard our declara- 
tion and our just rights will be respected. But the 
blood which flows in our veins like the tributary 
streams which form and sustain the father of rivers, 
encircling our delightful country, will return if not 
impeded to the heart of our parent country. The 
genius of Washington, the immortal founder of the 
liberties of America, stimulates that return, and would 
frown upon our cause should we attempt to change its 
course."^^ 

^'2 A copy of the address, printed at Natchez, is among the 
Madison Papers. 



BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 435 

The new executive found much to employ his time 
during the week following his inauguration. Kemper 
and the commissioners in New Orleans were urgent 
in their demands. On November 28 the draft for 
the Mobile expedition began. On the 30th the cap- 
tain of the artillery reported upon its condition. On 
the following day the militia board filled the vacancies 
in the list of officers and made the necessary assign- 
ments. On December 3 Skipwith nominated Samuel 
Baldwin of St. Helena purser and naval agent to take 
charge of the armament being prepared at Springfield 
and in the Chifonte River. On the 4th he gave in- 
structions to Joseph Collins, who was to command the 
naval forces. After examining the artillery at Baton 
Rouge to determine what he could use against Mobile 
and Pensacola, Collins was to go to Springfield and 
Chifonte and confer with Baldwin upon the vessels 
for this service. At New Orleans he was to arrange 
with Mills and Audibert for their purchase and equip- 
ment. When ready he was to proceed with the squad- 
ron to Dog River in Mobile Bay and cooperate with 
the land forces there. He was not to molest the prop- 
erty of friendly persons, but could make lawful prize 
of the enemy's possessions. All captures must, how- 
ever, be brought before a prize tribunal to be estab- 
lished on Mobile Bay or on the Chifonte. 

On December 5 some fifty-five men marched away 
from the garrison at Baton Rouge to join the forces 



436 BATON ROUGE — INSURGENT AND MILITANT 

assembling at John Stuart's plantation. They left 
twenty-five men behind them in the fort under Lieu- 
tenant Charles Johnson.^^ On the same day Skipwith 
began a letter to President Madison, to whom he said 
that he feared the wishes of the people of West Flor- 
ida had not been properly presented. De Lassus' 
course had made necessary their declaration of inde- 
pendence, but at the same time the greater part of the 
inhabitants realized that their only hope for the future 
lay in annexation to the United States.^* Before he 
could dispatch his explanatory missive, he learned that 
the United States had already taken steps to bring 
this annexation about, but in a way hardly satisfactory 
to himself or his associates. 

53 West Florida Papers, MS., 62-70, Library of Congress ; 
Summary, f. 80. 

5* Skipwith to the President of the United States, Dec. S, 
1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



I 



CHAPTER XII 

Filibustering Operations on the Mobile 

Baton Rouge was the political storm-center of West 
Florida, but the Mobile region was seldom free from 
a secondary tempest. This was true during the trying 
days that we have described in the three preceding 
chapters ; but along the Mobile it was peril from with- 
out rather than from within that worried the Spanish 
authorities. In 1810 there were indeed rumors that 
some malcontents in Pensacola planned to assassinate 
Folch and Morales, but nothing happened.^ The 
transfer of troops and munitions of war to the Amer- 
ican garrison on the Tombigbee gave rise in 1809 to 
some correspondence between Wilkinson and Folch, 
and between the latter and Someruelos. Porter and 
Folch had at the same time discussed the reciprocal 
return of deserters. They in time drifted into a dis- 
cussion of the American claim to West Florida. 
Someruelos, to whom Folch referred both questions, 
warned him to avoid fruitless discussions that could 
only stir up bad feeling. He did tell him that de- 

1 St. Maxent to Someruelos, reservado, No. 157, July 10, 
1810, Legajo 1574, Papeles de Cuba. 

437 



438 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

serters could not be returned without a special treaty 
to that effect.^ 

In February, 1809, Macon of Georgia introduced 
into Congress the irritating topic of Mobile commerce. 
This gave Foronda a chance to deny that the Amer- 
icans had any right to navigate that stream without 
paying duty, as the inhabitants of its upper courses 
desired. In a month he in turn protested against the 
detention of Spanish vessels at New Orleans. When 
Claiborne later permitted them to proceed to Baton 
Rouge as a special favor. Morales asserted that he did 
so simply because his government claimed West Flor- 
ida.^ Holmes, newly settled in his post, feared that 
the Spanish adherents among the Choctaws proposed 
to unite with the Creeks in an attempt to cut off Amer- 
ican travel between Nashville and points in his terri- 
tory. Echoes of the feud between the Kemper and 
Horton families disturbed both sides of the border at 
Pinckneyville, and led Holmes to employ regulars 
there for patrol duty.* Of internal disturbance at 
Pensacola or at Mobile there was little evidence. The 

2 Folch to Someruelos, June 23, 1809, Legajo 1566, same to 
same, July 7, 1809, Legajo 1567, Papeles de Cuba. 

3 Foronda to Madison, Feb. 12, 1809, Spanish Notes, MS., 
II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Morales to Garay, Aug. 
14, 1809, Legajo 267, Papeles de Cuba; cf. American State 
Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 341. 

4 Holmes to Cushing, Sept. 21, 1809, same to Smith, Oct. 22, 
1809, Proceedings Executive Council, Mississippi Territory, 
MS., Vol. I. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 439 

timely arrival of some fifty thousand pesos from Mex- 
ico gave the overwrought Folch a little relief.^ 

In August, 1809, Folch gave the captain-general an- 
other view of the ever-present American peril. Be- 
tween two and three thousand boats annually de- 
scended the Mississippi, each one manned by at least 
four persons. This meant a reverse current of six 
thousand men returning overland through Baton 
Rouge. He could keep them out only by erecting two 
powerful military posts on the Nictalbany and the 
Chifonte. Another stream of these undesirable immi- 
grants, from Georgia, the Carolinas, and even Virginia, 
passed through Pensacola and Mobile, whence they 
took passage by sea to New Orleans and points to the 
westward. If he attempted to force them back after 
their long overland journey, he would only cause them 
to combine in armed bands, with Indian recruits, and 
betake themselves to the unprotected harbors for em- 
barkation. If resistance should lead to the death of a 
single Indian, a war with the savages would result. 
With his present forces he could not make headway 
against a combination of Indians and frontiersmen, and 
judged it better to allow the latter free use of the 
Florida highways. This was one of the inconveni- 
ences brought upon them by the cession of Louisiana. 

This exterior peril seemed to cause little disturb- 

5 Folch to Someruelos, Aug. 3, 1809, Legajo 1567, Relation 
of Donation, etc., 1809, Legajo 1568, Papeles de Cuba. 



440 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

* 

ance at Pensacola or at Mobile. Subsequently there 
were some rumors of personal violence to Folch and 
Morales, as we have seen. But in November the 
timely arrival of some fifty thousand pesos from 
Mexico, supplemented by contributions from loyal resi- 
dents of the two settlements, gave the despairing 
officials some relief.^ In the following spring, there- 
fore, Folch judged the occasion opportune for a neces- 
sary trip to Havana. Thus he was away from his 
post during the initial events that led up to the Baton 
Rouge Convention. His absence also encouraged an 
alarming movement nearer home. 

On June 20, 1810, Perez, the commandant at Mobile, 
wrote Maximiliano de St. Maxent, who was tempo- 
rarily taking Folch's place, that the American settlers 
in the vicinity of Fort Stoddert had formed what they 
called the " Mobile Society." It numbered two hun- 
dred men who intended to attack and capture the fort 
at Mobile, plunder the establishment of Forbes and 
Company, and commit other excesses. The head of 
the association was a lawyer, Joseph Pulaski Ken- 
nedy ; and Zenon Orso, a resident o'f Mobile, was im- 
plicated in it. Perez had obtained a partial confession 
from the latter, and also a letter from Kennedy, invit- 
ing Orso to join the society. In the letter Kennedy 
stated that if Orso wished to become a subject of 

6 Morales to Saavedra, Nov. 30, 1809, Legajo 2330, Papeles 
de Cuba. 




FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 441 

Napoleon and of Joseph, he had only to say so. But 
he summoned him to strike for liberty and appointed 
a place for a personal conference/ 

Perez did not arrest Orso, but placed him under 
surveillance in the hope of gaining further informa- 
tion. As soon as St. Maxent received his report, he 
ordered the immediate arrest and examination of 
Orso, and also of a certain Powell at whose house 
Kennedy had promised to meet the former. He pre- 
pared to send Perez twenty-five additional men from 
the Louisiana regiment, and authorized him to summon 
fifty Choctaws to act as scouts and spies, and to em- 
ploy confidential agents to watch the movements of their 
Arnerican neighbors. Furthermore he advised Perez 
to seize and secure Kennedy if he could do so without 
disagreeable complications. St. Maxent also referred 
the occurrence to Colonel Richard Sparks, the com- 
mandant at Fort Stoddert, whose course during the 
past year had had a deterrent effect upon border out- 
breaks. In view of the harmonious relations between 
their respective governments, he requested Sparks to 
take the necessary measures for breaking up the 
project. This was Sparks's first intimation of the plot, 
but he answered that he would watch for its manifesta- 
tions and observe the course of its reputed leader, who 
was well known to him. At the same time he called 

■^ Kennedy to Orso, June 7, 1810, American Historical Re- 
view, II, 700. A Spanish translation is enclosed in Perez to 
St. Maxent, June 20, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles de Cuba. 



442 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

St. Maxent's attention to the numerous deserters from 
his forces in the Mobile district.^ 

As a result of his investigations, Sparks soon be- 
came convinced that the society existed, and he took 
measures to suppress it. He immediately communi- 
cated this information to St. Maxent, who made prep- 
arations to receive the invaders should they attempt 
an attack. Judge Toulmin, who had at first doubted 
the reality of the plan because he did not credit its 
leaders with sufficient prudence to keep it concealed, 
afterwards changed his mind, but thought that the pre- 
cautions of Sparks and the Spaniards had caused its 
abandonment.^ The friends of the leaders were at 
least anxious to save them from prosecution by a 
temporary suspension of legal processes. 

While reassuring the Spaniard, Sparks made a de- 
tailed report of this " General and Public Combina- 
tion " to Secretary Eustis. He expected the conspira- 
tors to attempt the seizure of the stores and ammuni- 
tion at Fort Stoddert, thereby putting the American 
forces out of commission, and then to attack Mobile 
and Pensacola. Some of the most popular characters 
of the vicinity were at its head and the people gen- 
erally regarded it with favor. He had not been able 

8 St. Maxent to Perez, June 22, 1810, St. Maxent to Sparks, 
June 22, 1810, Sparks to St. Maxent, June 27, 1810, Legajo 
1568, Papeles de Cuba. 

9 Sparks to St. Maxent, June 30, i8io, Legajo 1568, Papeles 
de Cuba. 




FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 443 

to learn the date of the projected attack, but he be- 
lieved it to be near, for its projectors were using every 
possible intrigue to gain adherents. Many turbulent 
and ambitious characters who had previously shown no 
bond of union except their hostility to the Spaniards 
now displayed a sudden and suspicious unanimity in 
giving public dinners to officers and men of their mili- 
tia companies. A group of settlers from Kentucky 
and Tennessee had recently been forced to pay duties 
at Mobile, and Sparks beheved that this event added 
to the popularity of the hostile propaganda. The im- 
migrants had been detained so long that their provi- 
sions and money were exhausted. Their destitution 
upon arriving at Fort Stoddert excited the pity of the 
inhabitants and increased the resentment against the 
Spaniards, to whom the people attributed the slow 
growth of their community. 

In addition, the inhabitants also resented the presi- 
dent's action in regard to the navigation of the Tom- 
bigbee and the Mobile. Recently the representatives 
from Tennessee had presented an address remonstrat- 
ing against the necessity of making a long detour by 
way of the Mississippi, New Orleans, and Mobile, in- 
stead of a much shorter overland journey from the 
bend of the Tennessee through the Indian country. 
The savages daily used these rivers to trade with the 
Spaniards and were always ready to ally themselves 
against the Americans. Citizens, the petitioners 



444 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 



claimed, were entitled to equal privileges with In- 
dians. It will be noted that they reverted to the earlier 
plan of Zachariah Cox. The Indian agents, particu- 
larly Benjamin Hawkins, were thought to be opposed 
to this agitation, but Governor Holmes was in sym- 
pathy with it.^^ 

A fourth and still more important cause for popular 
discontent, according to Sparks, was the cunning art 
of certain demagogues in fomenting disturbances. In- 
stead of attempting leadership in the peaceful develop- 
ment of the country, they preferred " the first position 
in the ranks of rebellion and [sought] to gain wealth 
and position through general anarchy." Accordingly 
they represented the general government as looking 
upon the people of this section with "unfriendly views" 
and charged that its conduct was dictated by a "cold, 
jealous policy" that was not conducive to popular 
attachment. By this means they had been only too 
successful in stirring up resentment. 

Sparks stated that the Spanish officials were re- 
enforcing Mobile and seeking to gain the assistance of 
the Creeks and the Choctaws. At the same time his 
garrison was in a most miserable condition. " Deaths, 
desertions, and discharges " would soon leave him 
without men. The soldiers had an " unaccountable 
aversion " to Fort Stoddert and would not reenlist 

10 Nashville Clarion and Gazette, Aug. lo, 17, 1810; Holmes 
to Caller, Aug. 22, 1810, Proceedings Executive Council, Mis- 
sissippi Territory, MS., Vol. i. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 445 

there, while the same cause produced a remarkable 
number of desertions. He suggested that his garri- 
son should be increased to four full companies of in- 
fantry and one of artillery. If this were done at once 
he might overawe the projected expedition. In a 
postscript Sparks described the leader of the " Mobile 
Society," Kennedy, as a leading lawyer, "once the 
son-in-law of Abraham Baldwin, Sr. . . . and also 
brother-in-law to Joel Barlow. . . . He is a young 
man, educated in the Eastern States, ambitious, in- 
triguing, and popular; and although without real tal- 
ents, yet in a seditious intrigue, or for the low arts 
that secure popularity, he must be acknowledged emi- 
nent. He is a man of engaging address, popular man- 
ners, and daring, and although I doubt his capacity to 
conduct, yet I am well assured he is seconded by a 
character who has been several years a resident of this 
country and well calculated to meet any deficiency of 
the first."^^ 

Sparks may have referred to Colonel James Caller. 
Some two weeks later Toulmin got possession of a 
letter showing that Kennedy expected Caller to raise 
four hundred men for an attack on Mobile in co- 
operation with a certain McFarland. Kennedy was 
going to Georgia to arouse public opinion there in 
favor of the expedition. Carson and Laval were 

11 Sparks to the Secretary of War, July 12, 1810, Papers 
Relative to Revolted Spanish Provinces, MS., Bureau of Rolls 
and Library, Department of State. 

30 



446 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

others who were mentioned as " warm in the business." 
After taking Mobile the insurgents proposed to hold 
it for the government or deliver it to the military 
authorities at Fort Stoddert. As the national authori- 
ties would do nothing for them, the people must act 
for themselves. They incurred the danger of prosecu- 
tion ; but as all were equally involved Kennedy ex- 
pected only a brief imprisonment, especially with a 
patriotic judge. He was willing to risk this, in view 
of the certainty of success. 

In transmitting this report to Governor Holmes, 
Toulmin was uncertain whether it indicated Kennedy's 
full assurance of success, or, in view of the increasing 
hazard, a discreet way of backing out. In either case, 
as he later stated, the preparations of the Spaniards 
rendered the plot abortive.^^ Holmes had already 
written to Colonel Caller, on July 31, telling him of 
rumors about the hostile expedition and expressing 
the sincere hope that there was no foundation for 
them. Such an attempt would be bad for the individ- 
uals concerned and would compromise the country at 
large. Accordingly he relied on Caller's vigilance and 
patriotism to prevent an attempt so disastrous to his 
immediate neighborhood. Besides this tactful appeal 
to Caller's better judgment, he instructed Judge Toul- 
min that the United States would discountenance such 

12 Toulmin to Holmes, July 28, 1810, Proceedings Executive 
Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., Vol. I ; Holmes to Smith, 
July 31, 1810 (Parker, 4373)- 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 447 

an assumption of authority by all means within its 
power. He hoped that there was no reason to ap- 
prehend such an unlawful aggression, which could 
only be disastrous to people and country ahke. He 
also reported these rumors to Secretary Smith, but 
added that there was no evidence to substantiate them, 
and said that he believed that if such an expedition 
had ever been contemplated it was now abandoned. 
He assured the secretary, however, that he would em- 
ploy all means in his power to discover and suppress 
any such action.^^ 

Meanwhile the arrest of Orso and Powell at Mobile 
led Kennedy to show his ability to stir up trouble, if 
not to profit from it after it was under way. Under 
date of July 19 he wrote Cayetano Perez, the com- 
mandant at Mobile, that he knew the other possessed 
a copy of his incriminating letter. In the name of the 
Mobilena, he informed the other that no American 
citizens would attempt to attack the fort without the 
consent of the general government. If this should be 
given, Kennedy would do* his duty as a public official, 
after giving Perez due notice of his purpose. The 
Spaniards would be unable, by a threat of Choctaw 
help, to continue terrorizing the Americans, " who are 
free men and soldiers." Although the latter desired 
the good fortune of the subjects of the "ex-king of 

13 Holmes to Toulmin, July 30, 1810, same to Caller, July 
31, 1810, Proceedings of Executive Council, Mississippi Ter- 
ritory, MS. Vol. I. 



448 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

Spain," they objected to further restriction simply be- 
cause the Spaniards held territory that his government 
lawfully claimed. He was surprised at the arrest of 
Orso and Powell and absolved them from any knowl- 
edge of the Mobile Society. To relieve the Spaniards 
of any unfounded fears, he told Perez that he was 
preparing to visit other parts of the United States and 
would not return until October.^* 

Toulmin mentioned Kennedy's intention to visit 
Georgia. It was also confirmed, but hardly in a way 
to quiet Spanish apprehension, by a letter that James 
Innerarity wrote his brother John at Pensacola. In- 
nerarity believed that Kennedy was going to Georgia 
to secure aid for the society of bandits of which he was 
head. The four hundred members of this society were 
supposed to have some connection with the insurgent 
leaders at Baton Rouge, and they were not omitting 
their preparations during Kennedy's absence. Al- 
though Kennedy was not likely to get much assistance 
from the Georgians as a whole, a man there of violent 
temper, named Troup, was supposed to favor the 
cause. In time Folch learned of these facts, and in 
reporting them to his superior emphasized his lack of 
resources to meet the emergency, and suggested that 
Someruelos should appeal to the American govern- 

14 Kennedy to Perez, July 19, 1810, American Historical Re- 
view, II, 700. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 449 

ment to break up the plot.^^ Governor Holmes was 
much concerned for the deluded citizens whom Toul- 
min and Sparks implicated in it. The national gov- 
ernment would undoubtedly direct its attention to the 
serious events that were then under way in West 
Florida. Any private attempt to invade the province 
might injure the people of Mississippi, particularly 
those residing on the Mobile. "I entreat you there- 
fore," he wrote Toulmin, " to impress upon the public 
mind the danger that would attend such an expedition 
as you seem to think may be in contemplation."^^ 

In time President Madison learned the substance of 
the reports from Sparks and Toulmin. He informed 
John Graham, who was now chief clerk of the State 
Department, that Sparks's letter should form the basis 
for instructing Governor Holmes to do his part in 
maintaining the laws. As for Toulmin's missive, he 
suggested that the State Department should exam- 
ine the law applying to such illegal expeditions, in 
order to determine how to suppress this one. He later 
wrote to Toulmin that information was less definite 
in regard to the expedition and he was glad of it. 
Such attempts were unlawful, and as chief executive 
it was his duty to employ force against them and to 
make an example of their leaders. Secretary Eustis, 

15 Folch to Someruelos, Aug. 2, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles 
de Cuba. 

16 Toulmin to Holmes, Aug. 9, 1810, Proceedings Executive 
Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., Vol. i. 



450 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

who also received copies of the correspondence, em- 
powered General Hampton to reinforce the garrison 
at Fort Stoddert at discretion, and if necessary to 
make use of some troops operating in another capacity 
on the Muscle Shoals. He felt that the mere coming 
of reinforcements would disperse the incipient in- 
surgents.^^ 

Governor Holmes, of Mississippi, already preoccu- 
pied with the situation at Baton Rouge, was deter- 
mined that the Spaniard should not have all the ad- 
vantage in the controversy arising on the Mobile fron- 
tier. In August one of his militia officers had written 
him that the commandant at Mobile had assembled 
there a considerable number of Choctaws to assist in 
defending it against the projected attack. The Span- 
iards were also expecting the arrival of British troops 
to assist them in occupying American territory. 
Holmes objected to an appeal to any foreign govern- 
ment or to the Indians under American jurisdiction. 
The Spaniards had no right to interfere with the latter, 
much less request their help, for this would imply that 
the Indians might live within the United States and 
yet act independently of its government. He re- 
quested Folch, therefore, not to appeal to them again 



18 



I'' Madison to Graham, Aug. lo, 24, 1810, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 34, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; Madison 
to Toulmin, Sept. 5, 1810, Madison, Writings, II, 482. 

18 Holmes to Folch, Sept. 4, 1810, Proceedings Executive 
Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., Vol. i. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 451 

While penning this remonstrance Holmes notified 
the militia officers within the disturbed area that he was 
greatly concerned over the persistent rumors regard- 
ing the filibustering attack. The citizens would retard 
the object they had in view by taking up arms to re- 
lieve themselves of commercial exactions at Mobile. 
The United States could not permit such conduct with- 
out abandoning its constitution and laws, and no por- 
tion of the country could rightly demand such a sacri- 
fice. He held out the hope thit the administration 
was considering its relation to West Florida and that 
the next Congress would doubtless act on the subject. 
Everything would be satisfactorily settled, if no hos- 
tility occurred on the frontier. Meanwhile individuals 
should not hazard their fortunes and reputations in 
this manner. He asked the militia officers to aid the 
civil authorities in restraining the few who were likely 
to attempt it. He addressed Colonel Sparks and Judge 
Toulmin in the same tenor. Later Perez reported to 
Folch that Colonel Caller had already gathered a force 
of one hundred and fifty men and would soon increase 
it to three hundred, but he was not able to learn how 
he proposed to use it.^^ 

In reporting to the secretary of state what he had 
done, Holmes reiterated his belief, based on recent ad- 

19 Holmes to the Colonels of the 6th, 8th, and 9th Regiments, 
Sept. 8, 1810, Proceedings Executive Council, Mississippi Ter- 
ritory, MS., Vol. I ; Perez to Folch, Oct. 26, 1810, Legajo 63, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



452 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

vices from Toulmin, that the proposed expedition had 
been abandoned. The project had been a very gen- 
eral subject for conversation and many favored it as a 
means of removing the unpopular restrictions at Mo- 
bile, yet he did not think that any considerable number 
were ready to engage in it. The alarm aroused by 
the project in Mobile and Pensacola had first led him 
to think otherwise and to use his influence with the 
leading characters of the region in order to break it 
up. To this end he asked Colonel Gushing to send 
additional regulars to Fort Stoddert. The latter offi- 
cer told him that he would need an order from the 
secretary of war to do so, but prepared a detachment 
for service there at the earliest possible moment. 
Holmes reported to the secretary that the regulars 
were in good shape and that three or four hundred 
might be spared for this purpose. He hoped that 
they would not be needed, but assured the secretary 
that he would use his utmost endeavors to prevent 
any violation of the law.^^ 

Toulmin acted before the governor's second warn- 
ing reached him. In September, 1810, he addressed 
a most emphatic charge to the grand jury of Washing- 
ton County on the subject of illegal expeditions. Ap- 
preciating the disadvantages under which the country 
labored, he thought it was absolutely absurd for the 
people to try to avenge themselves by unlawful means. 

20 Holmes to Smith, Sept. 12, 1810 (Parker, 4381). 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 453 

Such action was not possible on the ground that West 
Florida belonged to no prince or state, as some claimed. 
It was true that the United States had thus far re- 
fused to acknowledge the representative of Ferdinand 
VII or of Joseph Bonaparte and at the same time had 
remained on good terms with both. Others claimed 
that West Florida as far as the Perdido belonged to 
the United States. The judge was one of these, but 
if the government chose to waive its rights, he did not 
believe the people of the territory should undertake 
to uphold them. If the American government must 
obtain this territory through the people of the Tombig- 
bee, such dependence did not speak well for its power. 
Its course toward the Burr and Miranda expeditions 
did not lead him to think that the government was 
ready to encourage this undertaking. The Spanish 
representative might draw a different conclusion, but 
as the judge warned his hearers, there was no assur- 
ance that the government would wink at such offenses 
in the future. Even if the remote situation of the dis- 
trict rendered its people secure from federal interfer- 
ence, he himself was bound by his oath to restrain such 
illegal attempts. 

The judge went on to say that the expedition would 
exert an evil effect upon foreign powers. If they saw 
that the citizens had little respect for the national gov- 
ernment, they would be emboldened to stir up mis- 
chief among them, just as the Spanish emissaries had 



454 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

formerly done in Kentucky. As the frontier repre- 
sentatives of the nation, the inhabitants along the 
Tombigbee were under obligations to keep the peace. 
They were already implicated in the Yazoo affair, and 
any violence on this occasion would tend to fix that 
charge more definitely. They should not, therefore, 
betray themselves by encouraging such an enterprise.^^ 
This wholesome advice seemed to have the effect of 
temporarily checking the expedition, but it did not 
make Toulmin any more popular with the leaders or 
with their deluded followers. 

Meanwhile Someruelos sent a full report of the 
Mobile Society to De Onis in Philadelphia and asked 
him to bring the affair to the attention of the admin- 
istration. The captain-general hoped that the United 
States would, through its military forces on the Tom- 
bigbee, keep the people of the vicinity from insultin^^ 
the Spanish authorities rather than take occasion to 
reinforce its various garrisons. De Onis communi- 
cated this letter at once to Secretary Smith by conduct 
of Bernaben, the consul at Baltimore. De Onis said 
that he did not believe that the United States would 
allow its citizens to disturb a neighboring friendly 
power. As the most innocent occurrences might cause 
disquietude and uncertainty, he wished the president 
to know what American citizens were planning against 
the Spanish dominions. At the same time his protest 

"1 National Intelligencer, Nov. 7, 13, 1810. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 455 

was to be regarded as proof of the utmost friendship 
for the United States. The captain-general preferred 
to proceed thus rather than send reenforcements to 
the Floridas ; for despite all explanations, such a move- 
ment was bound to be misinterpreted. De Onis also 
mentioned a rumor that the American officers on fur- 
lough were ordered to rejoin their commands and as- 
sist in the capture of Pensacola. He asked for an 
immediate' disclaimer of this in order to quiet West 
Florida officials.^^ In his letter to the captain-general, 
De Onis added that Bonaparte was evidently trying to 
force the Americans to take Florida, either through a 
cession or through a sale carried on by his brother 
Joseph. By this bribe he would keep the Americans 
from supplying Cadiz with provisions. De Onis also 
thought that the administration was working with 
Napoleon to deceive the people in regard to the Berlin 
and Milan decrees and thus force a war with Great 
Britain. 

Some ten days later De Onis reported that the sec- 
retary of state had first denied the existence of the 
Mobile Society and then acknowledged that he had 
heard of it through the War Department. The secre- 
tary assured him that the American government would 

22 De Onis to Captain-General, Sept. 30, 1810, Legajo 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba; Bernaben to Smith, Oct. i, 1810, Spanish 
Notes, MS.. II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. The name 
of this Spanish official is also spelled " Bernabue " and " Ber- 
nabeu." 



456 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

do its utmost to keep its citizens from breaking the 
peace between the two nations. Yet De Onis was not 
ready to confide wholly in this assurance. There were 
many contradictions in the secretary's statement, and 
he had no scruples in denying what he had said a 
day or two before. It would not be strange if the 
American government used Napoleon's method and 
attempted to gain possession of the Floridas at one 
blow, so he advised the captain-general to reenforce 
both provinces. ^^ 

As a result of these assurances the captain-general 
informed his subordinates at Pensacola that the Amer- 
ican government was about to strengthen its garrisons 
on the Tombigbee in order to prevent any action by the 
Mobile Society; and that it would oppose every at- 
tempt of its citizens to compromise the peace and har- 
mony that existed between the two nations. It would 
not merely reprimand, but would also punish vigor- 
ously every individual who attacked Spanish vessels 
or Spanish territory.^* Some three weeks before this 
assurance was penned, however, the president of the 
United States took measures that thoroughly neutral- 
ized it. The action, as we shall see, followed the 
events that were then occurring in the vicinity of 
Baton Rouge. 

23 De Onis to Captain-General, Oct. lo, 1810, Legajo 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba. 

24 Someruelos to Commandant of Pensacola, Nov. 19, 1810, 
Legajo 1574, Papeles de Cuba. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 457 

Kemper's mission as agent of the convention opened 
a second series of filibustering operations in the vicin- 
ity of Mobile. Most of the residents of that town 
viewed his approach with alarm, and especially so soon 
after Kennedy's project. The alarm was heightened 
when he came alone, for his associate White was de- 
tained by illness. Possibly the latter had been chosen 
for the diplomatic task, while Kemper was to work 
among the American settlers on the Tombigbee. His 
absence did not deter Kemper, who, as he later wrote 
a fairly kindred spirit, " done as you yourself under 
similar circumstances would have done, imbarked Hart 
and soul devoted to the prosecution of the wish of our 
infant but beloved country."^^ 

At Fort Stoddert, which he reached on October 24, 
Kemper was hospitably received by Colonel Sparks, 
" an old acquaintance," whom he found " warm " in 
his cause. Even Toulmin, to whom he bore letters of 
introduction, did not at first oppose him. As court 
was then in session at St. Stephens, he had no oppor- 
tunity for immediate interviews with private citizens. 
He learned that there were only about fifty soldiers 
in the fort at Mobile and that part of the artillery 
there consisted of painted logs. During the dry season 
the surrounding ditch was useless. A company of 

25 Kemper to Jackson, Nov. 7, 1815, Papers in Relation to 
Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library; Perez 
to Folch, Oct. 31, 1810, Legajo 63, Papeles de Cuba; National 
Intelligencer, Dec. 15, 1820. 



458 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

infantry from Baton Rouge would suffice to take it. 
The officers at Fort Stoddert assured him that by 
raising his standard a mile below the line he would 
speedily enroll enough men from above to do this. 
He expected to gain as recruits the one hundred and 
fifty or two hundred citizens in Mobile capable of 
bearing arms. The officers might resist, although 
there was little prospect of their receiving reinforce- 
ments from Havana or gaining Indian assistance. But 
an item in the National Intelligencer predicted a 
bloody encounter should the insurgents attempt to cap- 
ture the fort without artillery.^^ 

Judge Toulmin, for one, did not share Kemper's op- 
timism, although he did not openly tell him so. In a 
letter to Madison he commended the temperate tone 
of the convention address to the people of Mobile, and 
believed that Kemper would have a chance to bring it 
to their attention. All classes of people there desired 
a change in government, but few were ready to run 
the risk of advocating it openly or welcomed the pros- 
pect of attendant anarchy. Ultimate annexation to 
the American Union, which was the aim of the Baton 
Rouge Convention, was popular in Mobile. Toulmin 
believed that the Spanish officials there would even de- 
liver their posts directly to the United States, although 
overtures to that effect from General Matthews of 

26 Kemper to John Rhea, Oct. 28, 29, 1810, West Florida 
Papers, MS., 25, 26, Library of Congress. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 459 

Georgia, special agent of the secretary of war, had 
failed to elicit a definite response.^^ 

To avert possible hostilities and to bring about a 
" union of interests " between the " Mobilians " and the 
" Floridians " on the Mississippi, Toulmin determined 
on an indirect appeal to Folch. His son-in-law, Cap- 
tain James B. Wilkinson, sent to James Innerarity an 
account of Kemper's presence and mission. He felt 
that " the star of the West " would attract myriads of 
" Boatmen and sharp-shooting Kentuckians," who 
would be influenced less by plunder than by " an imag- 
inary glory and the novelty of the thing." While he 
did not know the attitude of the American cabinet, 
he advised his correspondent to ascertain whether in 
case of " extreme necessity " the Spaniards would ac- 
cept the assistance and protection of the United States. 
He promised to write more when he learned Kemper's 
"genuine object," and solemnly assured his friend that 
"our Government are perfect strangers to the meas- 
ures pursued at Baton Rouge."^^ 

Toulmin also advised Innerarity that the people of 
West Florida should apply directly to the American 
government for protection. This was the only way to 
checkmate the Conventionalists and paralyze foreign 
intrigues. The cautious merchant was inclined to 

^■^ Toulmin to Madison, Oct. 31, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 

28 Folch to Someruelos, Oct 30, 1810, enclosing Wilkinson's 
letter, Legajo 1568, Folch to Perez, Nov. 2, 1810, Legajo 55, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



460 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

think that it would be treasonable to hint at such a 
thing. Yet if Folch were in Mobile he would not 
hesitate to broach the subject, for he believed the 
Spanish governor would weigh the suggestion sensibly 
and calmly. The merchant wrote Captain Wilkinson 
that he preferred American control, if a change had 
to take place, but for the present he was satisfied with 
their existing government. He and his friends re- 
garded an invasion from the west as a portent of the 
" anerky " that Kemper threatened.^^ His attitude, 
as Toulmin believed, was typical of the majority at 
Mobile. They were alarmed, but cautious, and ready 
to welcome American control. The officials, as he 
ascertained during a recent visit, were courteous, but 
not inclined to political discussion. 

Meanwhile Kemper, according to the commandant 
at Mobile, was attracting adherents to his party and 
inflaming their spirits. On November 3 he commis- 
sioned Joseph P. Kennedy colonel in the service of 
the West Florida Convention. This was a promotion, 
on paper, for Kennedy ranked only as a major in the 
Mississippi mihtia. The new colonel could appoint his 
subordinates and with them determine such rules and 
articles of war as seemed necessary.^^ This free and 

29 Toulmin to Madison, Oct. 31, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. ; 
Kemper to Rhea, Nov. 5, 1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 36, 
Library of Congress. 

30 Kennedy to the Convention of the State of West Florida, 
Nov. 3, 1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 32, Library of Con- 
gress. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 46 1 

easy method of procedure was in keeping with the 
temper of the leaders, the character of their respective 
followers, and the outcome of their quixotic cause. 
By this act Kemper definitely arrayed himself against 
Judge Toulmin and the element in the American set- 
tlements that stood for law and order. 

On the same day that he gained this doubtful re- 
cruit, Kemper determined to let the Spaniards know 
more definitely his "genuine object." After some 
difficulty he secured a messenger, who bore to Caye- 
tano Perez, the commandant at Mobile, a copy of the 
address prepared by the convention. Perez received 
this missive on the evening of November 6, subjected 
the messenger to a rigorous examination, and then 
dismissed him without a reply. On the same evening 
he referred the communication to Folch and asked 
him how it should be answered. 

In keeping with the address Kemper offered to en- 
ter into any friendly arrangement with Perez for or- 
ganizing the people of Mobile along with Baton Rouge 
into a free and independent government. Since Bona- 
parte had annihilated the mother-country, they had 
" a natural Right by the Laws of God and Nations " 
to adopt such a government as the majority of the 
people should choose. The inspired "Republicans" 
of Baton Rouge, he wrote, "are free and are deter- 
mined not only to make you so but every individual in 
West Florida." Upon Perez would rest the responsi- 

31 



462 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

bility for the ensuing bloodshed should he reject their 
offer. At the same time Kemper promised him and his 
officials the same rank and pay they then enjoyed.^^ 

Kemper's appeal, with its combined bribe and threat, 
gave point to the previous American offers of help. 
Folch determined to address himself to the proper 
border authorities. He asked Colonel Sparks to 
break up Kemper's hostile projects within Amer- 
ican territory, and thus merit the approval of his 
superiors and "cement the union and harmony that 
exists between [their] respective governments." In 
behalf of this double object he enclosed the same 
request in a letter to Holmes. Sparks promised "to 
exert every legitimate power " he possessed to sup- 
port a good understanding "between his Catholic Maj- 
esty and the United States." Toulmin also seconded 
his efforts by writing to Holmes and to the president.^^ 

The receipt by Sparks of a packet from Pensacola 
aroused Kemper's suspicions. Could he have known 
of its contents, as indicated above, and of the letters 
of Innerarity, he would have felt still more uncom- 
fortable. The failure to receive a direct reply from 

31 Kemper to Perez, Nov. 3, 1810, West Florida Papers, 
MS., 34, Library of Congress. The same accompanies Perez 
to Folch, Nov. 6, 1810, Legajo 55, Papeles de Cuba. 

32 Toulmin to Madison, Nov. 22, 1810, enclosing Folch's 
letter of the 13th to Sparks, Madison Papers, MS. ; Folch to 
Holmes, translation, Mississippi Territorial Archives, MS., 
Vol. 9. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 463 

Perez was ominous. He inferred that a reinforce- 
ment of twenty men had given that officer greater con- 
fidence and led him to prepare for vigorous resistance. 
Yet he beHeved that the people would welcome a 
change in government. More disquieting was the pos- 
sibility of opposition from the American authorities. 
General George Matthews was in the vicinity on some 
mysterious errand that seemed to oppose his own. 
Colonel John McKee, the Choctaw agent, who was 
later to be closely associated with Matthews, told 
Kemper that he did not favor his plans, although he 
would do nothing against them. Kemper assured him 
that the convention would "maintain the Independ- 
ents of the Floridas throughout." Sparks let him 
know that Folch had requested the aid of American 
troops. Kemper regarded such a possibility as "a 
discreable [sic] movement" for himself and for every 
citizen of Florida. 

Against these possible discouragements Kemper 
balanced his new recruit, Kennedy. The latter was 
the most popular man in the community, was familiar 
with legal and military matters, and had influential 
friends in the United States and in West Florida, 
where two of his brothers resided. They were on 
good terms with the Spanish officials, but would join 
the insurgent standard as soon as he gave the word. 
As proof of his influence Kennedy himself wrote that 
he was to command the five companies of the Missis- 



464 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

sippi militia which Holmes was shortly to call into 
service in his district. He loved his country and the 
cause of Florida, between which he detected no con- 
flict of interests, and vowed never to prove a traitor 
to either. Unable to remain silent when men were 
fighting for liberty, the convention might absolutely 
depend on him : " my fortune shall be your fortune, 
your country shall be my country." 

Kennedy approved Kemper's plan to reduce both 
Mobile and Pensacola. Then the convention should 
make Mobile its capital and send ministers to propose 
annexation to the United States. If the latter re- 
sponded favorably the convention had nothing to fear ; 
if not, it would know what to do.^^ His statement 
shows that he and Kemper, Matthews and McKee, 
Toulmin and Sparks, the West Florida convention and 
the Madison administration were all working for a 
common end, although frequently at cross purposes. 
The people of the border, aroused by a decade of 
controversy, only awaited the beckoning hand of a 
real leader. Judge Toulmin and his friends doubted 
if Kennedy were the man of the hour. Needless to 
say Kemper did not agree with them. 

Believing that "Prompt and Inerjectick" measures 
were in order, the two disturbing spirits planned to raise 
their " star " below the line on Sunday, November 25. 

33 Kemper to Rhea, Nov. 5, 6, 10, West Florida Papers, MS., 
36-41, Library of Congress. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 465 

Here Kennedy promised to meet the convention troops 
with two (Kemper said ten) companies of recruits 
from "the upper country," which was unanimous in 
voicing its good wishes. With a force of five hundred 
men and two eighteen-pounders from Baton Rouge, 
they would "play Don Galves on the fort." The 
failure to answer Kemper's summons led them to ex- 
pect a show of resistance, but they had no doubt of . 
easy success. The speedy reduction of the fort would 
be followed in two or three months by the occupation 
of Pensacola and St. Augustine. 

These energetic conspirators contracted for a boat, 
powder, lead, and necessary provisions. To pay for 
these they drew upon Abner L. Duncan of New Or- 
leans, who was thus to suffer the inevitable punish- 
ment for too great friendliness. Edward Morgan of 
New Orleans, their " friend E. Randolph " of Pinck- 
neyville, and John Johnson, Sr., a "good" resident 
near Fort Stoddert, acted as intermediaries. As 
Judge Toulmin was postmaster at the last named settle- 
ment, they were forced to entrust many of their joint 
notes to a special messenger, "Major John Mills," 
who was to be rewarded by a suitable commission in 
the Floridian forces. 

Notwithstanding their apparently thorough organi- 
zation, they waited in anxious suspense for some cheer- 
ing word from Baton Rouge. A copy of the proposed 
constitution for West Florida might serve to "tran- 



466 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

quilize" the people of Mobile and bring them to sup- 
port the revolution. Kemper did not know whether 
they would resist or not, but expected through spies 
to learn their views and those of the residents of Pen- 
sacola before the eventful Sunday when he raised his 
standard below the line. He was concerned over the 
failure to hear from Duncan, but that agent was even 
then forwarding the supplies that the convention had 
recently ordered. The prospect of obtaining a twelve- 
pounder from Pascagoula gave him some comfort. 
Whatever happened now, as he and Kennedy wrote, 
their cause was " afloat " and they " must not look 
back."3* 

Kemper was much encouraged by the attitude of 
the American settlers above the line. At St. Stephens 
everybody seemed to favor his cause except Toulmin. 
Those residing near Fort Stoddert, in the fork of the 
Alabama and Tombigbee, generally promised him their 
support. Most of them were recent arrivals from 
Georgia, who bitterly resented the commercial policy 
of the Spaniards and looked to Kemper to relieve 
them from its exactions. In the Tensaw settlement 
they supported him almost unanimously. Their offi- 
cials openly encouraged him, and in some cases as- 
sured him that by going below the line he would place 
himself beyond the reach of American laws, gain a 

34 Kemper to Rhea, Nov. 19, 1810, West Florida Papers, 
MS., 46, Library of Congress. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 467 

share in the plunder of the campaign, and obtain six 
hundred and forty acres of land at its close. Some of 
the militia officers even resigned their commissions to 
take the same rank in the service of West Florida.^^ 
In all of these settlements the filibusters encountered 
one determined opponent. Toulmin, " the old Exiled 
Briton," as Kemper called him, warned the prospec- 
tive recruits that by taking part in the expedition they 
jeopardized their persons and property and might in 
the end find themselves under British jurisdiction. 
In the Tensaw settlement he tried to induce one of the 
leaders, a certain "Major" Buford from South Caro- 
lina, to change his course. The latter promised to do 
so, but later showed that his promise was worthless. 
Kemper had a "war talk" with the judge, called him 
an " old fool " for interfering with his " speculations," 
and threatened him with the vengeance that he visited 
on all who crossed his path. As Toulmin had already 
incurred the animosity of the restless elements in the 
region by his course the preceding summer, threats and 
hard names did not deter him from his self-imposed 
public service. In the existing state of public opinion 
he doubted the efficacy of the ordinary legal processes. 
Sol he made his reports directly to the president, and 
to Kemper's disgust circulated a letter from Madison 
in which the latter expressed his disapproval of the 
earlier proposed expedition. Still Kemper did not 

35 Toulmin to Madison, Nov. 22, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



468 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

regard Toulmin's course as especially injurious. But 
the judge thought that the other was exceeding the 
instructions of the convention. He believed that that 
body had given Kemper blank commissions under the 
impression that a considerable American population 
lived below the line. Accordingly he wrote his friend 
John Ballinger at Baton Rouge pointing out the lam- 
entable effects that might be expected from Kemper's 
methods. He was inclined to think that Kemper would 
gain few followers, possibly a hundred in all. These 
would be "barely enough to begin the work of mis- 
chief." They could not take the fort at Mobile, but 
by a futile attack might jeopardize the people and the 
property in its vicinity. To avoid this possibility he 
urged that his friends induce the Spanish officials, if 
possible, to make a direct application to the American 
government for assistance. For all of these eiTorts 
Innerarity believed that every inhabitant in West Flor- 
ida owed him a debt of gratitude. 

In his stormy interview with Toulmin, Kemper had 
reiterated his determination to raise the " star " below 
the line on November 25, whatever the number of his 
followers. He assured Toulmin that Colonel Sparks 
had told him that his cause was just and that thou- 
sands would flock to his assistance.^^ The leaders 
needed all the encouragement of this sort they could 
gather. On November 23 Robert Caller, Jr., informed 

36 Toulmin to Madison, Nov. 22, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 469 

Kennedy that he could not meet him that evening, 
although he would be present at "Bunker Hill" (the 
name adopted for their rendezvous) on the follow- 
ing Sunday. " Don't blot me out of your books yet," 
he implored. His report of recruits was not particu- 
larly encouraging. Captain Jones in the " fork " had 
a full company, Captain Moffet about fifty men, and 
a third officer, twenty-two. One, N. Gilmore, "was 
abusing the expedition with all his might." Kennedy 
himself intimated that he might be late in reaching the 
rallying place, and he forwarded some powder, lead, 
drums, his own trunk containing the colors, and (ill- 
omened harbinger) a barrel of whiskey .^^ 

Kemper had planned to rally his followers on the 
east side of the Mobile, so as more readily to cut off 
Spanish assistance from Pensacola. But Folch, leaving 
the latter place, reached Mobile November 21, and this 
move gave the affair a different aspect. Yet, deter- 
mining to pursue the plan agreed upon, Kemper sent 
one of his followers, Samuel McMullen, to observe the 
governor's forces and to report upon the disposition of 
the people. Later he learned that Folch's presence 
did not seem to make them enthusiastic in the Spanish 
cause. He interpreted this as a willingness on their 
part to submit to the convention. From Pensacola, to 
Which town he had sent " Major " Parsons with copies 

27 Kemper to McMillan, with enclosures, Nov. 23, 1810, West 
Florida Papers, MS., 53, 54, Library of Congress. 



470 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

of the proclamation, came an agent to report sickness 
among the officers of the garrison and an utter lack of 
precautions against attack. Many a resident, like the 
agent's father-in-law, was ready "to turn his jacket" 
when the insurgents arrived, or, like himself, had de- 
termined to move above the line and await results. 
" Our Cockade is mounting," exultingly wrote Kem- 
per; but he went on to report the "villainous exer- 
tions " of Judge Toulmin, that " base Devil filled with 
deceptive and Bloody Rascality."^^ 

Some details of Toulmin's " Rascality " appear in a 
later report of Toulmin to the president. He could 
no longer depend on the militia officers to restrain their 
men, as he had done the preceding summer, for most 
of them had already joined the filibusters. Judicial 
processes were futile, for no jurymen would convict 
their fellow-citizens for undertaking an expedition 
against the Spaniards. Even Governor Holmes had 
failed to answer his recent warnings. The main pur- 
pose of his associates and himself was to maintain the 
honor and dignity of the government. They wished 
to do so in a legal way. Therefore they had advised 
the imperilled Spaniards to appeal directly to the 
United States for protection.^^ 

John Ballinger had recently written from Baton 
Rouge that the convention was divided over the ad- 

38 Ibid. 

39 Toulmin to Madison, Nov. 28, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 47 1 

visability of attacking Mobile. This led Toulmin a 
second time to write to Innerarity and urge " manly " 
efforts by the Spanish officers to awaken the United 
States from its lethargy. His argument was clear and 
compelling : *' Could the proposition for the transfer of 
Florida come from the Floridian authorities, and that 
from the highest source, surely the cautious policy of 
the American government, would hold out no longer — 
and knowledge of such an overture would be such an 
appeal to the patriotism and Americanism of the New 
Baton Rouge assembly that they could not resist."*^ 
As we have seen, Folch had already made overtures 
of this sort to Sparks and Holmes. He now came on 
to Mobile to continue them, and possibly to escape the 
scrutiny of the officious Morales. Thus it was pos- 
sible for Innerarity to present the situation directly to 
him. The executive informed the merchant that he 
had already taken " decisive steps " as mentioned above, 
and that these afforded the only means of allaying the 
prevailing discontent. Furthermore he had advised 
the captain-general to deliver Florida to the United 
States, " in trust until the conclusion of a treaty in 
which an equivalent to Spain should be determined 
and agreed upon." Folch felt that the preliminaries 
to such a treaty were already under way, and that he 
was justified in asking the American authorities to 

40 Toulmin to Innerarity, Nov. 15, 1810, American Historical 
Review, II, 701, 702. 



472 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

break up the plundering expedition then forming on 
the Tensaw and the Tombigbee. In addition to these 
statements Folch told Innerarity that if the Amer- 
icans above the line gave no assistance, directly or 
indirectly, to the agents of the convention, he would 
immediately abolish the commercial duties of which 
they complained. This action was to take place on 
the very day he received word that the people of the 
three counties involved entirely repudiated the expedi- 
tion of Kemper and Kennedy. If this concession did not 
wrest the arms from their hands, he could only oppose 
force to force and continue the duties as before. 
Only a desire to prevent the shedding of blood ''be- 
tween men who will probably soon become citizens of 
the same community " prompted him to make this offer. 
In transmitting it, Innerarity hoped it would be suc- 
cessful in stopping Kemper before he crossed the line.*^ 
The terms of Folch's offer were rather too sweep- 
ing to be effective. In the turbulent American popu- 
lation some would inevitably be found to violate the 
essential condition that no direct or indirect aid should 
be given to the Conventionalists. Perhaps the wily 
Spaniard anticipated this but hoped by his specious 
offer to persuade the Americans to suppress all filibus- 
tering. He feared this rather than the more regular 
efforts of the Baton Rouge insurgents. His previous 

■^i Folch to Sparks, Nov. 20, 1810, enclosed in Toulmin to 
Madison, Nov. 28, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. ; American His- 
torical Review, II, 703. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 473 

hints about giving up his province, under certain con- 
tingencies, were in keeping with the assurances he now 
gave, and naturally tended to give the Americans more 
confidence in them. They would doubtless feel that 
he was yielding to the inevitable and immediately ex- 
tend to him the assistance he craved. This protection 
from Kemper's cohorts would in turn serve to justify 
his action, should his superiors be inclined to criticise. 
Above all, some unexpected turn might even yet en- 
able him to maintain his precarious foothold, and this 
security would more than atone for any apparent mo- 
mentary weakness. 

Accepting Folch's statement in good faith, Innerar- 
ity wrote that it would be lamentable to have his inten- 
tions frustrated by rash lawlessness or a cold calculat- 
ing policy on the part of the American government. 
He urged Toulmin to use every effort with Sparks to 
prevent the effusion of blood. If they were successful 
the people of Mobile would hail the American flag 
with joy; if not, with mourning. Colonel Gushing 
was on his way to Fort Stoddert, and when he reached 
Mobile, Folch would explain his intentions " more 
fully." Innerarity's brother John, residing in Pensa- 
cola, also wrote that the additional force Gushing was 
bringing with him ought to save the province from 
anarchy. Then within two months it might honorably 
be annexed to the United States. Such an end, how- 
ever, depended wholly on the prompt action of the 



474 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

American government, and those interested in secur- 
ing this were sending William Simpson to New Or- 
leans as their agent. 

Like every other good citizen of the region, Toul- 
min regarded the commercial duties at Mobile as bur- 
densome, and was ready " to go to any length under 
the authority of the government to get rid of them." 
The offer of Folch seemed too good to lose. He wrote 
Innerarity that the leaders of the expedition were 
simply using public resentment for their own advan- 
tage, and he disliked to have the concession appear to 
come about as a result of their lawlessness. He de- 
termined to increase his efforts in behalf of peace. 
At first he planned to go to McCurtin's Bluff (their 
"Bunker Hill") and attempt to reason with the men 
in the ranks. Not being able to obtain a boat for this 
purpose, he contented himself with sending two private 
soldiers with letters to the leaders. In addition, act- 
ing under a former order of the War Department, 
Captain Gaines decided to visit Folch and urge him to 
express his intention in a public proclamation. This 
would remove, in a regular way, every pretext for ac- 
tion by filibusters. 

Before Gaines reached Mobile, Folch had sent 
Sparks a second request to restrain the lawless charac- 
ters that threatened him with ruin. He even author- 
ized the American officer to send troops, if necessary, 
to McCurtin's Bluff, or to any other point within West 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 475 

Florida. This permission, he said, ought to restrain 
effectually the " extravagant restlessness " of a " mere 
handful of people who disgrace humanity," remove 
any possible misconception of the policy of the Ameri- 
cans, and preserve the existing harmony between their 
nations. 

On the following day, in the course of a personal 
interview, Gaines promisesd Folch that the American 
authorities would punish their restless citizens. On 
his part Folch agreed to levy no further duties on 
American goods within his district (including Pasca- 
goula). He was led to make this concession because 
of the desire expressed by the American authorities, 
through Gaines, to preserve harmonious relations with 
the neighboring officials. Moreover he professed to 
believe that a negotiation was then under way for the 
cession of the Floridas to the United States.*^ 

Toulmin, as we have seen, was unable to accompany 
Gaines as far as the rendezvous of the filibusters. It 
was well that he did not go, for Kemper arrested his 
messengers, under the pretext that they were deserters, 
and later made an insolent demand on Sparks for the 
correspondence that he and Toulmin had carried on 
with the Spaniards. Now that the outlaws were under 
the protection of the " star " and beyond American 
jurisdiction they might have visited upon the judge the 
resentment they had been storing up against him since 

^2 Toulmin to Madison, Nov. 28, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



476 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

the previous summer. They especially resented his 
criticism of Kennedy, whose acts, according to Toul- 
min, "would have hung him in any other country." 

The arrest of the messengers and the news of Folch's 
latest offer spurred Toulmin and Sparks to renewed 
activity. While the latter sent an officer to recover 
his men and invited the insurgent leaders to a confer- 
ence, the judge addressed himself to Major Buford 
and Colonel John Caller. The former had not proved 
dependable in breaking up the expedition, of which 
he was now reported to be a member, but Toulmin 
hoped he would now take advantage of this oppor- 
tunity to serve his country. John Caller, though a 
brother of James, whose similar attempt Toulmin had 
previously defeated, was a justice of Washington 
County, and because of his age and position should 
have assisted in maintaining the law rather than break- 
ing it. But in this hope Toulmin was disappointed. 
Buford reported Toulmin's communication so as to 
convey the impression that the judge favored the ex- 
pedition. The judge later tried to institute legal pro- 
ceedings against both these men, but was unable to 
convince the county attorney that his evidence was 
sufficient to justify the step.^^ 

Kemper's shrewd but somewhat terrifying person- 
ality doubtless attracted some followers to his stand- 
ard ; his extravagant promises of aid from Baton 

*3 Toulmin to Madison, Dec. 6, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 477 

Rouge gained more; but the compelling motive with 
most of his recruits was resentment at the rigorous 
Spanish commercial policy. Yet among the sixty or 
seventy misguided men, largely recent settlers on the 
public lands about the " forks " or on the Tensaw, 
that attended the initial rally at McCurtin's Bluff, there 
were few that possessed property, or paid duties to 
the Spanish government or any other. A former Ken- 
tuckian. Dr. John Barry, who was regarded as an ac- 
complice, gave Toulmin some information of their 
movements. The men were in high spirits (evidently 
Kennedy's barrel had arrived) ; they forced all with 
whom they came in contact to declare their sentiments, 
and breathed out threatenings against their opponents, 
among whom they regarded Toulmin as chief. A 
report that the military authorities might hold up a 
boatload of provisions led Kemper to order it to pass 
directly in front of the fort. " Let them stop it if they 
dare," was his challenge. But those in charge more 
prudently conveyed it by the eastern channel of the 
Mobile. 

Kemper's followers, not numerous enough to for- 
tify any one place, maintained what he called a " mov- 
ing camp " on the eastern shore of Mobile Bay. He 
tried to rally the neighboring people to his standard, 
but the general effect of his presence was to terrorize 
them and force many to seek safety in Mobile or above 
the line. Toulmin was credibly informed that " re- 
32 



478 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

spectable legal characters in New Orleans" had ad- 
vised the convention to reduce Mobile. Yet if Kem- 
per were acting as the agent of that body, the judge 
could not understand why he also tried to involve 
American citizens. As irregular levies the latter were 
absolutely inefficient.^* Possibly Kemper designed to 
involve the leaders on the Tombigbee so thoroughly 
that in case the United States did not recognize the 
convention they must make common cause with it and 
add their settlements to the new state of West Florida. 
Governor Holmes was too far away to deal effec- 
tively with the problem, which thus rested upon Toul- 
min. He might prosecute the ringleaders, although 
at some personal peril ; but the legislature was about 
to abolish the district court over which he presided 
and institute separate county courts, which undoubt- 
edly would favor the filibusters. He doubted his 
authority to detain boats bound below the line, but 
he might force those in charge to furnish bail for 
their good behavior. Under these conditions he could 
only appeal to Madison. So, too, could his enemies, 
as E. Lewis demonstrated in a long and intemperate 
missive assailing Toulmin as a foreigner, whose par- 
tiality tended to make all laws contemptible. His 

*4 Ibid. ; Kemper to Jackson, Nov. 17, 1815, Papers in Rela- 
tion to Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, 
Meek MSS. ; Mendieta to Folch, Nov. 29, 1810, Legajo 1568, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 479 

animus, however, plainly put him in the camp of the 
filibusters. 

In his letter of December 6 Toulmin had naively 
mentioned with surprise a prevalent report that the 
American government, through the territorial officials, 
was encouraging disturbances in West Florida in order 
to annex the region. Could he have seen Claiborne's 
famous letter to Wykoff he might have been less aston- 
ished, but considerably crestfallen. The aims of the 
American government, however, in furthering the pro- 
ceedings at Baton Rouge smacked of greater regularity 
than Kemper's filibustering projects. The Louisiana 
Gazette pointed out the fact that the latter might 
prevent the formal cession of the Floridas to the 
United States. This possibility caused Madison great 
concern. Kemper's lawless attempt was not only " re- 
pugnant to his wishes " but contravened his plan to oc- 
cupy West Florida. The administration organ warned 
the outlaws that their expedition might lead the people 
of Mobile, who were anxious to become American 
citizens, to seek a French protectorate. By this means 
they might save themselves from conquest by the 
Baton Rouge Convention or from plunder by banditti 
nominally in its employ.*^ 

Folch speedily learned that the insurgents had 

45 Toulmin to Madison, Dec. 22, 1810, E. Lewis to Madison, 
Dec. 10, 1810, Madison Papers, MS.; National Intelligencer, 
Dec. 22, 1810; Morphy to Audiencia, Nov. 14, 1810, Historia, 
MS., Vol. 330, A. G., Mexico. 



480 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

burned a dwelling and a sawmill and committed other 
atrocities. He did not think they were strong enough 
to capture the fort, although they might sacrifice the 
town in a desperate attempt to do so. After raising 
the standard the marauder suggested a joint confer- 
ence upon the best method of securing the liberty of 
West Florida. This insult proved to be the last straw. 
The long-suffering executive immediately wrote the 
captain-general that he absolutely lacked all means to 
cope with existing conditions. His superior had failed 
to respond to his repeated requests, because, as Folch 
believed, he was wholly unable to do so. He himself 
could not work miracles, so unless he received some 
assistance before the first of January he would deliver 
up his province to the Americans.*® 

Folch at once informed Colonel McKee of his inten- 
tion to treat directly with the president for the delivery 
of his province. The increasing perils, he wrote, 
warned him to carry on this negotiation in more posi- 
tive terms than he had employed in his letters to 
Holmes and Sparks. He felt confident that McKee, 
from his personal knowledge of frontier conditions, 
could give the president much valuable information. 
Prompt action was necessary to forestall the dangers 
that threatened both American and Spanish jurisdic- 
tions from French agents and Florida insurgents. 

46 Folch to Someruelos, Nov. 30, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles 
de Cuba. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 48I 

Folch therefore asked McKee to be his personal mes- 
senger to Washington. McKee at once conferred with 
Colonel Sparks and Judge Toulmin. To these men 
Folch's letter seemed the culmination of hints that the 
Spaniard had given during the past two years. These 
hints had already brought an American commissioner, 
General George Matthews, to the border. They deter- 
mined, therefore, that McKee should proceed at once 
to Washington with Folch's offer. At the same time 
Toulmin sought to disabuse the president of the im- 
pression, for which he was partially responsible, that 
McKee was a former accomplice of Burr.*^ 

Folch had already given Sparks permission to use 
his troops below the line, should such a course be nec- 
essary in order to restrain the insurgents. The Amer- 
ican commander had courteously declined to avail him- 
self of this permission, without express orders from 
his superiors, but Folch's desire to make some agree- 
ment for delivering his province to the American gov- 
ernment caused Sparks and his associates to conceive 
high hopes from the Spaniard's most recent offer. 
Yet there was no indication that Folch had lost his 
usual finesse. He proposed nothing more than to 
treat for the delivery of his province. It is true that 
in his letter to Someruelos, he had actually threatened 
to abandon it unless he were reinforced before the 

47 Folch to McKee, Dec. 2, 1810, McKee to Eustis, Dec. 5, 
1810, Letters Received, MS., War Department; Toulmin to 
Madison, Dec. 6, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



482 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

first of the year. If the captain-general did not ap- 
prove his purpose, he might forestall it by a speedy 
response. His failing to respond earlier had led Folch 
to his resolution, and now Someruelos would be forced 
to share with him the responsibility for making it. If 
negotiations were under way for the transfer of the 
province to the Americans, neither would be held 
blamable. On the other hand any trifling aid would 
furnish a pretext for withdrawing his offer. Until 
that event the Americans would have to defend him 
from the Baton Rouge insurgents and their irregular 
helpers. 

Although professing willingness to surrender his 
province to a legitimate government, Folch first wished 
to chastise all rebels in it. After Kemper's challenge 
he made two unsuccessful attempts to attack him on 
the east side of Mobile Bay. The filibuster main- 
tained his " moving camp " altogether too well. But 
the fates worked against the rebels even better than 
the governor hoped. Sparks, possibly as a result of 
Toulmin's " unfortunate interference," had invited 
Kemper to confer with him in regard to Folch's offer 
to suspend the duties at Mobile. Kemper delayed 
nearly a fortnight before complying. The delay leads 
one to suspect that he did not accept the invitation 
until prospective failure led him to seek some pretext 
for disbanding his followers. If so, further disap- 
pointment was in store for him. Toulmin placed him 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 483 

under arrest, along with Caller and Kennedy, whom 
family illness had called from the disintegrating camp 
on Saw Mill Creek.*^ 

Kemper asserted that Toulmin immediately apprised 
Folch of their detention. But the Spanish executive 
had other information of their whereabouts. On the 
morning of December lo, with a force of one hundred 
regulars and militia (American accounts add a score 
or two), he embarked on the river, and late in the 
afternoon landed about a half league from their sup- 
posed camp. After a wide detour he approached the 
spot shortly after nightfall without being discovered. 
Possibly the whiskey of which the remnant of the 
band, some two dozen in number, had liberally par- 
taken did its part in concealing the approach of the 
Spaniard's force. The surprise was not complete, for 
an impatient soldier discharged his gun too soon, and 

48 Toulmin to Madison, Dec. 22, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 
J. F. H. Claiborne states (Mississippi I, 308), that Kemper 
was arrested on the instigation of Silas Dinsmoor, the Indian 
agent, " an accomplished but mischief making man." The 
Mississippi historian believed that the arrest was uncalled for. 
Kemper was acting for a de facto government and in his 
opinion had attempted nothing more than had the leaders 
at Baton Rouge. If he could have turned Mobile over to the 
federal authorities, as they turned over Baton Rouge, he 
would have been as honored as they. The facts as narrated 
above will show that Kemper did not act on so high a plane 
as the others, nor did the latter receive what they regarded 
as their desserts for delivering Baton Rouge to the Americans. 



484 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

this gave the outlaws a chance to kill two of Folch's 
men and wound four. The filibusters claimed that the 
first notice they had of the enemy was a general volley 
as they lay around their fires. Folch killed four of 
their number, wounded three, and made seven pris- 
oners. In addition he seized their provisions, stand- 
ards, and a large boat. In this inglorious fashion the 
" star " of West Florida disappeared from the Mobile. 
A few of the survivors were ordered to join the in- 
surgents on the Pascagoula. On their way thither 
they had a slight brush with a party of fifty Spaniards, 
whom they chased toward Mobile. This feat gratified 
their wounded pride, but it did not repair the greater 
damage caused by their unauthorized acts.*^ 

An interesting aftermath to the fight at Saw Mill 
Creek was the effort put forth by the friends of Har- 
greave and Sibley, two of Folch's captives, to obtain 
their release. Claiborne actively interested himself in 
their behalf, with the approval of the State Depart- 
ment, and John Ballinger and John Sibley seconded 
his efforts. During the second struggle with Great 
Britain the treatment accorded them caused the news- 
papers to threaten war against Spain. Diplomats 
exerted themselves to secure their release, or at least 

*9 Folch to Someruelos, Dec. 11, 1810, Legajo 1568, Papeles 
de Cuba ; John Nicholson to Rhea, Dec. 17, 1810, West Florida 
Papers, MS., 96, Library of Congress; Nashville Clarion and 
Gazette, Feb. i, 181 1. 



FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 485 

to mitigate their sufferings. As time wore on their 
more fortunate leaders, among them Kennedy, felt 
called upon to explain how they escaped a like fate. 
Apodaca later released Sibley and some others. 
Kemper made two journeys to Washington in an at- 
tempt to secure aid for the remaining captives, and ap- 
pealed to Andrew Jackson to assist him. He drew an 
affecting picture of the aged Hargreave, a Revolution- 
ary veteran, who before 1810 had never breathed other 
than free "American ayre," then loaded with irons 
and exposed to insult, and forced to hard labor in the 
streets of Havana.^" Truly the way of the filibuster 
was like that of other transgressors. 

Holmes had exerted himself so strongly against the 
expedition of the preceding summer that he was 
greatly chagrined to learn that Kemper and his asso- 
ciates had persuaded even a few to take part in their 
ill-considered enterprise. The prosecution of these 
leaders, he reported, developed some irritation; but 
in view of the president's measures he did not ex- 
pect any further attempt against Mobile.^^ Kemper 
himself, in despair, wrote to the West Florida Conven- 
tion chiding it for failing to send him instructions, 
and shortly thereafter learned that his agency was ter- 

50 Kemper to Jackson, Nov. 17, 1810, Meek MSS. ; cf. n. 44- 

51 Holmes to Toulmin, Dec. 2(i, 1810, Proceedings Executive 
Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., Vol. i. 



486 FILIBUSTERING OPERATIONS ON THE MOBILE 

minated by the demise of that body.^^ His only re- 
course was to turn his animus against Judge Toulmin, 
about whom poHtical controversy long continued to 
rage, or to attempt further unavailing filibustering 
efforts against the hated Spaniards. 

52 Kemper to Rhea, Dec. i6, 25, 1810, West Florida Papers, 
MS., 94, 98, Library of Congress. 



CHAPTER XIII 
American Intervention in West Florida 

Popular interest in the fate of West Florida early 
manifested itself in Kentucky and Tennessee. Neigh- 
borhood and personal connections and commercial pos- 
sibilities — for the people of those States wished an 
outlet by way of the Tennessee and the Mobile — largely 
accounted for this interest. In the summer and early 
fall the newspapers suggested a series of county meet- 
ings for preparing addresses to the president on the 
subject of annexation. It was thought that he was in- 
different to the subject, but that he would not inter- 
fere in measures to assist the people of West Florida 
to gain their freedom, provided such measures did not 
" compromit the peace of the nation.'* He would not 
interfere, did they but know it, even without the pro- 
viso. 

Those who favored this expression of public opinion 
went on to point out that while the administration was 
waiting for the people of West Florida to declare and 
maintain their independence or for Napoleon to dis- 
pose of the territory for a nominal sum, British agents 
might carry away the prize. Premature report already 

487 



488 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

credited them with occupying Pensacola.^ Gallatin 
expected Great Britain to oppose the independence of 
the Spanish colonies, at least as long as she was war- 
ring in Spain's behalf ; and in case of repulse in the 
Peninsula, he expected her to set up a nominal regency 
in Cuba, where she could favor her own commercial 
interests at the expense of the Americans and inter- 
fere at will in the Floridas. His only suggestion, in 
that event, was to send Erving to Havana to circum- 
vent English diplomacy there.^ 

Eustis, the secretary of war, was interested in re- 
straining the filibusters at Mobile, so as to advance 
Matthews's mission. Paul Hamilton of the Navy De- 
partment, in September, prophesied " occurrences very 
interesting to the United States " in the Floridas, and 
declared that these occurrences must lead his chief to 
exercise " much circumspection and no little firm- 
ness."^ As Madison was not conspicuous for the latter 
quality, Holmes's report of the capture of Baton Rouge 
put him in a quandary. He wrote his mentor Jeffer- 
son that he doubted if he possessed adequate powers to 
deal with the problem, or if he ought to do so before 
the approaching session of Congress. The successful 
faction at Baton Rouge had as yet made no advances 

^Nashville Clarion and Gazette, Aug. 17, 1810; National 
Intelligencer, Oct. 12, 30, 1810. 

2 Gallatin to Jeiiferson, Sept. 17, 1810, Jefferson Papers, MS., 
Library of Congress. 

3 Hamilton to Madison, Sept. 20, 1810, Madison Papers, MS. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 489 

to him, but he expected them to do so, or to address 
Great Britain. In the latter event he felt that he might 
fairly take possession of Baton Rouge, especially if the 
British manifested any tendency to interfere as they 
had done at Caracas. If he did so, he expected to 
arouse their resentment and possibly bring about a 
war in which Great Britain, France, and Spain, com- 
promising their differences, would combine against the 
United States.* 

The remote possibility that he might indirectly be- 
come the peacemaker of Europe did not deter Madi- 
son from acting when he received from Holmes a 
copy of the declaration and address issued by the con- 
vention at Baton Rouge. He wisely determined to 
abandon any thought of awaiting action by Congress 
some five weeks hence. He must initiate measures for 
taking possession of the territory at once, not so much 
to prevent foreign intervention as to maintain order 
among the turbulent factions composing its population. 
Fortunately Claiborne, the chosen agent of his policy, 
was still at hand for advice and personal instructions. 
On October 27, therefore, he issued the momentous proc- 
lamation that translated into concrete action the plaus- 
ible arguments of the past seven years. West Florida 
formed part of the Louisiana Purchase. Thus the 
president reiterated the familiar claim. The fact that 
the United States had since 1803 acquiesced in Spanish 

*Hunt, Madison, VIII, 109. 



490 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

occupancy, had not vitiated this claim. The present 
crisis threatened it, and moreover interfered with en- 
actments against the slave-trade. The laws of the 
United States which sanctioned temporary occupation 
by Spain also contemplated ultimate occupation by 
the United States. With this in view he directed Gov- 
ernor Claiborne to take possession of the territory; 
and invited the people to respect him, to obey the laws, 
and to preserve order, with assurance of adequate 
protection.^ 

On the same day Smith directed Claiborne to repair 
at once to Mississippi Territory and there consult with 
Governor Holmes about taking possession of the re- 
gion. After creating a favorable impression by dis- 
tributing copies of the proclamation, he was to or- 
ganize the militia, form parishes, and establish the 
necessary courts. For any additional powers he was 
to look to the legislature of Orleans Territory, to 
which West Florida was to be annexed. " Should, 
however, any particular place, however small, remain 
in possession of a Spanish force," the secretary warned 
him, " you will not proceed to employ force against it, 
but you will make immediate report thereof to this 
Department." Should the people of the territory op- 
pose its occupation by force, the commander of the 
regular troops was to aid him. Smith promised ade- 
quate protection to the people of the territory about 

'^ American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 395. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 49I 

to be occupied, provided they acquiesced in the inter- 
vention, but his statement that the region "will not 
cease to be a subject of fair and friendly negotiation 
and adjustment was likely to arouse their concern." 
Shortly after Claiborne's departure Rhea's second 
communication reached the State Department. Smith 
at once informed Holmes of his qualified assent to the 
requested pardon for deserters, but warned him not 
to encourage Rhea's other proposals. The instructions 
of the president, as we have seen, were to the same 
effect.^ 

While awaiting the results of its policy, the ad- 
ministration sought to prepare the public for it. A 
few days before the opening of Congress, the National 
Intelligencer quoted a letter of October 30 from Wash- 
ington, Mississippi, urging the earliest possible atten- 
tion of the government to the situation in West Flor- 
ida, on account of the danger to American interests 
from foreign interference. There was a strong British 
party in the region, but every true American, judging 
from the recent border activity, was prepared to resist 
its efforts. The representatives of the people there 
were preparing to adopt a new constitution and to 
prosecute a military campaign, but they would joy- 
fully acquiesce in any " claim of dominancy the United 
States might set up." 

« Smith to Claiborne, Nov. 5, 1810, Domestic Letters, MS., 
Vol. 15, 458, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of 
State. 



492 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 



A few days later, in an obvious attempt to forestall 
criticism, the Intelligencer stated that the affairs of 
West Florida, though important, would probably not 
require any immediate action by Congress. Citizens 
would, however, "look with anxiety for any commu- 
nication of the executive."^ Later in December the 
administrative organ quoted the opinion of a New Or- 
leans correspondent, that the only rational course to 
pursue was to take possession to the Perdido. More- 
over, if there was the most remote possibility of East 
Florida's falling into the possession of any European 
power whatever, the United States should add Pensa- 
cola and St. Augustine. Commercial and strategic 
reasons rather than the intrinsic value of the territory 
itself dictated this course. In case of war with Great 
Britain the United States must occupy those ports or 
yield New Orleans. They afforded excellent harbor 
facilities and gave easy access to the Creeks and the 
Choctaws.^ 

Before Madison revealed his hand, even the opposi- 
tion papers hinted that prompt action was needed to 
forestall foreign intervention. The New York Even- 
ing Post regarded an independent West Florida as 
preposterous, and looked upon either Great Britain or 
France as a troublesome neighbor. The Freeman's 
Journal of Philadelphia thought the declaration vio- 

■^ National Intelligencer, Nov. 2^, Dec. i, 1810. 
8 Ibid., Dec. 25, 1810. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 493 

lated the vested rights of the United States under the 
West Florida Claim, a claim that "would assume a 
serious aspect under an energetic government." In 
any event Florida must one day become a part of the 
United States. The Alexandria Gazette also referred 
to the claim to the Perdido, hinted that the principal 
hindrance to taking possession arose from the " Presi- 
dent's love or fear of Bonaparte," and wished to have 
the question referred to Congress. Thus the opposing 
press as well as the administration organ was firm in 
demanding prompt and energetic measures, although 
each defined these in its own way.^ 

Meanwhile the agents of the administration were 
preparing to carry out its policy. On December i 
Claiborne reached Washington, Mississippi, and in two 
days the printed copies of the president's proclamation 
were ready for distribution. The two executives re- 
garded the majority of the people of West Florida as 
anxious to accept its provisions, but felt that it was 
necessary to provide against intriguing factions and 
outside adventurers. For this purpose Colonel Cov- 
ington was to follow Claiborne closely with four hun- 
dred troops — all that he could transport at once — 
while Colonel Pike was to hold the remainder as a re- 
serve. Claiborne was to proceed down the river, while 
Holmes went overland to St. Francisville, where he 
would candidly explain to the legislature then in ses- 

® Quoted in National Intelligencer, Dec. orjy 1810. 
33 



494 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

sion there the reasons for the president's policy, and 
endeavor to reconcile the members to it.^^ 

After securing the adjournment of the Mississippi 
legislature without arousing undue curiosity and ex- 
citement, and after ordering the militia officers to hold 
their commands in readiness, including those near 
Mobile, Holmes set out for St. Francisville on the 
evening of December 4.^^ On the same evening Clai- 
borne reached Fort Adams and began to prepare his 
own escort. He also instructed Colonel Sparks, at 
Fort Stoddert, to distribute the proclamation in the 
vicinity of Mobile and to prepare his troops to take 
possession of that place. This step was necessary, for 
the two executives had heard that Folch had recently 
received reinforcements from Vera Cruz. This might 
lead the Conventionalists — or more properly speaking, 
the filibusters under Kemper and Kennedy — to attempt 
some desperate act, which the regulars and militia 
should prevent.^^ 

Claiborne also anticipated difficulty with the con- 
vention unless the United States should assume the 
debt it had created and legalize the land sales made 
since 1803. His messengers were accordingly in- 
structed, when distributing their proclamations, to as- 
certain the opinion of its members, the strength of its 

10 Claiborne to Smith, Dec. i, 2, 3, 1810 (Parker, 7656-7664). 

11 Holmes to Smith, Jan. i, 181 1 (Parker, 4405). This is a 
detailed account of Holmes' movements in West Florida. 

12 Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 5, 1810 (Parker, 7666). 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 495 

forces, particularly in the fort at Baton Rouge, and 
the strength and condition of the Spanish and insur- 
gent forces at Mobile and Pensacola. One messenger 
was to go to St. Francisville, where he was to report 
to Holmes on the 7th, and the other to Baton Rouge. 
The former was to state that Claiborne was on the 
way, and that he brought no troops with him but had 
arranged to have them follow him.^^ 

On the same day that Holmes and Claiborne were 
giving the final touches to their plans for intervention, 
the unconscious executive of the short-lived state was 
urging the president to hasten that step, albeit not as 
his neighbors were proposing to take it. Despite the 
efforts from various sources to bring pressure to bear 
upon the American executive, Skipwith apprehended 
that he had not yet been properly informed in regard 
to the wishes of the people in West Florida. He ex- 
plained that while the majority favored the declara- 
tion of independence, they realized that their only sure 
hope for the future rested on union with the United 
States. This belief led them to accompany their decla- 
ration with an appeal to that power for protection, and 
the greater part of the people still hoped for union 
on terms of mutual advantage. He referred to their 
previous willingness to be received as a separate State 
or Territory or to be incorporated with one of the 
neighboring units. In the latter case he suggested that 

^3 Claiborne to King, Dec. 5, 1810 (Parker, 7665). 



496 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

it would be advantageous to unite them with Orleans 
Territory, for then the American element would pre- 
dominate in the proposed new State. The present 
military expedition against Mobile rendered more 
necessary than ever the loan they had previously re- 
quested. Aided by this they could expel all Spanish 
troops from West Florida, unless these were strongly 
reinforced. In this remote contingency he requested 
the active cooperation of American troops. The 
authorities of West Florida had not yet sent an agent 
to treat with the secretary of state, preferring to await 
some hint of American views. If the president pre- 
ferred to begin negotiations through commissioners 
from the vicinity, such a course would be more prompt 
and equally advantageous.^* 

Skipwith's letter was answered with stunning swift- 
ness. Even before he sealed it he learned that Clai- 
borne's agents were distributing copies of Madison's 
proclamation and sounding the people in regard to 
possible resistance. Such action showed little defer- 
ence to the recently installed authorities of West 
Florida. In the steps so far taken these men had acted 
wholly within their rights and, as they believed, in ac- 
cordance with the wishes of the American people and 
so as to clear the American government of any sus- 
picion of complicity. Accordingly it was with a feel- 

1^ Skipwith to the President of the United States, Dec. 5, 
1810, West Florida Papers, MS., T7, Library of Congress. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 497 

ing of bitter resentment that the members of the legis- 
lative assembly hastily gathered to listen to Skipwith's 
unmailed letter and to unite with him in expressing 
toward the proclamation " the mutual sentiments and 
honest feelings of freemen." In the first place they 
exonerated Skipwith of undue ambition and of attach- 
ment to any foreign power. They had a right to self- 
government, despite the "imperative tone" in which 
the president summoned them to submit to the Or- 
leans executive. They resented the implied threat 
that foreign ministers might still determine their polit- 
ical status. They were not greatly affected by the 
thought that their independence might jeopardize the 
revenue laws of the United States. While desiring 
annexation they wanted it on fair and honorable terms, 
and not by virtue of any right under the Treaty of 
1803. The form of annexation proposed by them was 
the only one that could give the United States a per- 
fect title to the territory. They were ready to unite 
with the people of Orleans on such terms as Skipwith 
proposed, but they would not betray their constituents 
and dishonor their cause by accepting Madison's pro- 
posals. They closed by assuring Skipwith of their 
readiness to unite with him in " proper resistance."^' 

In addition to this address to Skipwith, signed by 
eleven members of the assembly, the senate empow- 
ered the executive to ascertain from Claiborne why he 

1^ Address to Skipwith, ibid., 7- 



498 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

was approaching West Florida with a hostile force, and 
whether he was authorized to suspend operations pend- 
ing another appeal to the president. In case he re- 
fused to answer, the messenger was to assure Clai- 
borne that Skipwith and the members of the assembly 
"were determined sooner to perish under the falling 
star of Florida than to submit to the sacrifice and dis- 
grace of any of [their] followers, not even the Deser- 
ters from the American Army, or suffer [themselves] 
to be given up to any Foreign Power."^^ 

Truculent as this resolution was, Osborne, Clai- 
borne's messenger, claimed it represented merely the 
views of Skipwith, Thomas, and a few others. The 
majority would gladly accept American authority, 
coupled with American citizenship, even if thrust upon 
them in this indecorous fashion.^'' The main causes of 
their discontent, as Holmes speedily learned after his 
arrival at St. Francisville on December 6, were the 
debt, the land claims, and the deserters. For the last 
named Holmes promised immunity for the present, 
and he believed they would ultimately be pardoned. 
He could give no positive assurances in regard to the 
other points, but he referred to the previous liberal 
policy of the United States toward actual settlers. 

Assuming that the Floridians were already Amer- 
ican citizens, he pointed out how injurious and futile 

1^ Skipwith to John H. Johnston, Dec. 8, i8io ( Parker, 7670) 
1'^ Osborne to Claiborne, Dec. 6, 1810 (Parker, 7669). 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 499 

Opposition would prove. In defending the proclama- 
tion he called their attention to the fact that it was an 
executive act, in which the president had only the 
Louisiana Treaty and some acts of Congress to guide 
him. Therefore he could not recognize the authority 
of the Florida legislature. As for the implication that 
by " fair and friendly negotiation " the Floridians 
might again be subjected to Spanish authority, he bade 
them dismiss it at once. It merely showed the hon- 
orable motives of the administration. He believed 
thoroughly that the United States had a right to the 
territory, and whatever adjustment might follow, the 
nation would never surrender a foot of it. By such 
arguments, in the course of a strenuous afternoon, he 
succeeded in appeasing all but a few malcontents. 

Holmes was asked to make a formal call on Skip- 
with but declined to do so. At the same time he de- 
clared his willingness to discuss the occupation with 
any gentleman. Skipwith then called at his lodgings. 
Holmes tried to show him how unavailing and mis- 
chievous it would be to resist the United States. Pro- 
fessing his desire for annexation, Skipwith complained 
that the method of the executive favored the Spanish 
authorities at the expense of the actual residents. 
Since the United States had abandoned its right to any 
part of West Florida, the people of that region would 
not now submit unconditionally to the control of the 
American government. After a fruitless interview 



500 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

they separated, Skipwith and some companions depart- 
ing for Baton Rouge, where the legislative assembly 
was next to gather. Had he remained to meet Clai- 
borne, that executive was prepared to adopt a most 
conciliatory interpretation of the president's instruc- 
tions. 

In the evening the convention army, consisting of a 
hundred dragoons and a corps of riflemen, reached 
St. Francisville, having been recalled from the Mobile 
campaign in consequence of this new development. 
Holmes likewise conversed with the officers and men, 
and convinced them that it was consistent with their 
honor and duty to support the United States. As 
most of the force came from Bayou Sara, the original 
seat of revolt, its submission indicated the peaceful oc- 
cupation of the whole region.^^ 

On the morning of the 7th Holmes and Osborne, 
accompanied by John H. Johnston, crossed the river to 
confer with Governor Claiborne at Pointe Coupee. 
The prominence of Johnston, who acted as Skipwith's 
representative, gave point to his profession of attach- 
ment to the Union. Claiborne told him that he would 
respect Skipwith as a citizen, but that he could not 
recognize him as executive of West Florida. More- 
over he gave Johnston " permission " to tell the people 
that he came among them with the most friendly views, 
and should proceed to carry out the president's proe- 
ms Report of Holmes to Smith, cf. note 11. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 50I 

lamation in this spirit. Johnston then verbally deliv- 
ered Skipwith's ultimatum. As governor of West 
Florida he would retire to Baton Rouge, and there, 
"rather than surrender the country unconditionally 
and without terms, he would, with twenty men only, 
if a greater number could not be procured, surround 
the Flag-Staff and die in its defense. "^^ 

Johnston accompanied the bellicose message with as- 
surances of his own devotion to the United States and 
an urgent request for Claiborne to visit St. Francis- 
ville. He assured the Orleans executive that he would 
find a troop of cavalry, a company of riflemen, and a 
concourse of citizens ready to welcome him. Osborne 
crossed the river and brought back a similar request, 
whereupon Holmes and Claiborne passed over to the 
opposite bank. 

On his landing in West Florida the citizens received 
Claiborne " with great respect," while the cavalry and 
infantry escorted him to the center of the town. Then 
as his escort took position around the West Florida 
flag, Claiborne stepped forward, read the president's 
proclamation, and commanded the flag to be removed. 
It was lowered amid respectful cheers, and a like salute 
greeted the American flag that replaced it. Claiborne 
then erected the region into a parish and appointed 
the necessary officers. Thus the wealthiest and most 
populous section of West Florida passed without dis- 

19 Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 7, 1810 (Parker, 7668). 



502 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

turbance into the possession of the United States. In 
accomplishing this result the loyal, tactful, and ener- 
getic efforts of Holmes proved most helpful.^'' 

The occupation of Baton Rouge, the next under- 
taking to present itself, promised greater difficulty. 
After conferring with Claiborne, Holmes, again serv- 
ing as avant courier, departed for Baton Rouge by 
land, accompanied by "a few gentlemen of respect- 
ability " from Bayou Sara and an escort of the former 
West Florida cavalry. Claiborne descended the river 
with the detachment of troops under Covington as 
soon as the latter arrived. He hoped to conciliate Skip- 
with and persuade him to abandon his ill-advised re- 
sistance, rather than appeal to military measures. The 
American deserters in the fort were likely to prove the 
most difficult problem, but he intended to take no 
measures to punish them if they would lay down their 
arms. Holmes hoped that his escort would exert a 
tranquilizing influence on their former colleagues in 
the lower district. 

Skipwith reached Baton Rouge a day ahead of 
Holmes. He found that John Ballinger, the com- 
mander of the fort, had arrested Claiborne's other 
messenger. King. Ballinger was under the impres- 
sion that the proclamation that King was distributing 
must be a forgery designed by the Spanish commander 
at Mobile to check and confuse the force destined 

20 Ibid, ; Report of Holmes to Smith. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 503 

against that town. The apprehension of Spanish 
dagger and Indian tomahawk was still so strong that 
Ballinger's inference and action were wholly natural. 
Skipwith immediately released the messenger, but he 
still felt too resentful to counsel submission. Per- 
sonally he desired to maintain peace and order in the 
region, while working for its honorable " return to the 
bosom of [his] parent Country." At the same time 
he strove to secure that country " a fair and legitimate 
title " to the disputed territory of West Florida. He 
expressed these sentiments in a postscript to his letter 
to Madison, begun only four days before, and resent- 
fully reviewed the surprising events of the interim 
which seemed to neutrahze his desire. He and his 
liberty-loving associates, he assured the president, 
would resist dishonor, repel any " wanton outrage " to 
their feelings, and " assert the rights of their adopted 
country " should circumstances require it.^^ 

Tidings of King's arrest and of the prospective re- 
sistance of the garrison at Baton Rouge reached 
Holmes and his company at the end of their first day's 
journey. On the morrow, when within a few miles 
of the town, the Mississippi executive sent forward 
some of the former West Florida officials to state the 
object of his visit and to ascertain if he might enter the 
town. Although halted for a time on its outskirts 

21 Skipwith to the President, Dec. 9, 1810, West Florida Pa- 
pers, MS., 86, Library of Congress. 



504 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

Holmes encountered no resistance. After a second 
conference Skipwith announced that he and his fellow- 
legislators had abandoned all thoughts of resistance, 
but he could not speak for the garrison in the fort. 
Many of its members were deserters from the Amer- 
ican service and might be tempted to some desperate 
step. On the following morning Holmes, accompanied 
by Skipwith, held an interview with its commander, 
Ballinger. Without entering into any express stipu- 
lation, he repeated the assurances already given, and 
Ballinger thereupon expressed his willingness to sur- 
render the fort. Almost immediately word came that 
five gunboats with the American regulars on board had 
been sighted some two miles above the town. On 
reaching the spot. Holmes found that Colonel Coving- 
ton had already landed his force of two hundred and 
forty-five men with due precaution against attack, and 
informed him that he need expect no resistance. To 
Claiborne, who accompanied the troops, Holmes bore 
a letter from Skipwith expressing the latter's gratifi- 
cation at his prospective annexation to the United 
States. The superseded executive defended his course 
thus far, and protested against Claiborne's methods as 
an outrage against the flag and the constitution of 
West Florida. Yet as a native of the United States he 
could never sign an order that would lead to the shed- 
ding of a drop of American blood. He would not 
bid the Florida troops lower their own flag, but di- 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 505 

reeled them not to resist the measures of the Amer- 
icans. He requested amnesty for such as were de- 
serters and recommended the whole force if Claiborne 
needed its assistance.^^ 

The gratified Claiborne readily promised not to mo- 
lest the deserters, and agreed that some simple but re- 
spectful ceremony should mark the lowering of the 
West Florida flag. At half past two that afternoon 
the conventionalist force of some four hundred men 
marched out of their fort, stacked their guns, and saluted 
the emblem whose descent marked the close of the 
short-lived republic of West Florida.^^ 

In this peaceful manner the two executives were 
able to anticipate the wishes of the administration and 
establish American control in Baton Rouge without 
any disagreeable complications. In this delicate task, 
as well as in the preliminary events, Governor Holmes 
had showed himself a discreet and effective inter- 
mediary. Having accomplished his part he modestly 
retired to his post, content with the honor of partici- 
pating in an event so conducive, as he believed, to his 
country's welfare. 

In keeping with his instructions. Governor Clai- 
borne immediately provided for local governments and 
organized the militia. He divided the jurisdiction 

22 Skipwith to Claiborne, Dec. 10, 1810, Monroe Papers, 
Lenox MSS. 

23 Report of Holmes to Smith ; Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 12, 
1810 (Parker, 7671) ; Summary, fs. 67, 80. Cf. note 21, p. 334. 



506 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

into four parishes, appointing Richard Steele judge in 
Feliciana and George Mather in East Baton Rouge. 
In St. Helena and St. Tammany (the last named re- 
placing the St. Ferdinand of the Spanish regime and 
including settlements on the Bogue Chitto and Tan- 
chipaho) he had difficulty in finding suitable men for 
the judicial positions. In the other parishes he was 
overwhelmed by applicants for office. He noted some 
attempt to discriminate against those who had not 
made common cause with the convention, but selected 
his appointees largely from the patriotic American 
contingent.^* 

There was some dissatisfaction over the parish divi- 
sions as well as over Claiborne's " palatine " method in 
forming them. Philemon Thomas, the " Ajax " of the 
defunct government, professed that his object was ac- 
complished. Skipwith refused to accept the office of 
justice of the peace; but as his first resentment cooled 
he acknowledged that Claiborne had treated him per- 
sonally with courtesy and the whole people with more 
than magnanimity. There was liable to be some latent 
dissatisfaction in regard to the land bounties promised 
to the forces of the convention, the debts of that body, 
and the vacant lands of the province. Claiborne wrote 
that those who felt themselves aggrieved would prob- 
ably memorialize Congress. The land grants by Grand 
Pre and Morales also presented many difficulties, al- 

24 Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 17, 23, 24 (Parker, 7673, 7680- 
82, 7684). 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 507 

though Claiborne was relieved to find, contrary to his 
earlier impression, that Skipwith was not involved in 
them. 

The concluding resolution of the West Florida leg- 
islature seemed unduly hostile. But once having fully 
submitted, Skipwith assured the Orleans executive 
that he might absolutely rely on the American element 
in the population in case of invasion, and likewise on 
the French and French-Canadian. Claiborne acknowl- 
edged that most of the population, including the more 
influential elements, were virtuous, but there were 
some with British preferences and others who objected 
to any stability or justice in government. " A more het- 
erogeneous mass of good and evil," he wrote with some 
reserve, " was never before met in the same extent of 
territory." Of late the Spanish officials had seemed 
to encourage the worst element. The revolt had been 
started by the opposite class, but the more vicious, 
Claiborne believed, were gaining power and would 
shortly have controlled affairs had the American 
authorities not intervened. If the latter had delayed 
two weeks longer, the convention troops might have 
reduced Mobile and included that region, too, within 
the new acquisition. Many " aspiring individuals " at 
first naturally displayed resentment at the failure of 
their plans. 



25 



25 Claiborne to Smith, ibid. ; Skipwith to Graham, Dec. 23, 
1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 100, Library of Congress ; 
same to same, Jan. i, 181 1, ibid., 105 ff. 



508 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

Claiborne showed marked attention to De Lassus, 
whom Skipwith released just before the Americans 
took possession. That chagrined official took refuge 
across the river, where for obvious reasons he pre- 
ferred to remain rather than face his accusers in 
Havana. Claiborne also took the first occasion that 
presented itself to inform Someruelos 6f his action at 
Baton Rouge and to assure the captain-general that 
it betokened no hostility whatever toward the Spanish 
government. But he was unable to persuade the other 
that his course was wholly friendly.^^ In view of 
recent occurrences at Mobile, it was far more im- 
portant to know how Folch regarded it. The Intel- 
ligencer published a premature report that he would 
evacuate Mobile without opposition, and Claiborne 
urged Colonel Cushing to hasten his journey to Mobile, 
so as to prevent a clash between the Spaniards and 
the frontiersmen that might jeopardize this result.^^ 

Colonel James Caller, from the Tombigbee, chanced 
to be in Natchez on the eve of Holmes's departure for 
West Florida. To him the governor entrusted copies 
of the proclamation, and ordered him and his associate 
Carson to prepare their militia for cooperation with 
the regulars. His arrival at Fort Stoddert on the 
afternoon of December 13 caused great rejoicing 

26 Claiborne to Captain-General of Cuba, Dec. 20, 1810 
(Parker, 7681). 
2" Parker, 7692. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 509 

among the neighboring "honest people," as Kemper's 
followers called themselves. Colonel Sparks, " amiable 
old officer favorable to [their] views," immediately 
sent a copy of the proclamation to Folch. This paper 
and the colonel's statement that he had been ordered to 
get his troops ready to act in accordance with it caused 
an appreciable rise in land values at Mobile.^^ 

Some of the "Tories," that is, Toulmin and his 
friends, thought that Sparks was interpreting his in- 
structions too freely. To them he seemed to be as- 
suming the offensive with needless haste, and they 
doubted the expediency of inviting the cooperation of 
the militia. The colonel's course may have been par- 
tially determined by Caller, who in turn had been 
urged thereto by F. L. Claiborne, brother of the execu- 
tive. The latter had claimed that the proclamation 
would justify Sparks in hurrying down to Mobile with 
the regulars and militia and taking possession without 
delay. Coming from such a source the advice would 
be entitled to great weight.^^ 

To Sparks's surprise Folch answered that he could 
not deliver up the province to the Americans. He re- 
ferred Sparks's note to Someruelos and then started 
to Pensacola, evidently to confer with Morales and his 

28 Holmes to officers at Ft. Stoddert, Dec. 4, 1810, Proceed- 
ings Executive Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., Vol. i ; 
Nicholson to Rhea, Dec. 17, 1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 
96, Library of Congress. 

29 Toulmin to Madison, Jan. 23, 181 1, Madison Papers, MS. 

34 



510 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

other colleagues over the latest development. As the 
intendant later observed, the American government had 
at length thrown off the mask which had hitherto con- 
cealed its intrigues at Baton Rouge.^^ This revelation 
caused a complete reversal in Folch's position. A few 
weeks before, he had offered to transfer his province to 
the Americans on his own authority, and had come to 
Mobile in order to carry out his purpose unhampered. 
But such a transfer, after the president's procedure, 
meant a yielding to the untenable American claim that 
he had so long opposed. Moreover, in connection with 
the events at Baton Rouge it would bear all the marks 
of direct collusion. Kemper's mad foray gave him 
an adequate pretext for withdrawing his offer of 
peaceful surrender. A recent subsidy from Mexico 
enabled him to meet his most pressing financial obli- 
gations. But with a force of seven hundred men on 
its way from Baton Rouge to attack Mobile, with eight 
gunboats loaded with troops approaching from Mobile, 
and with the commander at Fort Stoddert preparing 
to descend the river with his regulars and militia, he 
needed additional reinforcements and money to meet 
the perils that confronted him. While Morales be- 
sought the authorities to send these at once, Folch 
wrote Perez, who had reported the forces threatening 
to overwhelm them, that the greater the attacking 

30 Folch to Sparks, Dec. 14, 1810 (Parker, 7688); Morales 
to Secretary of State for the Treasury, Dec. 19, 1810, Legajo 
267, Papeles de Cuba. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 5 II 

force and the more hopeless the defense, the more 
honorable the surrender. Perez was to husband his 
slender force as much as possible, and when his para- 
pets were dismantled and his artillery was useless, he 
was to yield on the best terms he could get.^^ 

It was natural for the Spaniards to confuse the 
West Florida forces with the American, as Perez had 
done, and to exaggerate the menace from each. Kem- 
per's course at this juncture served to confirm this 
impression. As soon as he learned the president's 
orders, undeterred by recent defeat, former failure to 
receive instructions, or recent prosecutions, he be- 
stirred himself to collect his scattered filibusters from 
the Tensaw, St. Stephens, and Pascagoula. Designat- 
ing a rendezvous near Mobile, where "Major" Orso 
with a small contingent awaited them, he and his lieu- 
tenant, John Nicholson, boasted that their flag would 
be hoisted at Mobile before that of the United States. 
Their chief purpose was to "take a pull" at the 
" Dons " in revenge for the repulse at Saw Mill Creek. 
Then they hoped to have the " satisfaction of receiving 
the U[nited] S[tates] with open arms at Mobile and 
of joining the one star with the many." 

These would-be marauders, professing their readi- 
ness to " hail the Goddess of Liberty as the protectress 
of our rights civil and personal," strove to deepen this 

31 Perez to Folch, Dec. 20, 1810, Folch to Perez, Dec. 21, 
1 810, Legajo 1569, Papeles de Cuba. 



512 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

mistaken impression of their activity. They repre- 
sented the American authorities as involved in the 
events at Baton Rouge and as not approving Toulmin's 
measures to repress the expedition against Mobile. 
In view of Sparks's activity and Cushing's arrival they 
anticipated a welcome expenditure of powder at Mo- 
bile. The people were ready, when Sparks gave the 
word, to drop work, and to feed their resentment 
against the Spaniards by investing the fort at Mobile.^^ 
Such a diversion was liable to produce disagreeable 
complications. Perez, though vain, would fight. The 
first shot against the fort would be the signal for the 
destruction of the town. Sparks accordingly stationed 
Captain Gaines with a force of fifty men near Mobile, 
and through a special messenger induced Kemper to 
return. He and his followers were almost imme- 
diately incorporated in the territorial militia, whose 
officers were largely their partisans.^^ This prompt 
clothing of the whilom outlaws with the semblance of 
respectability served still more to confuse the Span- 
iards. Therefore Sparks's action, while preventing the 
useless shedding of blood, did not disclose any real 
difference between the filibusters and the militiamen, 

32 Kemper to Rhea, Dec. i6, 1810, Nicholson to Rhea, Dec. 
17, 1810, West Florida Papers, MS., 96, 98, Library of Con- 
gress; Toulmin to Holmes, Feb. 3, 181 1, Mississippi Terri- 
torial Archives, MS., Vol. 9. 

33 Nashville Clarion and Gazette, Feb. i, 181 1; Sparks to 
Claiborne, Dec. 21, 1810 (Parker, 7690). 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 513 

or make clear the attitude of the administration toward 
each group. 

Sparks expected the force under Gaines not only to 
check Kemper but to secure the delivery of Mobile to 
the Americans. Accordingly on December 22 Gaines 
sent Captain Luckett to notify Perez that he had come 
to take possession of the fort agreeably to the proclama- 
tion. He supposed that the Spaniard had already made 
up his mind on this point and requested an immediate 
answer. He emphasized the conciliatory policy thus 
far pursued by the United States, and mentioned the 
feeling of duty and attachment that prompted the offi- 
cers of the American army "to support a measure 
adopted by their beloved President." Perez doubtless 
appreciated this new challenge from the " Cock of 
Stoddert," backed up as it was by pointed references 
to reinforcements expected from the Mississippi and 
to the militia from the Tombigbee. 

Perez answered that he had nc; communication from 
his government to guide him in forming an opinion on 
this momentous subject. He advised Gaines to sus- 
pend operations until they could hear from Folch, then 
on his way to Pensacola. Each appointed a represen- 
tative to interview Folch, and mutually agreed to take 
no hostile measures pending his response. Under this 
agreement Gaines took up his position a half mile 
above the town. Their messengers reached Pensacola 
before Folch himself. Possibly Perez anticipated this 



514 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

and wished to gain time thereby. Folch expressed 
surprise when he heard of Gaines's demand. He 
thought the American force had descended the river 
merely to save Mobile from the filibusters. As he had 
previously informed Sparks, he could deliver up his 
province only on order from the captain-general.^* 

To Perez, Folch wrote more bitterly, complaining 
that the landing of American troops within the do- 
minions of His Majesty would justify him in using 
force to expel them. Perez should tell Gaines or any 
other American officer that he had no power to sur- 
render the king's territory, but was obhged to defend 
it to the last extremity. By this time Perez learned 
of Cushing's approach, which added to the perils con- 
fronting him, and reported that Gaines had offered to 
grant soldiers, officers, and other employees the most 
favorable terms possible. He was sure that he could 
not escape surrender, even if each man should prove a 
lion in combat. Moreover by useless resistance he 
would lose the artillery and the munitions that he 
might otherwise save. Yet he had warned Gaines not 
to permit a larger party than six to come together at 
one time within gunshot of the fort.^^ 

In the closing month of 1810 the town of Mobile 

34 Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 28, 1810 (Parker, 7687) ; Morales 
to Secretary of State for Treasury, Jan. 20, 181 1, Legajo 267, 
Papeles de Cuba. 

35 Folch to Perez, Dec. 25, 1810, Legajo 63, Papeles de 
Cuba; National Intelligencer, Jan. 26, 181 1. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 515 

was liable to become a sacrifice to the motley forces 
threatening it from without and within. If the fili- 
busters did not plunder it, the Spanish commandant 
might sacrifice it in defending his fort. To prevent 
such a calamity and to save the whole region from an- 
archy and pillage, Judge Toulmin undertook a special 
mission to the camp of Colonel Gushing. He was al- 
ready in Mobile, making necessary provision, as con- 
tractor's agent, for the latter's arrival, when he learned 
that Sparks was about to embody the territorial militia 
and move down the river. While he credited Sparks 
with good faith, he thought that he had misinterpreted 
his orders. It would be folly to attack the fort before 
Gushing arrived with gunboats and artillery, and it 
would be impossible, with such levies, to avoid some 
clash, once they reached its vicinity. 

Toulmin repaired to Gushing's camp as soon as the 
latter reached Mobile Bay, represented the situation in 
its true light, and induced him to order the immediate 
mustering out of the militia. He paid the usual pen- 
alty for his unpopular but patriotic service. His ene- 
mies, terming him an enemy to his country and its op- 
pressed people, charged him with neglecting his public 
duties. More serious still was the insinuation that he 
was trying to prevent the surrender of Mobile so as 
to favor his own land speculations. But the judge, 
disregarding temporary odium and personal threats, 
prided himself on saving Mobile, preventing the shed- 



5l6 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

ding of blood, and fulfilling the real wishes of his gov- 
ernment. The administration and its organ, and Con- 
gress as well, agreed with him, and refused to enter- 
tain charges based merely on malice and envy. 

The local resentment against Toulmin long continued 
to show itself. He and Caller had a personal alter- 
cation at the disbanding of the militia, in which, so 
the latter claimed, Toulmin attacked him in a way 
"unbecoming his character as a judge, and a Gentel- 
man." The militiamen resented the action so forcibly 
that Caller had to interfere to save the judge from vio- 
lence. Before Kemper left the Tombigbee region, late 
in January, 1811, he and his cronies held what Toul- 
min called "high courts of impeachment," in which 
they threatened to present him for treason. He was 
less disturbed by their threats than by the working of 
a new system of courts, in which local sentiment would 
have more chance to interfere with conscientious 
officials. 

In the following autumn Toulmin's enemies packed 
the grand jury of Baldwin County and returned a 
presentment against him. One of the specifications 
stated that he used military methods in examining the 
charges against Kemper and Kennedy, and another 
that he corresponded with foreign enemies. Toulmin 
flattered himself that his course had been fairly ac- 
ceptable to the better elements of the community, even 
if his reputation had not been proof against "the 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 517 

desperate profligacy of a Cataline . . . supported by 
the abandoned intrigues of a Robespierre." This pre- 
sentment, later brought before the legislature, was re- 
ferred to a committee of which Kennedy was chair- 
man and Caller a member. These worthy but "un- 
fortunate citizens," moved by a love for "the pure 
and impartial administration of Justice," secured the 
passage of resolutions embodying the charges and for- 
warded them to Congress and the president. Need- 
less to say their enmity overshot its mark.^^ 

After the introduction afforded by the preceding 
events, Claiborne's next task was hardly likely to com- 
mend itself to Folch. Possibly the Orleans executive 
did not greatly care. At any rate it was December 2y 
before he officially informed Folch of his course at 
Baton Rouge and of his intention to occupy the country 
as far as the Perdido. He wished the other to regard 
his action as wholly friendly and calculated to advance 
the best interests of both nations. His letter, accom- 
panied by a copy of the president's proclamation, was 
dated some three weeks after he had informed Sparks 

36 Caller to Holmes, Jan. 7, 181 1, Toulmin to Holmes, Feb. 3, 
1811, Mississippi Territorial Archives, MS., Vol. 9; Toulmin 
to Madison, Jan. 'zz, 181 1, Feb. 2^, 181 1, Madison Papers, MS.; 
National Intelligencer, Feb. 10, 181 1; Holmes to Smith, Feb. 
2, 181 1, Proceedings Executive Council, Mississippi Territory, 
MS., Vol, i; Toulmin to Samuel Postlewaite, Oct. 21, Nov. 11, 
181 1, Claiborne Letters, E, MS., Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History; Mead to Madison, Nov. 20, 181 1, Madi- 
son Papers, MS. 



5l8 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

of his intended action. The delay impHes that he 
hoped the other would occupy the territory at once, 
as his brother had apparently advised. The later re- 
port of Kemper's irregularities caused him to warn 
Sparks against permitting a nominal occupation of 
Mobile by the Conventionalists. He might invite the 
Spaniards to retire from their post there, should he 
think them disposed to do so, and permit them to take 
their military stores, but he should enter into no formal 
capitulation with them. He was to take this action, 
however, only to prevent bloodshed. If the Spanish 
commander refused to yield possession, he should as- 
sure him that he would not resort to forcible measures 
without further orders.^'' 

On January 6 Sparks sent a messenger to Folch 
with Claiborne's missives. Before he reached Pensa- 
cola. Captain Luis Piernas arrived there with a hun- 
dred thousand pesos from Mexico. The viceroy could 
supplement this with no troops, for he was experienc- 
ing insurrection in his own dominions, and the sum was 
wholly inadequate to meet Folch's pressing problems of 
defense; but the timely succor afforded him a con- 
venient pretext for retaining what he had professed 
to regard as a useless province. It was also an oppor- 
tunity to reinstate himself with his superiors. At the 
same time the arrival of Cushing and his flotilla before 
Mobile warned him to preserve a courteous attitude 

3^ Claiborne to Folch, Dec. 2^, i8io (Parker, 7694) ; same to 
Sparks, Dec. 28, 1810 (Parker, 7693). 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 519 

toward the Americans. He replied to Claiborne that 
he would inform the captain-general of his communi- 
cation, and he expressed the hope that in the interim 
the other would do nothing to disturb the existing har- 
mony. Some of his entourage were inclined to be less 
courteous. An Indian interpreter, Manuel Gonzales, 
acted as host to Carson, the messenger. When Carson 
expressed surprise at the prudence so far exhibited 
by the Spaniards, Gonzales retorted : " Fire the first 
shot, and see if we answer."^^ 

In Claiborne's message both Folch and Morales 
found new evidence of the perfidy of the American 
government. Seizing the occasion when Spain was 
beset by enemies and the Floridas were bereft of de- 
fense, its agents stirred up insurrection in West Flor- 
ida and threatened still further encroachments in the 
eastern province. Their course was not merely per- 
fidious but ungrateful, for Spain had assisted the 
United States in gaining its independence. Folch 
could only suggest an appeal to American cupidity, 
while Morales advised his superiors to press a claim 
for the territory which the Americans had already 
occupied. Meanwhile they both waited anxiously for 
the Americans to lay aside the mask altogether.^^ 

38 Sparks to Folch, Jan. 6, 1811, Legajo 1568, Folch to 
Sparks and to Claiborne, Jan. 10, 181 1, Legajo 1569, Papeles 
de Cuba. 

39 Folch to Someruelos, Jan. 12, 1811, Legajo 1569, Morales 
to Secretary ... of Treasury, Jan. 20, 181 1, Legajo 267, Pa- 
peles de Cuba. 



520 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

Late in January, Toulmin advised the president to 
resort to diplomacy in order to gain the coveted ter- 
ritory. Claiborne, without favorable response from 
Folch, was concerned over the report that the Spaniard 
was about to cross the Perdido with reinforcements. 
As the Spaniards now controlled only the environs of 
Mobile, this, in his estimation, would constitute an in- 
vasion of American territory.*^ Fortunately Folch 
was in no condition to test Claiborne's theory. Colonel 
Cushing, reaching the vicinity of Mobile with two hun- 
dred and fifty men and a convoy of gunboats, encoun- 
tered no such " warm work " as the newspapers had 
predicted. His most important task, as we have 
already seen, was the disbanding of the militia, at 
Toulmin's request. 

Although this act meant a signal favor to the Span- 
iards, Perez refused to give Cushing permission to 
pass the town without an order from Folch. The 
American officer went ahead without being molested 
and later invited Perez to a formal conference. When 
this failed to elicit a favorable response, Cushing and 
his suite made a formal call on the Spaniards and thus 
established relations that were at least outwardly 
friendly. Cushing then took up his residence in town, 
and although he attempted to exercise no authority 
beyond the limits of his camp, his mere presence gave 
increased confidence to those residents who had com- 

*<^ Claiborne to Smith, Jan. 30, 1811 (Parker, 7715). 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 52 1 

mitted themselves too thoroughly to the American 
cause. 

Perez still continued his vigilant attitude toward the 
Americans. Their deserters, even, were to be kept in 
custody, pending the decision of the captain-general. 
The cruises of the American flotilla between the town 
and Dauphine Island were carefully noted. Both 
Spaniards and townspeople were mystified when on 
February 9 the troops proceeded to Fort Stoddert. 
Early in the following month the flotilla withdrew to 
New Orleans. These movements, they afterwards 
learned, arose from the fact that Gushing and some 
of his subordinates had to report for court-martial at 
Fort Adams. This was one of the incidents growing 
out of the interminable Wilkinson enquiry.*^ Coving- 
ton, who succeeded Gushing, was permitted to anchor 
before Mobile ; but Folch instructed St. Maxent, who 
was now in charge there, not to allow this again with- 
out express order from Someruelos.^^ Thus the situa- 
tion still contained anxieties for the Spaniards. On 
the other side of the line came reports of "rustling" 
cattle, interference with the Indians, and anticipations 
of the appearance of the British at Pensacola. But 

*i Gushing to Perez, Jan. 9, 181 1, Perez to Gushing, Jan. 
10, 181 1, Perez to Folch, Jan. 19, 25, 27, 30, Feb. 6, 9, 13, 181 1, 
Legajo 1569, Papeles de Cuba; Toulmin to Madison, Jan. 23, 
Feb. 6, 181 1, Madison Papers, MS. 

42 St, Maxent to Folch, Mar. 19, 1811, Legajo 63, Papeles 
de Guba. 



522 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

the most pressing anxiety of the Americans was the 
fate of the unfortunate members of the Kemper party, 
who had now been transferred to Havana. 

Meanwhile the administration was attempting an- 
other " diplomatic " tnove in relation to the Floridas. 
In 1810 General George Matthews, of Georgia, had 
been given a commission to the Spanish authorities 
similar to Wilkinson's of the previous year.*^ Un- 
able to visit Folch at Pensacola because of the preva- 
lence of yellow fever in the early fall of 1810, he came 
to the Tombigbee country, where his presence aroused 
Kemper's concern. Finally Matthews secured an in- 
terview with Folch at Mobile and explained to him the 
president's views. The latter contemplated a union 
of forces on the part of the United States and the 
Spanish colonies to prevent European nations from 
gaining a foothold in the new world. Folch was 
equally unwilling to have the Spanish colonies become 
subject to some other European power or to the United 
States. Matthews thought that if the United States 
should make some provision for Spanish officials, it 
would remove the great obstacle to union with the 
Spanish colonies. Perhaps Matthews's suggestion en- 
couraged Folch to offer to deliver his province to the 
Americans. Colonel John McKee, as we have seen, 
bore this offer to Washington.** 

*3 Crawford to Smith, Nov. i, 1810, Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 34, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, cf. p. 287. 
44 Cf. p. 481. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 523 

Folch's offer and Matthews's earlier report aroused 
the extravagant hopes of the president. Prompt ac- 
tion might mean the acquisition of both Floridas. On 
January 3 he sent a special message to Congress trans- 
mitting Folch's offer. He accompanied this with a 
British protest against the occupation of Baton Rouge, 
thus creating the impression of interference that the 
advocates of immediate occupation, among whom Jef- 
ferson was chief, so sedulously inculcated. To heighten 
this impression Madison suggested that Congress pass 
a resolution to the effect that it " could not see without 
serious inquietude any part of the neighboring terri- 
tory pass from Spain to another foreign power." He 
also asked for authorization to take possession of any 
part of it for which he could make proper arrange- 
ments with the local authorities.^^ Within two weeks 
Congress complied with the president's request, but 
added the assurance that the territory should still be 
subject to negotiation. It authorized the executive to 
make such use of the army and navy as was necessary 
and to incur expense up to a hundred thousand dollars. 
The secretary of state officially informed Folch that 
his proposal was accepted and Matthews and McKee 
were appointed as commissioners to carry it out.*® 

McKee gave Folch additional details of the pro- 
posed occupancy. The American government would 

^5 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 394, 395. 
^^ Smith to Folch, Jan. 26, 28, 1811, Domestic Letters, MS., 
Vol. 16, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



524 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

accept temporary possession of East Florida and of 
West Florida beyond the Perdido in order to assure the 
region adequate protection. Claiborne had supposedly 
taken possession up to the Perdido ; but if Mobile 
was unoccupied he and Matthews might take steps to 
hold it. They might agree to redeliver the portion 
east of the Perdido to its lawful sovereign. In case 
of amicable surrender they were authorized to assume 
a " reasonable amount " of the current local debts owed 
by the Spaniards, regarding these debts as a future 
lien on Spain, and to spend a reasonable sum in re- 
moving Spanish troops from the province. They were 
to confirm land titles, exercise customary religious tol- 
eration, and continue local customs and local officials 
with as little change as possible. If no amicable sur- 
render of territory should occur, and they had reason 
to suppose that " a foreign power " intended to land 
troops there, they were to preoccupy such territory 
by force, using, however, such measures as would com- 
promise their government as little as possible.*'^ 

McKee's letter from Washington was the precursor 
of the more formal communication that he and 
Matthews addressed to Folch from Fort Stoddert. In 
this, dated March 22, they requested an early inter- 
view to discuss Folch's previous offer in view of the 
president's instructions. To both Folch's reply was the 

*'=' McKee to Folch, Jan. 17, 1811, Legajo 1569, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 525 

same. His superiors did not approve his offer to sur- 
render his province, and ordered him to hold it at all 
cost, and had sent him fifty thousand dollars to enable 
him to do so. He was now happily relieved of any im- 
mediate danger of invasion. In addition to these 
favorable changes in local conditions, the president's 
action in taking possession of Baton Rouge was re- 
garded as distinctly hostile. Moreover a national 
Cortes had now assembled in Spain, and the American 
government could direct negotiations to that body.*^ 
Doubtless Folch had never seriously intended to sur- 
render his province and accordingly welcomed the op- 
portunity to withdraw from an awkward situation. 
Ralph Isaacs, the militia colonel, who acted as the com- 
missioners' messenger, attempted to reason with Folch. 
He appreciated the Spaniard's desire for harmony; 
but in view of Bonaparte's ambition and Spain's in- 
ability to protect her colonies, he had hoped that the 
other would unite with the American authorities in a 
joint defiance to European powers. Folch agreed to 
support such a policy as long as he could honorably do 
80.*^ His later elaborate defense shows that he meant 
little by this evasive promise. He assured his su- 
periors that he had made no effort whatever to in- 
gratiate himself with the American authorities, and 

48 Folch to McKee, Feb. 2rj, 181 1, same to Matthews and 
McKee, Mar. 26, 181 1, Legajo 1569, Papeles de Cuba. 

49 Isaacs to Matthews and McKee, Mar. 31, 181 1, Miscella- 
neous Letters, MS., Vol. 35, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



35 



526 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

that his whole purpose was to paralyze the military 
preparations that the Americans were industriously 
making in the rear of the insurgents. In this aim he 
was successful, although at the time neither Mobile nor 
Pensacola was in a position to offer adequate re- 
sistance.^^ 

He and his watchful adversary, Morales, now ex- 
pected the American government to resume its policy 
of intrigue in behalf of the desired territory and to 
stimulate a revolt in the region that still acknowledged 
Spanish authority. There were rumors of dissatisfac- 
tion with the American rulers at Baton Rouge and 
of disturbances at Pascagoula, where they had not yet 
fully established their authority, but these gave the 
Spaniards little satisfaction. Nor did they anticipate 
any advantage from the insults that Kennedy and his 
party were heaping on Judge Toulmin. The same in- 
dividuals that attacked him were ready to rally their 
followers for the capture of Mobile, as Caller readily 
assured the Mississippi executive, despite Toulmin's 
effort to discourage them.^^ 

Caller had noted the presence of Matthews, McKee, 
and others of the same set that had " swarmed " about 
Fort Stoddert the preceding summer, and doubted if 

50Folch to Someruelos, Feb. 4, 1811, Legajo 1569, Papeles 
de Cuba. An elaborate defense of his conduct occurs in Le- 
gajo 5555, Estado, A. H. N., Madrid. 

^1 Morales to Sierra, Mar. 31, 1811, Legajo 267, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 527 

it was theif purpose really to serve the American gov- 
ernment.^2 Thus he and Folch were making common 
cause against them. But Matthews determined to 
make one more effort in behalf of his mission, and in 
April, 1811, secured a personal interview with Folch 
at Pensacola. Matthews told Folch, so the latter re- 
ported, that nine tenths of the American people dep- 
recated the position of their government toward Spain. 
On the other hand he claimed that the existing ad- 
ministration did not favor France. His instructions 
simply empowered him to receive the province from 
Folch upon the condition of returning it when Spain 
terminated her contest with France. But if Spain 
then preferred, his government would exchange for it 
land in the western part of Louisiana or make some 
other suitable compensation. 

This offer by Matthews, if correctly reported, 
marked a recurrence to the diplomatic propositions 
that the American government had vainly made for the 
last six years. It was accompanied by offers equally 
tempting. Matthews was empowered to render full 
inventories for all property delivered; to pay all ar- 
rears in the salaries of the clergy and the civil officials 
in the province ; to continue at full pay all who wished 
to remain in the province, or to assume their trans- 
portation if they preferred to leave; and to assure the 

52 Caller to Holmes, Apr. 4, 181 1, Mississippi Territorial 
Archives, MS., Vol. 10. 



528 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 

people full religious toleration and the continuance of 
such Spanish laws as were not contrary to those of 
the United States. These offers certainly represent a 
wide interpretation of his instructions, and if he really 
made them, show the importance that the government 
attached to his mission. 

But he utterly failed to move the obdurate Spaniard. 
Not present gain, nor the fear that Napoleon might 
subdue the mother-country, nor the lure of Pan-Amer- 
icanism could render the American proposition accept- 
able to him. He pointed out to Matthews that circum- 
stances had so changed as to neutralize his former 
offer. The president's proclamation, which also re- 
leased him from that offer, was a positive insult to his 
nation. Much as he desired peace he preferred war to 
such insult, and regretted that he could not exact com- 
plete satisfaction for it. Perhaps Folch did not answer 
Matthews so brusquely as the report would indicate, 
but he evidently convinced him and the administra- 
tion as well that it was useless to expect a peaceful 
transfer of the Floridas at that time. The secretary 
of state gave the commissioners the conventional ex- 
pression of thanks for their efforts, and directed them 
to turn their task over to Governor Claiborne. Mat- 
thews was to continue his functions in East Florida 
if he thought he could accomplish anything.^^ He 

53 Folch's defense in Legajo 5555, Estado, A. H. N., Madrid ; 
Morales to Sierra, Apr. 30, 181 1, Legajo 267, Papeles de Cuba, 



AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WEST FLORIDA 529 

did think so; but his equivocal course there, thor- 
oughly in keeping with the American policy in West 
Florida, does not properly fall within the limits of 
our subject. 

Domestic Letters, MS., Vol. 16, 191, 192, Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives. 



CHAPTER XIV 

In Defense of Intervention 

The little coterie of diplomats at Washington and 
the near-by centers followed with keen attention the 
shifting events on the West Florida border. Their 
reports provoked disquieting rumors in the distant 
European capitals. Madison had not been unmindful 
of this when, a week before his proclamation, he 
wrote Jefferson that the "successful party" at Baton 
Rouge might address itself to Great Britain, as well 
as to the United States. This might influence the 
former to compose its differences with France and, 
allied with that power and Spain, to engage in a 
" quadrangular war " with the United States.^ While 
the alliance seemed more threatening in prospect than 
in retrospect, there was enough possibility of Euro- 
pean intervention to give point to his proclamation. 
Morier, the British charge, was unfriendly, and was 
vigorous in championing the Spanish cause. He 
charged the administration with trying to seduce the 
inhabitants of West Florida — mostly renegade Amer- 
icans — and with strengthening its garrisons at Fort 
Stoddert and St. Stephens, in collusion with the Mo- 

1 Hunt, Madison, VIII, 109. 

530 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 53 1 

bile Association. Secretary Smith with some dif¥icuhy 
finally assured Bernaben that the contrary was the case. 
This organization, the British representative reported, 
was appealing to Congress through a member from 
Georgia. The people at Baton Rouge, despite their 
apparent agreement with De Lassus, held Ferdinand 
VII " in most sovereign contempt " and disappointed 
Morier by showing little British predilection. The 
naval officer at Jamaica, he suggested, should inquire 
into the mysterious affair.^ 

De Onis feared that a French force of twelve tho'u- 
sand men, said to be preparing against South Amer- 
ica, might be employed against the Floridas and Mex- 
ico, with Louisiana as a basis. Secret cabinet meet- 
ings, coupled with the presence of Turreau in Wash- 
ington, led him to surmise some sort of alliance with 
the "intrusive Bonaparte." Perhaps the latter had 
already sold the Floridas to gain funds for his urgent 
needs, or to involve the United States in a war with 
Great Britain and Spain.^ 

The French government certainly needed a com- 
mercial alliance with the United States against these 
two powers, but Madison had definitely instructed 
Joel Barlow, the new American minister, not to make 

2 Morier to Wellesley, Oct. 9, Nov. i, 181 1, MS., British For- 
eign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 70. 

3 De Onis to Captain-General, Oct. ig, 1810, Legajo 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba; De Onis to Viceroy, Oct, 19, 1810, Hist'oria, 
MS., Vol. 161, A. G., Mexico. 



532 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

the Floridas the basis of such a transaction. In 
August, 1810, Petry advised Champagny, now the 
Due de Cadore, to use them to balance all American 
claims against France and her dependencies. Such 
a solution would relieve Spain of an unprofitable de- 
pendency, give France commercial privileges on the 
Mississippi and a free hand in the Spanish colonies, 
and create a more favorable public sentiment through- 
out the United States.* 

As the American government still refused to receive 
De Onis as an accredited diplomat he had to make 
inquiries through Bernaben, the consul at Baltimore. 
On the other hand the administration usually made 
A. J. Dallas its intermediary. It was probably 
through him and a companion that Madison chose 
to let the Spaniard know of the fall of Baton Rouge. 
At the same time his messengers told De Onis that the 
affair was utterly unexpected to their government. 
De Onis apparently accepted their statement, adding 
that should the case be otherwise, such hatred would 
be aroused in Havana and Mexico that the Americans 
would lose their trade there. Morier was more di- 
rect and less charitable. He believed that the Amer- 
ican government secretly favored the insurgents (a 
set of western banditti) in order to gain the disputed 
territory without an open quarrel with Spain.® 

4 Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 
161, 270, 295. 

5 De Onis to Captain-General, Nov. 2, 1810, Legajo 1708, Pa- 
peles de Cuba. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 533 

Early in December De Onis asked Dallas some dis- 
quieting questions. He wished to know if the action 
of the governor of Mississippi, in embodying his 
militia, betokened any hostility toward Spain. • A neg- 
ative reply would greatly relieve the captain-general, 
as well as himself, and prevent any unfortunate mis- 
understanding on the border. He also inquired what 
measures had been taken to punish such American 
citizens as took part in the rebellion.^ When he and 
Morier learned, through a clerk in the State Depart- 
ment, that Claiborne was to take possession of West 
Florida through an agreement with the convention, 
they advised the reinforcement of Pensacola and other 
measures to protect their respective national interests 
in the West Indies. Morier favored the joint occupa- 
tion of Mobile in case of war with the United States, 
or even its cession to Great Britain.'^ In this sugges- 
tion, be it noted, the Englishman assumed the role of 
forcible protector, such as Iberville and Talleyrand 
formerly essayed. He and his kind did much to jus- 
tify American attempts to forestall later British ac- 
tivity in the Floridas. 

Secretary Smith refused to discuss the situation at 
Baton Rouge with Morier before it was presented to 
Congress. He intimated that the United States and 

^ De Onis to Dallas, Dec. 4, 1810, Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 34, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

■^ Morier to Wellesley, Dec. 3, 1810, MS., British Foreign 
Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 70. 



534 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

Spain were alone concerned, and that any interference 
by Great Britain would be disagreeable to the Amer- 
ican government. Madison had already instructed 
Pinkney to inform the British government that his 
proclamation, called out by the crisis in West Flor- 
ida, was an act wholly within executive authority. 
He was also to state that Congress would probably not 
permit East Florida or Cuba to pass into the control 
of any other power than Spain, and to express the 
hope that Great Britain would not entangle herself 
by seizing either.^ But Pinkney seems to have left 
England without making this explanation. 

Madison's instructions to Armstrong, who had not 
yet left France, were equally truculent. In placat- 
ing Napoleon he was to observe: "If France is wise 
she will neither dislike [the proclamation] nor pro- 
voke resentment of it in any other quarter." To 
soften this curt message Armstrong might suggest 
that France should " patronize " the independence of 
the Spanish colonies. Either France or England must 
profit from the leadership in this movement, but he 
did not explain how the former could do so without a 
navy. His suggestion was only an echo from Na- 
poleon and hardly likely to satisfy the originator. 
Spain must content itself with even less. That power 
must remain satisfied with the statement in his procla- 
mation that "West Florida . . . will not cease to be 

8 Madison to Pinkney, Oct. 30, 1810, Hunt, Madison, VIII, 
121. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 535 

a subject of fair and friendly negotiation and adjust- 
ment."^ 

In addition to a personal note Madison sent Arm- 
strong more complete instructions over Smith's signa- 
ture. Now that Spain had lost control over her colo- 
nies the United States could not permit disturbances 
to remain unchecked in her immediate neighborhood, 
especially when her own territorial rights were thereby 
jeopardized. Having been compelled to occupy the 
region as far as the Perdido, he was still willing to 
discuss the " right of sovereignty involved." This 
occupancy meant a change in possession but not in 
right, and was to be viewed as "the natural conse- 
quence of a state of things which the American gov- 
ernment could neither foresee nor prevent."" 

Jonathan Russell, acting charge at Paris, laid these 
matters before the French cabinet, with the assurance 
that his government was willing to discuss the just 
claims of other nations in a "candid and equitable" 
manner. His representation may have led Cadore to 
instruct Serurier, the new French minister, that the 
emperor would not oppose the American occupation 
of the Floridas or the independence of Spanish Amer- 
ica." After Madison's encouragement the French 

9 Madison to Armstrong, Oct. 30, 1810, Hunt, Madison, 
VIII, 116. 

10 Smith to Armstrong, Nov. 2, 1810, Instructions, MS., VII, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

11 Russell to Cadore, Dec. 18, 1810, Archives des Affaires 
£trangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 63, 288; Cadore to Serru- 
rier, Dec, 20, 1810, ibid.. Vol. 64, 295. 



536 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

coupling of these measures seems less sinister. Na- 
poleon could the more readily affect a benevolent de- 
sire for the well-being of the United States. At the 
same time, by an acquiescence in regard to the Flor- 
idas he might secure her adherence to his continental 
system. 

While directing its defense abroad, the administra- 
tion was not unmindful of its opportunities at home. 
Turreau had not yet left the country, and Robert 
Smith attempted to explain to him the latest develop- 
ments in this wise: "As for the Floridas, I swear, 
General, on my honor as a gentleman, not only that 
we are strangers to everything that has happened but 
even that the Americans who have appeared there as 
agents or leaders are enemies of the Executive, and 
act in this sense against the Federal government as 
well as against Spain." He went on to say that Skip- 
with, Thomas, and Clark, to whom he attributed an 
" intriguing devotion " to England, were interested in 
land speculations and hoped to profit from the trans- 
fer. It was easy to make this aspersion, and it would 
carry greater conviction had not Skipwith, through his 
friends, IMason and Graham, kept the administration 
informed of his whereabouts and intentions. More- 
over the reports of Claiborne, Boiling Robertson, Bar- 
row, Toulmin, and, above all, of Governor Holmes, 
had enabled Madison to size up the situation with pre- 
cision and take his measures accordingly. Smith was 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 537 

therefore hardly within the bounds of truth in saying 
that "we are strangers to everything that has hap- 
pened. "^^ Possibly Madison did not inform him of 
all that occurred, and if so, the president and his pre- 
ceptor, Jefferson, must also share in the obloquy. 

Smith trod upon more certain ground when he 
claimed that the administration acted to keep England 
out of Pensacola and Baton Rouge. vSuch a position 
would enable that power to close " our outlets by the 
Mobile and the Mississippi. We hope your govern- 
ment will not take it ill that we should defend the 
part of Florida in dispute between Spain and us ; and 
whether our pretensions are well founded or not, 
your interest, like ours, requires us to oppose the en- 
terprises of England in that country." Turreau as- 
sured Smith, as he had his predecessor, that an at- 
tempt by England to possess any of this territory 
would be sufficient to cause France and the United 
States to compose their relatively slight disputes and 
make common cause against her. 

Smith also used the fear of England to justify his 
efforts to break up the filibustering efforts against 
Mobile. '' Whatever power may direct Spain," he 
pointedly told the other, the United States could not 
lose sight of her interests there. Claiborne, who had 
been sent posthaste to the threatened frontier, would 

12 Adams, History of the United States, V, 313 ; Turreau 
to Champagny, Dec. 6, 1810, Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, 
£tats Unis, MS., Vol. 63, 280. 



538 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

oppose any British adherents there. The current dis- 
patches of Morier and De Onis show that there was 
some reason to apprehend British influences in the 
Floridas, but Turreau's quahfied approval of Amer- 
ican measures was probably due to the commercial 
situation in Europe. West Florida was a cheap price 
to pay for acquiescence in Napoleon's exactions. 

At home the administration faced an uncertain pub- 
lic opinion. Most of the Federalist papers attacked 
Madison's course as unconstitutional, unjust toward 
Spain, and likely to involve the United States in a 
war with Great Britain. The Virginia Patriot, tak- 
ing a mixed view, regarded his action as belligerent, 
but constitutional, and commendably prompt and de- 
cisive. Moderation in pushing claims tO' the territory, 
while Spain was in control, was uncalled for after 
revolt broke out there. Neither England nor Spain 
had any just cause to complain because the president 
ordered troops into the region. To call such action a 
breach of the constitution was to make " a bear out of 
a bramble." He had as much right to send troops 
there as across the Mississippi, where we had similar 
territorial claims.^^ 

New England Federalism was inclined to take a 
less lenient and likewise more accurate view of 
the executive policy. Northampton, Massachusetts, 
adopted resolutions against the president's action as 

13 Quoted in the National Intelligencer, Dec. 25, 1810. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 539 

unauthorized, wasteful, and likely to involve us in 
warfare with a magnanimous nation struggling for its 
very existence. In the Columbian Sentinel, John 
Lowe attacked the executive in a series of essays, 
afterward published in pamphlet form as "The Im- 
partial Inquirer." His main contention is that France, 
before 1763, did not possess exclusive title to the re- 
gion in question. Great Britain continually disputed 
its validity. The correspondence between Pitt and 
Bussy, and between Pitt and Vaudreuil, befo're 1763, 
clearly recognized the Indian tribes as barrier nations. 
In his discussion of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, 
Lowe favored the Spanish interpretation of the per- 
plexing three clauses. The whole question, he 
averred, was too complicated for all but lawyers, but 
it involved a moral standard that should obtain among 
nations as among individuals.^* 

Madison informed Congress, when it met in De- 
cember, that he regarded his action in West Florida 
as legal. He defended his unusually vigorous course 
by the familiar plea that events there threatened the 
peace of the Union and American territorial claims. 
He did not doubt that Congress would take the same 
view and promptly incorporate the territory with the 
Union. Inspired articles in the Intelligencer sup- 

^* The Impartial Inquirer, etc. By a citizen of Massachu- 
setts (John Lowe), Boston, 181 1, Library of Congress; en- 
closure in Morier to Wellesley, May 9, 181 1, MS., British For- 
eign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 74. 



540 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 



ported his message, by presenting a resume of the 
American claim to the region " fairly traced," and 
by references to the act of October, 1803, authorizing 
the president to take possession of Louisiana, and to 
subsequent legislation for organizing Orleans Terri- 
tory.^^ These articles followed the usual American 
arguments that were designed to establish "an un- 
disputed title " to West Florida. 

Such inveterate critics as Senator Pickering ac- 
knowledged that the president's course seemed bold; 
but Pickering thought it rash and unwarranted. The 
United States had no title to the region ; the adminis- 
tration had acquiesced in Spanish occupancy and had 
consented to negotiate its claim. At a word from 
France it had dropped negotiation, and now at the be- 
hest of the same power had, he beheved, inspired the 
revolutionary proceedings there. Ellicott again pro- 
nounced the American claim untenable. McHenry, 
the former secretary of war, expressed some uneasi- 
ness over the disposal of the region ; and Walter Jones 
of the War Department, while feeling that the presi- 
dent had acted as properly as could be expected, 
thought he had gone " full far enough, in what are 
called acts of decision, for a country without soldiers, 
without discipline, and almost destitute of the means 
to raise them."^^ 

15 Adams, History of the United States, V, 317, 318; Na- 
tional Intelligencer, Dec. 8, 22, 25, 29, 1810. 

16 Pickering to McHenry, Dec. 17, 1810, Steiner, Papers of 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 54I 

The president's message proved a disagreeable con- 
firmation of De Onis worst surmises. The latter at 
once urged the frontier officials to be doubly watch- 
ful of their remaining holdings. Not diplomatically 
recognized himself, he dispatched Bernaben to Wash- 
ington to deliver a personal protest, and asked Morier 
to back him up. The Spanish representative was per- 
suaded that the events in West Florida could never 
have disturbed the tranquility of neighboring terri- 
tories if the American government had taken pains to 
restrain its fractious citizens, as it had promised to do. 
In reply Smith assured him that the president's action 
was dictated by no hostility to Spain, as Claiborne's in- 
structions to offer no violence to the Spanish forces 
showed ; but to prevent the inhabitants of the disputed 
area from asking the protection of France or England. 
The intimation that Spain could not adequately de- 
fend her possession little pleased the unrecognized 
Spanish minister, but he could do nothing except try 
to work on Congress and to enlist Morier.^^ 

The English charge had not intended to broach the 
subject without further instructions from home. He 
thought that Turreau was already giving the Amer- 
ican government some anxious moments — perhaps de- 
manding possession in the name of Joseph Bonaparte 

James McHenry, 559; Walter Jones to (?), Jan. 7, 181 1, 
Lenox MSS. 

17 Bernaben to Smith, Dec. 10, 1810, Spanish Notes, MS., 
II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; De Onis to Captain- 
General, Dec. 20, 1810, Legajo 1708, Papeles de Cuba. 

36 



542 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 



— and that his menaces, with some aid from the vice- 
roy, would result in the recovery of the threatened 
district. Upon De Onis' request, however, he asked 
Smith why West Florida could not as well be the sub- 
ject of negotiation in the hands of Spain as of the 
American government, especially when the latter had 
to commit an act of hostility to get possession of it. 
After once discussing its status it was certainly an act 
of warfare to take forcible possession of it. Further- 
more how could it continue to be the subject of nego- 
tiation after it had been " received into the bosom of 
the American family?" 

Although Morier spoke in behalf of his country's 
ally, he had no expHcit instructions to guide him, and 
desired to speak in a most conciliatory manner. As a 
sample the following passage seems typical of British 
diplomacy of this period. Doubtless those whom he 
addressed deserved it, but it was hardly likely to con- 
ciliate them. "But it may be said that the Spanish 
forces in Mexico, in Cuba, or at Pensacola are un- 
equal to quell the rebellious associations of a band of 
desperados who are here known by the contemptuous 
appellation of land jobbers. Allowing as much (which 
you will agree with me, Sir, is allowing a great deal) 
would it not have been worthy of a free nation like 
this, bearing as it doubtless does a respect for the 
rights of a gallant people at this moment engaged in a 
noble struggle for liberty, would it not have been an 




IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 543 

act on the Part of this Country, dictated by the sacred 
ties of good neighborhood, and of Friendship which 
exists between it and Spain, to have simply offered its 
assistance to crush the common enemy of both, rather 
than to have made such interference the pretext for 
wresting a province from a friendly power and that 
in time of her adversity,"^^ 

Morier made his vigorous protest without instruc- 
tions because of the " uncandid proceedings " of the 
American officials. He hoped, at least, to make them 
refrain from further conquest. As Smith assured him 
that Claiborne was ordered not to attack any Spanish 
force, he anticipated that he would be successful in 
this, provided Folch had enough men to hold Mobile 
against the Conventionalists. The American govern- 
ment attempted to confine the discussion to Spain 
alone, but it had not contended for this till after that 
nation had broken with Bonaparte. Accordingly it 
could not object to a remonstrance from Spain's new 
ally. By instructing its minister to discuss this remon- 
strance in London, the administration tacitly admitted 
British interest in the subject. Morier assumed that 
the whole affair arose from French instigation. Tur- 
reau's formal remonstrances, belied by his reported 
utterances, merely strengthened his assumption. ^^ 

18 Morier to Smith, Dec. 15, 1810, MS., British Legation, V, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

i» Morier to Wellesley, Dec. 28, 1810, MS., British Foreign 
Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 70. 



544 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

Morier's note, carefully censored, accompanied the 
president's secret message on the Floridas. Smith 
also enclosed a copy to Pinkney, and requested him 
to explain at once that the United States intended no 
hostility against Spain.^^ It was doubly necessary to 
make this explanation, for, by the action of the execu- 
tive and Congress, East as well as West Florida was 
shortly brought into the complicated discussion. 

During the session of 1810-11 this discussion as- 
sumed a threefold phase. Congress reviewed the 
acts of the president and his subordinates under the 
proclamation of October 2.^] ; considered the status of 
the remainder of West Florida and of East Florida, in 
accordance with the secret message of January 3 ; and, 
finally, attempted to dispose of the territory already 
acquired and that in prospect in such manner as would 
be agreeable to its inhabitants and their immediate 
neighbors. These points promised to give the 
" Dashers," as one termed the ready supporters of the 
administration, full employment. 

Senator Giles of Virginia introduced a bill to ex- 
tend Orleans Territory to the Perdido.^^ This bill 
gave an opportunity to discuss the first and third 
phases mentioned above. In the absence of its spon- 
sor. Pope of Kentucky opened the debate on the bill, 

20 Smith to Pinkney, Jan. 15, 181 1, Instructions, MS., VII, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

21 Steiner, Papers of James McHenry, 560. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 545 

December 27, 1810. His discussion of the American 
title to the region lacked both originality and clarity. 
His defense of the expediency of the proclamation 
was clear enough. Spain had refused to pay Amer- 
ican commercial claims and was entitled to no consid- 
eration from the United States. As Bonaparte had 
favored the independence of the Spanish colonies, he 
could not complain if the United Statees should annex 
the Floridas, Cuba, or any other portion judged expe- 
dient, provided it were done with the consent of the 
people living in the annexed area.^^ 

Bradley of Vermont presented a novel argument with 
even less to support it. In 1803 France had no real 
title to West Florida, but her representatives implied 
that she had. Now that the French were absorbing 
Spain and her possessions, the United States might 
legally require them to deliver the disputed portion.^^ 
On the following day Horsey of Delaware quickly dis- 
posed of this argument. If the American negotiators 
permitted themselves to be deceived in 1803, their 
country must now bear the consequences. Far from 
being expedient, the proclamation was an unauthor- 
ized assumption of legislative power and an act of 
war. The fact that all Europe was relapsing into 
barbarism gave the United States no license to do the 
same. His discussion of the American title under the 

22 Annals of Eleventh Congress, Third Session, 37-42. 

23 Ibid. 



546 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

Treaty of 1803, it is needless to say, was diametrically 
opposed to that of Pope.^* 

Henry Clay, the young senator from Kentucky, who 
was filling out Adair's term, posed as the chief de- 
fender of the administration. His historical sum- 
mary of the title to West Florida was based on the 
grant to Crozat and the local agreement to observe 
the Perdido as a jurisdictional boundary. In 1800 
Spain had in some measure controlled Baton Rouge, 
Feliciana, and Mobile from New Orleans, as France 
had done before her, so that she was bound to cede 
this territory to the United States as part of French 
Louisiana. The Act of October, 1803, provided for 
the occupation of Louisiana, not merely its temporary 
government, and in the former sense the president 
might still use it to justify his proclamation. West 
Florida rendered New Orleans susceptible to attack 
by some new Burr faction or a foreign enemy, and 
its own weakness was a constant temptation to seize 
it. Consequently the president's action was wholly 
expedient.^^ 

The eloquent, if illogical, defense by Clay typified 
the new American spirit of which he was later so bril- 
liant a champion. Pickering of Massachusetts, in so 
many points his antithesis, attempted to fix on the ad- 
ministration the charge of French subserviency that 

24 Annals of Eleventh Congress, Third Session, 43-55. 

25 Ibid. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 547 

we have already noted. In doing so he quoted Talley- 
rand's letter of December 21, 1804, from which the 
Senate had not yet removed the pledge of secrecy. 
This raised a point of order that led to his censure, 
and in the ensuing wrangle the Senate found a pre- 
text to drop the unwelcome subject.^^ 

The House, meanwhile, was emphasizing the do- 
mestic phase of the Florida problem. This narrowed 
itself down to a struggle between Mississippi and 
Orleans for the despoiled territory. Many were un- 
willing to have the latter, now about to become a State, 
control both the Mississippi and the Mobile. Poin- 
dexter, delegate from Mississippi, wished to await the 
result of the debate in the Senate. His proposal arose 
less from a desire to avoid foreign complications than 
from a hope that he might thereby advance statehood 
for Mississippi. Troup and Bibb of Georgia were 
averse to including within the proposed State of 
Louisiana an area that the president had declared sub- 
ject to future negotiation. Barry of Kentucky wished 
to reserve to the general government the power to 
change the boundaries of the State. Shefifey of Vir- 
ginia thought that neither the executive nor the treaty- 
making power could give away territory. 

On January 3 Bibb proposed a resolution annexing 
the territory to Mississippi ; Miller of Tennessee sup- 
ported this, because it would divide the control of the 
chief watercourses and still provide the proposed State 

-^ Annals of Eleventh Congress, Third Session, 43-55. 



548 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

of Louisiana with a white population predominatingly 
American. His colleague Rhea thought that the treaty 
of cession forbade the annexation of a part of the 
Louisiana Purchase to any other state or territory 
east of the Mississippi. Finally, on January lo, 
Sheffey secured the passage of an amendment omit- 
ting the disputed region from the proposed State. 
In this form, after Josiah Quincy's famous disunion 
speech, the bill passed the House by a vote of ^"j to 
36.^^ In the Senate, Tait of Georgia made an unsuc- 
cessful attempt to include in Louisiana the region to 
the Pearl. On February 20 the president signed the 
enabling act for the new State, but this area did not 
yet form part of it.^^ 

De Onis believed that this moderation in congres- 
sional action was partly due to a memorial which he 
had pubHshed under the pen-name " Verus." In this 
he represented the whole unjustifiable course of the 
United States in West Florida as part of a Machiavel- 
lian plot instigated by Bonaparte. His arguments had 
been given unexpected publicity in the Federalist 
newspapers. Folch's recent defeat of the insurgents 
had likewise placed the administration in a very em- 
barrassing position.^^ The "immaculate Republi- 

27 Annals of Eleventh Congress, Third Session, 486-514, 

534, 537- 

28 Ibid., 103, 104; Adams, History of the United States, V, 
320^326. 

29 De Onis to Captain-General, Jan. 5, 1811, Legajo 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 549 

cans," as the English charge termed them, having ex- 
perienced great difficulty in justifying their usurpa- 
tion, were falling back on the plea of self-defense, 
and were inclined to be guided by what they had 
previously called the perfidy of European nations. 
"Many," wrote Morier, "viewed [the West Florida 
question] as big with fatal consequences to the Peace 
of this country."^^ 

Both Morier and De Onis received conflicting re- 
ports regarding Claiborne's course in Baton Rouge and 
at Mobile and Pensacola. Both, however, feared that 
the recent secret message of the president to Con- 
gress concerned East Florida. The Democrats were 
predicting some energetic measures, but Morier an- 
ticipated energy in nothing but words from a country 
with an empty treasury and an army of five thousand 
men, of whom some fifteen hundred only were in the 
Southwest. If, therefore, the United States should 
occupy the Floridas, as he thought very probable, and 
thus bring on a war with Spain and England, it would 
not be difficult to blockade the Mississippi, or to in- 
vade Orleans. These acts would distress the western 
country and lead it to revolt from the Union. Besides 
encouraging western separatism, he suggested the pos- 
sibihty of working among the slaves of the Carolinas, 
Georgia, and Mississippi and of sending regiments of 

30 Morier to Wellesley, Jan. 12, 181 1, MS., British Foreign 
Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 74. 



550 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

blacks from Havana to assist them in their struggle 
for freedom.^^ 

By the middle of February the British and Spanish 
representatives learned that Congress in its secret 
session had authorized the president to occupy East 
Florida, as they had feared, and that Matthews and 
McKee were already at work on the border. Through 
Dallas, De Onis protested that Spain had never given 
the least motive for an act so contrary to interna- 
tional right. Coming so soon on the heels of the 
president's proclamation, it was likely to stir up trouble 
for which his nation could not be held responsible. 
The administration vouchsafing no reply, the incensed 
Spaniard poured out his wrath to the viceroy and the 
captain-general. Never amid all her recent buffetings 
had the mother-country suffered so grievous an insult, 
delivered under the cloak of friendly righteousness. 
The American government, while disclaiming any part 
in the disturbances in the Floridas, had deliberately 
initiated them. Nor did it have the shame to conceal 
its unjust and cowardly spoliation by passing a law to 
check its own turbulent border. Condemning the 
course of England against Denmark, it was guilty of a 
grosser outrage toward its unfortunate neighbor. Its 
action was another proof of Bonaparte's domination. 
No improvement was to be expected from the present 

31 De Onis to Captain-General, Jan, 22, 181 1, Morier to 
Wellesley, Jan. 24, 181 1, cf. notes 29 and 30 for sources. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 55 1 

administration, but the time might soon come when its 
head would bitterly repent of his unmoral measures 
against Florida.^- 

De Onis' best ally, Morier, called the attention of 
his government to the action of the insurgent leader. 
Smith had claimed that Skipwith would resist the 
American forces ; but when the latter entered Baton 
Rouge, the quondam governor of the insurgent state 
quietly retired to his plantation. This confirmed 
Morier's earlier opinion that the convention was sim- 
ply a mock government used by the Americans to cloak 
their aggression. Later a Federalist newspaper pub- 
lished a copy of Claiborne's incriminating letter to 
WykofT, which in the view of this editor and his fel- 
lows and of the British charge simply confirmed their 
opinion of the administration's hypocrisy. Morier 
could, however, derive some satisfaction from the fact 
that Congress had as yet made no disposition of West 
Florida ; that Folch still retained Mobile, and with 
reinforcements might restore his authority to its pre- 
vious limits ; and that Cushing and his fellow-officers 
were under arrest and facing a court-martial.^^ 

In April the incompetent Smith gave place to the 
more promising Monroe. Bernaben, the useful sub- 
ordinate G'f De Onis, immediately subjected the new 

32 Bernaben to Monroe, June 2, 181 1, Spanish Notes, MS., 
II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; De Onis to Viceroy, 
Feb. 12, 181 1, Historia, MS., Vol. 161, A. G., Mexico. 

33 Morier to Wellesley, Feb. 16, 26, May 9, 181 1, of. note 30. 



552 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

secretary to a vigorous resume of Spain's injuries. 
The United States permitted France to hamper her 
commerce and to plot insurrection in the Spanish col- 
onies on her very soil, despite the present and past 
favors that she received from Spain. Moreover, in- 
cited by French precedents in Europe, she had stimu- 
lated revolt in Baton Rouge and occupied that point 
when Spain, weakened by European conflict, could 
not protect herself. After this territory had been the 
subject of negotiation, such an act was doubly hostile. 
Spain would gladly have concluded the diplomatic 
dispute had not political conditions for which she was 
not responsible absolutely prevented her. In the name 
of the Regency he requested the United States to evac- 
uate any part of West Florida in its military posses- 
sion and restore conditions as they were. Otherwise 
his nation must adopt such measures as its interests 
and power required.^* 

This vigorous arraignment, if not covert threat, 
led to an " unofficial conversation " between the new 
secretary and Bernaben. Monroe was surprised that 
the latter charged the United States with unfriend- 
liness, but he answered with a catalogue of complaints 
dating from Gardoqui's mission. Among these his 
own exasperating negotiation in 1805 played a con- 

34 Bernaben to Monroe, June 7, 181 1, Spanish Notes, MS., 
II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, cf. also report in Papers 
in Relation to Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bureau of Rolls and 
Library. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 553 

spicuous part. As for West Florida, it was well 
known that his government had no agency in the 
revolt there. When affairs became too critical for 
Governor Folch, he tried to save himself by offering 
to surrender his province to the United States. The 
latter did not recognize the assumed authority of the 
convention but suppressed that body, and by doing so 
preserved Folch in the residue of his government. 
Though it had the right and the power to force him to 
surrender this, according to his promise, it refrained 
from doing so. It had made no attempt to acquire a 
title through this series of events, for it already pos- 
sessed an incontrovertible one under the Treaty of 
1803, nor did it propose in any way to recognize the 
land claims of the revolutionists. Anyhow the terri- 
tory east of the Mississippi, now surrounded by the 
United States, could be of little use to Spain. For 
that power to persist in maintaining it only indicated 
a purpose to annoy the other.^^ 

The pass between Bernaben and Monroe indicated 
that the administration henceforth proposed to defend 
itself with greater vigor, if not with less speciousness. 
Pending the arrival of new instructions from across 
the Atlantic, De Onis could only note the movements 
of American troops toward the threatened frontier and 
speculate upon the outcome of the secret action of 
Congress, which, he surmised, must concern both the 
Floridas. It was rumored that Joseph Bonaparte was 

35 Ibid. 



554 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

to sell them to the United States, through Joel Bar- 
low, the new minister to France. He feared that the 
administration might at the same time try to seize 
Texas, which it also claimed. When the proposal to 
occupy East Florida revealed the full import of 
Folch's ill-advised offer, he urged captain-general and 
viceroy alike to make common cause against American 
cupidity. His urging was supplemented by direct or- 
ders from the Regency to aid the governor of West 
Florida in every possible way. 

That body also instructed Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, its 
representative in London, to inform the British gov- 
ernment of the events that showed such marked Amer- 
ican hostility and to ask it to intervene in behalf of 
"a more regular conduct." Accordingly the British 
Cabinet added Apodaca's request to the burden of A. 
J. Foster's delicate mission. The American adminis- 
tration had not given Morier the explanations that 
Smith had promised, but rather had pressed for the 
surrender of Mobile and the organization of the in- 
vaded territory. Foster was to protest against any 
further occupation and also against any similar action 
in East Florida, where the United States had no claim 
whatever. He was to " soften " this protest, make no 
threats, and after submitting his report, await further 
instructions.^^ Evidently Jackson's blustering course 
had taught his superiors a lesson. 

36 MS., British Foreign Office, Spain, ^2, Vol. 177; MS., 
British Foreign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 75. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 555 

When Foster arrived he and Bernaben cooperated 
to give the administration, early in July, 1811, the 
discussion on West Florida that Madison had invited 
in his proclamation. The Spaniard accepted the re- 
port that troops were still being sent from New Or- 
leans to West Florida as evidence that the govern- 
ment was less friendly than it professed. As the oc- 
cupation of this region constituted the chief obstacle 
to negotiation, he demanded its evacuation before 
Spain could even consider relinquishing the Floridas.^'' 
His statement may mean that the concession would 
lead his government to act as it did in 1819, but there 
was no Jackson in the field to force such a treaty. 

In a personal interview with Monroe, Foster " urged 
with as much force as temperate language would ad- 
mit, the ungenerous treatment " that the United States 
had visited upon Spain in her extremity, and that, too, 
in defense of a doubtful claim. Monroe retorted that 
the area geographically belonged to the United States, 
and that his country had an unquestionable right to it 
anyhow. It was a humane act on the part of the ad- 
m.inistration to preserve the few Spanish soldiers there 
from the insurgents. Possibly it may have been this 
that inspired Foster's later reference to Monroe's " ar- 
guments of a most profligate nature " ; though very 

sT^ De Onis to Captain-General, May 21, June i, July i, 1811, 
Legajo 1708, Papeles de Cuba; Bernaben to Monroe, July 4, 
181 1, Spanish Notes, MS., II, Bureau of Indexes and Ar- 
chives. 



556 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

likely it was Monroe's unkind insinuation that in its 
general policy the United States was more scrupulous 
than other nations. Certainly it had not assisted the 
insurgents in South America in order to advance its 
commercial interests there. 

But neither counter-claim nor insinuation could 
shake Foster's belief in the validity of Spain's posi- 
tion. The conditions in West Florida did not render 
it expedient for the United States to intervene, nor 
could the executive quote one invitation from the 
local authorities there to justify the forcible occupation 
of territory. The Spanish government would never 
have condoned such a request. He doubted the genu- 
ineness of Folch's offer to surrender his province. 
This led him to ask about the act empowering the 
president to take possession of East Florida — a sub- 
ject which he had not originally intended to broach. 
Monroe at first afifected ignorance, but later betrayed 
himself by laughter. Yet he refused to state what 
might happen should a hypothetical Skipwith or a 
hypothetical Folch be opportunely located there. 

Foster believed that the American officials were 
only too ready to take advantage of the needs or the 
fears of their Spanish neighbors, as they had done in 
Folch's case. Also land speculators were settling East 
Florida for the purpose of stirring up rebellion and 
calling in American aid. British and Spanish success 
on the Peninsula had retarded this project; but noth- 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 557 

ing but the probability of war with Great Britain 
would cause them to abandon it. He regarded Amer- 
ican occupation of East Florida as a disadvantage to 
his nation, and suggested that some British executive 
in the West Indies should offer to aid the officials there 
and at Mobile against any insurgents. Such an offer 
might be made to appear spontaneous, yet it would 
lead timorous Americans to hesitate before involving 
their country in a war with Great Britain. Anyhow, 
the insurgents were generally renegade Americans 
who could not claim the protection of their own gov- 
ernment.^^ 

In his formal note following the interview Foster 
wisely forbore to mention East Florida. The Amer- 
icans evidently would not employ force there, nor were 
they willing to do so at Mobile, where the old commer- 
cial controversy was again in progress. He found 
sufficient exercise for his pen in discussing the occupa- 
tion of Baton Rouge and the resultant catalogue of 
Spanish complaints. He hoped that territorial ambi- 
tion had not prompted this occupation, or the present 
condition of Spain ; but at best it was an ungenerous 
act. As the American government evidently did not 
intend to change its policy, he did not hesitate to pre- 
sent "the solemn protest" of his own government 
"against an attempt so contrary to every principle of 

38 Foster to Wellesley, July 5, Aug. 5, 181 1, MS., British 
Foreign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 76. 



558 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

public justice, faith, and national honor, and so in- 
jurious to the alliance subsisting between His Majesty 
and the Spanish nation. "^^ 

While the administration resented Foster's inter- 
ference, Monroe undertook to give him a " friendly " 
explanation, obviously designed for the public that 
shortly read it. He repudiated the idea that his col- 
leagues had tried to take advantage of Spain's neces- 
sities, although the other government afforded them 
numerous precedents for such a policy. Without 
enumerating all the just complaints of his nation 
against Spain, he mentioned the suspension of the de- 
posit at New Orleans and the commercial spoliations. 
Although the United States did not depend wholly on 
them for justification, she did not expect to neglect 
them entirely. Great Britain and France had made 
reparation for such claims. Some six years before 
Spain had invited the United States to negotiate upon 
the claim to the Perdido. In accepting this invitation 
the United States had hoped to settle that and all other 
points in dispute between the two countries, but had 
been disappointed. Thus he naively passed over his 
failure at Aranjuez. Since that unsuccessful nego- 
tiation, the affairs of West Florida had remained in a 
state of confusion favorable to neither nation, but the 
United States made no attempt to profit by this. In 

39 Foster to Monroe, July 2, 181 1, MS., British Legation, VI, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 559 

the preceding year, -however, the United States could 
not be indifferent to the revolt of its inhabitants which 
threatened her rights and at the same time wrested 
the province from Spain. In occupying that part no 
longer controlled by the Spanish troops, his nation 
consulted Spain's honor as well as her own rights. 
By this occupation the United States acquired "no 
new title to West Florida. It wanted none." His 
government proposed to adjust amicably " all the other 
points at issue " as soon as Spain was ready, and then 
"her claim to this territory [might] also be brought 
into view and receive all the attention that [was] due 

Monroe was interpreting the president's promise to 
submit the West Florida question to future negotia- 
tion in a way that had occurred to few of his con- 
temporaries. Yet it was obviously the only way to 
justify forcible occupation. The man who had clung 
so tenaciously to the West Florida claim, in opposition 
to Talleyrand and Cevallos, now had the chance to 
maintain it as a fait accompli, and undoubtedly took 
a certain malicious pleasure in making a British rep- 
resentative realize this. He stated that Pinkney had 
not been able to give the necessary explanations in 
London, but hoped that his own "frank " course would 
completely satisfy the British government. 

Evidently his " frankness " did not, for early in 

40 Niles' Register, I, 188. 



560 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

September, 1811, upon De Onis' initiative, Fester 
asked Monroe to explain Matthews's course in East 
Florida. The United States certainly could not al- 
lege any claim there to justify its agent's correspond- 
ence with traitors or attempts to bribe Spanish sub- 
jects from their allegiance. Some two months passed 
before Monroe deigned to answer this. He based his 
defense on the commercial claims, which were more 
valuable than w^as East Florida. In this matter the 
United States owed something to its citizens as well as 
to Spanish honor, so it could not permit the region 
to pass into the hands of a third power, or even to 
remain as a possible temptation. Its action, therefore, 
predicated upon the consent of the local authorities, 
or the designs of a third power, simply afforded an- 
other evidence of its "just and amicable views" to- 
ward Spain, and its representatives abroad had been 
instructed so to explain it. This, Monroe intimated, 
ought to close the discussion, for the United States 
would pursue its just and honorable course only so 
long as it comported with national honor and safety.*^ 
Monroe was evidently very " warm " over the cor- 
respondence, as Foster reported him, and seemed to 
view possible hostilities with much less dread than 
the British minister anticipated. The British cabinet 
was content to rest the discussion wholly with Foster, 
and the. Regency definitely expressed their obligation 

-1 Niles' Register, I, 189, 190. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 56 1 

for his services. During the winter of 1811-1812 
there were rumors that the English and the Spaniards 
would unite to defend the Floridas as a step against 
the general independence of the Spanish colonies, but 
the cabinet did nothing beyond ordering the admiral 
on the American coast to watch hostile demonstrations 
in the region. In the spring of 1812 Foster renewed 
his complaints against Matthews's course in East Flor- 
ida. Monroe acknowledged that the latter was ex- 
ceeding his instructions, and later reported orders to 
supersede him, but, to Foster's mortification, failed to 
make any reference to West Florida. On the eve of 
war between the two nations Foster made a last at- 
tempt to secure recognition for De Onis, suggesting 
the possibility of acquiring the desired Floridas in 
the ensuing negotiations. But Monroe quoted the re- 
cent resolution of the Spanish Cortes against alienat- 
ing territory as an effectual bar to such a settlement.*^ 
The outbreak of war between the United States and 
Great Britain presented a new problem in Anglo- 
Spanish relations. The British representative in Spain 
reported the event to the Spanish Council of State 
with an evident desire to enlist its aid in the conflict. 
A long series of unfriendly acts by the Americans, 

42 Foster to Wellesley, Apr. 2, 1812, MS., British Foreign 
Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 85 ; Foster to Castlereagh, May 21, 
1812, MS., British Foreign Office, America, II, 5, Vol. 86; 
Foster to Monroe, Apr. 6, June 6, 1812, MS., British Legation, 
VII. Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



562 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

culminating in the occupation of Baton Rouge and 
Amelia Island, constituted virtual warfare against 
Spain, although accompanied by no formal declara- 
tion of hostilities. The Council of State, however, de- 
termined to take provisional action only. Spanish of- 
ficials were to adopt every precaution against Amer- 
ican aggression and should even ask British naval offi- 
cers to assist in protecting their shipping. They 
should express to Great Britain their intention to fol- 
low her lot, but at the same time express a desire to 
keep out of the struggle as long as possible.*^ This 
decision was not so one-sided as it seemed, for Great 
Britain was able to violate the pretended neutrality of 
the Spaniards whenever it suited her purpose to use the 
Floridas, while open hostility on the part of Spain 
would have delivered those territories immediately to 
the Americans. 

Although avoiding formal warfare, the Spanish 
authorities were by no means inclined to minimize 
their resentment against the Americans. This was 
voiced by Pedro Labrador in a report to the Cortes on 
December 31, 1812. From the beginning of the 
struggle of Spain against Napoleon the American gov- 
ernment had shown its unfriendliness. It had refused 
to receive De Onis, the representative of the Regency. 
It had intrigued to gain possession of the Floridas, 

^^Libro de Actos del Consejo de Estado, 13 d, Aug. 6, 1812, 
Estado, A. H. N., Madrid. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 563 

and finally had occupied portions of them, after insti- 
gating revolt, and was evidently disposed to absorb 
the rest. These and similar warlike acts elsewhere 
revealed the hostility and guile of the American gov- 
ernment and the rank ingratitude of the American 
people.** 

An anonymous memoir of the period sought still 
further to arouse the Spaniards against " the demo- 
cratic government of the United States." Under the 
Frenchified Jefferson and Madison its authorities had 
stimulated the revolt in West Florida in 1810; had 
threatened to overwhelm Spain in her hour of neces- 
sity by such " unworthy pretexts " as spoliations and 
territorial claims ; and had recently attempted to annex 
both the Floridas, corrupting officials there if neces- 
sary to accomplish its purpose. From this scene of 
intrigue its " emissaries and democratic agents " had 
spread to the interior provinces of Mexico, where 
vagabond invaders were following them. It was evi- 
dently the intention of the American government to 
aggrandize itself by fraud and force, ultimately estab- 
lishing "Democracy and its companion Atheism" 
throughout New Spain. The root of all these evils 
was a fraudulent transaction which gave the United 
States possession of Louisiana, but no property right 

44 A copy of this report, dated at Cadiz, Dec. 31, 1812, is 
found in Papers in Relation to Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bu- 
reau of Rolls and Library. 



564 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

there. Nor had that power since gained the allegiance 
of its people. By assisting them to separate from the 
Eastern States, Spain might make Louisiana into a 
friendly barrier. The region could then be organized 
as a " modern monarchy " under the joint guarantee of 
Spain, England, Russia, and Sweden, with the Flori- 
das and Texas attached to it. This new power, like 
the infant Hercules, would " strangle the serpent of 
Democratic usurpation " and effectively restrain all 
enterprises against Spanish America.*^ 

The author of this curious diatribe may have been 
Richard Rayneval Keene, a land-hungry aristocrat of 
the period, who seems to have learned little from sev- 
eral years' residence in New Orleans. The essential 
point to note in it is that the Spanish authorities were 
gradually coming to transfer their concern at Amer- 
ican progress from the Floridas to the Louisiana- 
Texas frontier. The contemporary mission of John 
Hamilton Robinson, one of Monroe's " emissaries and 
democratic agents," to Chihuahua afforded a definite 
case in point. He was provided with documents to 
explain the course of the American government in 
East and West Florida, but his real purpose was un- 
doubtedly to open up commercial relations with Mex- 
ico. For this reason the Spaniards regarded his mis- 
sion as a continuation of those undertaken by Wilkin- 

45 A copy of this memoir is filed in Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 54, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, under date of 
Jan. I, 1817. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 565 

son and Matthews. Such efforts betokened equal 
peril to Spain's political control and Britain's com- 
mercial supremacy.^^ 

France, too, had an interest in the fate of the Flor- 
idas, as well as in the future of Spanish America. 
This interest continued, as before, to be associated 
with Napoleon's general commercial policy. Bassano, 
whose devotion to the Continental System had given 
him Cadore's place, must be brought to approve re- 
cent American action, as his predecessor had appar- 
ently done. To this task, therefore, Jonathan Russell, 
the charge at Paris, addressed himself in the latter 
part of April, 1811. 

Mentioning the long-cherished desire of the United 
States to possess the Floridas, for which its commer- 
cial claims against Spain afforded a fair equivalent, 
Russell stated that the recent revolts in the Spanish 
colonies rendered annexation absolutely necessary. 
But the administration was uncertain with whom to 
negotiate for a perfect title. Certainly any power 
claiming Spain must assume her debts, and in lieu of 
these might be willing to trade the Floridas or make 
some other just indemnity. Having established this 
basis for a bargain — which it must be confessed is 
rather one sided — Russell went on to clinch it by as- 

46 For Robinson's mission consult my article on " Monroe 
and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents " in the Annual 
Report of the American Historical Association for the year 
1911, 199-215 



566 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

suring Bassano that if circumstances compelled the 
United States to occupy the region, France would not 
receive harm, nor any other power have cause to ob- 
ject. The United States would have the means to 
pay the claims of its citizens and to carry out its cus- 
toms laws more effectually.*^ 

As these customs laws bore more hardly on Great 
Britain than on France, Bassano was not likely to ob- 
ject to the latter point. But if American citizens were 
to profit from this transaction, and the United States 
to gain the desired territory, there must be some com- 
pensation for France as well. Of course the assump- 
tion of all claims against that power, as well as against 
Spain, counted for something; but in addition the 
Americans had formerly been willing to make a cash 
payment to France, and had even appropriated ten 
million francs for this purpose. They might now be 
induced to pay this sum or even to double it. The 
transaction might easily be arranged through a treaty 
with Joseph Bonaparte, or through an arrangement 
forcing him to transfer the territory to France and 
then cede it to the United States. Bassano showed 
that France had never supported the claim to West 
Florida and that the Americans could not strengthen 
their right to it by seizing both Floridas as security 
for their commercial claims. Nor did the mere verbal 

47 Russell to Bassano, Apr. 30, 181 1, Archives des Affaires 
fitrangeres, £tats Unis, Supplement, MS., Vol. 8, 249. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 567 

promise of Cadore not to oppose this occupation estop 
France from receiving the sum mentioned above.*^ 

In his note reviewing the discussion with Bassano, 
Russell did not mention any compensation for France 
beyond the assumption of commercial claims,*^ Ob- 
viously such compensation was contrary to Madison's 
hope, expressed to Barlow, that the emperor would 
make no unworthy attempt to extract money from 
the United States by means of the Floridas. When 
Barlow reached Paris, Petry, Bassano's subordinate, 
reported that the American bore no definite instruc- 
tions on the subject. Congress had simply advised the 
president to occupy the region in order to keep Great 
Britain out. The latter power also desired the terri- 
tory as a counterpoise to Louisiana, and had protested 
against the American occupation of West Florida. 
Its possession by the United States would protect the 
southeastern border and give both the United States 
and France commercial advantages in Mexico.^'' 

About this time the French vice-consul at Ports- 
mouth, Cazeaux, submitted a memoir in which he 
claimed that mere commercial advantages alone would 
not pay France for permitting the Americans to oc- 
cupy the Floridas. France herself could derive many 

*8 Ibid., 251 ; unsigned Note sur les Florides, probably by 
Bassano in Archives des Affaires Strangeres, £tats Unis, MS., 
Vol. (^, 34, 36, Z7. 

49 Ibid., 80, 81. 

50 Petry to Bassano, Nov. 15, 181 1, ibid., 287. 



568 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

advantages from seizing the region where some French 
estabHshments already existed. Possibly he had Mo- 
bile and its vicinity in mind. Evidently the Amer- 
icans were determined to possess all the territory east 
of the Mississippi, but a small force, say three frig- 
ates and some five or six hundred men, would cause 
them to abandon their purpose.^^ De Onis seems to 
have had some inkling of Cazeaux's suggestion, for he 
earlier mentioned a project to send a French expedi- 
tion to Amelia Island.^^ Some months later an un- 
signed memoir reviewed the advantages that the 
United States would gain from the possession of the 
Floridas, and advised that France in return for her 
acquiescence should demand commercial privileges 
there, as well as in Louisiana, for a period of twelve 
years. ^^ 

Shortly after his correspondence with Foster, Mon- 
roe wrote Barlow that Spain owed the United States 
more than East Florida was worth, and that his coun- 
try should look to that province for compensation, and 
in no case permit a third power to occupy it. On the 
other hand West Florida belonged to her by a title 
that could not be improved.^* Perhaps he meant the 

51 Memoir, Dec. 14, 181 1, ibid., 383-390. 

52 De Onis to Captain-General, Sept. 28, 1811, Legajo 1708, 
Papeles de Cuba. 

53 Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, fitats Unis, Memoircs 
et Documents, MS., Vol. 10, 361-363. 

54 Monroe to Barlow, Nov. 21, 1811, Instructions, MS., VII, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 569 

old rule that possession is nine points of the law. 
With such divergent views the French and Americans 
were not likely to agree in a division of Spanish 
spoils. In May, 1812, George Poindexter wrote that 
Barlow had been unable to arrange a satisfactory ter- 
ritorial and commercial treaty with the French em- 
peror and there was no prospect that he would do so.'^^ 
Yet even in the midst of the difficult Russian cam- 
paign there was an attempt to settle these long-stand- 
ing disputes. Possibly in view of impending disaster 
elsewhere, the emperor sincerely desired to gain the 
good-will of the United States. Petry at Paris sug- 
gested that the fifteen million acres of unoccupied lands 
within the Floridas ought to be worth at least three 
francs an acre to the United States. Bassano, now 
on the Russian border, wished to utilize any conces- 
sion on the part of France in order to gain a favorable 
commercial treaty. For this purpose he ordered all 
documents relating to the Florida controversy to be 
transferred to him at Wilna. These documents ought 
to show that when France received Louisiana it in- 
cluded no part of the Floridas, and that the American 
representatives had frequently expressed such a belief. 
At one time the United States actually provided ten 
million francs for their purchase. In taking posses- 

^5 Poindexter to Mead, Apr. 10, May 24, 1812, Claiborne 
Letters, B, MS., Department of Archives and History, Jack- 
son, Miss. 



570 IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 

sion of the disputed area the United States had prom- 
ised to arrange for the rights of all interested parties, 
and this promise should now be utilized to end all 
claims for spoliations, including the recent ones of 
which Barlow was complaining.^^ 

Evidently Bassano believed the settlement of these 
claims to be essential, for he said that if the United 
States persisted in its refusal to discuss West Florida 
as an offset to the spoliations, he might use the un- 
settled western boundary as an additional incentive. 
In view of the fact that revolt was spreading through- 
out her colonies, Spain might now be willing to relin- 
quish the claims to the Bravo, although he did not 
think it very probable.^^ This suggestion of the per- 
plexed minister indicated that the diplomatic interest 
formerly centering about West Florida was to be 
transferred further afield. Even the Spanish officials 
recognized this, although they were not at all willing 
to abandon their previous contentions in regard to the 
Floridas. 

In the fall of 1812 Barlow left Paris for distant 
Poland in the vain hope of settling these disputes as 

^^ Petry to Bassano, July 31, 1812, Archives des Affaires 
fitrangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 68, 262; cf. also Vol. 68, 
316, and Vol. 69, 86, 87, 336, 390-397- 

57 Roux to Brennin, Oct. 14, 1812, Archives des Affaires 
fitrangeres, fitats Unis, Supplement, MS., Vol. 5, 416; Bas- 
sano to Serrurier, Nov. 25, 1812, Archives des Affaires fitran- 
geres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 69, 390-392. 



IN DEFENSE OF INTERVENTION 57 1 

well as the wider question of commercial rights. In 
a sense the American fell a victim to Napoleon's 
ruthless poHcy which sacrificed diplomats as readily 
as divisions. Before his death in the little Polish 
village near Cracow, Barlow knew that it was hopeless 
to expect from the whilom giver of Louisiana any 
settlement of its complicated boundaries. ^^ 

58 Adams, History of the United States, VI, 263-265. 



CHAPTER X\" 

Ix CORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

The people of the "Baton Rouge district were anx- 
ious for prompt incorporation into the American 
Union ; the American people cienerally desired to re- 
ceive them. The question of adjustment, therefore, 
seemed relatively simple. There were, however, some 
details connected with the later Spanish regime and 
the brief period of independence that presented dit^- 
eult problems. Among these were the recognition of 
land sales since 1803. the payment of the convention 
debts, and pardon for the deserters from American 
service. These points had aroused Skipwith's concern 
and for a time threatened to brine: him into armed col- 
lision with Claiborne. Fortunately his better judg- 
ment led him to waive them, pending action by the 
executive and Congress. 

Skipwith desired American intervention : but he was 
firmly persuaded that he and his associates could give 
the United States a better title to the region than did 
the president's proclamation, which foreign nations 
were not likely to recognize. He did not explain how 
he expected to induce them to recogiiize his embryo 
goveniment. Yet when the occupation was an assured 

57^ 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 573 

fact he acknowlc'-Ij^ed that Ckibornc had b^^en mag- 
nanimous to the people of West Florida and courteotus 
to himself, ffe assured his friend Graham that in 
case of foreign invasion the governmfmt might abso- 
lutely rely upon them, French and American alike. 

The executive of the short-lived State felt douUy 
resentful because his proud eminence made him the 
easy target of newspaper abuse, in which the "chaste 
Intelligencer" and "the unchaste Aurora" alike 
joined. 7here was much in his melodramatic inter- 
views with Flolmes, his bombastic messages to Clai- 
borne, and the concluding address of his legislative as- 
sembly to excite their mirthful sarcasm ; but their vic- 
tim writhed under FJuane's "libertine abuse." The 
revolutionists were neither "Burrites" nor mere land 
speculators. Now that they had returned "to the 
bosom of their Parent Country," he and his former 
legislative companions wished their address to be 
buried in oblivion \vithout aspersion upon themselves 
or censure for the national administration.^ 

Skipwith's friends regretted the false position in 
which he had placed himself. Monroe had written in 
regard to his ruinous controversy with Armstrong 
that if he had been less honest he would probably have 
been more fortunate. From distant Rio Janeiro, 
Thomas Sumpter, Jr., inquired what devil possessed 

1 Skipwith to Graham, Dec. 23, 1810, Jan. 14, 181 1, Madison 
Papers, MS. 

33 



574 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

Skipwith. He had been so long a steadfast friend of 
his country that it was grievous to see him attempting 
a melodramic role in such poor company. James 
Bowdoin, who knew his tested worth in Paris, was 
concerned to think that his action in West Florida had 
cast a shadow on his reputation.^ 

Skipwith beHeved that the report of his actions as 
published in the Intelligencer was a literal extract from 
Claiborne's correspondence. Claiborne took pains to 
explain that this was not the case, although he had 
furnished the facts and could have told much more. 
He gave Skipwith full credit for his correct course 
after the occupation. In his second letter to Graham, 
Skipwith asserted the loyalty of his friends and him- 
self to the Union, despite all attempts to calumniate 
them. He had opposed Kemper's operations and all 
attempts to enlist American citizens, so that no foreign 
government might have the least reason for suspect- 
ing the American authorities of fomenting the insur- 
rection. Personally he had supported the agreement 
with De Lassus as long as he could, and had later as- 
sumed office in order to afford the United States an 
" honorable pretext " to take possession of the terri- 
tory. Until that end should be reached he had hoped, 
with the aid of Dr. Steele and others, to preserve order 
and administer justice. 

2 Monroe Papers, MS., XII, 1593, 1588, Library of Con- 
gress ; Hamilton, Monroe, IV, 512. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 575 

Having secured the desired intervention of the 
United States, the people hoped that some way might 
be devised for paying the expenses of their independ- 
ent government and for releasing them speedily from 
a territorial organization. Skipwith preferred an- 
nexation to Orleans, for that would hasten the for- 
mation of a State there. Moreover the American ele- 
ment in West Florida would neutralize the French in- 
habitants, who had shown little progress in acquiring 
the English language or American ideas, and would 
make of it a State, entirely free from Bonapartist 
intrigues.^ 

About the middle of January, 1811, a series of in- 
surrections among the slaves of the German Coast 
caused great alarm in Orleans and Mississippi and 
aroused some uneasiness in the newly acquired terri- 
tory.* Two months later the latent discontent mani- 
fested itself in a more dramatic manner. When the 
residents of St. Francisville arose on a Sunday morn- 
ing they beheld the flag of West Florida again wav- 
ing from the top of the flagstaff. Evidently its reap- 
pearance some sixty feet high in the air was due to a 
mere prank, and no one cared to remove the emblem 
by climbing the pole or cutting it down. Moreover 

3 Skipwith to Graham, Jan. 14, 1811, cf. note i, 
* Butler to Holmes, Jan. 15, 1811, Mississippi Territorial 
Archives, MS., Vol. 9; Holmes to Colonel James Wood, Jan. 
17, 181 1, Proceedings Executive Council, Mississippi Terri- 
tory, MS., I. 



576 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

the flagpole was private property. As the report 
spread, considerable uneasiness developed. Then Gen- 
eral Hampton happened to come into town, and or- 
dered the flag to be cut down, for its presence seemed 
a deliberate insult to the government. When there 
was some hesitation to injure private property, he 
threatened to call out a company of soldiers for the 
task. The civil authorities then quickly had the pole 
felled. On the following day the flag was solemnly 
interred with elaborate military ceremonies, and a pre- 
tentious epitaph was placed over it.^ 

Scarcely had this farce ended when news reached 
St. Francisville that the Orleans legislature had re- 
fused to seat the five representatives from West Flor- 
ida. This act seemed to be in keeping with Claiborne's 
previous palatine methods, although it is more likely 
that the blame should be given to Congress because 
of its delay in attaching the district to Orleans. The 
incensed people of St. Francisville immediately talked 
of a remonstrance to' the president. Some attributed 
the action to the fact that the assembly was composed 
largely of Frenchmen who hated Americans and would 
be only too glad to cause trouble in West Florida. If 
that was what they were to expect when Orleans be- 
came a State, they hoped that the people of Missis- 
sippi Territory would be ready to meet the issue.® 

5 Nashville Clarion and Gazette, Apr. 2, 181 1. 
« Ibid. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 577 

Exaggerated reports of these incidents led the Span- 
iards to hope for respite from further American en- 
croachments. 

Skipwith had been one of the rejected representa- 
tives. He had prepared an elaborate defense of the 
whole revolutionary movement to present to the legis- 
lature, and later had contemplated using it as an ad- 
dress to his constituents, but he refrained from doing 
so. In his draft he opposed the American contention 
that West Florida was part of the Louisiana Purchase 
— a contention that he had previously assisted his 
friend Monroe to maintain. He reviewed the steps by 
which he and his associates had made themselves inde- 
pendent, showing that no other course was open to 
them. He commented bitterly upon Claiborne's hos- 
tile approach, so different from the tone of his letter 
to Wykoff, and contrasted his tenderness for Spanish 
sensibilities with his blunt course toward the conven- 
tion. Yet its members desired to be incorporated in 
the Union and had no alternative but submission. 
But they expected Congress to better Claiborne's 
procedure.'^ 

After Monroe became secretary of state, Skipwith 
felt that he had a friend at court who would give him 
credit for integrity of motive. Accordingly, on May 
18, he sent Monroe the documents giving his inter- 

7 Address of Skipwith, West Florida Papers, MS., iii ff., 
Library of Congress. 



578 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

pretation of the West Florida revolution. When it 
seemed evident to himself and his companions that 
the United States did not intend to occupy the country 
under the Louisiana cession, they determined to pro- 
claim their independence for the sole purpose of giv- 
ing themselves to the United States. He had so in- 
formed his friends, Mason and Graham, and expected 
them to impart this information to the president. He 
then needed only a hint from either of them to check 
or extend the movement as was desired. Instead of 
recognizing his agency in any way, the administration 
permitted its own paper to make a most disgraceful 
attack on him. He had as yet taken no steps for pub- 
lic vindication, and now asked nothing of the admin- 
istration but an opportunity to defend himself. He 
had mentioned his resentment only to Dr. Steele and 
Boiling Robertson, who supported the administration, 
and he requested Monroe to show his present letter 
only to his friends Mercer and Sumpter.^ 

Monroe requested Boiling Robertson to write Skip- 
with, but delayed his own reply for some months. 
Probably he did not intend to neglect his former inter- 
mediary, with whose misfortunes he sympathized, and 
he certainly cherished full confidence in the desire 
of Skipwith and his companions to advance the best 
interests of the country. With reference to the main 
point of Skipwith's letter he thus expressed him- 

s Skipwith to Monroe, May i8, 1811, Lenox MSS. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 579 

self : " I shall say but little relative to the late affair 
in West Florida. I shall only remark that it was im- 
possible for the U[nited] S[tates] to accept a title for 
it, from the revolutionary party. They would have 
been as much responsible to Spain, or any other gov- 
ernment claiming Spain, in taking it from the revolu- 
tionists, as if they had driven the Spanish troops out 
by those of the U[nited] States. Spain would always 
have said that this party was put in motion by the 
U[nited] States, for the purpose of masking their 
views. In taking the country from it, they would 
have had the same difficulty to keep the possession 
against the ultimate possessor of Spain, as if they had 
taken it by force. If war had been the consequence, 
it would have fallen on the U[nited] States, not on 
the revolutionary party in Florida, who would have 
disappeared and mingled with the rest of their fellow 
citizens. In taking that course then the U[nited] 
States would have gained nothing as to title or secur- 
ity ; and would have lost in character and likewise in 
property for [in] so far as they made the revolution- 
ists any recompense for the cession, [just] so far it 
would be an entire loss."^ We may regard Monroe's 
argument as no more convincing than Skipwith's, but 
he was defending an accomplished fact, not a theory. 
On the whole he offered what is possibly the best jus- 
tification for the course pursued by the administration 
in the Florida intervention. 

9 Monroe to Skipwith, Oct. 22, 1811, Lenox MSS. 



58o INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

As the disputes over the status and the claims of the 
Baton Rouge district were gradually transferred to 
Washington for leisurely settlement, the frontier offi- 
cials turned their efforts to the region further east- 
ward. The situation along the Pascagoula especially 
demanded attention. When Colonel James Caller car- 
ried the president's proclamation to Fort Stoddert, he 
sent a copy to Sterling Dupree, who was then in the 
midst of his plundering course. That marauder im- 
mediately hauled down the convention flag and hoisted 
that of the United States, but he did not mend his 
ways. Moved by reports of his action, supplemented 
by the testimony of Captain George Farragut and 
Joseph CoUins, Claiborne determined to send troops to 
repress disorder there and at Bay St. Louis. He 
commissioned a justice of the peace with instructions 
to organize the parishes of Biloxi and Pascagoula, the 
latter extending to Bayou Batture [Labatre?], some 
twelve or fifteen miles beyond Pascagoula River, and 
including the only family between that stream and 
Mobile. Commodore Shaw was to furnish a gunboat 
and Captain Farragut was to accompany him. 

Judge Toulmin hoped that this action would repress 
lawlessness along the Pearl and the Pascagoula and 
give the law-abiding people there confidence in the 
American government. The residents along the Pearl 
seized one of the leaders of the disturbing element 
and sent him to New Orleans. It would have been 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 58I 

a hard task to apprehend Dupree and compel him to 
disgorge his plunder, for he had already partly dis- 
posed of it or divided it among his followers. One 
slave owner, the judge reported, was despoiled to the 
extent of $30,000, and other men of property had suf- 
fered in proportion. A resident named Audry lost his 
son in an encounter with the brigands. He later or- 
ganized his neighbors, and pursued and killed a num- 
ber of the miscreants, but failed to capture the 
leaders.^^ 

It was high time to suppress lawlessness in the re- 
gion. Claiborne's justice, Cuming, found his presence 
there " unavailing," for he brought no military escort. 
Dupree was unwilling to relinquish his arbitrary con- 
trol, because, as Toulmin claimed, he still enjoyed the 
support of James Caller. In February Perez reported 
that the American flag was flying at Pass Christian. 
Major John Darrington landed there with some three 
hundred soldiers and later sent two detachments in 
pursuit of Dupree.^^ That marauder, with his stolen 
negroes, took refuge in Washington County, while 
John Caller and his militia took charge at Pascagoula, 
pending the arrival of the American troops. Toulm.in 

10 Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 28, 1810, Jan. 5, 181 1 (Parker, 
7687, 7700-7703) ; Caller to Holmes, Jan. 7, 181 1, Mississippi 
Territorial Archives, MS., Vol. 9; Meek MSS. ; Toulmin to 
Madison, Jan. 23, 181 1, Madison Papers, MS. 

11 Meek MSS.; Perez to Folch, Feb. 14, 1811, Legajo 63, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



582 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

asserted that the failure of Claiborne to act promptly 
and with sufficient force led many of the prominent in- 
habitants to doubt if the United States really intended 
to take possession of the country. They began to talk 
of again tendering their allegiance to the Spanish gov- 
ernment, but Toulmin advised them that this would 
once more precipitate civil strife. 

In the spring of this year Toulmin visited New Or- 
leans and Baton Rouge, and on his return reported 
general conditions to Madison. Aside from the dis- 
turbance at Pascagoula and the discontent already 
noted at Bayou Sara, the majority of the people in the 
recently occupied territory expressed unfeigned satis- 
faction at the course of the United States. In the 
region between Baton Rouge and Fort Stoddert, 
through which a definite trail now ran, settlements 
were hardly a day's journey apart. A hundred fami- 
lies had recently arrived on the Pearl. This increased 
population necessitated the prompt establishment of 
an organized government. The people were anxious 
to know in what territory they were to be included 
and how far occupancy or Spanish title would be re- 
spected.^^ 

Among the prospective citizens who were interested 
in the future status of West Florida, James Innerar- 
ity occupied a prominent place. Toulmin had visited 

12 Toulmin to Holmes, Feb. 3, 181 1, Mississippi Territorial 
Archives, MS., Vol. 9; Toulmin to Madison, Feb. 27, May 14, 
181 1, Madison Papers, MS. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 583 

him while on his way to New Orleans, and they had 
evidently talked over many happenings of common 
interest in connection with the calling out of the mi- 
litia, Cushing's conduct in countermanding the order, 
and the abuse that Toulmin had suffered because of 
his agency in the affair. Colonel Gushing had saved 
the country " from the firebrands of the Tombigbee," 
but because the judge had set his face against the 
" innocent plans " of Kemper, Caller, and Kennedy, 
" thus slighting their patriotism, and snatching from 
their hands the prize which they were ready to grasp," 
they " abused, denounced, impeached, and burnt " him 
in effigy. Innerarity believed that they would have 
burnt Mobile in reality had they been given the chance. 
Now these " worthies " were scrambling for the 
loaves and fishes that the " poor sand-bank and quag- 
mire" had to offer. Innerarity contemplated with 
little enthusiasm the possibility of having the " learned, 
intelligent, upright, and brave" Kennedy for a judge 
or Wilson Carman for a collector. Referring to the 
bill that Giles had introduced into the Senate on De- 
cember 8, he stated that the people of Mobile would 
welcome temporary union with Orleans Territory be- 
cause of the " horror and dread " with which they re- 
garded the "Bigbians." This, however, should be 
only a temporary arrangement, for they had no " nat- 
ural connection " or common interest with New Or- 
leans, and were destined to become commercial rivals. 



584 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

For this reason Mobile ought not to be subject to her 
legislation. The provision of the bill in regard to land 
grants was also uncertain. The people could not tell 
whether it included those made up to the receipt of 
the proclamation, or only those granted previous to 
December 20, 1803.^^ 

Toulmin did not favor even the temporary subjec- 
tion of Mobile to New Orleans ; but when he was in 
the latter city, in January, 181 1, he advised Claiborne 
to extend his jurisdiction to the Perdido, leaving to 
the Spanish garrison at Mobile only so much of its 
environs as it could reasonably control. The Amer- 
icans might then use the east channel of the Mobile, 
which was preferable to the other, and emptied into 
the bay some seven miles from the town, without in- 
terference from the Spaniards. They could protect 
this course by gunboats and a suitable garrison on its 
eastern bank or at the mouth of Dog River. At Clai- 
borne's request Toulmin indicated such boundaries as 
would give the Americans control over an additional 
area about fifty miles square. 

Claiborne readily acquiesced. Moreover he wrote 
Monroe that the Florida revolutionists had once pos- 
sessed this area. He must have had in mind merely 
Kemper's operations.^* A few days later the neces- 

13 Innerarity to McKee, Jan. 21, 181 1, American Historical 
Review, II, 704, 705, 

1* Toulmin to Madison, May 14, 1811, Madison Papers, MS.; 
Claiborne to Monroe, June 7, 181 1 (Parker, 7740). 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 585 

sity for some organization became apparent. The 
military agent informed Claiborne that a schooner with 
stores for Fort Stoddert had not been allowed to pass 
Mobile. This promised a revival of the wearisome 
commercial wrangle, but if passed over in silence, 
would invite further insults to the American flag. 
With the discretion vested in him Claiborne felt jus- 
tified in attempting to meet force with force, and asked 
Commodore Shaw to provide the necessary convoy for 
vessels that he proposed to send. 

Claiborne also learned that slaves were being intro- 
duced into Mobile and then sold within the United 
States. This traffic constituted another reason for 
taking possession of the region. Pending this act, he 
requested Commodore Shaw to extend his cruising 
ground as far as the Perdido and to capture and send 
to New Orleans any vessels from a foreign port bound 
to Mobile with slaves. A few days later he himself 
left for Biloxi and Pascagoula to establish American 
authority there and place himself near the scene of 
prospective danger.^^ 

The weeks that had passed since Folch repudiated 
his promise had not brought him assured peace. Fili- 
busters and rebels, it is true, no longer hovered near 
Mobile, but American regulars afforded him scarcely 
less anxiety. With them, however, he could maintain 
definite relations. Pending the decision of his home 

15 Claiborne to Monroe, June 11, with enclosure, and June 
16 (Parker, 7741, 7746). 



586 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

government, he determined to avoid every chance for 
collision with them. He would thus afford the crafty- 
American executive no pretext for further encroach- 
ment. Whether his superiors should elect to nego- 
tiate or to resist the advance of the Americans, his 
continuance in the fort at Mobile would be an advan- 
tage. Scant resources, intelligently directed, would 
enable him to remain there. 

Someruelos had advised him to ask aid of the In- 
dians. Folch replied that he could depend only on the 
Seminoles, who mustered barely five hundred war- 
riors, while the four principal nations in American ter- 
ritory encircled them with twenty thousand. The gov- 
ernor was exaggerating the difficulties that surrounded 
him, for none knew better than he that a large propor- 
tion of these Indians were hostile tO' the United States. 
He wrote with more certainty that an attempt to in- 
cite the Indians would enable the president to control 
public opinion through more than five hundred period- 
icals and thus force from Congress the necessary sup- 
plies for a campaign against the Floridas. Moreover 
a new source of danger increased his dependence on 
the Americans. Vessels bearing various insurgent 
flags threatened to blockade Mobile and Pensacola 
and starve out his garrisons. He had asked the Amer- 
ican commodore to drive these vessels away.^^ In 

16 Folch to Someruelos, Apr. i, 2, 1811, Legajo 1569, same to 
same, May 29, 181 1, Legajo 1570, same to same, June 24, 181 1, 
Legajo 2330, Papeles de Cuba. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 587 

view of his request, the action of his subordinate in 
detaining an American vessel at Mobile was hardly 
conciliatory. 

Such was Folch's situation when Claiborne sent his 
convoy toward Mobile. The movements of near-by 
American troops had already occasioned frequent 
juntas. Now from New Orleans, Morphy reported 
that the people there were on tiptoe with expectation. 
They anticipated that the commander at Mobile would 
again refuse to permit the passage of the convoy and 
that his refusal would lead to serious consequences. 
At Pensacola they gave this report no credence, but 
Collell at Mobile took it more seriously. The same 
vessel to which he had refused passage was now to be 
escorted by under his very guns, while Claiborne 
brought troops from Pascagoula and detachments 
from Fort Stoddert hovered in the immediate back- 
ground. If Collell resisted the others would claim 
that he initiated hostilities. Nevertheless he deter- 
mined to defend his ruined fort to the last. St. 
Maxent, who was assuming charge on the eve of 
Folch's departure, notified Collell that he would not 
modify his instructions, but advised him to tell the 
commander of the opposing squadron that he proposed 
to resist. ^^ 

An armed schooner and eleven gunboats acted as a 

1'^ Collell to St. Maxent, June 27, 181 1, St Maxent to Collell, 
June 28, 181 1, St. Maxent to Someruelos, June 28, i8ii, Le- 
gajo 1570, Papeles de Cuba. 



588 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

convoy for two vessels loaded with stores. They were 
prepared to meet any opposition with " firmness and 
promptitude." In taking this measure Claiborne knew 
that he was assuming a high responsibility ; but he had 
been given discretionary powers, and, as he wrote 
Madison, " things might so eventuate " that he would 
be obliged to proceed farther than he had at first 
planned. He promised to do nothing rash, but he 
really seemed determined to bring about an armed 
collision and to occupy Mobile. The expedition thus 
represented the third attempt against this place within 
less than a year. Kemper had threatened it with his fili- 
busters ; Sparks and Gushing had invited the Spaniards 
to abandon it ; now Claiborne dared them to close its 
approaches against the Americans. Under such provo- 
cation its commander must employ infinite tact and 
patience or resort to a fatalistic spirit of obedience. 

From Pascagoula, on June 29, 181 1, Claiborne ad- 
vised Folch that his convoy was on the way. He was 
obliged to send this force because of the recent deten- 
tion. He informed the Spaniard that the naval com- 
mander would not prove aggressive, but was instructed 
to repel force by force. If Folch wished to avoid 
hostilities, he should refrain from opposing his pas- 
sage. The right of the United States to the free navi- 
gation of the Mobile was too evident for discussion, 
and he proposed to maintain it. Claiborne's impa- 
tient, not to say dictatorial, tone was almost a chal- 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 589 

lenge. Evidently he was weary of the never-ending 
controversy. He wrote Monroe that if the Spaniard 
opposed the passage of the convoy, he would hasten 
to Fort Stoddert and there concert further measures 
with its commander.^^ 

Collell declined to act upon Claiborne's threatening 
missive, but sent it on to the acting governor. Al- 
though wishing to preserve the existing condition, he 
would oppose the passage of the convoyed schooner 
if the Americans forced him to do so. While awaiting 
word from the higher authorities, Lieutenant Bain- 
bridge, in command of the convoy, sent six gunboats 
up the east branch of the Mobile with instructions to 
drop down to a favorable position above the fort. 
The Americans then threatened the beleaguered garri- 
son from two directions, while Pascagoula and Fort 
Stoddert afforded adequate reserves should they be 
needed.^^ 

Folch, who was still at Pensacola, prepared a digni- 
fied answer for Claiborne, and one as spirited as the 
other had written. The United States had invaded 
Spanish territory with no other right than its own de- 
sire. Since the occupation of Louisiana it had de- 
prived Spain of the free navigation of the Mississippi. 

18 Claiborne to Folch, June 29, 181 1, Legajo 1570, Papeles de 
Cuba; the same is in Claiborne to Monroe, June 29, i8li 
(Parker, 7748, 7749). 

19 Collell to Claiborne, June 30, 1811, Legajo 1570, Papeles 
de Cuba; Nashville Clarion and Gazette, Aug. 18, 181 1. 

39 



590 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

Though allowed to convey goods to the Indians only 
by special permission of the Spaniards, the Americans 
had claimed the free use of the Alabama and the Tom- 
bigbee. Unmindful of solemn treaties and the serv- 
ices that Spain had rendered them in obtaining their 
independence, they now threatened with force those 
officials who would not patiently submit to a violation 
of national rights. But Spanish officials were not to 
be intimidated. If the naval officer should attempt to 
proceed before gaining the permission of the captain- 
general, the commander of the fort might oppose him 
without thereby being the aggressor. He who offered 
the insult was the aggressor, not he who repelled it.^*^ 
Yet Folch was not inclined to begin hostilities. 
Accordingly, on the following day, he ordered St. 
Maxent to Pascagoula for a personal conference with 
Claiborne. He was to propose that the Americans 
should send Captain Piernas to Havana on one of 
their swiftest vessels to obtain the decision of the 
captain-general. Failing to gain Claiborne's consent 
to this, he was to propose that the vessels with muni- 
tions should sail up the Tensaw, beyond cannon shot 
of the fort; or if past Mobile, they should do so 
without the convoy. If Claiborne rejected all their pro- 
posals, he evidently wished to provoke hostilities and 
upon him should rest the blame for a rupture. St. 

20 Folch to Claiborne, July 2, 1811, Legajo 1570, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 59 1 

Maxent should then deliver Folch's challenge to Clai- 
borne and return immediately to inform the com- 
mander of Mobile of his answer.^^ 

Folch's spirit of concession was seconded by St. 
Maxent, who immediately sent a messenger to ask 
Claiborne to suspend action pending his arrival. Clai- 
borne felt that national honor demanded the step he 
had taken, and he was not ready to retrace it. But 
he was pleased at the sign of yielding on the part of 
the Spaniards, and requested the naval officer to post- 
pone the attempt to force a passage. At the personal 
conference with St. Maxent, Claiborne refused to 
await the decision of the captain-general or to send the 
vessels up the Tensaw, but did consent to withhold 
the convoy if the craft were permitted to pass Mobile 
unmolested. He did not accept this concession as a 
favor, but as a right to which all American vessels 
were entitled.-- 

Lieutenant Bainbridge had already forced a solu- 
tion of the case under discussion. While Claiborne 
and St. Maxent were coming to an agreement at Pas- 
cagoula, he with four gunboats proceeded to tow one 
of the schooners past the fort. In view of this direct 
challenge the distressed Collell called a council of his 
officers, and showed the futility of resistance and the 

21 Folch to St. Maxent, July 3, 1811, Legajo 1580, Papeles 
de Cuba. 

22 Claiborne to Monroe, July 5, 9, 181 1 (Parker, 7752-7754, 
7757. 



592 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

probable loss of the whole colony, for which he would 
be personally responsible. He then agreed with Bain- 
bridge to allow the passage of the vessel accompanied 
by one gunboat only, and this was done before Cap- 
tain Farragut arrived with the agreement between 
Claiborne and St. Maxent. To add to the confusion 
the captain-general shortly forwarded an order from 
the Regency revoking the privilege of sending vessels 
with provisions and munitions to Fort Stoddert. 
This order was based on resentment for the occupa- 
tion at Baton Rouge rather than on a knowledge of 
actual conditions at Mobile. 

Later a junta de guerre at Pensacola agreed to make 
no change in the conditions that had existed since 
Folch's concession of the preceding November. The 
captain-general and the Regency both agreed that this 
determination was prudent, although to maintain con- 
sistency they disapproved of CollelFs course.^^ Yet 
it was evident that their continuance at Mobile de- 
pended upon the discretion of its commandant as 
much as upon American forbearance. 

In October the doughty Folch was finally relieved 
of his trying command. A year later he was in Cadiz 
almost penniless, attempting to defend himself against 

23 Morales to Secretario Interino del Despacho de Hacienda, 
Sept. 30, 181 1, Legajo 267, Ziiniga to Apodaca, Dec. 14, 1812, 
Legajo 1793, Collell to St. Maxent, July 6, 181 1, Legajos 
1570 and 2369, Papeles de Cuba; Nashville Clarion and Ga- 
zette, Aug. 18, 1 81 1. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 593 

the imputation of treachery to Spanish interests. In 
February the Regency exculpated him from blame in 
offering to deliver his province to the Americans, but 
at the same time they refused to censure Someruelos 
for not approving this act. Five years later Folch was 
living in poverty in Havana, still striving to collect 
the arrears in his salary and to relieve his reputation 
of the cloud resting upon it.^* He had fought a good 
fight for his sovereign, albeit with some guile and 
self-interest, under frontier conditions of unusual diffi- 
culty. At times he had seemed to waver and yield 
a point, but he had thereby prolonged the rule of his 
nation if not her true interests. Like many of his 
fellow-servants, in his declining years he found him- 
self an unappreciated sacrifice to stubborn Spanish 
pride. 

While Claiborne was in the vicinity he took meas- 
ures to organize the territory as Toulmin had sug- 
gested. By proclamation he had already extended the 
parish of Pascagoula to Dog River near Mobile. The 
Orleans legislature embarrassed his action by extend- 
ing it to the Perdido. He now appointed a justice 
of the peace for the region between that river and 
the Mobile and contemplated sending one to the town 

2* Statement of Martin Folch, Oct. 4, 181 1, Folch to Labra- 
dor, Nov. I, 1812, Carabajal to Depacho de Estado, Feb. 2^, 
1813, Folch to Pizarro, Apr. i, 1818, Legajo 5555, Estado, A. 
H. N., Madrid. 



594 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

itself. In his instructions he assigned limits running 
from Dog River to Bayou des Moulins [Saw Mill 
Creek], and told the justices to exercise no jurisdic- 
tion in Mobile, to which the Spaniards had for some 
time exclusively confined themselves. ^^ Rumors that 
the Spaniards were about to relinquish the territory to 
the Perdido, or that the Americans were on the point 
of employing their forces to compel them to do so, 
continued to arouse apprehensions on both sides of the 
line. But the American army was too thoroughly 
demoralized by the courts-martial then in progress to 
take any offensive action.'^ 

When in a dispute over a custom's bond the officials 
of Washington County decided that Mobile was with- 
in the limits of the United States, St. Maxent promptly 
protested. Claiborne stated emphatically that the re- 
gion formed part of the Louisiana Purchase and that 
he had a full right to occupy it. For his part he in- 
quired if there was any truth in the rumor that the 
Spaniards were fortifying Dauphine Island, which 
was included in the same claim. The inquiry, por- 
tending occupation, aroused the anxiety of Perez, who 
now commanded Mobile. The corporal and four sol- 
diers on the island could not resist if the Americans 

25 Claiborne to Monroe, July 24, 181 1 (Parker, 7758, 7759). 

26 Morphy to Governor of Pensacola, Dec. 30, 1811, Legajo 
22,12, Papeles de Cuba; Aurora (Philadelphia), Dec. 20, 22, 
1811, Jan. 16, 1812. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 595 

acted upon their claim. He referred the letter to St. 
Maxent for answer.-^ 

Backed by a decision of a council of war, the acting 
governor expressed surprise at the tone assumed by 
Claiborne. Dauphine Island belonged to Spain by 
right of conquest since 1780. As St. Maxent made 
no attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Louisi- 
ana, he did not welcome Claiborne's interference in 
Florida. The American executive might indeed fol- 
low the example of the Tyrant of Europe and take 
possession of the territory ; but so far he had not done 
so, and he ought, therefore, to take no offense at an 
act done there in the name of the Spanish sovereign. 
If, however, Claiborne entertained other views the 
Spaniard would take the necessary steps to protect 
His Majesty's dominion. Claiborne expressed equal 
surprise at the other's protests, reiterated the claim to 
the Perdido, and stated that his own action would 
depend on any addition to the forces or fortifications 
on the island. His government would brook no at- 
tempt by the other to strengthen its possession.^^ 

In March, 1812, Claiborne again mentioned the 

27 Claiborne to St. Maxent, Oct. 27, 1811, Legajo 1571, Pa- 
peles de Cuba; Nashville Clarion and Gazette, Sept. 24, 181 1. 

28 Morales to Secretary of Hacienda, Oct. 2, 181 1, Legajo 
267, St. Maxent to Someruelos, Oct. 25, 181 1, Legajo 1570, 
Papeles de Cuba; cf. Legajos 5554 and 5556, Estado, A. H. 
N., Madrid, and MS., British Foreign Office, America, II, 5, 
Vol. 85. 



596 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

American claim to the Perdido. But he was only an 
executive, and although always ready to fulfill his 
duties, forbore to discuss the claim. Evidently 
neither executive was anxious to test his assertions 
unless the other committed an overt act. The authori- 
ties at Pensacola made the usual appeal to Mexico for 
assistance, but none was now available. The contro- 
versy attracted the attention of the British minister at 
Washington, and De Onis used it as a second warning 
to the colonial authorities against the depraved inten- 
tion of the Americans to gain the Floridas. 

In the latter part of December, 1811, while this 
leisurely, if tart, correspondence was in progress, 
Morphy warned the authorities at Pensacola that new 
dangers threatened Mobile. General Wilkinson, re- 
leased from the court-martial that he had faced for 
some months, was to resume command of the army at 
New Orleans. With an adequate land force and gun- 
boats, he proposed to blockade Mobile and compel its 
surrender, if possible, without bloodshed. Wilkinson 
proposed, by occupying this place and Pensacola be- 
fore the British could do so, to strengthen the defense 
o'f New Orleans. Some weeks later De Onis was ask- 
ing Monroe to explain this rumor and others of simi- 
lar import. General Hampton, he said, had been or- 
dered to raise the American flag at Mobile and Pensa- 
cola. The passing of American soldiers eastward by 
way of the lakes, and the increase in the garrisons at 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 597 

Baton Rouge and Fort Stoddert, gave point to his in- 
quiries. Moreover the Spaniards expected that the 
American government would employ " vagabonds " or 
Indians to initiate its campaign, and then step in as it 
had done at Baton Rouge.^^ 

While Claiborne was wrestling with the problems 
presented by his new constituents and his persistent 
but polite Spanish neighbors, his attention was also 
fixed on Washington, where Congress had perforce to 
consider the same problems. When that body con- 
vened in the fall of 1811, it was asked to consider a 
petition signed by George Patterson and four hundred 
and ten others living in the Baton Rouge district. The 
petitioners, so their opponents claimed, represented 
the Tory element in the eastern part of that district. 
But the essential point was that they desired annexa- 
tion to Mississippi Territory, with which they formed 
a natural geographical unit. They were fairly recent 
arrivals, preponderatingly American in stock, and had 
no desire to be used to counteract the French element 
in Orleans Territory. Moreover they desired the con-, 
firmation of their land grants, most of which were 
dated subsequent to the cession of Louisiana.^^ 

Their petition was in keeping with a resolution pre- 

29 Morphy to Governor of Pensacola, Dec. 30, 1811, Legajo 
63, Papeles de Cuba; De Onis to Monroe, Feb. 22, 1812, 
Spanish Notes, MS., II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; 
Wilkinson, Memoirs, I, 470; Aurora, Jan. 14, 16, 1812. 

30 American State Papers, Miscellaneous, II, 155. 



598 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

sented by Poindexter, on December 17, in favor of 
statehood for Mississippi. He wished the proposed 
State to include British West Florida " with its ancient 
limits." The American claim to this desired area was 
" reasonable." Evidently he could not use a stronger 
term, if he proposed to separate West Florida from 
Louisiana within which the Americans had persis- 
tently included it. His suggestion was to create a new 
commonwealth embracing the territory from the Mis- 
sissippi to the Chattahoochee, south of the line of the 
Yazoo, and including the whole of the Gulf coast.^^ 
This meant a longitudinal rather than a vertical divi- 
sion of the territory south of Tennessee. It likewise 
meant the virtual relinquishment of the claim that 
West Florida formed part of the Louisiana Purchase 
in favor of a British claim long since abandoned. 
However " reasonable " such a claim might be made to 
appear, it could hardly justify the risk in assuming it 
at that late day. 

Yet if the administration was unwilling to abandon 
the claim that West Florida formed part of the Louisi- 
ana Purchase, it did not necessarily follow that all of 
it must belong to the new State of Louisiana. Months 
before, Toulmin had proposed that the area should be 
divided between Orleans and Mississippi by the Pearl 
River. Now Claiborne suggested the same. As an 
active participant in the race for statehood between 

31 American State Papers, Miscellaneous, II, 163, 164. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 599 

the two territories, he wrote Poindexter that he did 
not sympathize with his efforts to take the whole of 
West Florida from Louisiana. The best interests of 
the latter required an extension of its eastern bound- 
ary. Personally he preferred all the territory to the 
Perdido, but was willing to compromise on the area 
west of the Pearl. Mississippi should content itself 
with Pascagoula and the growing commerce of Mo- 
bile.^^ John Ballinger, who was then in Washington 
as agent for the former Conventionalists, took essen- 
tially the same view. He contended for the treaty 
limits ; but if the government wished to cut the Louisi- 
ana Purchase up into convenient " administrative par- 
ticles," he believed that the Pearl would make a good 
boundary. This division would also place Patterson 
and his fellow petitioners in Mississippi, as they pre- 
ferred.^^ 

The petitioners, whom Ballinger personally repre- 
sented, were interested in statehood and land titles, as 
were the others, and in addition wished the American 
government to assume the debts and other claims 
against the convention. Many of them had accepted 
its paper or loaned their credit to the embryo govern- 
ment, and after its collapse were threatened with nu- 
merous lawsuits. Ballinger represented their cause 

*2 Claiborne to Poindexter, Jan. 6, 1812, Claiborne Letters, 
F, MS., Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss. 

33 Ballinger to Monroe, Dec. 26, 181 1, Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 35, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



600 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

until the War of 1812, which necessarily postponed 
all prospect of payment. Reuben Kemper succeeded 
him, and pushed their claims as well as the cause of 
his imprisoned followers for several years, but in vain. 
Obviously the government could not pay these claims 
without recognizing the validity of the convention's 
acts, and this, as Monroe had already explained to 
Skipwith, was impossible. Those who had brought 
about the occupation of West Florida by the United 
States must find their reward in the success of their 
exploit. 

Yet Ballinger was able to present Monroe with a 
strong argument to justify the acts and expectations of 
his companions and himself. After 1803 the Spanish 
officials in West Florida, realizing the uncertainty of 
their tenure, had used their offices to enrich them- 
selves, betraying alike the interests of sovereign and 
people. The latter could only look to the American 
government for relief. The Mobile Act and the diplo- 
matic negotiation abroad encouraged them in this hope. 
When the government later acquiesced in the con- 
tinued control by Spain, tolerated the region as a 
refuge for deserters and fugitives from justice, and 
applied the embargo to it, they began to lose hope; 
and wlien the administration refused to receive a min- 
ister from Spain, they abandoned hope altogether. 
At the same time the increasing exactions of colonial 
officials forced them to seek redress. At first they 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 60I 

cherished no idea of independence, but compelled by 
the suspicious attitude of these officials to choose be- 
tween resistance and unconditional submission, they 
chose the more honorable alternative and overthrew 
their oppressors. Those who thus acted were neither 
land jobbers nor former American Tories, as some 
papers characterized them. They showed their Re- 
publican views in the constitution which they had 
adopted. While by no means above criticism, it was 
the best the situation afforded. None of those who 
acted under it had any purpose to disturb the neigh- 
boring American territory. 

Ballinger's argument to justify the revolt repre- 
sents the best interpretation to be put upon that move- 
ment and suggests the similar specious pleas of Skip- 
with. He was more successful in treating the later 
views of his constituents. He mentioned without 
criticism the conflict in authority which might follow 
from the continued presence of Spanish troops at Mo- 
bile. The residents of the occupied territory should, 
as soon as their numbers warranted, be admitted into 
the Union on the same footing as the people of the 
original States. They preferred to be attached to 
Louisiana rather than Mississippi, and resented the 
oversight of Congress in failing to include them in the 
recent enabling act. This omission might be reme- 
died by the new State, but in the meantime his fellow- 
citizens desired some regular form of government. 



602 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

If necessary, as we have noted, they were willing to 
accept the Pearl as their eastern limit. 

Ballinger divided the land claimants into two 
classes : the large speculators, who had purchased of 
Morales since 1803, and those holding smaller tracts 
(from two hundred to one thousand arpents) under 
grant from Grand Pre or other local commandants. 
Two thirds of the people were actual settlers, belong- 
ing to the latter class. If their holdings, perfectly 
legal under Spanish title, were not confirmed, great 
misery and dissatisfaction would result. No man of 
ordinary intelligence, least of all himself, doubted the 
American claim ; but even Spanish officials might have 
been led to doubt whether the United States intended 
to exercise it. Under the circumstances, after seven 
years' abandonment it was hardly expedient to insist 
upon it, and thereby upset all property claims in the 
region. Even a donation of land to these claimants 
would be only a partial alleviation. 

The unpaid expenses of the convention amounted 
to some $40,000. This was chiefly owed to persons 
in Kentucky and Tennessee for horses, provisions, and 
outfit for the troops. Those to whom these sums 
were due could ill afford to lose them. The national 
government was rightly bound to remunerate them, 
for its act prevented the convention from doing so'. 
If the United States should intervene at St. Augustine, 
as was possible, and prevent the Spanish governor 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 603 

there from carrying out his contracts, it would legally 
be bound to fulfill them. BalHnger claimed that the 
principle was the same at Baton Rouge, especially for 
all contracts antedating the president's proclamation. 
He did not mention the fact that made an essential 
difference in status : one government was recognized, 
the other not. In view of the disturbances that had 
prevailed there for many years, he contended that it 
would be good policy to pay these debts. In a crisis 
the people would more than requite the obligation. 
But if those who had assumed these expenses should 
be ruined by being forced to meet them, it would 
"palsy the energies of the country, stifle its patriots 
and sink it into original nothingness."^* 

Whatever justice or expediency might be contained 
in Ballinger's plea, the American government could 
not openly recognize it, and so for years Ballinger 
and Kemper, backed by interested petitioners, strove 
in vain to secure the payment of the convention debts. 
In the matter of land titles they fared better, for ul- 
timately those with any pretense to legality were duly 
confirmed. The division of the region between Louisi- 
ana and Mississippi Territory, the third point for ad- 
justment in the program, presented fewer difficulties, 
and in this respect Congress was ready to act with 

3* Holmes to Monroe, Sept. 20, 181 1, Proceedings Executive 
Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., I; Ballinger to Monroe, 
Dec. 26, 181 1, Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 47, Bureau 
of Indexes and Archives. 



604 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

fair promptness and in a way to meet Ballinger's ex- 
pectations. 

Congress made no provision in the enabling act for 
Louisiana to include any part of West Florida in the 
proposed new State. The constitutional convention 
that met pursuant to the act made an attempt to in- 
clude the region to the Perdido within the proposed 
limits, but it was decisively defeated. The result may 
indicate an unwillingness to strengthen the Anglo- 
American element in the new State. Some days later 
the convention adopted a memorial to Congress asking 
for the annexation of West Florida to Louisiana.^^ 
The opposition to this measure seemed to be largely 
among the Creoles. This memorial attracted the at- 
tention of De Onis and Foster. The former professed 
to believe that Congress would pay no attention to it, 
but he did not fail to protest against such a possibility. 
Action under the memorial was not necessary to re- 
store order in the territory and would preclude any 
future negotiation to acquire it.^^ 

Undeterred by his protest, Congress on March 19, 
1812, took up the measure to admit the State of Louisi- 
ana. Before passing it an attempt was made by 
amendment to secure representation for the region to 

35 Gayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 273. 

36 De Onis to Monroe, Mar. 2, 1812, Spanish Notes, MS., 
Ill, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; Foster to Wellesley, 
Mar. 13, 1812, MS., British Foreign Office, America, II, 5, 
Vol. 85. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 605 

the Pearl, which they proposed to annex to it. This 
was defeated on the ground that it imposed a condi- 
tion on the State without the consent of its constitu- 
tional convention. It is interesting to note that John 
C. Calhoun was one who held this view. On April 8 
the president signed the bill admitting the State. Six 
days later he signed another enlarging its limits to 
the Pearl. At the same time the remainder of the ter- 
ritory to the Perdido was bestowed on Mississippi. 
Early in August the legislature of Louisiana con- 
curred in this action, and gave to the incorporated 
area a larger representation than even its friends in 
Congress had proposed.^^ 

In the legislation disposing of this territory there 
was no statement in regard to future negotiation over 
its status. Foster, the new English minister, imme- 
diately wished to know if this indicated an intention 
to trespass still further upon the rights of the Spanish 
sovereign in that region. Monroe evaded the issue, 
but assured Foster that no orders had been given to 
disturb the Spanish soldiers at Mobile.^^ With war 
between the United States and Great Britain less than 
a month away, the British representative had far 
weightier matters to occupy his attention. In August, 

87 Gayarre, IV, 277-281 ; Annals of Twelfth Congress, First 
Session, Part II, 2270, 2298. 

38 Foster to Wellesley, Apr. 4, May 4, 21, 1812, cf. note 36; 
Foster to Monroe, May 6, 1812, MS., British Legation, MS., 
VII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



40 



6o6 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

i8i2, De Onis, now single handed, protested against 
the legislation as a violation of his nation's rights and 
as contrary to the president's proclamation. He de- 
manded its repeal and the delivery of the territory to 
Spain as a preliminary to negotiation for its ultimate 
possession. Notwithstanding his assurance that he 
was prepared to treat upon all points at issue between 
the two countries, the administration refused to recog- 
nize him or to divest itself of the debatable area.^^ 

Following the action by Congress, Governor Holmes 
on August I, 1 812, formally issued a proclamation 
organizing the region between the Pearl and the Per- 
dido as a county of Mississippi. On September 17 he 
empowered the sheriff of Mobile to convene the free- 
holders on the third Monday in October for the pur- 
pose of selecting a representative in the territorial 
legislature. These measures naturally caused Gover- 
nor Zufiiga to make reflections little flattering to the 
Americans. But Spanish comment disturbed the Mis- 
sissippi executive less than did the uncertainty of the 
law under which he acted. He felt that he could not 
provide for the administration of justice in the county 
without the sanction of the legislature, or designate 
the place for holding court. He was unwilling to ex- 
tend his jurisdiction beyond the limits already recog- 
nized by Claiborne. This made necessary the moving 

39 De Onis to Monroe, Aug. ?, 1812, Spanish Notes, MS., 
II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 607 

of administrative control from Mobile, at least tem- 
porarily. In his uncertainty he turned to his usual 
aid, Toulmin, and gave him discretion as presiding 
judge of the superior court to provide subordinate 
tribunals for criminal cases.^^ 

This shifting of responsibility by no means relieved 
the situation. The judge was perfectly willing to act 
as if the laws of the United States were already in 
force at Mobile, and even to serve writs on the Span- 
ish commandant, employing military force if neces- 
sary to carry them out. By this measure his son-in- 
law thought he might gain the coveted town. On the 
other hand the secretary of the treasury had given 
orders to consider Mobile as foreign territory as long 
as the Spaniards remained there.^^ This naturally 
caused confusion in jurisdiction. The embargo that 
preceded the war with Great Britain created further 
difficulties. Prospective immigrants, unwelcome and 
forbidden as they were, still harassed the Spanish 
officials by their importunities for admission. 

*^ Proceedings Executive Council, Mississippi Territory, 
MS., II; Zufiiga to Apodaca, Sept. 7, 1812, Legajo 1793, ^^- 
peles de Cuba; cf. Case of Sheriff Brightwell and the Callers, 
May 10, 1813, Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 40, Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives ; Holmes to Toulmin, Sept. 28, 1812, 
Proceedings Executive Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., 
II; Mobile Transcripts, Alabama Department of Archives and 
History, Montgomery, Ala. 

*i Wilkinson to Hawkins, Sept. 26, 1812, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 38, Bureau of Indexes and Archives ; Mobile 
Transcripts. 



6o8 INCORPORATION AND ADJUSTMENT 

Among those who accepted a county commission 
from Holmes was James McBay, who bore the title of 
" Major " among his neighbors in Mobile. The Span- 
iards arrested him and confined him in irons at Pen- 
sacola. Toulmin issued a writ of habeas corpus for 
his release and went to Mobile to serve it in person. 
Perez refu&ed to ho'nor it and claimed that McBay 
was a spy in American service. Holmes then made 
a direct protest to Zuniga. The fact that the United 
States did not extend its laws immediately over Mo- 
bile gave the commandant there no authority over 
American citizens within the declared limits of Mis- 
sissippi Territory. The Spaniard's act was probably 
due to false information, and Toulmin confidently ex- 
pected McBay's speedy release. Fifteen of the pris- 
oner's fellow-citizens testified to his good character, 
but Manrique, now in charge at Pensacola, referred 
the case to the captain-general for decision and kept 
him in prison for some time longer. McBay's friend, 
E. Lewis, urged his expenses thus incurred as a claim 
against the Spanish government.'*^ 

42 Holmes to Zuniga, Apr. 30, 1813, Manrique to Apodaca, 
May 14, 1813, Legajo 1794, Papeles de Cuba; E. Lewis to ?, 
Feb. 3, 1818, Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 61, Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives. 



CHAPTER XVI 
Mobile and the Aftermath 

The outbreak of the second war with Great Britain, 
even more than the organization of Mobile County, 
foretold the speedy end of Spanish rule west of the 
Perdido, if not further afield. The ports of Mobile, 
Pensacola, and St. Augustine were likely to prove too 
tempting for Spain's ally. The diplomatic interest 
that the British authorities had already manifested in 
their fate might now serve as a pretext to assist in 
their defense. By this move Great Britain would 
secure ports in which to dispose of prizes, refit her 
blockading fleet, and incite insurrection among the 
southern blacks and Indians. The administration had 
anticipated this possibiHty, and requested Congress to 
give it the necessary power to occupy the threatened 
points. The House had complied, but factional dis- 
putes in the Senate defeated the program. 

On the distant frontier the outbreak occasioned 
much concern. Claiborne regretted that Wilkinson 
was not definitely ordered to occupy Mobile and Pen- 
sacola. This step was necessary to secure that section 
of the Union, especially since Zufiiga, the new gover- 
nor, had, it was reported, recently provisioned these 

609 



6 10 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

posts and increased their garrisons by one hundred 
and fifty colored troops.^ The Americans deter- 
mined to control Mobile Bay as a precautionary meas- 
ure, and raised their flag at Rio Pescado and Dauphine 
Island. The small Spanish guard on the island were 
ordered to withdraw or be regarded as prisoners of 
war. The pilot was forbidden to aid Spanish or 
British vessels. 

The council of war that Zufiiga at once called could 
offer no relief to the imperilled guard, but the gover- 
nor advised the officer in charge to remain there 
quietly, even at the risk of imprisonment. The inci- 
dent provoked spirited correspondence with Claiborne 
in the strain already familiar. As his predecessors 
had done on like occasion, Zuiiiga emphasized past 
aggressions of the Americans, their ingratitude for as- 
sistance during the Revolution, and their unwilling- 
ness to extend favors on the Mississippi that they 
demanded for themselves on the Mobile. Knowing 
of no declaration of war by the United States against 
Spain, and assuming that Claiborne was continuing 
his past aggressions, he warned the other to withdraw 
his troops from Dauphine Island. Otherwise his of- 
ficers must resist this new insult, even to bloodshed; 
and, if there was bloodshed, the American, as the 
aggressor, would experience difficulty in justifying 
himself. 

1 Claiborne to Monroe, July 2,6, 1812, Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 27, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 6ll 

Claiborne may not have been directly responsible 
for the incident that called forth this censorious pro- 
test, but he did not hesitate to reply in kind. Refrain- 
ing from comment on the tone of the Spaniard's letter, 
although pointedly telling him so, he let the other know 
that his unmerited, reproachful menaces would " di- 
vert no American officer from the course of conduct 
enjoined by duty." His country claimed that the 
Louisiana Purchase extended to the Perdido, had oc- 
cupied all of the claim except a small district around 
Mobile, and was prepared to defend any part of it 
against all aggressors.- He sent copies of the corre- 
spondence to Wilkinson and Holmes, with whom he 
must concert measures to defend the territory if 
Zufiiga tried to carry out his threats. 

Claiborne doubted if Wilkinson could effectually de- 
fend Louisiana without occupying both Mobile and 
Pensacola. Holmes looked upon the failure of Con- 
gress to authorize this as a piece of criminal negli- 
gence. Yet Wilkinson was unwilling to move without 
some such authorization. A council of war in New 
Orleans resolved that the United States government 
" would never submit to unmerited reproaches or 
quietly yield to the unwarrantable pretensions of any 
power on earth. Should the Spanish governor adhere 
to the determination which he has dared propose, hos- 

2 Zufiiga to Claiborne, July 12, 1812, Claiborne to Zufiiga, 
July 24, 1812, ibid.; Minute of Council of War, July 11, July 
31, 1812, Legajo 1793, Papeles de Cuba. 



6 12 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

tilities must undoubtedly ensue and the points in con- 
test be settled by the sword. The people of the 
United States will neither rescind a right nor abandon 
a fellow citizen in any extremity."^ 

These brave words were uttered while a second 
council of war at Pensacola was pondering over Clai- 
borne's missive. The Americans, Morales thought, 
were employing every device to make the Spaniards 
fire the first shot. Such a conflict might start an at- 
tempt to conquer the Floridas, but the enemy should, 
at any rate, find them ready to resist this irrup- 
tion. But their resources hardly matched their re- 
solves. Sixty regulars and double that number of 
colored troops constituted the garrison of Pensacola. 
Ready to defend themselves to the last extremity, 
they promised to be only a useless sacrifice. Many of 
the officers had not been paid in two years. The 
council could only advise the garrison on Dauphine 
Island to remain there while they awaited the tardy 
arrival of five hundred more soldiers from Cuba, or 
strove to rally to their aid some four thousand Indians, 
largely from the Creeks."* 

This Indian peril was a continual nightmare to 
Holmes. He was perfectly willing to cooperate with 
Wilkinson against Mobile and Pensacola, but he hesi- 

3 Wilkinson, Memoirs, I, 499. 

4 Minute of Council of War, July 31, 1812, Legajo 1793, 
Morales to Romanillos, Aug. 26, 1812, Legajo 267, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 6I3 

tated to employ in this way the full complement of 
militia from the Tombigbee. At Pascagoula and Bi- 
loxi the Choctaws aroused apprehension. Claiborne 
could not keep them from visiting the Spanish posts, 
but advised them to listen to no bad talk there. If the 
Spaniards were their true friends, they would also 
counsel them to keep the peace. The Indians on the 
Apalache might aid the Americans, in order to keep 
for themselves the privilege of navigating that river. 
But the Seminoles were bitterly hostile, and only a 
lack of artillery kept them from attacking the Amer- 
icans at Casa Colorada.^ 

American levies were scattered along the coast from 
New Orleans to Bay St. Louis, and were moving to- 
ward Fort Stoddert from Natchez and Baton Rouge. 
The Spaniards believed Mobile to be the real objec- 
tive of these forces. In November, 1812, Zuiiiga in- 
formed Claiborne that he would hold him respon- 
sible for any further attempts against the dignity of 
the Spanish flag. The American retorted that the 
presence at Pensacola of British vessels with their 
prizes invited such attempts. The Spaniards offered 
to give the Americans such privileges as the British 
enjoyed, but the offer seemed to lack sincerity.^ 

5 Stiggins to McKee, Aug. 2, 1812, Talk of Claiborne to 
Choctaws, Aug. 5, 1812, Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 38, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

6 Zufiiga to Apodaca, July 21, Aug. 20, Nov. 17, 1812, same 
to Claiborne, Nov. 2, 1812, Legajo 1793, Papeles de Cuba; J. 



6l4 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

Holmes and Claiborne saw no safety for the ex- 
posed frontier unless both Floridas were occupied. 
Poindexter, who represented their views in Congress, 
was uncertain what action that body would take. 
The president seemed unwilling to incur hostilities 
with Spain while engaged in a war with Great Britain, 
but if Congress should reconsider and pass the bill 
for the occupation of East Florida that the Senate 
rejected at the last session, he would have to execute 
it. Wilkinson, according to report, was ready to carry 
out such a measure. F. L. Claiborne wrote that every 
citizen soldier anxiously awaited the order to drive 
the British and Spaniards from Mobile and Pensacola. 
Andrew Jackson assured the secretary of war that his 
men would permit no constitutional scruples to deter 
them in such a task.'^ 

So'me intimation of this danger reached Zuiiiga, 
but at the end of the year his spies could learn of no 
preparations at Fort Stoddert to warrant his fears. 
The possibility of an attack from New Orleans, due 
to the gathering of levies there, led him to withdraw 
some men from Mobile to Pensacola and strengthen 

B. Wilkinson to Hawkins, Sept, i6, 1812, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 38, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

7 Holmes to Wilkinson, Oct. 29, 1812, Proceedings Executive 
Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., H; Poindexter to Mead, 
Oct. 15, 1812, Claiborne Letters, F, MS., F. L. Claiborne to 
Poindexter, Nov. 26, 1812, Claiborne Letters, F, MS., Depart- 
ment of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss. ; Parton, Jack- 
son, H, 372. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 615 

the defenses of the latter port. But to garrison his 
posts, including Mobile and Apalache, he could mus- 
ter only t\{^o hundred and eighty-eight men attached 
to the Louisiana Regiment. These were almost des- 
titute of supplies. The contractor refused to furnish 
meat, and he had extreme difficulty in obtaining other 
provisions. There were only five barrels of wheat 
flour in the province, and this must be reserved for 
hospital use. Each soldier was restricted to five ears 
of maize per day for Indian meal. He expected to 
be entirely out of provisions by the end of February. 
Mobile had only enough biscuit and jerked beef to 
last till the fifteenth of the month. The Americans 
would not sell provisions on account or in exchange. 
Despite the firmness of his men, he feared starvation 
would force them to desperate measures. To this 
moving appeal Apodaca, now the captain-general, re- 
sponded with only a thousand pesos in copper coin.^ 
In December, 1812, the Senate adopted a resolution 
to occupy the Floridas, and on January 10 its com- 
mittee reported a bill authorizing the president to do 
so provided the portion east of the Perdido continued 
to be "the subject of future negotiation." Later the 
president's enemies rallied and struck out the provi- 
sion to occupy East Florida. So the act that the 
president signed on February 12 authorized no move- 

sZuniga to Apodaca, Jan. 30, Feb. 3, 5, i3, 1813, Legajo i794, 
Papeles de Cuba. 



6l6 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

ment beyond the Perdido. Yet this would insure the 
immediate occupation of Mobile, a measure, as Poin- 
dexter wrote, "of great utility for our territory."^ 

Four days later John Armstrong, the new secretary 
of war, forwarded the necessary orders to Wilkinson. 
On March 14 that general began his preparations. 
Two weeks later the watchful Morphy reported that 
six or seven hundred men had lately left New Or- 
leans on pretext of establishing a post at the Rigolets, 
and that Wilkinson and his staff had just embarked at 
Bayou St. Jean. Evidently a movement of impor- 
tance was on foot, doubtless the favorite American 
project, — the occupation of Mobile.^^ 

The news that Wilkinson had reached Pass Chris- 
tian caused a hurried council of war at Pensacola. 
The impending attack had already been indicated by an 
embargo on all vessels trafficking with the Spaniards. 
The lack of men and provisions rendered it inadvisable 
for the Spaniards to reinforce the fort at Mobile, had 
its ruined condition not already rendered such action 
useless. They could only inform Havana of what was 
about to happen. Wilkinson had eight hundred men 
at Pass Christian, with fourteen small transports and 
four gunboats. Ten other gunboats had already started 

9 Poindexter to Mead, Feb. 3, 1813, Claiborne Letters, F, 
MS., Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss. 

10 Adams, History of the United States, VH, 213, 214; 
Morphy to Captain-General, Mar. 29, 1813, Legajo 1836, Pa- 
peles de Cuba. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 617 

for Mobile Bay. Four companies were to advance to- 
ward Mobile by land. Against these numbers Zii- 
niga's divided and ill-conditioned forces could make 
little headway. He determined to leave Mobile to de- 
fend itself as best it could, while he prepared Pensa- 
cola against an attack that seemed inevitable.^^ 

After a delay at Pass Christian, where he narrowly 
missed an unprofessional death by drowning, Wilkin- 
son moved on toward Mobile. On April lo Perez re- 
ported his proximity, and added that he himself had 
provisions for five days only, and that in case he re- 
ceived no further aid, he would either capitulate or 
evacuate the fort. Giving him discretion to get pro- 
visions if he could, Zuniga bade him abandon his evil 
intention of surrendering. He should assemble his 
officers and read them the royal order of April 13, 
181 1, prescribing the conduct for him to follow.^^ 
This advice was not very helpful in lieu of more sub- 
stantial aid. On the very day he sent it the detach- 
ment from Dauphine Island, ousted from that place 
by Wilkinson's orders, presented itself at Pensacola. 
On the same day Perez and his fellow-officials deter- 
mined unanimously to surrender Mobile to the Amer- 
icans. 

Their decision was well advised. Wilkinson had 

11 Minutes of Council of War, Apr. 3, 1813, Zuniga to 
Apodaca, Apr. 5, 8, 12, 1813, Legajo 1794, Papeles de Cuba. 

12 Perez to Ziifiiga, Apr. 10, 1813, Zuniga to Perez,- Apr. 12, 
1813, Legajo 1794, Papeles de Cuba. 



6l8 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

landed some six hundred soldiers below the town. 
At the same time Colonel Bowyer brought a force with 
five pieces of artillery down the Tensaw and stationed 
it above the town. A company of volunteers from 
Mobile itself also joined Wilkinson and afterward re- 
ceived high praise from him. Commodore Shaw with 
his gunboats held the bay. On few occasions in the 
warlike operations of this disappointing period were 
the American forces so well arranged for the task 
before them. On the other hand there were few occa- 
sions when the opposing force was so despicable. 
Perez had three score starving and dispirited men and 
three score pieces of artillery, but they were in a fort 
in such ill repair as to be useless. The whole cam- 
paign constituted a dress parade for Wilkinson, but it 
achieved the delivery of Mobile without bloodshed. 

In keeping with the " friendly " purpose back of his 
demonstration, Wilkinson asked the residents of the 
town to take no part in the ensuing events. At the 
same time he informed Perez that his forces came by 
order of the president, not as enemies, but to relieve 
his garrison from occupying a post within the " legiti- 
mate limits " of the United States. Perez expressed 
formal protest rather than profuse thanks for this 
relief, but in accordance with the decision of his coun- 
cil of war, proposed to retire beyond the Perdido 
with his garrison and its public and private property. 
His action was not to determine the final status of the 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 619 

territory, which their respective governments must 
settle. Upon this basis the two commanders signed 
the formal agreement on April 13. Two days later 
Perez evacuated the fort, leaving the artillery in the 
hands of the Americans. At five o'clock on the after- 
noon of that day, amid a salvo from batteries and gun- 
boats, the American flag rose over Fort Charlotte.^^ 
This event marked the virtual decision of a ten years' 
diplomatic dispute, bloodless but far from amicable. 

In New Orleans the occupation of Mobile occa- 
sioned great rejoicing. Governor Holmes learned of 
it with satisfaction, and at once came on to organize 
the local government. He wrote Monroe that the 
town was destined to become an important one, in 
some respects surpassing New Orleans. It was neces- 
sary to establish promptly the proper revenue and ju- 
dicial tribunals in order to break up the smugghng 
that had been so prevalent since the outbreak of war. 
The surrender prevented the establishment of a rival 
county seat at Blakeley on the eastern shore of the 
bay.^* 

When Zuniga learned of Wilkinson's presence from 
the Dauphine Island detachment, he sent Lieutenant 

13 Hamilton, Colonial Mobile (edition 1910), pp. 411-413; 
Convention between Perez and Wilkinson, Legajo 2369, Pa- 
peles de Cuba. 

14 Holmes to Monroe, Apr. 14, May 5, 1813, Proceedings 
Executive Council, Mississippi Territory, MS., H ; Hamilton, 
Colonial Mobile, 449. 



620 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

Bernardo Prieto to demand an explanation. His mes- 
senger reached the American commander on the fatal 
fifteenth, and immediately returned to inform his su- 
perior that the blow had fallen. Wilkinson immedi- 
ately began the construction of Fort Bowyer at the 
entrance of Mobile Bay, erected an outwork on the 
Perdido, and attempted to rebuild the bridges that 
the Spaniards had destroyed. Zufiiga was unable to 
oppose him, nor could he obtain assistance from a 
chance British vessel then at Pensacola. Its captain, 
however, agreed to carry his dispatches to Apodaca. 
Misfortune still dogged the footsteps of the unfor- 
tunate Perez. Wilkinson furnished him with provi- 
sions and transports for the voyage to Pensacola. De- 
tained by contrary winds, he did not reach Fort Bar- 
rancas till April 29, and in the interim his men suf- 
fered for lack of food. Although he had made no 
effort to relieve Perez, Zuniga bitterly criticized him 
for yielding the fort without firing a shot in its de- 
fense. Perez had peremptory orders to bury himself 
under its ruins rather than surrender it. On a former 
occasion when confronted by the enemy he had dis- 
played greater firmness. Now he had not even at- 
tempted to gather provisions for a siege, and by tak- 
ing the sea route to Pensacola had given his men a 
chance to desert. Morphy, who had warned Zuniga 
in full time, likewise regarded the incident as highly 
indecorous to Spanish arms. Manrique, who shortly 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 621 

succeeded Zufiiga, told the Indians tliat a faithless 
officer had sold Mobile to the Americans.^^ 

Apodaca directed that the accused officers should be 
court-martialled. Manrique reported that Perez had 
fled to avoid arrest, but he later submitted to the 
authorities, and in 1815 the interminable process 
against him, Morejon, and six others began. The 
mass of testimony fills more than 1250 folios. The 
court did not render its final decision until November 
18, 1822. By that time Perez was beyond the juris- 
diction of any earthly tribunal, after having suffered 
far beyond his deserts, but his judges did at least clear 
his reputation. The surviving officers were restored 
to their rank and service, without any mention of com- 
pensation for the seven wasted years. Truly the lot 
of Perez, like that of his fellow frontier officials, 
Folch, Grand Pre, and De Lassus, was a hard one, 
but his name is to be recorded among those who de- 
served well of their afflicted nation.^^ 

The administration was not a unit on the question 
of taking possession of Mobile. Gallatin, who had 
started abroad in an attempt to arrange a treaty with 

15 Perez to Zufiiga, Apr. 29, 1813, Zufiiga to Apodaca, Apr, 
29, May 2, 1 81 3, Legajo 1794, Morphy to Captain-General, 
Apr. 28, 1813, Legajo 1836, Manrique to Apodaca, June 14, 
1813, Legajo 1794, Papeles de Cuba; cf. Hamilton, Colonial 
Mobile, 419. 

1* Prieto to Apodaca, Nov, 17, 1815, Legajo 1877; Testi- 
monio, Ano de 1813, Criminal, etc., Legajo 1865, Papeles de 
Cuba. 

41 



622 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

Great Britain, through the mediation of Russia, feared 
that the act might prejudice both powers against the 
United States. The United States could take Mobile 
at any time. It was an act of war to do so, what- 
ever her claims. Even if European nations should not 
support the pretensions of Spain, they might take 
part against her alleged despoiler. Despite Monroe's 
insistence that the question was settled, Gallatin still 
maintained that the act was an impoHtic one caused 
by magnified representations from the frontier. If it 
led to war with Spain, it might disgust every man 
north of Washington and add to the intensity of 
existing sectionalism.^^ 

When Monroe told Serrurier, the French minister, 
that Mobile was occupied, he also mentioned a rumor 
that Spain had ceded the Floridas to Great Britain. 
If true, this would cause a renewal of the struggle 
between Great Britain and the United States, even if 
the anticipated negotiation should have resulted favor- 
ably. It would likewise lead the American govern- 
ment to occupy the threatened territory at once.^^ But 
as the Floridas had now become an affair of little im- 
portance to the Frenchman's imperial master, he trans- 
mitted Monroe's information without comment. 

Some of the American newspapers compared Wil- 

^7 Monroe Papers, MS., XIII, 1687, Library of Congress ; 
Adams, History of the United States, VII, 211-213. 

1^ Archives des Affaires £trangeres, £tats Unis, MS., Vol. 
70, 242. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 623 

kinson to Napoleon because by surprise he had ac- 
compHshed a bloodless conquest. This comparison led 
De Onis to express the fear that success would lead 
the American government to even greater aggressions. 
He expected no negotiation over the territory that had 
already been annexed to Louisiana and Mississippi. 
After hearing from Monroe ithrough Dashkoflf, the 
Russian minister, he urged better fortifications for 
Pensacola. He could not comprehend such an act as 
the Americans had just committed in the midst of 
peace without preliminary complaint. Very likely the 
officers in charge had exceeded their instructions, and 
he requested copies of these in order to make a full 
explanation to the Regency. While that body was to 
determine how far the event was compatible with na- 
tional honor, his own obhgation led him to protest 
against this hostile dismemberment of Spanish terri- 
tory. He hoped, however, that the president would 
interpret his protest as an attempt to shun any warlike 
results.^® 

In addition to securing his services as an inter- 
mediary, De Onis tried to' get Dashkoff to second his 
protest as Foster had formerly done. In answer to 
his informal inquiries Monroe told him that the com- 
missioners to treat with Great Britain also carried in- 

19 De Onis to Apodaca, June 3, 1813, Legajo 1837, Papeles 
de Cuba; De Onis to Monroe, June 4, 1813, Spanish Notes, 
MS., II, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



624 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

structions in regard to Spain.^^ With this failure in 
Washington to link Spain's wrongs with the Russian 
mediation, the Regency turned to London. Fernan 
Nunez, who succeeded Apodaca when the other went 
to Cuba, asked Castlereagh to demand, as preliminary 
to a treaty with the United States, " the recognition 
of the legitimate government of Spain . . . the evacu- 
ation of the Floridas and the restoration of all terri- 
tory taken from Spain since the invasion of the Penin- 
sula by the French." He asked this not merely as an 
act of justice, but because British as well as Spanish 
interests demanded that the United States should not 
gain an ascendency in the Gulf of Mexico. Castle- 
reagh evasively promised that, in keeping with the spirit 
of alliance between them, he would uphold the inter- 
ests of the Spanish sovereign in all negotiations with 
foreign powers.^^ 

When in June, 1813, Apodaca sent Manrique to re- 
place Ziiniga, he instructed him to enroll all the able- 
bodied men in his jurisdiction in the militia. With 
these he should strengthen the defenses of Pensacola 
and try to starve out the American force on the Per- 
dido. In his communications with the Americans he 
was always to express peaceful intentions, but clearly 
to place the responsibility for hostilities on those who 

20 De Onis to Labrador, June 14, 1813, Legajo 5554, Estado, 
A. H. N., Madrid. 

21 Fernan Nunez to Castlereagh, Aug. 23, 1813, Castlereagh 
to Fernan Nunez, Aug. 23, 1813, MS., British Foreign Office, 
Spain, 72, Vol. 149, 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 625 

tried to alter the existing situation.^^ Before Man- 
rique reached Pensacola the dispatch of the Third 
Regiment northward made it advisable for the Amer- 
icans to recall the detachment on the Perdido to Mo- 
bile. Manrique ordered the abandoned buildings and 
stockade to be burned. Apodaca approved this, and 
told him to occupy both banks of the river if possible, 
and secure its fords against any invader.^^ 

Still following Apodaca's instructions, Manrique 
made a formal but ineffectual protest against the pres- 
ence of American troops in Mobile. Though couched 
in pacific terms, the protest gave full evidence of the 
outraged bitterness that prompted it. The occupation 
of Mobile could not be regarded as a friendly act. The 
agreement with Perez, made under duress, was void. 
Military officers had no concern in diplomatic affairs. 
While their countries were at peace the subjects of 
neither should do anything to break the harmony. 
Therefore he hoped that the American would not erect 
fortifications on the Perdido, but would withdraw 
from Mobile and Baton Rouge, which the Spaniards 
had long ago legally acquired from Great Britain.^* 

22 Minute of Instructions to the Commandant of West 
Florida, June i, 1813, Legajo 1794, Papeles de Cuba. 

23 Manrique to Apodaca, July 9, 1813, with enclosures, Apo- 
daca to Commandant of Pensacola, Aug. 6, 1813, Legajo 1744, 
Papeles de Cuba. 

2* Manrique to the Commander of the American troops, 
June 15, 1813 (Robertson, 5196). 



626 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

Thomas Flournoy, Wilkinson's successor, did not 
disdain Manrique's challenge to renew the unending 
controversy. While the Spaniards had obtained Mo- 
bile and Baton Rouge from England, as Manrique 
claimed, the latter omitted to state that Spain subse- 
quently ceded the region in dispute to France, and 
France in turn to the United States. That power 
could take possession of territory, thus legally and 
fairly acquired, without having its act regarded as 
hostile or contrary to the law of nations. Rivalling 
the Spaniard's spirit of harmony, which he hoped no 
rash or inconsiderate act would break, he in turn pro- 
tested against the destruction of the stockade on the 
Perdido. Flournoy hoped that his reply met with 
Secretary Armstrong's approval. He had acted in 
accordance with what he thought was the accepted 
national policy and requested discretionary powers or 
more explicit instructions upon every point connected 
with the local public service.^^ 

Manrique may have intended his protest to serve as 
the forerunner of an expedition for the recovery of 
West Florida. If the captain-general planned such an 
expedition, as Claiborne suggested he did, his council 
of war more prudently advised him to postpone it. 
Later in the year the home authorities, to whom the 
project was referred, approved Apodaca's measures in 

25 Flournoy to Manrique, June o."], 1813, same to Armstrong, 
June 27, 1813, Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 41, Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 627 

general. They urged him to repel aggression and to 
attempt the reoccupation of posts like Mobile, but 
dwelt more on the difficulty of carrying on war against 
the Americans. Yet they empowered the captain-gen- 
eral to develop a naval force, and thus make Spain 
redoubtable on the Gulf. By this means he could pre- 
vent further losses of territory, even if unable to re- 
cover any. The Spaniards evidently hoped to profit 
from contemporary British operations in the vicinity, 
even if they did not openly countenance them.^^ 

The Creek Indians aroused greater alarm than did 
the Spaniards. In May, 1813, John McKee predicted 
hostility from them, but thought he might line up the 
other tribes against them. By the last of July Holmes 
learned that the war party among them had gained the 
upper hand. They were capturing the United States 
mails and resorting to Pensacola, where, according to 
report, the Spaniards supplied them with arms and 
provisions. Claiborne thought that the Indians also 
counted on the aid of the British. Holmes trans- 
mitted their reports to Flournoy, who used them as 
additional subjects for correspondence with Manrique. 
The Mississippi executive also took steps to prepare 
his militia and to seek further aid from the States 
above. Flournoy thought that the Spaniards might be 

26 Claiborne to Madison, July 9, 1813, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 41, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Junta 
of War, Marine and Treasury, Dec. 9, 1813, Audiencia of 
Santo Domingo, MS., 146-3-8, A. G. I., Seville. 



628 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

using the Indians to decoy the American forces north- 
ward while they moved against Mobile. To defeat 
such a stratagem he stationed the Seventh Regiment at 
Pass Christian and sent F. L. Claiborne with the Mis- 
sissippi volunteers to Fort Stoddert.^^ 

Intimations of complicity with the savages still fur- 
ther aroused Manrique. He was already resentful at 
Flournoy's protest against burning the blockhouses on 
the Perdido, and preferred to emphasize that issue 
rather than the Indian situation. He did not assume 
direct responsibility for the destruction of the out- 
posts, and he claimed that it could hardly be distorted 
into an act of hostility. Far otherwise were the 
American operations against Mobile. The United 
States had made a claim to the territory — a claim un- 
supported by French or Spanish evidence, as he dem- 
onstrated — and then abandoned it after Monroe's 
failure in 1805. Years later when war between Spain 
and France afforded the opportunity, the United 
States revived its pretensions in order to deprive Spain 
of her territory. If that country wished to go still 
further and use the burning of a few tree trunks as a 
pretext for beginning hostilities, it was welcome to do 
so, but few would approve that policy. Moreover one 
would not find at Pensacola an officer or man as weak 

27 McKee to Monroe, May 4, 1813, Flournoy to Secretary 
of War, July 30, 1813, Claiborne to Monroe, Aug. i, 1813, 
Miscellaneous Letters, MS., Vol. 41, Bureau of Indexes and 
Archives. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 629 

as those the Americans had unfortunately discovered 
at Mobile.28 

The restlessness of the Creeks, secretly encouraged 
by the British and Spaniards, and definitely inflamed 
by Colonel James Caller's ill-advised attack on a party 
returning from Pensacola, finally burst forth in the 
massacre at Fort Mimms on August 29, 181 3.^^ Pos- 
sibly the Spaniards interpreted this as the vengeance 
of Heaven upon the turbulent population of the Tom- 
bigbee; but in view of the rage and horror aroused 
along the entire southern border, Manrique knew that 
he must at once reHeve himself of any imputation of 
compHcity. He denied that he had furnished the In- 
dians with anything but the ordinary regalement, or 
permitted them, when armed, to enter Pensacola. He 
did not credit every wild rumor that came to him, as 
Flournoy seemed to do. As a specific instance he 
mentioned the report that the insurgent Gutierrez, 
who had recently invaded Texas, had been fitted out 
in Louisiana, with Governor Claiborne assisting. The 
circumstances suggested so clearly the methods em- 
ployed to occupy Baton Rouge that he (Manrique) 
had as much right to complain of it as Flournoy of 
the regalement of the Indians. As a parting sting he 
referred to the luster of the Spanish nation, and its 

28 Manrique to Flournoy, Aug. 18, 1813 (Robertson, 5199). 

29 Adams, History of the United States, VII, 227-231. 



630 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

desire to treat allies and "peaceful neighbors" with 
justice.^^ 

Flournoy evidently felt that the mingled sarcasm 
and insolence of Manrique's notes — to say nothing of 
their truthfulness — demanded the direct attention of 
his superiors. Armstrong evidently expected that 
Monroe, who had so long been identified with this 
controversy, would rejoice at another chance to con- 
tinue it, and sent the notes to him. The Spaniard's 
scathing review of the old quarrel and its most recent 
manifestations evidently afforded Monroe little satis- 
faction. He chose to regard it merely as an expres- 
sion of the Spaniard's individual views, and directed 
Flournoy to return the notes to the autho'r in silent con- 
tempt. Documents " so replete with insolence and 
falsehood " must not be retained in the government 
archives. If the hostile attitude of the Regency should 
finally force the United States into war, Spain would 
then learn the difference between the " magnanimous 
f orebearance " of the American people and its just 
resentment.^^ Evidently Manrique's insolence cut to 
the quick, for this was the most bitter word that 
Monroe had written in ten years of irritating cor- 
respondence. 

In November, 181 3, Monroe received another com- 
munication concerning the Floridas that caused him 

so Manrique to Flournoy, Sept 3, 1813 (Robertson, 5200). 
31 Monroe to Flournoy, Nov. 24, 1813, Domestic Letters, 
MS., Vol. 16, 92. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 63 1 

additional irritation. John H. Robinson, whom he 
had sent on a special mission to Mexico, had returned 
full of enthusiasm for the revolutionists of that coun- 
try. When the secretary received with coolness his 
urgings in their behalf, Robinson turned filibuster, and 
urged the young men of the West to join his standard. 
He confidently predicted that he would have a force 
of four thousand followers by April. To arm them 
he proposed to capture Pensacola and East Florida. 
With this in view he naively asked Monroe if the 
United States would '' by capitulation " permit his 
force to carry its munitions through American terri- 
tory to the western frontier. If they were able to 
come to an understanding upon this point, he believed 
they could make Cuba independent. In that case he 
generously offered his services to bring it into the 
American Union.^- 

The shocked Monroe, just free from an unpleasant 
experience with another agent, Matthews, indignantly 
rejected this sanguine offer. Moreover he lectured 
Robinson roundly on his course, for his irregularities 
compromised the department that had so recently em- 
ployed him.^^ He also took pains to warn the western 
governors to keep their eye on him. From New Or- 

32 Robinson to Monroe, Nov. 5, 1813, Papers Relative to the 
Revolted Spanish Provinces, MS., No. 22, Bureau of Rolls 
and Library. 

33 Monroe to Robinson, June 25, 1813, Domestic Letters, 
MS., Vol. 16, 92. 



632 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

leans came the report that General Humbert, a former 
French officer, posing as a Mexican insurgent, also 
planned to attack Pensacola.^* The plans of Hum- 
bert, Robinson, and others belong to the age of the 
fihbuster, which was just dawning. Their careers 
furnished the Spaniards with an additional catalogue 
of grievances. Generally operating against Mexico or 
the Spanish main, they often fancied that Pensacola, 
St. Augustine, or Amelia Island offered a tempting 
immediate prize. Their efforts naturally increased the 
suspicion with which the Spaniards regarded all Amer- 
icans. 

The Spaniards for their part could only observe the 
movements of the American troops more closely and 
insist more rigidly on passports. Late in 1813 the 
home authorities instructed the captain-general not to 
encourage American hostility or destroy the property 
of their opponents, but to check further aggression and 
employ all legitimate means to recover Mobile and 
Baton Rouge. Early in the following year they sus- 
pected that the Americans were about to convert a 
secret war into an open one, hence the local authori- 
ties should take pains to combat the insidious prac- 
tices of their "inquiet neighbors." They should in- 
crease their naval strength, put their frontiers in a 
good state of defense, enlist the Indians, initiate all 

3* Soto to Apodaca, Dec. 31, 1813, Legajo 1794, Papeles de 
Cuba. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 633 

measures for pursuing vigorous warfare within the 
United States, and expel Americans from Spanish ter- 
ritory, thus causing that government to feel the evils 
that other parts of the new world were then experienc- 
ing. On taking account of stock Apodaca discovered 
that his resources were inadequate for any such war- 
like policy. He could only mention the burning of the 
abandoned American stockade on the Perdido and the 
attempt to maintain patrols there as an incident in 
keeping with the above recommendation.^^ 

With the overthrow of Napoleon in Europe, the 
allies, Spain and England, expected the United States 
to suffer for its Machiavellian policy of the past ten 
years. De Onis \vrote that the " Republicans " feared 
the loss not merely of that part of the Floridas that 
they had recently occupied, but also of Louisiana. 
The sale of the latter was void because Napoleon had 
never carried out his contract with Spain. That power 
ought to repossess all this territory and thereby break 
up insurrectionary movements against Mexico, move- 
ments which found a natural focus at New Orleans. 
He outHned a plan for the conquest of this province 
and its separation from the Union, which had been 
suggested by a Louisiana planter of military preten- 
sions. The proposed plan, whoever its author, was too 
difficult for even a Spanish minister to encourage.^^ 

35 Apodaca to Luyandro, May 18, 1814, Audiencia of Santo 
Domingo, MS., 146-3-8, A. G. L, Seville. 

36 De Onis to Luyandro, June 8, 1814, ibid. Possibly the 
" Louisiana Planter " was Wilkinson. 



634 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

Diplomacy elsewhere might prove more effective 
than domestic revolt. In July, 1814, Fernan Nunez 
called Castlereagh's attention to his proposals of the 
year before. There was every prospect of peace be- 
tween Great Britain and the United States. Before it 
was established he wished Spain and her ally to form 
some common agreement. The British government 
knew that the United States had not preserved neutral- 
ity toward the revolted Spanish colonists and that it 
had occupied Mobile and continued to do so, despite 
British and Russian remonstrances. His own govern- 
ment, now at the end of its patience, wished by con- 
certed measures with Great Britain to make the United 
States pursue a more regular policy. This course 
would secure the reciprocal rights and possessions of 
both allied powers. 

Castlereagh brought the substance of this note to the 
attention of the prince regent, who was gratified to 
know that Spain appreciated previous British efforts 
in her behalf. The minister also directed a continu- 
ance of British efforts to make the United States 
realize its duty and repair the wrongs done Spain. 
Nothing would please his government more than to 
see a negotiation between them carried to a successful 
conclusion. If he were thus non-committal on the eve 
of negotiations at Ghent, he became convinced in the 
course of the long-drawn disputes there that the at- 
tempt to turn a twofold parley into a triple one would 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 635 

tend to " remove the period of our pacification," and 
in that measure sacrifice the real interests of Spain. 
He was interested in bringing about the peaceful union 
of all parts of the Spanish monarchy, but he could 
work effectually to that end only after resuming dip- 
lomatic relations with the United States.^^ 

If domestic treason or foreign diplomacy were in- 
effectual to shake the American hold on recently oc- 
cupied territory, Nicholls's bombastic proclamations 
and Packenham's veterans were equally so. Nicholls 
demonstrated the annoyance, if not peril, involved in 
Spanish jurisdiction at Pensacola and St. Augustine. 
But his appeals to western sectionalism, which were 
never feasible except in the imaginations of a few 
hopeful Spaniards or mercenary Americans, fell on 
deaf ears. Kentuckians and the people of Louisiana 
alike rallied to Jackson's support, and his "crowning 
mercy " at New Orleans justified their faith in the 
permanency of American control on the Mississippi.^^ 

This control was to be equally permanent in West 
Florida and likely to be further extended. Nicholls's 
course around Mobile and Pensacola had aroused some 
apprehension of a joint occupation of that region by 
the British and Spaniards from which the former 
would derive the lion's share of profit. Accordingly 

3'' Fernan Nunez to Castlereagh, July 6, 1814, (Castlereagh?) 
Draft to Fernan Nunez, Sept. 30, 1814, MS., British Foreign 
Office, Spain, ^2, Vol. 165. 

38 Gayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 333-347, passim. 



636 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

Monroe instructed Jackson to expel the British, even 
after the ratification of peace, if he found them west 
of the Perdido. This region formed part of the 
United States and was to be defended as such. 
Nicholls had also supplied the Indians with arms, so it 
was reported, and had encouraged them to demand 
the return of the recent cessions that Jackson had 
forced from them. Monroe was glad to note that the 
population flocking into this ceded territory not only- 
secured that area, but was also slowly drawing the 
residue of the Floridas from Spain.^^ 

The prospect of peace suggested a recurrence to 
earlier diplomatic wrangling. In 1814 George W. 
Erving was made minister to Spain, but he vainly 
waited at Paris for necessary passports. The failure 
of the Spanish government to supply them was vari- 
ously attributed to "the cloven foot of the British 
government," to the desire of Anthony Morris to sup- 
plant him, or to the hostile intentions of the Spanish 
government should the British occupy New Orleans. 
Morris, who was acting as American charge at Madrid, 
claimed that with ten thousand dollars for douceurs 
he could initiate the purchase of the Floridas. Both 
he and Richard McCall, the consul at Barcelona, re- 
ported that the clergy and court favorites, including 

39 Monroe to Jackson, Mar. 13, 1815, Jackson Papers, MS., 
Library of Congress; same to same, May 9, 1815, Miscella- 
neous Letters, MS., Vol. 47, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; 
Hamilton, Monroe, V, 341. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 637 

Cevallos, bitterly detested the United States, and Span- 
ish weakness alone kept them from declaring war 
upon it.'*'' Late in November, 1814, this feeling found 
definite expression in a memoir presented to Ferdi- 
nand VII, newly returned from exile.*^ 

According to McCall, the author of this memoir 
was one Bruno Vallerino, a member of the Council of 
the Indies. He mentioned the failure of Spain, fol- 
lowing the independence of the United States, to secure 
the region west of the AUeghanies. This advance 
might have enabled her to avoid boundary controver- 
sies with her neighbors, or to develop her frontier 
areas so as to arouse their respect. On the contrary, 
the Prince of the Peace in the Treaty of San Lorenzo 
was forced to recognize American sovereignty to the 
Mississippi and the thirty-first parallel. Therefore, 
Spain should have redoubled her efforts to develop 
her remaining holdings. Instead, her towns declined, 
while American adventurers, with uncanny foresight, 
occupied the best lands in the Floridas. It was then 
that France acquired Louisiana by the Treaty of San 
Ildefonso. Of this the author states : " There is in 

*o Fuller, The Purchase of the Floridas, 217, 218; A. Morris 
to Monroe, Nov. 22, Dec. 23, 30, 1814, Spanish Dispatches, MS., 
XII, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; McCall to Dallas, Mar. 
3, 1816, Letters in Relation to Burr's Conspiracy, MS., Bureau 
of Rolls and Library. 

■*! Translation of a Memoir which appears to have been in- 
tended for the King of Spain, dated Madrid, Dec. 23, 1814, 
ibid. 

42 



638 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

diplomacy no instance of a stipulation more strangely 
enigmatical than the article of the Treaty in which the 
compact is made for the retrocession of Louisiana to 
France." He believed that Napoleon inserted it for 
the purpose of backing up, in good time, his preten- 
sions to portions of Mexico, — pretensions that were 
based on La Salle's expedition and the grant of Crozat. 
He also thought that the French government secretly 
intended to possess West Florida on the ground that 
all the territory to the Perdido formerly belonged to 
France. The author could not explain why the Span- 
ish minister permitted such an uncertain stipulation in 
the treaty, but he did. In due time the territory thus 
defined passed to the United States, and that power 
immediately made excellent use of the enigmatical 
article " to forward its projects of aggrandizement." 
Nevertheless, during the special mission of Monroe 
and Pinckney, the Spanish government was able to 
present such soHd arguments against their claims that 
the American government never dared print them. 

Notwithstanding this diplomatic success, he said, 
Spain was unable to colonize the threatened territory. 
On the other hand colonists from the United States 
enabled the United States to seize West Florida ; but 
East Florida and Texas still remained to Spain. Now 
that the United States was engaged in a disastrous 
war, Spain might utilize the British alliance to force 
due respect for her rights. He then suggested a series 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 639 

of questions that brought up the validity of Napoleon's 
sale of Louisiana, the possibility of securing it in ex- 
change for the Floridas, the advisability of controlling 
the Gulf by retaining Pensacola and other ports in 
West Florida, and the probable British attitude upon 
this question. It would be difficult to restrain the 
Americans unless they set some definite limit to their 
ambition. Spain had yielded such strong barriers as 
the mountains and the Mississippi, and must now be- 
stir herself if she wished to hold her remaining prov- 
inces. 

Meanwhile all was not harmonious among those 
whom the Spaniards chose to regard as their de- 
spoilers. Squatters were being driven off from the 
land recently acquired from Spain and from the In- 
dians. Even Judge Toulmin felt that these irregular 
settlers were of some service in protecting the frontier. 
Some of the settlers beyond the Pearl complained be- 
cause they were not included in Louisiana, where they 
rightfully belonged, but were attached to Mississippi, 
" of all governments the most miserable and contemp- 
tible." Its tax laws were confiscatory, and its local offi- 
cials despicable. Among them Sterling Dupree pa- 
raded as a recent appointee of Holmes, and Lewis 
wrote that the people would prefer the Dey of Algiers 
to leaders of his sort. Land titles were still uncertain 
and new settlers were usurping the claims of older 
ones. If American rule meant the confiscation of 



640 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

their lands and subjection to a gang of villains, the 
older settlers would seek refuge among the Spaniards. 

Lewis also complained that Judge Toulmin retarded 
a case that he had before his court because he did not 
wish Lewis to improve certain lands that might come 
into competition with his own. This charge was re- 
garded as so slanderous that even the Mississippi leg- 
islature refused to consider it. A more damning 
charge, in Lewis's estimation, was the fact that the 
judge held court in Mobile on Sunday. This made 
him "a fit candidate for hell itself," and he asked 
Monroe to call the president's attention tO' the out- 
rage.*^ A charge of more serious import was to the 
effect that Toulmin and John Smith conspired with 
Francisco de Hevia, the recent Spanish commandant 
at Pascagoula, to lay claim to several thousand acres 
of land on the Pearl, the Pascagoula, and the Mobile. 
The claim was duly entered, but William Crawford, 
the commissioner for the district east of the Pearl 
River, refused to allow it.*^ The transaction is not at 
all in keeping with Toulmin's previous reputation, but 
it does not seem to have injured him in the estimation 
of his superiors. 

It is more pleasing to note that along with his 
judgeship, Toulmin still maintained his firmness 
against filibusters. In December, 1817, Masot, then 

42 E, Lewis to Monroe, July 22, 1816, Miscellaneous Letters, 
MS., Vol. 51, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

43 American State Papers, Public Lands, III, 20-29. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 64I 

in command at Pensacola, wrote him that the men on 
the Tensaw were planning an attack on that town. 
As the governor of the new Territory of Alabama had 
not yet arrived, Toulmin with his old vigor took upon 
himself the double task of reassuring the Spaniard 
and investigating the rumor. He found that prepara- 
tions for such an undertaking undoubtedly were on 
foot and that the local authorities were unable to 
check them. The land force expected to be joined by 
some vessels at the mouth of the Perdido. Evidently 
it was one of those semi-piratical raids that were then 
common in the Gulf. By threatening judicial process 
against one man, Toulmin hoped to break it up and to 
convince De Onis that the American authorities were 
not wholly prone to such irregularities.^* 

The admission of Mississippi into the Union in 1817 
and the development of Alabama to statehood two 
years later definitely determined the national status 
of the region to the Perdido. The question of land 
titles in the disputed area was not so readily settled. 
Among the claimants appeared prominent Convention- 
alists, loyal Spanish supporters, both naturalized and 
native, and steadfast adherents of the American gov- 
ernment, — a fact that illustrates the universal preva- 
lence of land hunger. The presence of French, Eng- 
lish, and Spanish claimants, mingled with those whose 

44 Toulmin to J. Q. Adams, Dec. 10, 1817, Miscellaneous 
Letters, MS., Vol. 59, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 



642 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

only right was that of occupancy, complicated the 
situation. In accordance with its earlier Louisiana 
legislation, Congress at first refused to recognize the 
validity of any Spanish grants subsequent to the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso, October i, 1800. But it 
discovered that this attempt to be consistent with its 
claim to West Florida would result in substantial in- 
justice to many bona-fide settlers in the region. Amer- 
ican acquiescence in Spanish occupation had led many 
of this class to confide in the legitimacy of Spanish 
grants. 

On the other hand, if the American government 
should recognize these grants, especially those subse- 
quent to December 20, 1803, it would favor a few land 
monopolists, whose connection with Morales gave 
them unusual privileges. The course of that official, 
supported by orders from his government, created the 
impression that the Spaniards recognized that their 
claim to the region was precarious, even if proper. 
This idea had provoked their determination to wring 
the utmost profit from it before they were forced to 
relinquish it. American acquiescence and Spanish 
cupidity had thus combined to dupe the innocent 
purchaser of small holdings, if not the grasping 
speculator.^^ 

Many claimants of the former type residing on the 
Mobile now bitterly criticised the national govern- 

*5 American State Papers, Public Lands, III, 35-62, 220-222. 



MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 643 

ment for its former equivocal attitude. It should 
never have acquiesced for ten years in Spanish occu- 
pation even to the extent of paying customs duties at 
Mobile unless it intended to recognize the validity of 
Spanish grants. The legislature of Louisiana sec- 
onded this criticism, although those who came from 
the Florida parishes resented the insinuation it con- 
veyed. The policy of the American government, this 
group contended, displayed its moderation toward 
Spain and its determination to suppress the land 
monopoly fostered by Morales. Congress, as usual, 
settled the difficulty by a compromise. That body, in 
the act of March 3, 1819, recognized holdings that were 
actually occupied and improved, according to Spanish 
regulations, after the Treaty of San Ildefonso. The 
amount of land in each holding was limited to a sec- 
tion, but this fact did not interfere with those titles 
that originated during British occupation and were 
ratified by the Spanish after 1783. No holdings were 
to be recognized under this act, unless they were occu- 
pied before April 15, 1813, the date of the surrender 
of Mobile.^« 

In this way Congress showed that it was not un- 
mindful of those who had assisted in bringing under 
the American flag the region to the Pascagoula and 
beyond. Yet it steadfastly refused to recognize the 
validity of their action. Incidentally it included in its 

4^ American State Papers, Public Lands, III, 346-348, 367. 



644 MOBILE AND THE AFTERMATH 

largess the more quiescent population of Mobile and 
some loyal Spaniards. Skipwith temporarily served 
as receiver for the land office west of the Pearl. 
There, despite legislation and recommendation, con- 
fusion in land titles prevailed for more than a dozen 
years after its acquisition.*^ As a result the settle- 
ment of the region was greatly retarded and the prob- 
lem of defending an important frontier still further 
complicated. 

4^ American State Papers, Public Lands, III, 411-421, 44^- 
449, 550-554- 



CHAPTER XVII 
The Conclusion of the Controversy 

The reception of De Onis as fully accredited envoy, 
in December, 1815, marked a renewal of the diplo- 
matic dispute of ten years before. Monroe as secre- 
tary of state defended the claim to the Perdido with 
the same vehemence that he had formerly displayed at 
Aranjuez. De Onis demanded the delivery of the 
contested region to Spain before that power would 
consent to treat on the now more important western 
boundary, and discussed the meaning of " retrocede " 
with the customary Spanish fulness and fervor. This 
demand led the House, at the instigation of Robert- 
so'n of Louisiana, to ask the president for the corre- 
spondence. When printed, this elicited from Niles the 
comment : " The pretensions of Spain are as prepos- 
terous as the manner in which they are urged is con- 
temptible."^ 

The demand gave force to the current presumption 
that England was backing Spain. The French charge 
repeated it, although his superiors supported the Span- 
iard's contention. From Europe Erving interpreted 

1 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 425 ff. ; 
Annals of Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 745; Niles' 
Register, IV, 405. 

645 



646 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

the Spanish argument as "the froth and scum of Ce- 
vallos' murky brain," but feared it might result in an- 
other special mission to deprive him of prospective 
diplomatic honors.^ At the suggestion of De Onis, 
however, he was empowered to take up the unending 
negotiation. He found Cevallos a feeble servant in a 
crumbling house, but still able to manifest his resent- 
ment at the American occupation of West Florida. 
Erving discussed this only to point out the moderation 
of his country in not occupying East Florida as well. 
In a few months the corrupt and doting Spaniard, 
whose chief asset was his detestation of Americans, 
was forced out of the office that, according to Erving, 
he encumbered rather than adorned. Before he left 
he took measures to transfer the negotiation to Wash- 
ington.^ 

As Great Britain had but recently used the Floridas 
as a military base, it was only natural for the Amer- 
ican press to charge her with diplomatic machinations 
in the same region. It seemed probable that that 
power would claim Cuba for aiding the mother-coun- 
try against Napoleon and the Floridas for assisting 
to subdue the rest of her colonies. General T. J. 
Jesup, in command of the Gulf Coast, also reported 
Spanish agents in New Orleans, evidently to advance 

2 Roth to Richlieu, Jan. 30, 1816, Instructions to Roth, Jan. 
29, 1816, Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, fitats Unis, MS., 
Vol. 72, 273, 300; Erving to Monroe, Feb. 23, 1816, Lenox MSS. 

3 Erving to Monroe, passim, 1816, Lenox MSS. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 647 

some such cooperation. In retaliation he proposed a 
counter-attack on Havana, for which a force of three 
thousand men with a naval contingent would suffice. 
If England once obtained Cuba, she would dominate 
the western hemisphere and threaten the safety of 
New Orleans. Madison, however, refused to be 
alarmed over the rumors or to approve Jesup's quixotic 
suggestions.* He passed out of office, as did his prede- 
cessor, with the West Florida question unsettled. 

The change from Napoleon to the Bourbons did not 
necessarily mean a change in the French attitude to- 
ward West Florida. Fernan Nuiiez, now ambassador 
at Paris, requested the Due de Richelieu to order a 
summary upon that " luxury of words," the third ar- 
ticle in the Treaty of San Ildefonso. He thought that 
its rich verbiage might be due to an artifice of the 
previous French government which permitted the 
Americans to make their pretentious but invalid claim. 
Evidently the American government was determined 
to reiterate this until it should force France to its in- 
terpretation. Taking advantage of Spain's necessi- 
ties, it was legislating for the territory as if already 
its legal possessor, and thus postponing settlement. 

The French government then preferred to withhold 
its opinion on the article, but advised the two coun- 

4 Jesup to Monroe, Sept. 3, 1816, Miscellaneous Letters, MS., 
Vol. 52, Bureau of Indexes and Archives; Madison to Mon- 
roe, Sept. 22, 1816, Lenox MSS. 



648 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

tries to determine by discussion the respective right 
of each and then arrive at some definite settlement.'^ 
Perhaps Pizarro, successor of Cevallos, had this opin- 
ion before him when in the summer of 181 7 he sug- 
gested the surrender of West Florida before attempt- 
ing to make a formal treaty. He then repeated an 
offer that De Onis had already made Monroe : to ex- 
change all Spanish territory east of the Mississippi 
for all American territory to the westward. The time 
for such a proposition, if it ever existed, had long 
since passed away. Erving immediately rejected it 
and likewise the proposal to submit all existing dis- 
putes to arbitration. This meant that the fertile- 
minded de Onis must undertake the proposed discus- 
sion.^ 

During this period Monroe's correspondents were 
not backward in offering suggestions. In 1814 H. M. 
Brackenridge reviewed the American interpretation of 
the wearisome third article. He claimed that Spain 
and France had jointly ceded the territory east of the 
Mississippi in 1762. This fact bound Spain, when 
she secured this territory in 1783, to restore it, as far 
as possible, to the original French status. To do so 
she must extend Louisiana to the Perdido. The 
United States had a perfect right to insist that its 
purchase included the land to that stream. An anony- 

^ Archives des Affaires fitrangeres, £tats Unis, Supplement, 
MS., Vol. 8, 275-296. 
6 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 445, 446. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 649 

mous correspondent in the summer of 1817 sent Mon- 
roe a pamphlet, which he claimed completely over- 
threw Brackenridge's labored defence. The uncer- 
tain third article was simply a Napoleonic scheme for 
further quarrels. After he sold the territory to the 
United States, he could use it as best suited his pur- 
pose, and had done so. This correspondent advised 
Monroe to obtain the disputed territory in return for 
our claims against Spain. 

Benjamin Vaughan, another correspondent, sent 
Monroe a geographical excerpt from Malte Brun that 
favored the American claim. Louisiana in 1800 and 
1803 included territory on both sides of the Missis- 
sippi "and the ancient and natural dependencies of 
New Orleans." Vaughan suggested that mere legal 
ownership of the Floridas amounted to little; Amer- 
ican citizens were rapidly occupying the whole region. 
If Spain should give the United States a quit claim 
to West Florida, or to so much of it as was necessary 
to control the important rivers flowing from American 
territory, and then bestow the remainder on Great 
Britain, all three powers might be satisfied. Great 
Britain would feel secure in her West Indian posses- 
sions; Spain would have a friendly neighbor in the 
Florida peninsula ; and the United States would con- 
trol absolutely the commerce of the Mississippi and 
the near-by streams. Vaughan confessed that he knew 



650 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

no more of the political situation than of Kamchatka, 
but thought the question should be settled soonj 

One of J. Q. Adams's correspondents also thought 
it was high time to settle this question, but did not 
believe that the British government was in a financial 
position to purchase the Floridas. There was now no 
Napoleon to hold them " in reserve as a nestling place 
whence he [might] serpentize into the Paradise of 
Talleyrand." America's respect for Spain's misfor- 
tunes had not received due credit in Europe, and he 
now wished an ending to the controversy that would 
show the sincerity of its government.® 

In his first annual message the patient Monroe could 
only report that our negotiations with Spain were 
still fruitless. Conditions did not promise to improve 
during the first few months of negotiation between 
Adams and De Onis. The Spaniard displayed a fond- 
ness for wordy discussion that finally tempted the 
whilom professor of oratory to respond. It is need- 
less to say that the verbal and historical discussion ac- 
complished nothing. De Onis was unconvinced by 
Adams's defense of the American claim to the Per- 
dido, but Jefferson congratulated its author on pro- 

'^ Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana, p. 24 ff., cf. p. 94; 
Adams to Monroe, Aug. 28, 1817, Benjamin Vaughan to 
Monroe, Apr. 17, 1817, Lenox MSS. 

8 George Joy to J. Q. Adams, Nov. 4, 1817, General Corre- 
spondence of J. Q. Adams, MS., Massachusetts Historical 
Society. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 65 1 

ducing one of the best state papers he had ever seen. 
From Philadelphia, Joseph Hopkinson offered to send 
Adams a copy of Moll's map to bolster up his argu- 
ment, and Alexander H. Everett wrote that his corre- 
spondence with the Spanish minister attracted favor- 
able attention in Boston.^ 

The failure to come to a diplomatic settlement be- 
tokened possible war. The British minister offered 
his mediation, but the American cabinet declined it. 
Yet England refused to aid Spain in her difficulty. 
That power hoped for aid from the reactionary forces 
in Europe. France coveted the Floridas for herself 
or wished Russia to get them, but gradually schooled 
herself to having the United States possess them. 
Spain was evidently in a critical condition, being un- 
able to defend the territory herself or to gain help 
from her European friends. Yet when Adams, upon 
Monroe's insistence, asked De Onis what his govern- 
ment would take for East Florida, which he affected 
to beheve was all that Spain possessed east of the Mis- 
sissippi, the Spanish minister simply repeated the offer 
that Pizarro made Erving the year before.^^ 

From Baltimore, Adams received a suggestion to 
pay Spain a million dollars for her territory east of 

» American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 452 ff. ; 
Ford, Jefferson, X, 122; General Correspondence of J. Q. 
Adams, MS., Massachusetts Historical Society. 

10 Adams, Memoirs, IV, yi^ 50> Si ; Archives des Affaires 
fitrangeres, Espagne, MS., Vol. 701, 156, 201, 202, See p. 648. 



652 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

the Mississippi. This was more than it was worth to 
her or to the United States except for its strategic 
position and the necessity for controlHng the Indians.^^ 
The Spanish government evidently felt that it was 
playing a losing game, for it began to dispose of the 
remaining vacant lands there. In June, 1818, de Onis 
spoke hopefully of an early diplomatic adjustment 
with the United States. From Madrid, Erving re- 
ported that Pizarro was inclined to yield to American 
pressure, but the other members of the Spanish cabinet 
restrained him. As a tangible manifestation of his 
compliance, however, he resurrected Pinckney's note 
of February 7, 1803, offering to guarantee Spain's pos- 
sessions west of the Mississippi in part payment for 
her territory to the eastward. But how Pizarro meant 
to use this resurrected offer never became evident. 
When he learned of Jackson's unauthorized invasion 
of Florida, he abruptly closed his parley with Erving. 
Soon after he yielded office to Casa Yrujo.^^ 

Diplomat and military expert had alike anticipated 
such a crisis as Jackson now caused. At last the fron- 
tiersmen had found their ideal leader. He unquestion- 
ably pointed out the only solution to this interminable 
controversy. At first the timorous Monroe and most 
of his advisers were incHned to censure the rash com- 

11 George Hebb to Adams, Apr. 25, 1818, Miscellaneous Let- 
ters, MS., Vol. 62, Bureau of Indexes and Archives. 

12 Biddle to Monroe, June 18, 1818, Lenox MSS. ; House 
Document 277, Twenty-eighth Congress, First Session, p. 30. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 653 

mander and propitiate the incensed Spaniards. But 
the resolute Adams seized upon the incident to demon- 
strate the folly of Spanish persistence. Jackson's ac- 
tion, if not Adams's arguments, coupled with minis- 
terial changes in Spain, finally triumphed over pro- 
crastination and pride. The king empowered Casa 
Yrujo to part with the Floridas and to settle the 
boundary of Texas. This cession was now subordi- 
nated to the latter, but there was still abundant op- 
portunity for tact and concession in phrasing the ar- 
ticles deahng with the territory east of the Mississippi. 
The Spanish colonies were also measurably involved, 
as they had been during the past ten years, for Spain 
wished to prevent the United States from recognizing 
their independence as soon as the treaty should be 
ratified.^^ 

In the ensuing discussions the French minister, 
Hyde de Neuville, proved a most efficient intermediary. 
Adams was firm, not to say stubborn ; De Onis, proud- 
spirited and intriguing. The American often had to 
vent upon the others the ire aroused in unsympathetic 
cabinet meetings. The French minister was inclined 
to favor him, after Texas was eliminated, except in 
regard to West Florida. In this he followed the 
French interpretation of the past fifteen years. In 
January, 1819, a series of articles in the Washington 
City Gazette gave him and De Onis some comfort. 

13 Adams, Memoirs, IV, 168, 200, 208. 
43 



654 "^^^ CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

The author, supposed to be Armstrong-, gave what pur- 
ported to be a secret history of the negotiations with 
Spain that was far from complimentary to Monroe. 
This attempt to defeat the negotiation caused others, 
including Clay, to regret the relinquishment of Texas.^* 
When the diplomats reached the stage of pro jets, 
Adams discovered that De Onis had described the 
Floridas as they were ceded to Spain by Great Britain 
in 1783, and with the limits assigned by the Treaty 
of 1795. Such a definition would comprise the dis- 
puted territory already in American possession and 
involve the total surrender of the American conten- 
tion. Instead Adams suggested that the article should 
read : " His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United 
States ... all the territories which belong to him, 
situated eastward of the Mississippi, known by the 
names of East and West Florida." In this form De 
Neuville believed it would cover the honor of both 
countries and divest the transaction of all "mutual 
reservation, disguise or recrimination." The phrase 
" which belongs to him " sustained the American con- 
tention, for one could apply it merely to that part of 
British and Spanish West Florida between the Per- 
dido and the Appalachicola. The Americans had 
never claimed this as part of Louisiana. On the other 
hand Spanish susceptibility might be appeased by the 
assumption that " East and West Florida " included all 

1* Adams, Memoirs, IV, 218-221, 237. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 655 

the territory south of the thirty-first parallel and east 
of the Mississippi and the Iberville.^^ 

With the arrangement of this non-committal article 
the controversy of fifteen years was allowed to rest. 
Neither nation could claim a victory in the treaty, but 
each had preserved its honor. The United States al- 
ready occupied the disputed territory; the legal title 
was a mere shadow that need not trouble it longer. 
As the Intelligencer stated, this stipulation " acknowl- 
edges the United States to be sovereign, under the 
hitherto contested Louisiana Treaty, over all the ter- 
ritory we seriously contended for."^® Spain had 
simply yielded to the inevitable, but De Onis could 
felicitate himself on retaining Texas. Hyde de Neu- 
ville's part in bringing about this settlement measur- 
ably atoned for the earlier diplomatic jobbery of 
Napoleon and his agents. 

In the two years' struggle over the ratification of 
the treaty West Florida was not specifically involved. 
Late in 1819, by the act for the admission of Alabama, 
the remaining portion to the Perdido became an in- 
tegral part of the American Union. For a time it 
seemed that Great Britain might attempt to seize Cuba 
as a counterpoise to the rest of the Floridas and thus 
separate the twin objects of Jefferson's diplomacy. ^^ 

15 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 619-623 ; 
Adams, Memoirs, IV, 249; Florida Treaty and Correspond- 
ence, MS., 48, Bureau of Rolls and Library. 

16 National Intelligencer, Feb. 24, 1819. 

17 Niles' Register, XVII, 305, 353, XVIII, 46, 47- 



656 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

The American government avoided this danger by re- 
fraining from seizing the peninsula by force. Finally 
Spain, deserted by the other powers and torn by revo- 
lution, resumed for a time a constitutional form of 
government. In October, 1820, the short-lived Cortes 
consented to ratify the treaty, and on the twenty- 
second of the following February, the American Sen- 
ate again accepted it with only four dissenting votes.^^ 
The long-drawn dispute was diplomatically settled. 

This settlement, however, in no wise determined the 
rightfulness of the American contention. Late in the 
following decade a case involving a land grant in 
Feliciana gave Chief-Justice Marshall a chance to ex- 
press his opinion upon this point, had he chosen to 
avail himself of it. Something of the animosity dis- 
played toward Jefferson in Marbury v. Madison or at 
the Burr trial might have led him to undo the argu- 
ment upon which the third president and his advisers 
had based their specious claims. But a decision of 
this sort would have run counter to the national policy 
of a quarter century. In the region involved it would 
favor the land speculator at the expense of the actual 
settler. Marshall, therefore, rendered a decision in 
keeping with national interpretation, but he threw upon 
the earlier Republican administrations the responsibil- 
ity for a condition that left the court no other alter- 
native. 

18 Adams, Memoirs, V, 288. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 657 

According to Marshall's dictum in Foster v. Neilson, 
France made no declaration on the limits of Louisiana 
until after she had sold it to the United States. Vital 
political considerations then prevented the latter from 
accepting her declaration. We have already noted at 
length what these " vital considerations " were. In a 
controversy over boundaries, the chief-justice con- 
tinued, the courts of each country must be guided by 
the measures of their own government. The judi- 
ciary cannot decide international questions ; its func- 
tion is to decide individual rights. If the course of the 
United States was a plain one, the court would hesitate 
to pronounce it erroneous. Whatever the opinion of 
the individual judge may be, it is his duty to conform 
his decision to the will of the legislature clearly ex- 
pressed. A treaty in the United States is equivalent 
to an act of legislation, and is thus part of the law 
of the land. The Louisiana court had dismissed the 
case on the ground that Spain had no right to grant 
land in West Florida, on January 2, 1804. Marshall 
ruled that in so doing the court had committed no 
error.^^ 

In the case of Newcombe v. Skipwith the superior 
court of the Territory of Orleans under Judge Martin 
had already decided that West Florida formed part 
of the Louisiana Purchase. ^^ Evidently the courts, 

1^2 Peters, 253-317, January term of 1829. 
20 Martin, Louisiana Reports, p. 151. 



658 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

both local and national, were unwilling to override the 
actio'n of executive and Congress. That body was less 
careful to remain consistent. In the Nineteenth Con- 
gress the House of Representatives favored a claim of 
De Lassus for the money that the convention seized, 
but the Senate refused to concur. In 1849 the gov- 
ernment finally paid the heirs of a certain De la 
Francia for the arms that he had furnished Kemper, 
but only because Jackson had later used them in the 
defense of New Orleans. ^^ 

With these partial exceptions the government con- 
sistently maintained its attitude upon this mooted ques- 
tion. More than thirty years after the above inci- 
dent, certain citizens of Louisiana resident in the Flor- 
ida parishes, now by subdivision numbering eight, at- 
tempted a more extensive raid on the federal treasury. 
Under the plea that these parishes constituted the heirs 
of the defunct State of West Florida, they claimed 
the domain which their reputed ancestor, in 1810, con- 
quered from the king of Spain. The American occu- 
pation of that year was due, they said, to the invitation 
extended by that State, and not to the reasons urged 
in the president's proclamation. The American gov- 
ernment had virtually abandoned its contention that 
West Florida was part of Louisiana in 1805, at the 
close of Monroe's mission. Strategic reasons urged it 

21 Favrot, in Publications of the Louisiana Historical So- 
ciety, I, Pt. Ill, 23, 24. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 659 

to take the country before Great Britain should do so 
and cut off New Orleans. Unless the American gov- 
ernment wished to follow precedents established in 
India rather than in America, it could justify the occu- 
pation only by the invitation of its inhabitants. 

In further support of this claim the attorney, Henry 
Skipwith, urged that those who took part in this move- 
ment were the only successful revolutionists in the 
New World who had failed to retain the prize for 
which they had risked their necks. The territory of 
West Florida was the only part of the vast public do- 
main held merely by a president's proclamation and 
an act of Congress. Moreover the petitioners claimed 
that Kemper's services gained Mobile for Alabama; 
that the arms purchased for him were of material as- 
sistance to Jackson at New Orleans ; and that the Ten- 
nesseean recruited the horses for his force in the pas- 
tures of Baton Rouge and Feliciana. The revolt in 
West Florida ushered in a series of victories from 
San Jacinto to the City of Mexico. In view of these 
facts Skipwith, as attorney for the interested parishes, 
asked for a restoration of title to the lands within 
those parishes or some other suitable reward. Thus 
the national government might requite the services of 
those who formed the short-lived, independent State 
of West Florida. Needless to say his appeal fell on 
deaf ears. His efforts, however, may have been in- 



660 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

strumental in preserving for us some of the records 
of that embryo government.^^ 

" Honest friendship with all nations, entangling 
alliances with none." Thus in his first inaugural ad- 
dress Jefferson tersely stated his ideal foreign policy. 
One need only read the foregoing pages to perceive 
that in the case of the Floridas the third president 
violated both of these cardinal principles. In his let- 
ters he often seemed disingenuous toward Spain; and 
on more than one occasion he was ready to ally him- 
self with France, or even his old enemy, England, in 
order to gain the coveted territory. Nor was he 
straightforward in his methods. As secretary of state 
and as vice-president he was willing to encourage the 
mistaken policy of the Spaniards in attracting Ameri- 
can emigration, and to ignore, if he did not openly 
encourage, filibustering projects against their domin- 
ions. He was bound to suppress these illegal projects, 
and he must have known that both emigration and fili- 
bustering were closely allied to western separatism 
and were fraught with peril to the newly-formed 
Union. 

22 Cf . the following pamphlets in the Library of Congress : 
Historical Summary and Argument in support of the claim 
of the Louisiana Parishes, etc., Washington, 1884, and Three 
Epochs, a Pocket Memorandum to aid Congress and the Presi- 
dent in Arbitrating the Rights of the Florida Parishes, New 

Orleans, 187 . The three epochs referred to were 1803, 

1810, 1846. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 66l 

Jefferson was a many-sided individual ; and some 
may attribute to his sympathetic touch with the fron- 
tiersmen the leniency that he exhibited toward emi- 
grants and filibusters. But his foreign policy is less 
easily defensible. He was willing to guarantee Spain's 
possessions beyond the Mississippi, to bear meekly Na- 
poleon's financial extortions, to submit to England's 
humiliating commercial demands, and to preach the 
gospel of Pan- Americanism — and all that he might 
thereby gain the Floridas. For the same reason he 
gave willing ear to Livingston's specious argument 
that West Florida was part of the Louisiana Purchase, 
and speedily surpassed his preceptor in advocating it. 
In due time this advocacy included his Virginian asso- 
ciates and his loyal henchmen everywhere. Once sure 
of their leader's position his supporters continued to 
champion the argument, even though it caused a 
schism in the party and morally weakened their chief 
in his encounter with the Federalists. 

A few at this day may contend that by maintaining 
the specious plea he saved the country from open war- 
fare with Spain. There are measures that are worse 
than war, and among them we may reckon the Florida 
controversy. Yet that dispute did not wholly prevent 
war. Jefferson's course and the course of his succes- 
sor may be classed among the minor causes of the 
second war with Great Britain. In that conflict Spain 
was as much the other's ally as she dared be. It was 



662 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

manifestly her weakness that had kept her from as- 
suming the role of open combatant in 1810, or long 
before. It was distrust of her British ally — a distrust 
that the latter's policy toward her colonies did much 
to warrant — that prevented her more effective partici- 
pation in the actual conflict. She had been likewise 
hampered when the nominal ally of Napoleon. The 
United States profited from the Corsican's chicane; 
but it also reaped advantage from the distrust aroused 
in Spanish councils by its traditional antagonist, Eng- 
land. Spain, helpless in the hands of her forceful 
allies, often had to yield to the contentions of the 
United States. We may assume that such easy suc- 
cesses stimulated in no small measure the Jeffersonian 
attitude toward national preparedness. 

It may be urged that the commercial situation 
abroad during the Napoleonic wars left Jefferson no 
other diplomatic course than the one he pursued. 
Henry Adams has pointed out the possibility of a more 
friendly understanding with Great Britain, especially 
after 1808. Such an understanding, if no closer union 
resulted, would have placed the United States squarely 
in the conflict against Bonaparte, and that at least 
would have been preferable to Jefferson and Madison's 
miserable truckling to the Napoleonic system. While 
it might have involved some subserviency to the Mis- 
tress of the Seas, this would have been but tempor- 
ary, and in any event would have been preferable to 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 663 

the alternate truculent and timorous bullying that 
shaped their Spanish policy. It was not this attitude 
but the tacit abandonment of Spain by her European 
neighbors that gave their successor, Monroe, or rather 
his secretary of state, Adams, the measure of success 
registered in the Florida Treaty. Not even Adams 
could defend all the steps leading up to that apparent 
triumph — and he generally did it passing well — with- 
out more than one violent wrench to his Puritan 
conscience. 

The men who opposed the American diplomats — 
Godoy and Talleyrand, Cevallos and Champagny, Tur- 
reau and Casa Yrujo, De Onis and Hyde de Neuville 
— received their training in an environment where 
intrigue, craftiness, and mendacity were the accepted 
weapons. Their American competitors claimed to be 
men of another stripe. Yet even when diplomacy de- 
scended to the plane of sordid bribery, the executive 
and his counsellors were willing to profit by it. To 
such depths did his obsession for the Floridas entice 
Thomas Jefferson. 

One must not criticise thus far without some at- 
tempt to point out another possible course. The won- 
der is that Jefferson, with his predilection for the 
frontiersman, did not perceive it more clearly. His 
utterances show that he had occasional inklings of the 
influence ultimately to be exerted by American expan- 
sion, but he seemed unwilling to rely upon it implicitly. 



664 "^^^ CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

It is not necessary to center this movement about 
Zachariah Cox, William Blount, Reuben Kemper, 
and Joseph Pulaski Kennedy, and others of irregular 
deed, although they represent one of its less favor- 
able phases. It is also unnecessary to overestimate 
the work of Andrew Ellicott, Harry Toulmin, William 
C. C. Claiborne, George Matthews, and David Holmes, 
who wrought under direct official sanction. But there 
were hundreds of humble pioneeers, whose names not 
even a land grant has preserved, whose collective 
agency in American expansion was more potent than 
either group of the above men, or even those who di- 
rected their common government. In Texas, and to a 
less degree, in California, they later demonstrated 
what they could do without direct governmental initia- 
tive. They were undertaking the same in the Floridas, 
and particularly in West Florida, when Jefferson and 
his associates unadvisedly tried to hasten the process. 
It is doubtful if they hastened it to any extent. It 
required ten years for them to occupy the land to the 
Perdido, and almost another decade passed before the 
peninsula rewarded their efforts. Texas was peopled 
in less than a score of years, and a like period sufficed 
to preoccupy California. In these later instances, im- 
patient diplomacy sought to hasten the process, as it 
did in Florida, and war actually followed, with a most 
unfortunate emphasis on sectionalism and its attendant 
evils. 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 665 

Although actual warfare did not mark the earlier ac- 
quisition, its avoidance brought no laurels to the diplo- 
mats of the period. Moreover the prolonged discus- 
sion over specious claims served to engender a hatred 
and suspicion that became the chief diplomatic heritage 
of our Spanish-American neighbors. The earliest 
suggestions of state policy presented to the embryo 
Mexican nation were marked by suspicion of the 
United States. In 1830 Alaman warned his country- 
men against the designs of its government as already 
shown in West Florida. Thirteen years later Almonte 
and Santa Anna vainly attempted to forestall a like 
peril in California.^^ It is fair to assume that later 
professions of Pan- Americanism often failed to arouse 
an enthusiastic response because such early exponents 
as Jefferson and Wilkinson used that cult as a bait to 
secure the Floridas. 

If the diplomat, then, played only the part of blun- 
derer in the acquisition of the Floridas, to whom is due 
the major credit for that deed? Obviously, to the 
American pioneer. Miro and Carondelet feared him 
and bribed his reputed leaders to keep him back. 
Morales and Folch declaimed against him but were 
unable to stay his course. Time and the river cur- 
rents were all in his favor. The hostile savage, se- 
cretly abetted by a few scattered Spanish garrisons, 
could not terrorize him. Virgin soil, almost unoccu- 

23 American Historical Review, XVII, 290. 



666 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

pied, had for him an irresistible attraction. A com- 
placent De Lassus gave him his opportunity. Under 
the circumstances it was only necessary to leave him 
alone and to profit by his onward course. Not all his 
acts while in progress were defensible, but more can 
be said in their favor than in behalf of the diplomacy 
that dogged his footsteps in West Florida. 

It was this pioneer, holding his own on the exposed 
frontier, who rightly claimed the assistance of his gov- 
ernment. Confusion and anarchy in the neighboring 
Spanish province might affect his negro slaves or the 
near-by Indians. This situation formed a real reason 
for action by the American authorities. In a lesser 
degree the pioneer was concerned over the prospect 
of foreign intervention. The peril of French pres- 
ence, before 1803, was very pronounced. After that 
date there was a possibility that Great Britain might 
be invited to establish herself in the Floridas, but it 
was a very remote possibility. The British faction 
there was not strong numerically, although it included 
some of the most influential men of the region. But 
it did not suit British policy to assume political con- 
trol of an area, unless it were absolutely necessary. 

As long as Spain retained Cuba and British com- 
mercial interests in the Gulf were not jeopardized, 
England was only mildly interested in the fate of the 
Floridas. Of course she preferred to have them re- 
main in the nominal possession of Spain. As long as 



THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 667 

they maintained that status her merchants had a 
chance in time of peace to monopoHze their restricted 
markets ; in time of war to blockade their few ports ; 
or in the later American conflict, to use those ports as 
best suited her military and naval purposes. Even 
with the American government absorbing the territory 
piecemeal, England retained some of these advantages ; 
and when that government obtained all of the Floridas, 
Spain still kept Cuba, and British interests in her 
other former colonies were superior to those of the 
United States. With such substantial advantages se- 
cured by a peace policy, it were madness to arouse 
American hostility and possibly Latin-American dis- 
trust by seizing territory that strategically was un- 
necessary. 

By registering a claim to West Florida, therefore, 
the American diplomats did nothing to advance the 
popular desire for the whole of the Florida region. 
Rather it confused the issue and hampered those resi- 
dents of the region who wished for American control. 
The argument for frontier defense against neighbor- 
ing anarchy or possible foreign intervention had more 
weight, but it played no conspicuous part in the train 
of events that brought the territory into the Union. 
Of commanding influence, however, was the wish of 
the people themselves, particularly those who dwelt in 
the Baton Rouge jurisdiction. It was necessary to 
express this wish covertly and to carry it through in 



668 THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 

a roundabout way. This they did successfully only 
to find that the American government would not rec- 
ognize their agency, but must base its action on a dis- 
carded diplomatic puzzle. There is little cause for 
wonder, therefore, that the story of how West Florida 
was acquired has remained a perpetual tangle, inex- 
plicable, discreditable, and generally ignored by the 
very people who should have been most interested in 
its details. 

That this is so is largely the result of the unfor- 
tunate diplomatic controversy that raged over the re- 
gion between the Mississippi and the Perdido. As 
a phase of frontier expansion its acquisition can be 
more readily understood. The various steps that led 
up to it were not wholly praiseworthy, but they were 
the natural phases of a popular movement into the 
wilderness. The pioneers who took part in it had 
pressed into an area that physiographically belonged 
to the United States and they undertook to make this 
relation a political one also. They occupied the terri- 
tory by peaceful means, dispossessing few that had 
any legitimate claim for redress. They outstripped 
the diplomat and forced his hand, and in the final 
settlement their deeds, though obscured under a cloud 
of words, formed the determining factor. If the pre- 
ceding chapters have made this clear, the writer has 
accomplished his purpose. 



INDEX 



Adair, John: on the Tombigbee, 
204, 208; reports on the Flor- 
ida border, 326-328; suc- 
ceeded by Clay, 546. 

Adams, John: favors separate 
treaty with Great Britain, 16; 
attitude toward France, 66, 

Adams, John Quincy: discussion 
with De Onis, 650; firmness 
in negotiation, 653; defends 
the claim to West Florida, 

663. 

Adet: attitude of toward Louisi- 
ana, 38, 39, T2. 

Alabama River: American claim 
to the navigation of, 590; see 
also Tombigbee and Mobile. 

Alabama, State: admission of, 641, 

655. 

Alaman, Lucas: warning of, 665. 

Alcudia, el duque de; see Godoy, 
Manuel. 

Almonte, Mexican minister: warn- 
ing of, 665. 

Alvina; see Davilmar. 

Amelia Island: occupation of, 562; 
possible French expedition 
against, 568. 

American diplomats: Jealousy 
among, 22,7, 246, 258. 

American government (adminis- 
tration) : ambition of, 68, 639 ; 
charged with complicity, 154, 
324, 406, 459, 512, 536; non- 
interference with Spanish col- 
onies, 303; criticism of, 362, 
449» 519. 530, 536, 538, 548- 
^^"i^t 597> 642; opposes Mobile 

44 



Society, 462, 466; policy to- 
ward Spain, 13, 102, 170, 185, 
526. 
American intervention in West 
Florida: character of, 331; 
measures to bring about, 578; 
justified by Monroe, 579. 
American migration: after 1783, 

22\ perils of, 439. 
American party in West Florida 
convention: purpose of, 382; 
measures for protection of, 
388. 
American protection: offer of, 266, 
459; Spaniards advised to ask 
for, 470. 
American troops: suspicious move-^^ 
ments of, 148; clandestiffe 
passage of, 196; Foronda's in- 
quiries concerning, 290; con- 
centration of, at New Orleans, 
306; Skipwith requests aid of, 
496; threaten Mobile, 510; 
confused with filibusters, 511; 
withdraw from Mobile, 521; 
threatening movements of, 
553; occupy Mobile, 613. 
Amite River: volunteers from, 
158; site for proposed arsenal 
on, 431. 
Apodaca, Juan Ruiz de: asks aid 
of the British government, 
554; relations as captain- 
general with Zuniga, 615, 620, 
624; orders court martial of 
Mobile officers, 621; plans to 
oppose the Americans, 626, 
633- 



669 



670 



INDEX 



Appalachicola River: as boundary, 
II, 12, 74, 272; Ellicott on, 
62. 

Armstrong, John, minister to 
Paris and secretary of war: 
succeeds Livingston, 113; has 
disappointing interview with 
Talleyrand, 128; advises 
seizure of Texas, 129, 
136, 227; forwards Tal- 
leyrand's project, 232; op- 
poses the sending of Erving 
to Madrid, 238; appeals to 
Talleyrand, 248; second ap- 
peal of, 251; disputes with 
Bowdoin, 258, 260-264; tem- 
porary absence from Paris, 
274; unsuccessful in submit- 
ting " hypotheses " for ne- 
gotiation, 272-274; advises im- 
mediate rupture with France, 
278; unsatisfactory negotia- 
tion with Champagny and re- 
call, 278-280; receives trucu- 
lent instructions from Madi- 
son, 534; orders the occupa- 
tion of Mobile, 616; trans- 
mits note of Manrique to 
Monroe, 626, 630; supposed 
author of attack on the Flor- 
ida Treaty, 654. 

Assembly in West Florida: peti- 
tion for, 319, 336, 342; re- 
sents Madison's proclamation, 
496-498; resolution of, 498, 

573- 
Audibert, C. M. : defends French 
refugees, 429; West Florida 
agent at New Orleans, 431, 

433- 
Aurora, abuses Skipwith, 573, 

Bahamas: reported mission of 

Kemper to, 163. 
Bainbridge, Lieutenant: in com- 



mand of American convoy at 
Mobile, 589, 591. 

Baker, Joshua G. : personal agent 
of Governor Holmes, 363. 

Baldwin, Samuel H. : naval agent 
of West Florida, 432, 435. 

Balearic Islands: Godoy's resent- 
ment over, 254, 256. 

Ballinger, John: immigrant from 
Kentucky, 388; commands 
West Florida grenadiers, 397; 
reports flight of enemy, 400; 
writes Toulmin about annex- 
ation, 418, 470; organizes the 
West Florida regulars, 420, 
428; makes appeal in behalf 
of Hargreave and Sibley, 484; 
arrests Claiborne's messen- 
ger, 502; submits to Ameri- 
can authority, 504; proposes 
the Pearl as boundary, 599; 
agent for the West Florida 
claimants, 599-601. 

Barbe-Marbois: attitude regarding 
claim to Mobile, 81; suggests 
payment of money, 114. 

Barlow, Joel, American minister 
in Paris: related to Kennedy, 
445; Madison's instructions 
to, 531; negotiations regard- 
ing the Floridas, 554, 568- 
571; dies in Poland, 570. 

Barrow, William: reports condi- 
tions in West Florida, 338; 
member of the West Florida 
convention, 349; urges Amer- 
ican intervention, 340, 364, 
418; member of executive 
committee of West Florida, 
428; reports conditions, 536. 
Bassano, Due de: succeeds Cadore, 

565, 569- 
Baton Rouge: importance of, 4; 
assemblage of militia at, 46; 
mentioned by Salcedo, 89, 
149; Grand Pre placed in 



INDEX 



671 



charge of, 150; character of 
population surrounding, 151; 
attacked by the Kempers, 156; 
military road to, 161; threat- 
ened by American forces, 191, 
202, 284; Jefferson advises its 
occupation, 308; threatened by 
French and Americans, 335, 

341. 360, 378, 392; ruinous 
condition of fort at, 371, 375; 
petition for assembly at, 342; 
compared with other centers 
in Spanish America 388; oc- 
cupation of by insurgents, 
395-408; attempted mutiny in, 
412; formal inquiry into cap- 
ture of, 413; occupation of, 
by Americans, 489, 495-506; 
reports of dissatisfaction in, 
526, 572; few British adher- 
ents in, 531; occupation of, 
discussed by the Spaniards 
and British, 510, 557, 562, 
592; American garrison at, 
597; temporary government 
for, 601; later mention of, 
625, 632, 667. 

Bayou Manchac: proposal to 
deepen channel of, 74, 325; 
mention of, 89; blockade of, 
2ig. 
Bayou St. Louis: disorder at, 580, 
Bayou Sara: outrages of banditti 
at, 157; complaint of turbu- 
lence at, 333; movement for 
holding an assembly in, 334, 

342, 358; alarming reports 
from, 371, 374, 395. 

Beauharnais, Eugene de: not to 
act as intermediary, 267; ad- 
vice of, to Erving, 268. 

Bedford, J. R. : correspondent of 
William Barrow, 338, 352, 
418; favors the incorporation 
of West Florida, 353. 



Bernaben (Bernabue, Bernabeu), 
Spanish consul at Baltimore: 
spelling of name, 455 ; assured 
by Smith in regard to Mobile 
Association, 531; controversy 
with Monroe, 532, 541, 551- 
553; demands evacuation of 
West Florida, 555. 

Beurnonville, French charge at 
Madrid: appeal of Spaniards 
and Pinckney to, 106; re- 
ceives instructions from Tal- 
leyrand, 107; attitude toward 
the joint negotiation, 120. 

Bienville: encounters English ves- 
sel, 7 ; leads expedition against 
the Chickasaws, 9. 

"Bigbians": antipathy inspired 

by, 583. 

Biloxi, Bay of: habitations on, 4; 
Iberville establishes garrison 
at, 7; plan to organize a par- 
ish at, 580; establishment of 
American authority at, 585; 
prevalent fear of Choctaws at, 
613. 

Blount, William: plans to invade 
Louisiana and the Floridas, 
37; relations of, with Wilkin- 
son and Jefferson and the 
Spaniards, 38; Ellicott's ef- 
forts to circumvent the con- 
spiracy of, 52; reputation as a 
frontier bogie, 53; mention 
of, 664. 

Bonaparte, Joseph: as diplomatic 
intermediary, "](>, 129; atti- 
tude toward the United States, 
279; accredited with proposal 
to sell the Floridas, 297, 455, 
553. 566; mention of, 441; re- 
fusal to receive minister of, 
453; demands the Floridas, 

541. 
Bonaparte, Napoleon; see Napo- 
leon. 



672 



INDEX 



Boundary survey: delayed, 54; 
completed, 62. 

Bourbon County: organization of, 
18, 42. 

Bourbons: fail to check the Eng- 
lish, 10, 26. 

Bowdoin, James: commissioned as 
minister to Spain, 118; goes 
to Paris, 237; opposes money 
jobbers, 239, 258; criticises 
Armstrong, 239, 242, 258, 269, 
275; reports plan of Parker, 
241; criticises executive, 269; 
diplomatic measures of, 243, 
262, 263, 266; lacks recogni- 
tion by the French govern- 
ment, 263, 276; warning to 
Erving, 277; regrets course 
of Skipwith, 574. 

Bowles, W. A.: offers to conquer 
the Floridas, 20; projects or- 
ganization of the Creeks, 140; 
assisted by Ellicott, 140; cap- 
ture of, 140. 

Brackenridge, H. M. : favors the 
claim to West Florida, 94, 
648. 

Brissot de Warville: predicts 
American success against 
New Orleans, 20; initiates a 
universal revolutionary propa- 
ganda, 24. 

British adherents and agents: 37, 
300, 322, 327, 341, 450, 491, 
507, 557, 609, 627, 636, 666. 

British alliance: suggested by Jef- 
ferson, 71, 228, 229; by Mon- 
roe, 123, 131; feared by Clai- 
borne, 210; by Folch, 224; 
considered by Godoy, 266; 
use of, to Spain, 638^ 

British fleet: to cooperate with 
Blount, 37; sent from Hali- 
fax to the West Indies, 288; 
reported at Pensacola, 521, 
613. 



British minister: protests against 
the occupation of Baton 
Rouge, 523; notes controversy 
over Mobile, 596; offers me- 
diation, 651. 

British titles to land in West 
Florida: confused condition 
of, 367. 

British West Florida: proposal to 
revive, 598. 

Brown, Shepherd, commandant at 
St. Helena: opposes the meet- 
ing of an assembly, 343, 408; 
offers to help De Lassus, 360, 
385, 386; appointed associate 
justice, 380; attempt of 
Crocker to reach, 403; flight 
of, 409-411. 

Buford, Major: 467, 476. 

Burr, Aaron: object of, doubtful, 
188; activities in New Or- 
leans, 189; connection with 
West Florida, 190; reported 
movements of, 194; Wilkin- 
son's warning against, 195; 
reaches Natchez, 197; reasons 
for flight, 203; arrest of, 204; 
effect of conspiracy, 209; ru- 
mors of revival, 288; later 
proposals of, 311; mention of, 
313, 346, 656. 

Cadore, Due de: see Champagny. 

Calhoun, John C. : on Louisiana, 
605. 

California: 382, 664. 

Caller brothers: threaten Span- 
iards, 169. 

Calfer, James: relations with Du- 
pree, 427, 580; with Kennedy, 
445, 583; appeal of Holmes 
to, 446; force under, 451; ar- 
rested by Toulmin, 483; car- 
ries Madison's proclamation, 
508; suspects Matthews, 526; 



INDEX 



673 



occupies Pascagoula, 581; at- 
tack on Creeks, 625. 

Caller, John: closes Mobile, 185; 
associated with Dupree, 423; 
Toulmin appeals to, 476. 

Caller, Robert: adherent of Kemp- 
er, 468. 

Campbell, of Georgia: 219. 

Caracas: 361, 489. 

Carmichael, William, American 
minister at Madrid: instruc- 
tions to, 21, 25; associated 
with Short, 26; quits Spain, 
28. 

Carolina Charter: 27. 

Carondelet, Baron de: fears propa- 
ganda of Genet, 25; attempts 
to revive western separatism, 
25, 46; attitude towards Elli- 
cott's mission, 34, 43; advises 
delay in delivering forts, 36; 
takes measures to suppress 
dissatisfaction at Natchez, 45; 
effect of proclamation of, 49; 
fears the American pioneer, 

66s. 

Carson: adherent of Kemper, 445; 
ordered to prepare militia, 
508; messenger to Folch, 519. 

Carter, C. E. : 12, note. 

Casa Calvo, el Marques de, Span- 
ish boundary commissioner: 
compared with Ellicott, 34; 
appeals to French commis- 
sary, 89; opposes American 
troops on the Mobile, 143; 
character of, 147; position of, 
in regard to the Kempers, 153, 
160; disapproves land sales, 
174; aroused by Jefferson'smes- 
sage, 175; expelled from New 
Orleans, 183, 230, 252; re- 
sents Burr's actions, 189. 

Casa Yrujo, el Marques de: rela- 
tions with Madison and Mer- 
ry, 98; aided by Turreau, 107, 



116; reports attitude of Amer- 
ican government, 112, 129, 
note; rumored connection of, 
with land sales, 174; warns 
against Burr, 191; position in 
negotiation, 242, 256, 267; 
succeeds Pizarro, 652; men- 
tion of, 663. 

Castlereagh: receives Spanish pro- 
test, 624; avoids joint action 
with Spain, 634. 

Castor, sloop: detained, 207. 

Cazeaux: urges occupation of 
Floridas, 567. 

Cevallos, Spanish minister of 
state: rejects proposal to buy 
the Floridas, 79; obduracy of, 
104; negotiates with Monroe 
and Pinckney, 119, 126, 130, 
131. 135, 559; complains of 
American actions, 225. 252; 
detests Americans, 637; char- 
acter of, 646; mention of, 663. 

Chambers, Joseph: at St. Steph- 
ens, 144; protests against du- 
ties, 168. 

Champagny (Due de Cadore) : 
succeeds Talleyrand, 274; ne- 
gotiates with Armstrong, 277- 
280; advised to settle Amer- 
ican claims, 532; instructs 
Serrurier in regard to the 
Floridas, 535; succeeded by 
Bassano, 565; mention of, 

663. 
Chaterpe Line: established with 

the Indians, 13. 
Cherokees: 18. 
Chesapeake outrage: effect of, 210, 

275- 
Chickasaw Bluffs (Memphis): 40. 

Chickasaws: 13, 18. 
Chifonte: 38s. 435, 439- 
Chisholm, John D. : 38. 
Choctaws: English traders among, 
9; Spanish treaties with, 18; 



674 



INDEX 



Ellicott's relations with, 42, 
57; cession by, 113; difficulty 
in restraining, 141; possible 
combination of, with Creeks, 
438; relations with Spaniards, 
447, 450; with British, 492; 
Claiborne's advice to, 613. 

Claiborne, F. L.: plots against 
Mobile, 222; advices to Cal- 
ler, 509; in War of 1812, 
614, 628. 

Claiborne, W. C. C: publication 
of letter books of, x, 146, 
note; favors claim to Per- 
dido, 88, 89; attacked by Wil- 
kinson and Clarke, 143; as- 
sociated with Wilkinson, 145, 
188, 198, 294, 609; attitude 
toward Kempers, 153, 160, 
164; toward Mobile commerce, 
168, 178; reports discontent in 
West Florida, 210; interviews 
Vidal and Folch, 296; urges 
intervention, 330; appoints 
Wykoff agent, 332, 551; fa- 
vors amnesty, 366; intercedes 
for American captives, 484; 
directs American intervention, 
490-505; "palatine methods" 
of, 506; explains action, 508, 
517; warns Sparks, 518; suc- 
ceeds Matthews and McKee, 
528; reports conditions in 
West Florida, 536; relations 
of, with Skipwith, 500, 502, 
572, 574, 577; measures of, 
to organize the Mobile Dis- 
trict, 584, 593, 606; contro- 
versy with Folch over Mobile, 
588-590; proposes the Pearl 
as boundary, 599; measures 
of, for frontier defense, 609, 
614, 626, 627; replies to 
Zuniga, 611; charged with 
complicity, 629; mention of, 
664. 



Clark, Daniel, Jr.: Gayoso's state- 
ment to, about the treaty, 35; 
informs Ellicott concerning 
the Spaniards, 47, 61; views 
of, on the boundaries of 
Louisiana, 88; advises meas- 
ures against the French, 142; 
exposes Wilkinson to Madi- 
son, 142; appeals in behalf of 
the Kempers, 158; reported 
intimacy of, with Burr, 189, 
19s; publicly exposes Wilkin- 
son, 220; "intriguing devo- 
tion " of, to England, 536. 

Clark, Daniel, Sr. : corresponds 
with Wilkinson, 59. 

Clark, George Rogers: prevents 
cooperation of British forces, 
15; resents treatment accord- 
ed him, 23; offers to the 
French, 24; visited by Ful- 
ton, 39. 

Clay, Henry: defends administra- 
tion, 546; regrets Texas, 654. 

Collell, Francisco: commands at 
Mobile, 185; disputes passage, 

587, 591 

Collins, Joseph: against Dupree, 
426, 580; commander of the 
naval force, 435. 

Collot, Victor: reports of, 39; 
Livingston opposes, 72. 

Colorado River: as western bound- 
ary of Louisiana, 134, 273. 

Columbian Sentinel: publishes es- 
says of John Lowe, 539. 

Commerce: threatened reprisals 
against, 132; mutual conces- 
sions concerning, 183; affect- 
ed by British attitude, 537, 
662; see also Mobile River, 
commerce on. 

Commercial claims: associated by 
Livingston, with the Floridas, 
73; Talleyrand's views on, 76, 
249; Cevallos refuses to 



INDEX 



675 



ratify, 106; American use of, 
in negotiation, 120, 532, 558, 
566; Cevallos discusses, 122; 
Americans oifer to relinquish, 
134, 231, 251; serve as pre- 
text, 560. 

Commercial route: Tennessee to 
Mobile, 140. 

Commissioners: to Mobile, 421; to 
New Orleans, 430; financial 
difficulties of, 431. 

Committee of Public Safety at 
Baton Rouge: 382, 421. 

Committee of Safety at Natchez: 

Congress, American: early atti- 
tude of, 14, is; suggested ap- 
peal to, 354, 382, 531; me- 
morial to, 506; authorizes the 
occupation of the Floridas, 
523; discusses the West Flor- 
ida question, 544, 55 1; secret 
action of, 553- 

Convention in West Florida: sug- 
gested by Claiborne, 330; or- 
dered by Esteban, 338; mem- 
bership, organization, and 
powers of, 346, 348, 35 1; de- 
sires harmony with De Las- 
sus, 348; statement of griev- 
ances by, 349; address of, to 
De Lassus, 351; Barrow re- 
ports uncertainty in, 352; 
true purpose of, 360, 384; re- 
assembles, 363; De Lassus 
approves its proceedings, 368, 
370; criticised by Lopez, 369; 
adopts financial measures and 
appoints officials, 378, 380; 
final adjournment of, 380; 
orders attack on Baton 
Rouge, 394; opposition to, 
408; wishes incorporation in- 
to the Union, 415; possible 
division among members of, 
418; governmental and mili- 



tary measures of, 420; in- 
vites participation of Mobile 
and Pensacola, 421; execu- 
tive committee of, 428; agents 
of, at New Orleans, 429; 
debt of, 494, 602; submits to 
the United States, 500. 

Convention of 1802: failure to 
ratify, 106, 257. 

Cooper, William: complaints of, 
349; addresses De Lassus, 
351; refuses joint agreement, 
379; opposes independence, 
386; property of, plundered, 
412. 

Cortes, Spanish: Americans re- 
ferred to, 525; opposes alien- 
ation of territory, 561; Lab- 
rador's report to, 563; con- 
sents to treaty, 656. 

Council: in West Florida as- 
sembly, 340- 

Council of War: considers Baton 
Rouge, 409; determines on 
defense, 611. 

Covington, Colonel: cooperates 
with Claiborne, 493; at Baton 
Rouge, 504; succeeds Cush- 

ing, 521. 

Cox, Zachariah: aided by Gayoso, 
59, 140; plans of, I40> 4445 
mention of, 664. 

Crawford, William, land commis- 
sioner: 640. 

Creek Indians: at Natchez, 17; 
Washington loses patience 
with, 26; oppose boundary 
survey, 62, 141; access of 
English to, 492; possible aid 
from, 612; hostility of, 627- 
629. 

Crocker, Raphael: secretary of 
De Lassus, 333", at confer- 
ences, 370, 393; remonstrates 
with De Lassus, 371, 389; 
complaints of, 391, 392; 



676 



INDEX 



course of, 395-403; punish- 
ment of, 413. 

Crocker, Samuel: 346. 

Crozat, grant to: mention of, 9, 
546. 

Cuba: early connection with the 
Floridas, 6; Turreau advo- 
cates seizure of, 231, 268, 
281, 307; revolutionary party 
in, 288; connected with the 
Floridas, 294, 304, 655; Brit- 
ish influence therein, 488, 
534, 646, 655; attitude of, 
toward annexation, 545; rein- 
forcements from, 612; possi- 
bility of independence, 631. 

Cuban Papers; see Papeles de 
Cuba. 

Cuming, justice of peace: 581. 

Cushing, Colonel Thomas P. : fur- 
nishes troops, 436, 452, 473; 
operations of, near Mobile, 
508, 512, 520; disbands mili- 
tia, 520, 583; court martial 
of, 551. 

Dallas, A. J.: as intermediary, 
532, 550. 

Darrington, Major John: 581. 

" Dashers": 544. 

Dauphine Island: fortification of, 
594; occupied by Americans, 
610; Spanish garrison ousted 
from, 617, 619. 

Dautremont: interviews of, with 
Skipwith, 247, 258. 

Davidson, R. : requests protection, 
405. 

Davenport, John: reports on 
Bayou Manchac, 325; agi- 
tates for assembly, 342. 

Davilmar (Alvina), Napoleonic 
agent: character of, 313; at 
Baton Rouge, 313, 317; ar- 
rested, 314. 



Davis, Colonel Hugh: 406. 

Dayton, Jonathan: on Louisiana 
limits, 93 ; intermediary for 
Burr, 190. 

De Clouet, Louis: relations of, 
with Wilkinson, 194, note; 
Folch indorses plan of, 205. 

De Lassus, Carlos Dehault, com- 
mandant at Baton Rouge: ap- 
points committee to examine 
Bayou Manchac, 325; com- 
plaints concerning, 333? 
warned against the French, 
335; permits convention, 342, 
344; acquiesces in its action, 
347-382; Folch's opinion of, 
358, 361, 377; rejects offer of 
salary, 359; complains of 
resources, 359; address of, to 
junta, 375; defends his course, 
383; charged with complicity, 
385; neglects the fort, 389; 
holds social conferences, 370, 
393; appeals to Folch for aid, 
394; fails to take precautions, 
395-400; apprehended, 401; 
house of, ransacked, 402; cen- 
sured by Spaniards and 
Americans, 413; Claiborne's 
course toward, 508; Skip- 
with's relations with, 574; 
mention of, 621, 658, 666. 

De Lisle: suggests boundary, 10. 

De Luna: settles at Pensacola, 6. 

De Onis, Don Luis, Spanish 
minister to the United States: 
fails to secure recognition, 
309, 561; reports French emis- 
saries, 335; complains of Mo- 
bile Society, 454; doubts 
Smith's assurances, 456; 
learns of the capture of Baton 
Rouge, 532; distrusts the 
American government, 532, 
541, 596, 641; publishes 
"Verus," 548; protests 



INDEX 



677 



against the annexation of 
West Florida, 604, 606; pro- 
tests against the occupation of 
Mobile, 623; demands re- 
linquishment of West Florida, 
64s; part of, in Florida nego- 
tiation, 648-652; character of, 

653. 

Dearborn, Henry: 2^2. 

Definition: period of, in West 
Florida, 10. 

Delimitation: period of, in West 
Florida, 2, 10. 

Deposit, right of, at New Orleans: 
28, 75, 124, 175. 

Deserters: Americans request re- 
turn of, 222, 437; patrol to 
apprehend, 406; pardon for, 
416; in Mobile district, 442; 
immunity for, 498, 502, 572. 

Dinsmoor, Silas: agent to Choc- 
taws, 144; part in arrest of 
Kemper, 483, note. 

Dog River: rendezvous at, 435; 
site for garrison, 584; tem- 
porary limit, 593. 

Dos de Mayo: political effects of, 
280, 283. 

Du Passau, George: 158, 398. 

Du Pratz: summarizes territorial 
claims, 10. 

Doyen: 247. 

Duane, William: 573. 

Dunbar, William: 55. 

Duncan, Abner L. : assists Folch, 
220; relations with Davidson, 
405; with convention, 429, 

431, 465- 
Duplantier, Armando: 158. 
Dupont de Nemours: T2, 304. 
Dupree, Sterling: course of, at 

Pascagoula, 423-427, 580; 

Kemper's instructions to, 424; 

opposed as office-holder, 639. 
Duvall, Richard: 346. 



East Florida: boundary of, 11; 
proclamation by governor of, 
24; proposal to incorporate 
with West Florida, 353; Brit- 
ish influence in, 492, 534, 560; 
work of Matthews in, 528; 
discussed in Congress, 544, 
554; protests against occupa- 
tion, 550, 554, 556; as com- 
pensation for commercial 
claims, 568; bill to occupy 
modified, 614; Adams makes 
offer for, 651. 

Ellicott, Andrew, boundary com- 
missioner: instructions to, 33; 
relations with Gayoso, 40-44; 
opposes Power, 47; conflict- 
ing testimony of, regarding 
Wilkinson, 47, note; meas- 
ures of, at Natchez, 50-52; 
on the boundary survey, 54; 
predicts annexation, 61; op- 
poses claim to West Florida, 
540; mention of, 664. 

Ellis, John: 312. 

Embargo: effect of, 217-220; 
Folch seeks to modify, 218, 
220; continuance of, 288, 291; 
established at Mobile, 607. 

England: enlarges her sphere of 
influence, 10; more vigorous 
policy toward, 235; warned 
by Merry, 245; attitude of, 
Turreau reports, 280-282; 
possible mission to, 364; meas- 
ures to circumvent, 537; joint 
guarantee of, 564; influences 
Spain, 645; Jefferson's atti- 
tude toward, 666. 

Erving, George W., American 
representative at Madrid: dis- 
cusses Spanish complaints, 
225; charges of, against Arm- 
strong and French agents, 
238-240; favors vigorous pol- 
icy, 240; relations of, with 



678 



INDEX 



Vandeul, 261; threatens to 
leave Spain, 268; possible mis- 
sion of, to Havana, 488; de- 
tained in Paris, 636; negoti- 
ates at Madrid, 646-648. 

Escorial: treaty of, 3, 64; migra- 
tion of court to, 30. 

Espiritu Santo: controversy over, 
6. 

Estevan, Thomas: proceeds against 
the Kempers, 153; opposes as- 
sembly, 322; administration 
of. 333-33^ > requests rein- 
forcements, 371; reports dan- 
ger at Bayou Sara, 374; with- 
draws guard, 391-396; re- 
tires, 405. 

Eubanks, William: 423. 

Europe: influence of, 285, 297; 
intervention of, 530; diplo- 
macy of, 663. 

Eustis, William, secretary of war: 
449- 

Evening Post, New York: 492. 

Everett, Alexander H. : 651. 

Extradition: 223. 

Farragut, George: 580, 592. 

Fauchet, French minister: 25, 38. 

Federalists: attack Madison, 538: 
publish letter to Wykoff, 551. 

Feliciana District: settlement of 
Americans in, 59; mention of, 
157; meeting of people in, 
340; people of, favor an ap- 
peal to United States, 341; 
disturbances in, 374; mention 
of, 380. 

Ferdinand VII: proceedings in 
name of, 324, 343, 346, 351, 
392; party of, 352; interests 
of, mentioned, 358; rights of, 
369; toasts to, 370; loyalty to, 
37^-37^, 414; refusal to rec- 
ognize, 453; contempt for, 



531; return of from exile, 
637- 

Fernan Nufiez, Spanish minister 
at London and Paris: pre- 
sents demands of the Re- 
gency, 624; proposes common 
action to the British, 634; 
requests opinion of the 
French government, 647. 

Filibusters: warning of Holmes 
to, 451; desperate character 
of, 494; operations of, in 
Floridas, 632; Jeflferson's atti- 
tude toward, 660. 

Fiscal at Havana: report of, 413. 

Florida parishes: claim of, 658- 
660. 

Florida peninsula: extent and de- 
fense of, 9; exchanged for 
Cuba, 10. 

Floridas: possible cession of, 21; 
population of, 21; mention of, 
25. 27, 35; invasion of, 29; 
attitude of Americans toward, 
32; Blount's plan to invade, 
37; Americans plan to seize, 
45; rumor that French pos- 
sess, 64; constitutionality of 
incorporating, 68; Spain un- 
willing to alienate, 69; French 
attempt to acquire, 69; desire 
to force cession of, 102; 
French desire to profit from, 
129; Folch proposes a cap- 
taincy-general in, 214; Tur- 
reau advocates seizure of, 231, 
254; stipulated price for, 232, 
251; Jefferson's attitude to- 
ward, 255, 284, 661, 663; 
Armstrong and Bowdoin ad- 
vise seizure of, 267, 278; ne- 
gotiation at Paris for, 277- 
280, 290; specious attitude of 
Napoleon toward, 278, 283; 
Robin's position toward, 282; 
American troops threaten, 



INDEX 



679 



284; opposition to English in, 
292, 533; destined to the 
United States, 296; American 
intrigues in, 306, 308; as re- 
ward for subserviency to Na- 
poleon, 309; Burr's purpose 
to seize, 311; threatened by 
the Mobile Society, 456; pos- 
sible transfer of, 471, 475, 
524, 527, 531; British protest 
concerning, 543; course of 
American government toward, 
563, 56s, 596, 614, 633; com- 
pensation to France for, 566; 
British views concerning, 567, 
609, 622; ceded to Spain by 
Great Britain, 654; ceded by 
Spain to United States, 653, 
654. 656. 

Flournoy, General Thomas J.: 
succeeds Wilkinson, 626; con- 
troversy with Spaniards, 627. 

Folch, Vizente : " crooked talks " 
of, 62; views of, on limits of 
Louisiana, 68; on Wilkinson's 
proposals, 92; official title of, 
149, note; character of, 150; 
operations of, against the 
Kempers, 161; in New Or- 
leans, 162; criticises Ameri- 
cans, 173; unwilling to re- 
ceive Morales, 183; deter- 
mines to visit Baton Rouge, 
19s; refuses to meet Wilkin- 
son and Claiborne, 207; plans 
to oppose British and Amer- 
ican influences, 211-213; dis- 
cusses claims with Claiborne, 
215; censures Grand Pre, 223; 
opinion of Wilkinson, 287- 
289; third journey to Baton 
Rouge, 294; interviews Clai- 
borne, 296; proposals of Wil- 
kinson to, 299; purpose of, 
regarding West Florida, 302; 
criticises De Lassus, 345, 362, 



385, 401; aroused by reports 
from Baton Rouge, 361, 367; 
invited to St. Helena, 387, 
408; appeal of Toulmin to, 
420; suggests abandonment of 
province, 422; plot to assas- 
sinate, 437; visits Havana, 
440; advises appeal to Amer- 
ican government, 448; re- 
quested not to interfere with 
Indians, 450; asks Americans 
to break up Kemper's project, 
462; comes to Mobile, 469; 
advises the transfer of Flor- 
ida to the United States, 471, 
480; authorizes American 
troops to enter West Florida, 
474; attacks Kemper's forces, 
482; reinforced, 494; reverses 
position in regard to delivery 
of West Florida, 508-519; re- 
lations with Matthews and 
McKee, 522-528; discussion of 
his offer, 553-556; attitude of, 
toward the American govern- 
ment, 585; final discussion 
with Claiborne, 589; charac- 
ter of, 592; mention of, 621, 
665. 

Foronda, Spanish charge: com- 
plains of blockade, 219; sup- 
ports Folch, 224; complains of 
Wilkinson, 291; attacks Flor- 
ida assembly, 324; denies 
right to navigate the Mobile, 
438. 

Fort Adams: Kempers at, 166; 
measures of Claiborne at, 494; 
court-martial at, 521. 

Fort at Baton Rouge: attempt of 
Kempers against, 156; neg- 
lected by De Lassus, 389, 392; 
capture of, 398-400; occupied 
by Americans, 505. 



68o 



INDEX 



Fort Charlotte (Mobile) : mention 
of, is; occupied by Ameri- 
cans, 619. 

Fort Mimms: massacre at, 629. 

Fort Stoddert: threatened by Mo- 
bile Society, 442, 444; rein- 
forcement of, 450, 597; men- 
tion of, 466, 614. 

Fortier and Son: 205. 

Forts on the Mississippi, Spanish: 
attitude of Kentucky toward, 

35- 

Foster, Augustus J., British min- 
ister to United States: in- 
structions to, 554; cooperates 
with Bernaben, 555; discus- 
sion of, with Monroe, 555- 
559; complains of Matthews, 
561; protests against occupa- 
tion of Baton Rouge, 605. 

France: possible intervention of, 
3; desires to regain Louisi- 
ana, 20; Jefferson tries to 
gain influence of, 25; at war 
with Spain, 28; Monroe 
wishes assistance of, 123; du- 
bious position of, 233, 261; 
measures to gain approval of, 
565; attitude of, toward Flor- 
idas, 651. 

Franklin: willing for Great Brit- 
ain to seize the Floridas, 16, 
note. 

Freeman, Thomas: service on 
boundary commission, 33. 

Freeman's Journal: 492. 

French agents: to Spanish colo- 
nies, 288. 

French commercial interests: 567. 

French Directory: attitude toward 
Pinckney, 29. 

French element in Louisiana: 9, 

S7S- 
French emissaries: plan revolt in 

Florida, 33S, 384. 
French force: for Mexico, 531. 



French government: financial ex- 
pectations of, 113, 118, 136; 
unpopular in West Florida, 
382. 

French intrigues: measures to op- 
pose in the West, 65, 142; 
against Spain, 276; warning 
against, 356; menace of, in 
the Floridas, 377. 

French refugees, from Cuba: pre- 
cautions against, 310; ex- 
pelled from Baton Rouge, 
335; danger from, 374, 384; 
loyalty of, defended, 429. 

"Friend of the People": broad- 
side of, 371. 

Frontier disputes: intensified by 
the purchase of Louisiana, 

139- 

Frontier: officials, 139, 464; prob- 
lems, 146. 

Frontiersmen: influence of, 663. 

Fulton, Samuel; visits Clark, 39; 
agent to the Creeks, 65; part 
in suppressing the Kemper 
uprising, 158; entrusted with 
the mails in West Florida, 
171; in controversy over de- 
serter, 222; on committtee at 
Bayou Manchac, 325; offers 
services to Madison, 328; as- 
sembly at house of, 342; 
made lieutenant-colonel, 380. 

Gaines, E. P. : in command at 
Fort Stoddert, 185; at Mo- 
bile, 196; releases Spanish 
vessel, 224; interview with 
Folch, 474; near Mobile, 512. 

Gaines, George T. : Indian factor, 

293- 
Gallatin, Albert: dissents from 

views of cabinet, 101; ex- 
plains amendment to Mobile 
Act, 219; wishes to modify 
demands on Spain, 228; inter- 



INDEX 



68i 



views Turreau, 307; sugges- 
tions from, 331; disapproves 
the occupation of Mobile, 621. 

Galvez, Bernardo de: friendliness 
to Americans, 14; reduces 
British establishments, 15; 
reference to, 465. 

Gardoqui, Diego de, Spanish rep- 
resentative: demands aban- 
donment of the Mississippi, 
is; ill success of, 19; asso- 
ciated with Morgan, 22; atti- 
tude of, toward American en- 
voys, 28; reference to, 552. 

Gayoso de Lemos, Manuel: delays 
the delivery of the Natchez 
district, 3S-37> 4°, 43 J retalia- 
tory measures of, 42; procla- 
mation of, 43; attempts to 
secure American neutrality, 
44; precipitates insurrection, 
50; delays the survey, 54; 
voices his distrust of Ameri- 
cans, 56-58; permits Wilkin- 
son on Bayou St. Jean, 143. 

Genet, French minister to United 
States: 24, 25. 

Georgia: founding of, 9; mention 
of, 12; Creek war in, 17; land 
agents of, 18; migration from, 
439, 460. 

German coast: slave insurrection 
in, 575- 

Giles, W. B.: 544, 583. 

Girondists: 24. 

Godoy, Manuel, Duke of Alcudia, 
the Prince of the Peace: not 
inclined to treat with the 
Americans, 28; negotiates 
with Pinckney, 30; gains 
title, 31; measures of, against 
treaty, 31, 33, 54; unmoved 
by Pinckney, 104; negotia- 
tions with Monroe, 119, 135; 
land claims of, 241, 269; 
" Prefect " of France, 243 ; 



unwilling to negotiate, 252; 
attempts to break with Na- 
poleon, 266; mention of, 663. 

Graham, John: relations with 
Charles Pinckney, 70, 104; 
secretary of Orleans Terri- 
tory, 172; mission to Folch, 
''-73' 179; interviews Morales, 
186; in the State Department, 
417; corresponds with Skip- 
with, 573, 578. 

Grand Pre, Carlos de: refusal to 
receive at Natchez, 52; in 
command at Baton Rouge, 
150; advises caution with the 
Americans, 152; appeals for 
aid against the Kempers, 154; 
distrusted by Folch, 161, 201, 
312; controversy of, with 
Williams, 166; measures of, 
to defend Baton Rouge, 191; 
disregards Wilkinson's warn- 
ings, 197; protests against 
violation of territory, 223; im- 
plicated with Davilmar, 314; 
death of, 325; mention of, 
334, 392, 602, 621. 

Grand Pre, Louis de: mention of, 
370, 375, 392; dies defending 
Baton Rouge, 396-399. 

Gravina, Admiral: 107. 

Great Britain: possible interven- 
tion of, 3; object of, in dis- 
pute over Natchez, 17; in- 
trigues of, in West, 20; trea- 
ties with, 26, 27, 30; allied 
with Spain, 28; Gayoso fears, 
57; unwilling to aid the 
United States, 64; attitude 
toward the French, 73; 
Americans fear designs of, 
96, 121; neutral position of, 
231; commercial interests of, 
involved, 251, 261; Napoleon 
demands American aid 

against, 278; warnings against 



682 



INDEX 



influence of, 285, 294; atti- 
tude of, towards West Flor- 
ida, 282, 329, 417; policy of, 
in Spanish colonies, 555; pos- 
sible interference of, in East 
Florida, 560; second war with, 
560, 60s, 609; proposal to 
cede part of Floridas to, 649; 
see also England and British. 

Green, Thomas: attempts to or- 
ganize Natchez, 18, 42. 

Guarantee, of Spanish colonies: 
25, 67, ^7, 652. 

Guion, Captain Isaac: at Natchez, 
52. 

Gutierrez expedition: 629. 

Hamilton, Alexander: position of, 
in the Nootka Sound contro- 
versy, 20; plans to invade 
Spanish colonies, 66. 

Hamilton, Paul: secretary of the 
navy, 488. 

Hampton, General Wade: 409, 
450, 576. 

Hargreave: agent of Kemper, 424; 
captivity of, 484. 

Harris, George: 323, 342, 349. 

Harris, William: 318. 

Hawes, Edward: 421. 

Hawkesbury, Lord: attitude to- 
ward the Floridas, 71. 

Hawkins, Benjamin: 444. 

Henry, Patrick: 14. 

Hevia, Francisco de: commandant 
at Ticfau, 374, 385; land 
claims of, 640. 

Hickey, Philip: protest of, 222; 
member of committee on 
Bayou Manchac, 325; sent to 
advise Estevan, 336, 342, 385;, 
doubtful attitude of, 337; re- 
ports plot to attack Baton 
Rouge, 341; activities of, in 
convention, 349-351; influ- 
ence of, over De Lassus, 367; 



member of special committee, 
382, 428. 

Holmes, David, governor of Mis- 
sissippi Territory: describes 
conditions in West Florida, 
339; instructed by Smith and 
Madison, 332, 355; views of, 
concerning the West Florida 
assembly, 341, 361-367; pre- 
dicts rupture with De Lassus, 
381; adopts precautions, 405; 
supports appeal to United 
States, 416; proclamation of, 
disregarded, 427; attitude to- 
ward Indian peril, 444, 612; 
works against the Mobile So- 
ciety, 446-451; mention of, 
470, 478, 536, 664; chagrin of, 
at Kemper episode, 485; part 
taken in intervention at 
Baton Rouge, 493-505; rela- 
tions with Skipwith, 499; or- 
ganizes territory beyond the 
Pearl, 606; protests to 
Zufiiga, 608; measures of, for 
defending frontier, 611-614; 
measures to organize Mobile, 
619. 

Hooke, Captain Moses: commis- 
sioned to seize Burr, 202. 

Horry, Pinckney: writes memoir 
on the Floridas, 254, 

Horsey, senator from Delaware: 

545. 

Horton, James: 421, 438. 

Howard, Carlos: opinion of, re- 
garding American officials, 
169; commandant at Pensa- 
cola, 185. 

Hughes, Daniel: interviews Folch, 
198. 

Humbert, General: plans to at- 
tack Pensacola, 632. 

Humboldt: reputed agent of Na- 
poleon, 310. 



INDEX 



683 



Humphreys, David: vouches for 
Americans, 53. 

Hundred thousand dollar bribe: 
offered by Spaniards, 46. 

Hutchins, Anthony: leader of 
Tories at Natchez, 14; identi- 
fied with Blount, 43; opposes 
committee of safety, 52; ex- 
cluded from West Florida, 

59- 
Hyde de Neuville, French minis- 
ter to United States: 653, 
655. 663. 

Iberville, LeMoyne d': settle- 
ment of, 7; plans to check 
English advance, 10, 533. 

Iberville River; 11, 74, 97, 325. 

Immigration: Gayoso's opinion of, 

58. 

Independence of West Florida: 
proclaimed by Kempers, 155; 
premature report of, 347; 
possible declaration of, 360; 
formally declared, 413. 

Indians: policy toward, 17; ob- 
ject to Americans, 35, 37; 
Gayoso threatens to employ, 
51; Wilkinson's treaties with, 
141; French agents among, 
142; rumors that Spaniards 
were tampering with, 173, 
210, 389, 411, 444, 521, 612, 
632; danger of combining 
with Americans, 439; fron- 
tiersmen resent privileges 
given, 443; recognized as 
barriers, 539; Folch unwilling 
to use, 586; effect of Jack- 
son's treaty with, 636; see 
also separate tribes. 

Innerarity, James: represents 
Forbes and Co., 180; opinion 
of Kennedy, 448; attitude re- 
garding annexation, 459, 473; 
grateful to Toulmin, 468; 



urges acceptance of Folch's 
offer, 472; attitude toward 
American occupation, 582- 

584. 

Innerarity, John: views of, on an- 
nexation, 473. 

Insurgents: at Baton Rouge, 158; 
vessels of, 586. 

Insurrection: caiises of, at Baton 
Rouge, 152. 

Intervention: in Spanish colo- 
nies, 109; by Napoleon, 260; 
in West Florida, 572-575. 

Isaacs, Ralph: interview with 
Folch, 525. 

Izquierdo: agent of Godoy, 247; 
diplomatic relations of, with 
Americans, 256-270. 

Jackson, Andrew: reference to, 
136; views of, regarding the 
Floridas, 614; at New Or- 
leans, 635; effect of his in- 
vasion of Florida, 652; uses 
arms purchased for Kemper, 

659. 

Jackson, T. J., British minister: 
instructions of, 289; views re- 
garding New Orleans, 309; 
blustering course of, 554. 

Jay, John: failure of, at Madrid, 
15; willing for Great Britain 
to seize the Floridas, 16, 
note; ill-success of, with 
Gardoqui, 19, 28; treaty of, 
with Great Britain, 29, 31; 
example of, 263. 

Jefferson, Thomas: Pan American 
view of, 5; in Nootka Sound 
episode, 20; proposes to guar- 
antee Spanish colonies, 21; 
attitude toward migration in- 
to Spanish territory, 24; in- 
structions of, to Carmichael 
and Short, 26; attitude of, on 
French in Louisiana, 71; pre- 



684 



INDEX 



pares pamphlet on limits, 87; 
attitude regarding navigation 
of the Mobile, 118, 182; criti- 
cised by Clark and Wilkinson, 
142; attitude of, toward peo- 
ple of Baton Rouge, 151; uses 
Kemper and Flannigan inci- 
dents, 167; measures of, for 
border defense, 181; answers 
complaints of Foronda, 225; 
indecision of, towards Spain, 
227-233; attitude of, toward 
the Spanish uprising, 284; 
note of, to Someruelos, 291; 
desires to profit from Na- 
poleon's intervention, 304; re- 
sponsibility for situation in 
West Florida, 312, 331, 537, 
563; congratulates Adams on 
defense of American claim, 
650; twin objects of his 
diplomacy, 655; violates his 
own principles, 660. 

Jesup, T. J. : proposes attack on 
Cuba, 646. 

Jobbery, financial: in negotiation 
at Paris, 133, 239. 

Jones, "Captain": with Kemper, 
469. 

Jones, Michael: Tory partisan, 
158; opposes convention, 387, 
408; joins insurgents, 412. 

Jones, Walter: 540. 

Johnson, Isaac: 380. 

Johnson, John, Sr. : 465. 

Johnston, John H. : part taken in 
summoning convention, 338; 
visited by Baker, 365; part 
taken in capture of Baton 
Rouge, 324, 393, 397, 403; 
member of committee of 
safety, 421; of executive com- 
mittee, 428; senator in as- 
sembly, 432; messenger for 
Skipwith, 500. 



Junta de Guerra : Z7Z-Z77y 587, 
592. 

Keene, R. R. : warns against Burr, 
195; memoir attributed to, 

564. 

Kemper brothers: agents of John 
Smith, 152; insurrectionary 
attempt of, 154; seized at 
Pinckneyville, 165-168; fur- 
ther projects of, 324; feuds 
of, 438. 

Kemper, Nathan: mention of, 152, 
15s, 158, 165. 

Kemper, Reuben: mention of, 152, 
153, 160, 163, 165, 313; com- 
missioner of the convention to 
Mobile, 421, 435-465; rela- 
tions with Pascagoula, 422; 
American attitude toward, 
449. 457; operations of, on 
the Mobile, 457-480, 494, 583, 
588, 659; arrest of, 482; ef- 
forts in behalf of Hargreave, 
485, 522; relations with Toul- 
min, 486, 516; reassembles fol- 
lowers, 511; opposed by Skip- 
with, 574; represents the 
West Florida convention, 600; 
mention of, 664. 

Kennedy, Joseph Pulaski: oppo- 
nent of the Spaniards, 180; 
threatens Mobile, 216, 222, 
445-447, 526; commissioned 
by Kemper, 423, 460; charac- 
ter of, 463, 476; arrest of, 
483; reference to, 485, 494, 
583, 664. 

Kennedy, William: physician at 
Mobile, 180. 

Kentuckians: references to, 58, 

193, 459- 
Kentucky: mention of, 21, 34, 
124: rumors of insurrection 
in, 200; Spanish intrigues in, 
58, 454- 



INDEX 



685 



King, Rufus: 94. 
King, messenger of Claiborne: ar- 
rested, 502. 
Koskiusko: offers services, 137. 

Labrador, Pedro: report of, to 
Cortes, 562. 

Land bounties: dissatisfaction 
over, 506. 

Land claims: of Hutchins, 52; 
waived by the United States, 
416; American policy regard- 
ing, 498, 553, 643; Toulmin's, 
640; character of, 602, 641. 

Land grants: uncertainty of, 584; 
confirmation of desired, 597. 

Land sales: by Morales, 174; 
Armstrong's connection with, 
269; difficulties connected 
with, 494; recognition of, 572. 

Land tax: levied by convention, 
420. 

Land titles: stipulations regard- 
ing, 366; confusion among, 
603, 639; final settlement of, 
641-644; status of British, 

643- 

Land values: 337. 

Lansdowne: proposes to ex- 
change Gibraltar for Floridas, 
j6, note. 

Las Casas, Eulogio de: magazine 
guard, 369; refuses to attend 
meetings, 310; yields keys of 
magazine, 403 ; diary of, 404. 

Laussat, French commissioner: 
views of, on limits of Louisi- 
ana, 89, 95. 

Lennan, Francisco, curate at 
Bayou Sara: mention of, 335, 
341; accompanies Estevan, 
393; later movements of, 404. 

Leonard, Gilbert: civil comman- 
dant, 380; present at junta, 
375. 393; later career of, 404. 



Leonard, John W. : adherent of 
De Lassus, 346; loyalty of, 
suspected, 369; member com- 
mittee of safety, 421; presid- 
ing officer of senate, 432. 

Lewis, E. : attacks Toulmin, 478, 
640; complains of Dupree, 

639. 

Lilley, Thomas: presides over as- 
sembly, 318; corresponds with 
Grand Pre, 322; signs peti- 
tion, 342; work in conven- 
tion, 349, 358, 382; at Baton 
Rouge, 398. 

Liston, British minister: 38. 

Livingston, Robert R.: attitude 
of, concerning French pos- 
session of the Floridas, 72; 
charged with corrupt dealings, 
73, note, 228, 246, 263; re- 
verses position on West Flor- 
ida, 77, 83, 661; doubts suc- 
cess of negotiation, 105; un- 
willing to work with Monroe, 
113. 

Loan: requested by the West 
Florida convention, 416, 496. 

Louisiana, province of (or Louisi- 
ana Purchase) : reference to 
purchase of, 21, 34, 110; atti- 
tude of western settlers to- 
ward, 25, 37; transfer of, to 
France, 31, 38, 64-66, 71; ces- 
sion of, to United States, 76, 
80, 124, 14s, 250, 439. 499. 
546; proposal to exchange for 
Floridas, 77, 81, 91. 123, 131, 
146, 212, 234, 527. 639. 648; 
limits of, 81, 93, 95, 97. 231, 
235, 257, 270, 577; militia of, 
to invade Mexico, 193; Folch 
proposes to invade, 224; rela- 
tion of West Florida to, 489; 
shifting of diplomatic interest 
in, 274, 564; American title 
to, fraudulent, 563; monar- 



45 



686 



INDEX 



chical government for, 564; 
plan for separation and con- 
quest of, 633. 

Louisiana Regiment: 396, 398, 615. 

Louisiana, State of: enabling act 
for, 547, 548, 604; Florida as 
counterpoise to French in, 
567, 601; relation of West 
Florida to, 598, 658; exten- 
sion of, to the Pearl, 598, 
604, 605; criticism by legisla- 
ture of, 643. 

Lopez, Manuel: member of the 
West Florida convention, 346, 
350, 382; protests against its 
work, 369. 

Lowe, John: attacks policy of ex- 
ecutive, 539. 

Lyonnet, Pierre: 24. 

McBay, James: arrested by the 

Spaniards, 608. 
McCall, Richard: 636. 
McCurtin's Bluff (" Bunker 

Hill ") : 469, 474» 477- 
MacDermott, Bryan: 380. 
McDonough, John: 431. 
McGillivray, Alexander: treaty 

with Spaniards, 17; mention 

of, 26; opposed by Milfort, 

39. 

McHenry, James: 540. 

McKee, Colonel John: opposes 
Kemper, 463; furthers Folch's 
offer, 480, 522-526, 550; re- 
ports hostilities of the 
Creeks, 627. 

Madison, James: explains Mobile 
Act, 98; urges claims against 
Spain, no; ■ favors abandon- 
ment of clailn to West Flor- 
ida, 118; instructs Monroe, 
138; discusses commerce on 
the Mobile, 178; attitude of, 
regarding Monroe's failure, 
228; instructs Armstrong and 



Bowdoin, 243-245, 257; pro- 
tests against subserviency to 
Napoleon, 271; moderates his 
views on the Floridas, 305 ; 
reverses Jefferson's policy, 
308; intervention of, 328-332, 
487. 555; communications 
from Bedford to, 339, 353; 
fails to mention communi- 
cations from Holmes, 416; 
views of, on Mobile expedi- 
tion, 449, 467; transmits 
Folch's offer to Congress, 
523; mention of, 563; op- 
posed to Napoleon's pecuniary 
views, 567; fails to settle 
Florida question, 647. 

Malte Brun: 649. 

Manrique, governor of West Flor- 
ida: arrests McBay, 608; suc- 
ceeds Zuiiiga, 621; measures 
of, against the Americans, 
624; corresponds with Flour- 
noy, 628-630. 

Marshall, Humphrey: 56. 

Marshall, John: 656. 

Martinez, Andres: 399, 410. 

Mary, schooner: dispute over, 180. 

Mason: intermediary for Skipwith, 
417, 536, 578. 

Masot, Spanish commandant: 640. 

Masserano, Spanish ambassador: 
245, 252. 

Mather, George: advises Estevan, 
335; signs petition for as- 
sembly, 342; strives to influ- 
ence De Lassus, 367; made 
judge in Baton Rouge, 506. 

Mather, George, Jr. : 380. 

Matthews, General George: Yazoo 
agent, 53; border mission of, 
458, 463, 481, 488, 565; as- 
sociated with McKee, 522- 
526, 550; interviews Folch, 
527; superseded, 561, 631; 
mention of, 664' 



INDEX 



687 



Mead, Cowles: warns against the 
Spaniards, 201; distrusts Wil- 
kinson, 202. 

Mears, John: 156. 

Medical society of West Florida: 
380. 

Mendoza, Mexican viceroy: 6. 

Merry, Anthony, British minister: 
reports attitude of American 
government on Floridas, 96, 
112; position regarding Mo- 
bile Act, 98; attention to, 
228, 231. 

Metzinger, Lieutenant Juan: opin- 
ion regarding West Florida, 
334; course of, in regard to 
social gatherings, 370; in 
charge of ordnance, 391 ; 
presence in fort, 392, 396; 
wounded, 399; later career of, 
404; sentence against, 413. 

Mexican Association: plan of, 189; 
warning against, 195; re- 
newed activity of, 224. 

Mexico: mention of, 6; oflfer to 
guarantee, 8; possible inva- 
sion of, 107, 188, 191, 193, 
311, 633; Jefferson threatens, 
271; possible attitude of, 
294; subsidy from, 410, 518, 
596; French and American 
agents in, 563, 567, 631. 

Milfort: French agent among 
Creeks, 39, 65. 

Militia: character of, 186; rally 
of, 192; convention proposes 
to arm, 363; superseded by 
regulars, 420; officers of, 
from Tombigbee, enter serv- 
ice of West Florida, 467; 
operations of, around Mobile, 
S09-516, 613. 

Mills, John: member of com- 
mittee. West Florida conven- 
tion, 360, 428; commissioner 
in New Orleans, 431, 435. 



Mills, Major John: 465. 

Minor, Stephen: 51, 54. 

Miranda, Francisco de: urges the 
occupation of New Orleans, 
20; project of, 250; effect of 
expedition of, 269. 

Miro, Estevan: invites American 
settlers, 22; fears the pioneer, 
665. 

Mississippi River: relation to 
Espiritu Santo, 6; mention of, 
II, 36; proposal to forego 
navigation of, 19; American 
claim to navigation of, 2T, 32, 
41; Spanish commerce on, 
170, 179, 187, 589, 610; 
French commerce on, 532. 

Mississippi, Territory and State of: 
mentioned, 6, 139, 143, 160, 
164, 165, 176, 201, 202, 329, 
42 1 ; controversy with Louisi- 
ana over West Florida, 547, 
576, 588; receives territory to 
Perdido, 605; admitted as 
State, 641. 

Mobile Act: passage of, 89; pro- 
visions of, 97; Casa Yrujo 
protests against, 98; inter- 
preted by Jefferson, 99, 112; 
counterpoise to claims, 106; 
explained by Livingston, 108; 
Cevallos objects to, 122; 
amended, 210; reference to, 
219. 

Mobile Bay and River: mention 
of, 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 75 ; on 
growing importance of, 66; 
request for commercial privi- 
lege on, 70; Wilkinson's ef- 
forts in behalf of settlers, 
143; duties levied on, 162, 
168, 170, 177, 182, 216; regu- 
lation of, by Morales, 183; 
concessions affecting, 179, 
187, 191, 216, 487, 591; con- 
troversy between Morales and 



688 



INDEX 



Folch over, 183-187; condi- 
tions of, affecting transfer of 
troops on, 196, 206, 584; 
Burr's adherents near, 203; 
Madison predicts trouble over, 
271; Turreau's views con- 
cerning, 282; Macon's resolu- 
tion concerning, 438; duties 
levied on, 443, 472, 474; 
threat to obtain commercial 
privileges on by force, 585, 
587. 

"Mobile Society": Americans 
manifest hostility toward Mo- 
bile, 192, 220, 410, 419, 422, 
428, 437; American govern- 
ment charged with complicity 
therein, 453, 481, 531. 

Mobile, Town of: ceded to Eng- 
land, 11; postal facilities at, 
122; disturbances near, 164; 
attitude of West Florida con- 
vention toward, 421, 435, 
457. 470; senators from, 432; 
popular attitude toward an- 
nexation, 458, 473; Kemper's 
operations in vicinity of, 457- 
486; American preparations 
to occupy, 494; danger threat- 
ening, 514; Morier advises 
British occupation of, 533; 
Folch retains, 551; surrender 
of, urged, 554; prospective 
officials of, 583; possible 
blockade of, 586; dispute over 
claim to, 594; proposed an- 
nexation of, to Mississippi, 
599; confusion in jurisdiction 
at, 607; occupation and or- 
ganization of, 607-611, 615- 
625; projects to recover, 632; 
land titles in, 643. 

Moll's Map: 651. 

Monroe, James: mentioned, 29; 
memoir of, on West Florida, 
84; special mission of, to 



Spain, 102-138; difficulties 
confronting, 113, 128; com- 
plaints of, 130; indecision of, 
^33> 138; submits final pro- 
posals to Cev alios, 134; ad- 
vises seizure of area claimed, 
136; accepts Armstrong's ad- 
vice, 137; effect of failure of 
his mission, 173, 227; posi- 
tion of, during the Paris ne- 
gotiation, 237, 247; replaces 
Smith, 551; negotiates with 
Bernaben and Foster, 552, 
555, 558, S6i, 605; instructs 
Barlow, 568; corresponds with 
Skipwith, 573, 577, 600; views 
of, on occupation of Mobile, 
622; lectures Robinson, 631; 
instructs Jackson, 636; de- 
fends claim to Perdido, 645; 
fruitless negotiation of, 650; 
ready to censure Jackson, 
652; mention of, 663, 

Montcalm: suggests limit, 10. 

Morales, Juan Ventura: suspends 
deposit at New Orleans, 75; 
restricts Mobile commerce, 
145; character of, 146; land 
sales of, 162, 602, 642; opposes 
Americans on the Gulf, 175; 
commercial controversy of, 
with Folch, 178-186; forced 
from New Orleans, 182, 252; 
appeals for funds, 199; advo- 
cates the cession of West 
Florida, 211; criticises De 
Lassus, 362, 385; plot to as- 
sassinate, 437; criticises 
American government, 509, 
519, 612; fears the pioneer, 
665. 

Moreau: presence in New Or- 
leans, 211; attitude of Ameri- 
can government toward, 231; 
confers with Davilmar, 313. 



INDEX 



689 



Morejon, Francisco: mention of, 
370, 375, 392; at attack on 
Baton Rouge, 396, 401; sub- 
sequent career of, 404. 

Morgan, Colonel George: 22. 

Morgan, Edward: 465. 

Morgan, John: 351, 428. 

Morier, J. P., British charge: 
charges Americans with fa- 
voring insurgents, 532; cham- 
pions Spanish cause, 536; aids 
De Onis, S4i, 544". criticises 
American government, 549, 

554- 

Morphy, Diego, Spanish vice-con- 
sul: reports presence of 
French emissaries, 335, 337; 
describes conditions at New 
Orleans, 587; warns against 
Wilkinson, 596; criticises sur- 
render of Mobile, 620. 

Morris, Anthony: 6z6. 

Murdock, John: secretary of as- 
sembly, 318; letter of Este- 
van to, 323; discovers broad- 
side, 371; warns De Lassus, 

395- 
Muscle Shoals: 171, 196, 45o. 

Napoleon Bonaparte: commer- 
cial system of, 5; declines 
to aid Monroe, 81; wishes 
subsidy from the United 
States, 102; favors Spain in 
the claim to West Florida, 
109, 112, 116, 127; influence 
of, on Paris negotiation, 
242, 254, 274; attitude of, 
toward Spanish colonies, 288- 
296, 304, 335, 525; rejects 
Burr's proposals, 3"", ^t*^' 
tude toward the Floridas, 
417, 545; reference to, 441, 
461, 650; influence of, on 
American policy, 455, 493, 
550, 575; commercial exac- 



tions of, 538; possible effect 
of overthrow of, 633; preten- 
sions of, 638; Spain ham- 
pered by, 662. 
Natchez: mention of, 9, 12, 14, 
18; American claim to dis- 
trict of, 26; relation to New 
Orleans and the Floridas, 33, 
41, 62; Ellicott in, 33; delay 
in delivering, 40; insurrec- 
tion at, 50; Spaniards evacu- 
ate, 55; Wilkinson reaches, 
59; Americans occupy, 139- 
Natches Weekly Chronicle: re- 
views situation in West Flor- 
ida, 355-357- 
National Intelligencer: propaganda 
of, in behalf of annexation, 
491; publishes premature re- 
port of evacuation of Mobile, 
508; supports Madison, 540; 
abuses Skipwith, 573; opinion 
of, concerning Florida Treaty, 

655. 
Navigation: of the Mississippi, 34, 

215, 257. 

Negotiation, joint, at Paris: pros- 
pects of, 134; course of, 227; 
effect of peace on, 259. 

Neutrality: during Genet episode, 
25; assumed by Madison, 
278. 

New Madrid: 22, 40. 

New Orleans: mention of, 8, 15, 
18, 23, 25, 30, 33, 492; ces- 
sion of, II, 21; Casa Calvo 
in, 34; possible presence of 
French at, 37, 64; plan to 
seize, 45, 60; American con- 
trol established at, 139; ex- 
citement at, 198; commercial 
control of, 215; defense of, 
298; inaccurate reports from, 
361; center of control for 
Florida, 546; rivalry with Mo- 
bile, 583; American council 



690 



INDEX 



of war at, 611; rejoices over 

occupation of Mobile, 619; 

British at, 636. 
Newcomhe v. Skipwith: 657 
Nicholls, British official: 635, 
Nicholson, John: 511. 
Nictalbany River: fort on, 408, 

412, 431. 
Nolan, Philip: joins Ellicott, 40; 

course at New Orleans, 45. 
Nootka Sound Affair: 20. 



O'Fallon, Dr. James: 2$. 

Oglethorpe, General Edward: 9. 

Ordinance of West Florida Con- 
vention: proposed, 363; ac- 
cepted, 369. 

Orleans Gazette: libels Grand Pre, 

319- 

Orleans Legislature: gives Clai- 
borne extra power, 490; re- 
fuses to seat delegates from 
West Florida, 576; extends 
limits of Louisiana to the 
Pearl, 605. 

Orleans Territory: Burr and the 
governorship of, 188; Baton 
Rouge desires annexation to, 
416; Skipwith favors, 416, 
575; controversy with Missis- 
sippi Territory over West 
Florida, 547; temporary union 
of Mobile with, 583; petition 
against annexation to, 597. 

Orso, Zenon: 440, 441, 447, 511. 

Osborne: messenger of Claiborne, 
478, 500. 

Osorno, Joaquin de: in command 
at Mobile, 169; attitude to- 
ward American commerce, 
184. 

Ouvrard (or Ouvras) : agent of 
Talleyrand, 23; financial pro- 
posals of, 242. 

Owens, John: 222. 



Paine, Thomas: in France, 24; re- 
lation with the Directory, 29. 

Pan American Mission: fiasco of, 
303; misuse of, 665. 

Papeles de Cuba: 35, note. 

Paris negotiation: 245, 259. 

Parker, Daniel: views regarding 
French interference, 238; 
proposes sale of the Floridas, 
241; responsibility of, for 
failure of negotiation, 261. 

Parma, Duchy of: offer to ex- 
change for the Floridas, 69, 

75- 

Pascagoula River: mention of, 4, 
97, 164, 171, 643; course of 
insurrection at, 410, 422-427; 
Spanish garrison leaves, 424; 
attitude of French residents 
of, 426; artillery from, 466; 
Kemper's survivors on, 484; 
disorder at, 526; difficulties in 
establishing American juris- 
diction over, 580-582, 585; 
Claiborne meets St. Maxent 
at, 590; parish created in, 
593; annexed to Mississippi, 
599; fear of Choctaws in, 
613. 

Pass Christian: mention of, 4, 
409; Wilkinson at, 616; 
Seventh Regiment at, 628. 

Patterson, George W. : petition 

of, 597-599- 

Pearl River: mention of, 4; set- 
tlement on, 59; insurgents 
near, 410, 422; measures to 
suppress lawlessness near, 
580; increased American pop- 
ulation near, 582; as bound- 
ary of Louisiana, 598, 605; 
dissatisfaction over land 
titles, 639, 644. 

Pensacola: capital of West Flor- 
ida, 4, 149; Spanish estab- 
lishment at, 7, 9; capture 



INDEX 



691 



and recapture of, 8; cession 
of, 11; surrendered by Eng- 
lish, 15; mention of, 18; 
council of war at, 192, 616; 
condition of garrison at, 327; 
Folch prepares to defend, 410, 
429; address to people of, 
424; views of people of, 438, 
466; attitude of Kemper to- 
ward, 469; possible blockade 
of, 586; possible occupation 
of, 609, 611; strength of 
Spaniards at, 612, 614; Brit- 
ish at, 613. 
Percy, Robert: 380. 
Perdido River: as boundary line, 
8; mentioned by Du Pfatz, 10; 
claimed as eastern boundary 
of Louisiana Purchase, 85-87, 
loi, 493, 558; Livingston ex- 
plains claim to, 108; papers 
relating to, 128; proposed as 
divisional line, 229, 245; re- 
port that Spaniards were 
crossing, 520; disposal of ter- 
ritory to eastward of, 523; bill 
to extend Orleans Territory 
to, 544, 593- 604; agreement 
to observe as boundary, 546; 
claim to, reiterated, 595; 
mention of, 609; Qaiborne 
asserts right of jurisdiction to, 
611; Wilkinson fortifies, 620; 
American property on, de- 
stroyed, 624-628, 632 ; views of 
French government concern- 
ing, 638; outlaws on, 641; 
status of claim to, 641, 645, 
650; occupation to, 664. 
Perez, Cayetano: commandant at 
Mobile, 440, 594; reports 
force under Caller, 451; holds 
Mobile against the Americans, 
51 1-5 14, 521; reports Ameri- 
can flag at Pass Christian, 
581; refuses to honor writ of 



habeas corpus, 608; surren- 
ders Mobile, 617-619; misfor- 
tunes of, 620; character of, 
621. 

Petry, French minister: advises 
Champagny, 532; subordinate 
of Bassano, 567. 

Pickering, Timothy: suspects the 
French in Louisiana, 38; 
opinion regarding limits of 
Louisiana, 93 ; criticises course 
of Madison, 540; charges 
government with subserviency 
to France, 546. 

Pickett Papers: 404, note. 

Piernas, Captain Luis: brings 
subsidy from Mexico, 361, 
518; visits Baton Rouge, 383- 
386; messenger to Havana, 
590. 

Pike, Z. M. : on the Florida 
frontier, 310; in American in- 
tervention, 493. 

Pinckney, Charles: early negotia- 
tions in Spain, 66; oflfers to 
guarantee the Spanish colo- 
nies, yT, 652; threatens in- 
vasion of the Floridas, 78; 
preliminary negotiation of, 
103-106; recalled, iii; asso- 
ciated in negotiation with 
Monroe, 1 18-138. 

Pinckney, Thomas: special envoy 
to Spain, 29; negotiation with 
Godoy, 30; comparison with 
Jay, Z2. 

Pinckney ville: refuge for out- 
laws, 159, 163, 360; measures 
to protect, 405. 

Pineda: 6. 

Pinkney, William, minister to 
England: instructions to, 534, 
544; fails to explain West 
Florida, 559. 



692 



INDEX 



Pintado, Vizente: 154-156. 

Pioneers: part of, in acquiring the 
Floridas, 665. 

Pizarro, Spanish minister of state: 
demands the surrender of 
West Florida, 648; offers to 
exchange territory, 651; in- 
clined to yield the Floridas, 
652. 

Poindexter, George: attitude of, 
regarding West Florida, 547; 
reports failure of Barlow, 
569; wishes to incorporate 
West Florida with Missis- 
sippi, 598; reports uncertainty 
in Congress over Mobile, 614- 
616. 

Pollock, Oliver: 14. 

Pontchartrain, Lake: 11, 12, 219. 

Pope, Lieutenant John: 42, 50-53. 

Porter, Captain David: 437. 

Postal routes: through Mobile and 
Baton Rouge, 171, 185. 

Power, Thomas: agent of Caron- 
delet to Sebastian and Wil- 
kinson, 46-48; revelations of, 
220. 

Preble, messenger of Monroe: 
views of, on negotiation, 132. 

Prieto, Bernardo: 620. 

Prince of the Peace, the: see 
Godoy, Manuel. 

Printing press: authorized in 
West Florida, 380. 

Privateers: in service of West 
Florida, 430. 

Proclamation: Jefferson's, 195; 
Madison's, 427, 489, 512; 
preparations to distribute, 493 ; 
defense of, 499; see also 
Royal Proclamation of 1763. 

Project for a treaty: 120, 654. 

Randolph, Edmund: 29. 



Randolph, Edward: associated 
with the Kempers, 155, 159, 

163, 465- 
Randolph, John: views of, 93; in- 
troduces Mobile Act, 97; op- 
poses Two-Million act, 234, 
245; "heterodoxy" of, 266. 
Raynor, Daniel: 380. 

Regency, Spanish: appoints De 
Onis, 310; not recognized, 
416; orders defense of the 
Floridas, 554; thanks Foster 
for services, 560; order of, 
disregarded, 592; exculpates 
Folch, 593; demands restora- 
tion of the Floridas, 623. 

Revolutionary agents: in Spanish 
colonies, 307. 

Rhea, John: chairman of conven- 
tion, 346; appeals of, for an- 
nexation, 364, 416, 419; com- 
munication of, to De Lassus, 
379; senator in West Florida, 
432; second communication 
of, 491. 

Rio Pescado (" Fish River ") : oc- 
cupied, 610. 

Rio Grande del Norte (Bravo) : 
point for invasion of Mexico, 
193 ; as limit of Louisiana, 
2T2; claim to, 570. 

Robertson, F. Boiling: cooperates 
with Holmes, 332; interme- 
diary for Skipwith, 417, 578; 
reports from, 536; presents 
resolution for diplomatic cor- 
respondence, 645. 

Robin: memoir of, 282. 

Robinson, John Hamilton: mission 
of, 564; proposes to capture 
Pensacola, 630-632. 

Rodney, Judge Thomas: 167, 203. 

Russell, Jonathan, American 
charge: 535, 565. 

Royal Proclamation of 1763: 2, 
II, 12, 27. 



INDEX 



693 



Saavedra, Spanish minister of 
state: 53, 57. 

Sabine River: as limit, 229, 273. 

St. Augustine: 9, 11, 188, 609. 

St. Francisville: on mail route, 
171; independence declared 
at, 413; meeting place for ex- 
ecutive committee, 428; for 
the legislature of West Flor- 
ida, 493 ; Claiborne takes 
possession of, 495, 501; un- 
rest at, 575. 

St. Helena (Ticfau Region) : men- 
tion of, 158, 380; loyalty of 
people in, 161, 343, 374, 385, 
403, 409; delegation from, 
344; overthrow of opposition 
in, 412; difficulty in obtaining 
officials in, 506. 

St. John's Plains: 346, 358. 

St. Maxent, Celestino: mention 
of, 370, 375. 392; remon- 
strates with De Lassus, 371; 
arrested, 405. 

St. Maxent, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Maximiliano, commandant at 
Mobile: mention of, 177, 180, 
183; ordered to prevent pas- 
sage of troops, 206, 521; sub- 
stitutes for Folch at Pensa- 
cola, 440-442; advises Collell, 
587; interviews Claiborne, 
590; protests against Ameri- 
can claim to Mobile, 594. 

St. Stephens: Indian factory at, 
144; mentioned, 466, 511, 

530- 
St. Tammany: 506. 
Salazar, commandant at Mobile: 

223- 

Salcedo, Manuel, governor of 
Louisiana: 88, 149. 

Salcedo, Manuel, Jr.: 150. 

San Ildefonso, Treaty of: signed, 
65, 127; character of Third 
Article of, 79, 82; Randolph's 



views on, 94; Lowe favors 

Spanish interpretation, 539; 

enigmatical character of, 637; 

connected with land grants, 

642. 
San Lorenzo el Real (Escorial) : 

Treaty of, 32, 637. 
Santo Domingo: proposed joint 

agreement regarding, 130; 

trade with, interdicted, 213, 

250, 305. 
Saw Mill Creek: attack on out- 
laws at, 483, 594. 
Sebastian, Judge Benjamin: 22, 

49» 56. 

Sedella, Father Antonio de: 195. 

Seminoles: 586, 613. 

Separatism: failure of proposals 
to bring about, 49; Gayoso's 
belief in, 58; favored as a 
precaution against the Ameri- 
cans, 176; stimulated by com- 
mercial rivalry, 250; allied 
with filibustering, 660. 

Serrurier, French minister to 
United States: 535, 622. 

Sharp, Joseph: 325, 342. 

Shaw, Commodore: furnishes con- 
voy, 580, 585; on Mobile 
Bay, 618. 

Short, William: 26-28, 270. 

Sibley, Cyrus: 484. 

Sibley, John: 88, 484. 

Simpson, William: 474. 

Six Thousand fund: sent to De 
Lassus, 361; seized by insur- 
gents, 402, 420; used for ex- 
pedition against Mobile, 429. 

Skipwith, Fulwar: Monroe re- 
quests documents from, 123, 
note; attacks Armstrong, 246; 
relations with Dautremont, 
247, 259; appears in West 
Florida, 342; made associate 
justice, 380; mention of, 388, 
566; measures of- in behalf 



694 



INDEX 



of annexation, 417; becomes 
governor, 432, 433-435; de- 
fends his course, 432, 497- 
504, 536, 573-577. 601; writes 
in favor of annexation, 436; 
relations of, with Claiborne, 
506, 572, 574; gives adminis- 
tration information, 536; op- 
poses Kemper's plan, 574; 
proposed address of, to Louisi- 
ana legislature, 577; Monroe's 
explanation to, 600; receiver 
for land office, 644. 

Skipwith, Henry: attorney for 
West Florida Claim, 659. 

Slave insurrection: reports of, 

411, 575- 

Slaves: trade in, 171, 220; plan 
to stir up, 389; repeal of tax 
on, 420; Morier suggests 
propaganda among, 549; in- 
troduction of, through Mo- 
bile, 585. 

Smith, John, Senator from Ohio: 
152, 208, 209, 640. 

Smith, Robert: secretary of the 
navy, 229; reassures Jackson 
about New Orleans, 310; in- 
competence of, 331; advises 
Holmes, 332; opposes "Mo- 
bile Society," 455; instruc- 
tions of, to Claiborne, 490; to 
Holmes, 491; assurances of, 
to Bernaben, 531, 541; re- 
fuses to discuss Baton Rouge 
with Morier, 533 ; denies 
American complicity, 536; re- 
placed by Monroe, 551. 

Someruelos, el Marques de, cap- 
tain-general of Cuba: views 
on limits of Louisiana, 88; 
permits passage of American 
troops, 196; character of, 286; 
Wilkinson's mission to, 286, 
290-292; relations of, wfth 
Folch, 301, 410, 437, 482, 



593; complains of "Mobile 
Society," 454; Claiborne's 
message to, 508; mention of, 
509- 

Spain: dispute of, with United 
States over West Florida, 3 ; 
declares war against Great 
Britain, 15; opposes the 
American claim to the 
Natchez District, 17; in- 
trigues of, 19; mention of, 
27', 35; attitude toward Pinck- 
ney, 29; breaks with England, 
iii; territory of, violated, 
222-22\; subserviency to 
France, 243 ; Napoleon's 
views regarding, 272; desires 
friendly relations, 297; ne- 
gotiation with, promised, 534; 
attempt to involve in war 
with United States, 561; men- 
tion of, 564; critical condi- 
tion of, 651; Jefferson's atti- 
tude toward, 660; abandoned 
by European powers, 663. 

Spaniards: jealous of Americans, 
is; reopen negotiation with 
France, 28; fear American 
hostility, 53; weakness in 
provinces, 60; oppose claim 
to Perdido, 86; forbid en- 
trance of Americans, 164; ob- 
ject to president's message, 
167; favor military precau- 
tions, 17s; oppose Burr, 
204; subserviency of, to 
Napoleon, 227; alarmed by 
movements of American 
forces, 288; vessels detained, 
438; efforts of, to strengthen 
Mobile, 444; pretended neu- 
trality of, 562; plan to defend 
possessions against the Ameri- 
cans, 632; dispose of lands 
in the Floridas, 652. 



INDEX 



695 



Spanish America: plan to revolu- 
tionize, 52; French attitude 
toward independence of, 535; 
suspicious of United States, 
665. 

Spanish colonies: diplomatic rela- 
tions with, 301; loyalty of, 
302, 305 ; American attitude 
toward, 306, 308; attitude of 
Great Britain toward, 488, 
561; France favors independ- 
ence of, 532, 534; involved in 
the Treaty of 1819, 653. 

Spanish Council of State: 562. 

Spanish garrisons: rumor of rein- 
forcements to, 148, 173; in- 
crease in, 495, 610; inade- 
quacy of, 542; scarcity of 
provisions in, 615. 

Spanish officials: forced from New 
Orleans, 182, 230; deprived 
of power, 386; oppressive 
course of, 600. 

Spanish patriots: commended, 315. 

Spanish pretensions: character- 
ized by Niles, 645. 

Sparks, Colonel Richard: mention 
of, 166, 449, 451, 463, 588; 
proceeds against " Mobile So- 
ciety," 442-445; preserves 
good understanding with 
Spaniards, 462; relations with 
Kemper, 468, 482, 512; rela- 
tions with Folch, 481, 494, 
509; judgment of, doubted, 

515. 
Special mission: determined on, to 

Spain, 26; Monroe appointed 

for, 75 ; instructions to, 100; 

hopelessness of, 116, 638. 
Spoliations: damages for, 102; 

balanced against the Floridas, 

569- 
Springfield: assemblage at, 397; 
fort at, 408, 411; armament 
at, 435- 



Squatters: expulsion of, opposed, 

639- 

" Star " (emblem of West Flor- 
ida) : mention of, 6, 423 : first 
use of, 156; Kemper plans to 
raise, on Mobile, 464, 468, 
475; disappears, 484; Skip- 
with refers to, 498. 

Status Quo: administration de- 
sires to retain, 137, 148, 196, 
228, 257. 

Steele, Andrew: signs petition for 
assembly, 342; secretary of 
convention, 346 ; appointed 
registrar, 380; associated with 
Skipwith, 433, 574, 578. 

Steele, Richard: 506. 

Sterling, Alexander: 152, 340. 

Stock jobbers: 242. 

Stoddart, Amos: 94. 

Stoddert, Fort: 169, 452, 530. 

Stuart, John: 13. 

Sullivan, James: 246. 

Sullivan, John: 23. 

Sumpter, Thomas, Jr. : 73, note, 

573. 578. 
Swain, Thomas: 196. 

Talleyrand: favors acquisition of 
West Florida alone, 76; atti- 
tude on limits of Louisiana, 
81; instructs Turreau, 107; 
Monroe's attitude toward, 
113, 125, 127, 559; report 
submitted to emperor by, 115; 
supports Spain, 128-130, 533; 
proposal of, to bargain for 
the Floridas, 230-232; dubious 
propositions of, 240, 245, 
249; reports on claims and 
West Florida, 249; rebukes 
Vandeul, 253; motives of, 
253, 264; views of, on bound- 
ary dispute, 273; Pickering 
quotes letter of, 547; mention 
of, 650, 663. 



696 



INDEX 



Tanchipaho River: 374, 506. 

Tennessee, State of: settlement of, 
21, 34; inclusion in French 
Louisiana, 124; commercial 
connection of, with Mobile, 
487; mention of, 598. 

Tensaw River: seizure of Spanish 
vessels on, 223; settlers on, 
support Kemper, 466, 511; 
navigation of, 590, 591, 618; 
filibusters on, 641. 

Terry, Champney: 155, 432. 

Texas: linked with West Florida, 
7; Armstrong advises seizure 
of, 129, 22T, crisis on border 
of, 187; comparison of, with 
West Florida, 382; Spaniards 
fear seizure of, 554; meas- 
ures to settle boundary of, 
653; retained by Spain, 655; 
influence of pioneers in, 664. 

Thirty-first parallel: as limit to 
West Florida, 2, 12, 14, 16; 
British attitude toward, 32; 
survey of, 55; Kemper's 
operations below, 423. 

Thomas, Joseph: 343, 346, note, 
350. 

Thomas, Philemon: commands 
West Florida militia, 370, 
380, 420; signs joint agree- 
ment, 379, 393; part in cap- 
ture of Baton Rouge, 388, 
395-400; intercepts letter of 
De Lassus, 394; campaign of, 
411; against Mobile, 428; 
senator of West Florida, 432; 
the "Ajax" of the revolt, 
506; mention of, 536. 

Ticfau Bayou: 374, 380. 

Tilsit, Peace of: references to, 
270, 273, 275. 

Tombecbe, Fort: 9. 

Tombigbee River: American forts 
on, 17s; restrain people on, 
454; work of Kemper near. 



457; of Matthews, 522; 
Americans claim navigation 
of, 590; turbulent population 
on, 629; see also Mobile 
River. 

Toulmin, Judge Harry: concern 
for the country, 176; efforts 
in behalf of commerce, 177, 
293; ready to arrest Burr, 
203; proposes joint suppres- 
sion of bandits, 222; efforts 
of, in behalf of intervention, 
418, 459; against Hargreave, 
425; opposes "Mobile So- 
ciety " and Kennedy, 442, 
446; instructions of Madison 
and Holmes to, 445, 451; 
charge of, to grand jury, 452- 
454; opposes Kemper, 461, 
467, 470, 478, 526, 583; post- 
master at St. Stephens, 465; 
writes to Ballinger, 467; ef- 
forts of, to secure concession 
from Folch, 474, 476; dis- 
trusts Sparks, 509; persuades 
Gushing to disband militia, 
515; altercation with Caller, 
515-517; reports conditions at 
Pascagoula, 580; advises Clai- 
borne to extend jurisdiction, 
584; court proceedings of, at 
Mobile, 607; opinion of, con- 
cerning squatters, 639 ; 
charges of Lewis against, 640; 
efforts to break up filibuster- 
ing, 650; mention of, 664. 

Treaty of 1782: secret article in, 
16, 2^. 

Treaty of 1795: terms of, 30; 
pretexts for disputes over, 35; 
of no profit to Spaniards, 57; 
mention of, 654. 

Treaty of San Ildefonso: Ameri- 
can rights under, 78; third 
article of, 84. 



INDEX 



697 



Treaty of 1803: American title to 
West Florida under, 553. 

Treaty of 1819: mutual honor 
preserved in, 655. 

Trinidad: effect of cession of, 68. 

Troup, of Georgia: 448, 547. 

Turreau, French minister to the 
United States: instructed to 
curb American pretensions, 
107; interview of, with Madi- 
son, 116; threatens French in- 
tervention, 257; aroused by 
Wilkinson's toast, 291; with- 
draws from Washington, 306; 
charges the Americans with 
complicity, 324; explanations 
of Smith to, 536; expects 
United States and Great Brit- 
ain to act together, 537; men- 
tion of, 663. 

" Two-Million Act " : proposed 
and passed, 234.-236. 

United States: southeastern por- 
tion of, I ; claim of, to 
Natchez District, 26-31; pos- 
sible alliance of, with Great 
Britain, 107; measures to in- 
crease respect for, 133; views 
toward the Floridas, 250; ter- 
ritorial pretensions of, 271; 
Convention wishes annexation 
to, 347, 352; danger of at- 
tack on, 489, 530; proposed 
union with the Spanish colo- 
nies, 522; attitude of, ex- 
plained, 544; influenced by 
Bonaparte, 548, 552; war by 
Great Britain against, 561; 
anonymous memoir attacking, 
563; proposal to check expan- 
sion of, 624. 

Urquijo: succeeds Godoy, 65. 

Vallerino, Bruno: attacks United 
States, 636-639. 



Vaughan, Benjamin: 94, 649. 

Vera Cruz: 205, 494. 

Vergennes: attitude toward Ameri- 
can and Spanish pretensions, 
16. 

"Verus": pamphlet of De Onis, 
548. 

Vezmonnet: reports attitude of 
United States, 255. 

Vicksburg (''Walnut Hills"): 

23, 40, 55- 
Victoria, schooner: detention of, 

293- 

Vidal, Jose, Spanish vice-consul: 
suspects purpose of United 
States, 295; interviews of, 
with Claiborne and Wilkin- 
son, 296, 298; warned against 
Davilmar, 313. 

Virginia Patriot: criticises Madi- 
son, 538. 

Vivora, schooner: searched by 
Americans, 221. 

Washington, George: mention of, 
17, 25; proclamation of, 
against the Yazoo settlers, 
23; attitude of, toward the 
Creeks, 26; the "modern 
Fabius," 60; fears the French 
as neighbors, 64; name used 
as battle cry, 399, 401, 403. 

Washington, Mississippi: resolu- 
tions passed in Washington 
County, 184. 

Washington City Gazette: 653. 

West, Cato: 157. 

West Florida: legatee of interna- 
tional claims, 2; areas of set- 
tlement in, 4; reasons for im- 
portance, 5; absorption of, 6; 
claimed by England under 
Carolina ^rant, 7; tripartite 
dispute over, 8; first bound- 
aries of, 12; prototype for 
Texas and California, 41; 



698 



INDEX 



Parma offered for, 69; con- 
nection of, with Louisiana 
Purchase, 74, 80, 82, 88; Liv- 
ingston asserts claim to, 83; 
American designs and claims 
on, 95, loi, 178; controversy 
over, 102, 124, 126, 146; con- 
nected with Burr Conspiracy, 
188; proposal to cut down 
garrison in, 21 1 ; wording of 
proposed article on, 244; offer 
to abandon claim to, 135; first 
declaration of independence 
in, 15s, note; insurrection in, 
157, 162; Wilkinson proposes 
to seize, 274, 298, 302; Tal- 
leyrand's report on, 115, 249; 
Claiborne reports dissatisfac- 
tion in, 312; connection of, 
with Spanish-American Revo- 
lution, 312, 32s, 415; expres- 
sions of loyalty among people 
of, 315-317; first attempt to 
organize assembly in, 318- 
325; meeting in, to consider 
Bayou Manchac, 326; reports 
of conditions in, 327, 329, 
340; names of members of 
convention in, 346, note; tem- 
porary government for, 353; 
Holmes reports conditions in, 
354; proposed annexation of, 
to United States, 366, 416- 
419; declaration of independ- 
ence in, 414; government or- 
ganized in, 428, 432; Skip- 
with urges annexation of, 
436, 495 ; discussion of 
American claim to, 437, 453, 
510; congressional action on, 
451; Napoleon's policy to- 
ward, 455 ; Folch gives hints 
of its surrender, 471-473; ex- 
ternal interest in, 487; Ameri- 
can intervention in, 489-505; 
discontent with Spanish rule 



in, 498; debt of, 498, 506, 
572, 599; Claiborne's course 
in> 594, 507, 573; character 
of population in, 507, 530; in- 
terest of diplomats in, 530; 
discussion of American title 
to, 539, 545, 559, S66, 568, 
598, 602, 625, 628, 647; 
Morier protests against seiz- 
ure of, 542; Mississippi and 
Orleans dispute over, 547, 
603; Bernaben demands 
evacuation of, 552; occupa- 
tion of, by Americans, de- 
fended, 558, 567; discontent 
of people in, 575-577; as- 
sumption of debts and claims 
in, 599; plan to receive, 626, 
638; views of De Neuville on, 
653; non-committal article 
concerning, 654; effect of 
American claim to, 661-668. 

West: genuine loyalty of, 20; ef- 
fect of Treaty of 1795 on, 33. 

Western Company: 9. 

Western separatism: 49. 

White, Joseph: 421. 

Wilkinson, General James: ne- 
gotiations of, with Indians, 
13, 141; disunion plans of, 
checked, 19; opposes settle- 
ment at New Madrid, 23; op- 
poses Genet's projects, 25; 
Ellicott to watch, 33 ; Caron- 
delet renews intrigues with, 
34, 46-49, 56; suggests uni- 
fied control in Mississippi 
Valley, 39, note; charged 
with trying to prevent sur- 
vey, 52; arrival of, at 
Natchez, 59; relations of, 
with Spaniards, 60, 89-92, 
196-199, 206, 221; relations 
of, with Claiborne, 139, 143, 
185; efforts of, in behalf of 
Mobile commerce, 143, 185; 



INDEX 



699 



relations of, with Burr, 188- 
.194; congressional investiga- 
tion of, 220; Pan-American 
mission of, 285-309, 564; ad- 
vises strengthening of fron- 
tier, 295, 298; courtmartial 
of, 303; warns against Davil- 
mar, 313; correspondence of, 
concerning transfer of troops, 
437; enquiry concerning, 521; 
measures of, to defend the 
southern frontier, 596, 609- 
614; occupies Mobile, 616- 
623; possibly identified as 
" Louisiana Planter," 634, 
note. 

Wilkinson, James B.: 459. 

Williams, Benjamin C. : 346, 350. 

Williams, Robert, governor of 
Mississippi Territory: 164, 
166, 208. 

Willing, James: 14. 

Wilson, Elizabeth: 426. 



Wykoff, William, Jr.: requested 
to act as agent in West Flor- 
ida, 330; mention of, 332, 
338, 342; publication of Clai- 
borne's letter to, 551, 577. 

Yazoo Land Companies: 23, 454. 

Yazoo Line: mention of, 3, 26; 
West Florida extended to, 
12; secret article on, 16; 
Poindexter proposes State be- 
low, 598. 

Zuiiiga, governor of West Florida: 
criticises Americans, 606; 
Holmes protests to, 608; dis- 
cusses Dauphine Island, 610; 
warns Claiborne, 613; meas- 
ures of, to defend province, 
614, 617; protests to Wilkin- 
son, 619; crticiseg Perez, 
620. 



